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The unbridgeable gap between the natural and 
social sciences?
The famous thesis about the unbridgeable gap between two cul-
tures – of the natural sciences and the humanities, to which Snow (1959) 
also later added the culture of (some) social scientists (Van Dijck, 2003), 
is a symbol of the great ontological and methodological divide that only 
few question (Fuchs, 1996). The division was most strongly expressed 
in the so-called Science Wars of the 1990s which have been extensively 
discussed (thematic issue of Science Studies, 1/1996; Segerstråle, 2000). 
Even though the Science Wars refer to the acrimonious disputes be-
tween researchers of science and some parts of the natural science 
community, they are only a more recent symbol of the gap articulated 
by Snow a long time before. However, this is not the place for a wider 
discussion on the genesis, protagonists and reasons for the verbal con-
flicts; the reader can obtain information on the issue elsewhere, and 
also in Croatian publications (Matić, 2001).
The polemic among scientists led to the public expression of opin-
ions of engaged natural scientists who claimed that some circles in the 
social sciences and humanities simply did not understand the way the 
natural sciences functioned (Bauer, 1996), not to mention the com-
ments in the widely-known book by Gross and Levitt (1994) Higher 
Superstition. Another type of relation that the natural scientists have 
towards the social sciences and humanities is the evaluation of other 
scientific fields according to the criteria of their own cognitive practice. 
Such an attitude was succinctly expressed by one of our respondents 
who said that the objectivity of physics has always been “the model for 
all sciences”. Some sociologists of science hold that the hard, natural 
sciences, which enjoy a higher intellectual and social status, have been 
attempting to conduct a rather aggressive intellectual colonisation of 
the soft, lower-status, sciences. And the higher status is shown here in 
greater public acknowledgment, prestige and funding (Fuchs, 1996).
Some also claim that the natural sciences have in general been a 
paragon for social scientists, from Comte to Merton and on (Fuller, 
1999). Although there are some grounds for this thesis, it is at the same 
time also rather dubious because of the widespread (self)awareness 
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among the social scientists of the peculiar nature of their fields com-
pared to the natural sciences (Andersen, 2001). In short, the social sci-
ences embrace the non-critical application of the natural science mod-
el, but also the uncritical denial of any cognitive similarity between the 
two areas that is not acceptable to natural scientists. The latter position 
is frequently stated when research evaluations, promotion criteria or 
other topics important to science policies are discussed.
Thus, a severe lack of mutual understanding and communication 
can be seen in scientists from both areas. This is why the argument 
seems so tempting that two scientific cultures can show mutual indif-
ference, ignorance, suspicion and even open hostility in situations when 
funding is shrinking, as in the Science Wars (Fuchs, 1996). 
Although the widest communities of natural and social sciences 
are extremely important, they still remain to be encompassed by re-
search. However, the theory of science(s) is more relevant as the starting 
point of study. Despite talk of the (non)codified sciences, Merton (1973) 
had no doubt that science was one and unified, “out of one piece”, as his 
critics often reproach him for implying. Within this theoretical frame-
work, there was no interest in wider and deeper comparisons of the 
epistemic and social dimensions of particular sciences. Kuhn’s view of 
the scientific community gathered around a scientific paradigm, and 
Price’s concept of invisible colleges as communication networks in in-
dividual sciences have encouraged the spread of sociological and other 
investigations in the development of scientific fields and specialties 
(Crane, 1972; Lodahl and Gordon, 1972).
The well-known empirical classification of sciences made on the 
basis of scientists’ assessments of similarity among research fields/disci-
plines was directly encouraged precisely by Kuhn’s distinction between 
the preparadigmatic (social) and paradigmatic (physical) sciences, and 
it resulted in a typology of hard and soft, pure and applied, sciences, 
and the distinction between sciences dealing with living and nonliving 
systems. These types of sciences differ in terms of the social cohesion 
of scientists, their teaching, research, expert and administrative work, 
as well as in terms of their productivity (Biglan, 1973a, 1973b). Kolb 
also came to a similar typology in his psychometric measurements of 
students’ learning strategies (according to Becher and Trowler, 2001). 
Nowadays, the distinction used most often in literature and daily com-
munication is the two-member distinction between the hard and soft 
sciences.
11
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Becher’s conception of academic cultures is a synthesis of previ-
ous theoretical taxonomies (Pantin and Kuhn) and the above-men-
tioned empirical studies. Considering their epistemic characteristics, 
Becher adopted the typology of hard-soft and pure-applied fields, but 
also introduced two social, cultural dimensions. The convergence-
divergence of disciplinary communities indicates the (non)existence 
of uniform standards, intellectual control and a stable elite, while 
the urban-rural dimension shows the smaller or greater density of 
researchers with regard to a lesser or greater restriction of topics and 
research problems. Becher founded his typology on a great number of 
interviews with scientists from 12 scientific fields. He also developed 
an anthropological approach which sees disciplinary communities as 
academic tribes that inhabit a certain academic territory, that have 
their own goals, typical behaviours, publication patterns, values, tra-
ditions and membership controls (Becher, 1994; Becher and Trowler, 
2001).
Theories of scientific organisations or fields are the origin of the 
sociological typologies of science (Whitley, 1984; Fuchs 1992). The 
heuristic value and advantage of these theories are their primary 
thesis that links the cognitive and social organisation of science, and 
thus allows the scientific fields to be observed as scientific organisa-
tions where their intellectual products, cognitive style and epistemo-
logical orientations are connected to the social structures, mode and 
organisation of the production of that knowledge. Individual (sub)
disciplines can thus be seen as distinct intellectual and social or-
ganisations that differ to a certain extent. Typologies of the scientific 
fields developed by the theory-makers were very complicated at first 
(Whitley, 1984), and significantly simpler later (Fuchs, 1992), but that 
is not their greatest weakness.
There are two key, and even interconnected, f laws in these the-
ories (Prpić, 1997). The first is the excessive sociologisation of the 
cognitive dimension of science, which later annulled the initially as-
sumed possibility that the cognitive organisation of science affects its 
social organisation. This even excluded the possibility that the type of 
demanded (applicable) knowledge encouraged by science policies for 
decades influenced the (re)shaping of the modes of knowledge produc-
tion (Whitley, 1984). For this reason, it is not hard to agree with the 
view that the intellectual structure of science will not be sufficiently 
considered if the cognitive dimension is not taken as an independent 
12
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source of variance (Leydesdorff, 2007). The other weakness of these 
theories is the view that science is almost a series of atomised scien-
tific fields, despite the fact that a sociological, and not philosophical, 
demarcation of science from other forms of cultural production has 
been offered. Science is the producer of innovations, cognitive novel-
ties, and is characterised by the high level of uncertainty of its tasks 
and by the mutual dependence of the knowledge producers.1 In line 
with this proposition, the scientific fields should have a minimal nu-
cleus of shared cognitive and social characteristics, apart from their 
peculiar intellectual and social organisation. The reluctance of scien-
tific field theoreticians to produce such a thesis stems from their tacit 
view that the nucleus would be understood as a set of firm, unified, 
universal intellectual rules and procedures, with the same social, pro-
fessional structures in all sciences.
However, both models of science – unitary and atomised – can be 
replaced by the concept of the complex socio-cognitive structure of sci-
ence, with a common (relatively loose) nucleus of the basic character-
istics of its social and intellectual system, the interdependence of these 
two systems, and a high level of cognitive and social peculiarity of in-
dividual scientific fields. If modified in this direction, the theories of 
scientific organisations offer a fruitful, and the widest possible hypo-
thetical framework for sociological empirical investigations of science. 
This hypothetical starting point could be the basis of broader empirical 
comparisons of scientific fields in thematically different studies, from 
productivity to the professional ethics of scientists (Prpić, 1997, 2004, 
2005). This was precisely the inspiration for this book.2
Our goal was to gain as complete an insight into the socio-cogni-
tive specificities of the natural and social sciences as possible, on the 
basis of comprehensive empirical research. This would allow us to es-
tablish whether the sociological theories of science also built the myths 
on the great divide between these sciences. The aim was not set too 
ambitiously, since a single study could not provide an answer to that big 
 1 Later, Fuchs (2002) restated his thesis from the 1990s, which proposes that sociologically-
determined objectivity, understood as a mode of communication in science, is the very demar-
cation of science on the one hand, and pre-science and pseudo-science on the other.
 2 The book was written within the scope of the scientific project Social Actors in Science 
and Technology (100-1001172-3041) at the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb. The project is 
funded by the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia, and is car-
ried out by a research team made up of all of the authors who contributed to the book, headed by 
the project leader and editor of the book. 
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question, even if it included several investigations. We wanted to gain 
as complex an insight as possible into the differences and similarities 
between natural scientists and social scientists in their career paths and 
patterns, professional performances and achievements, and scientific 
productivity, as well as in their perceptions of scientific objectivity and 
quality.
To achieve this goal, a more complex quantitative and qualitative 
methodological approach with several research methods had to be ap-
plied. The first ever web survey among Croatian scientists was conduct-
ed in 2004, covering 480 or 24.7% of natural scientists and social scien-
tists, from whom both quantitative and qualitative data were gathered. 
In 2007, the first comprehensive bibliometric study of the productivity 
of all 1,938 doctors of natural and social sciences was carried out. The 
data on publications and citations over the period of the last ten years 
was collected from the WoS (Web of Science) and Scopus bibliographic 
and citation database for every PhD holder.
Empirical material collected in the mentioned studies cannot be 
analytically processed and exhausted in only one publication, regard-
less of its extensiveness. Basic quantitative (including bibliometric) and 
qualitative analyses were conducted, in line with the goal and the con-
cept of the book. Sociological papers, which form the backbone of the 
book, are enriched by an information-science approach to the analysis 
of the scientific output, the socio-psychological view of scientific qual-
ity, and an epistemological overview of objectivity in the social scienc-
es. We believed that besides a complex theoretical and methodological 
approach, interdisciplinarity was also necessary if any relevant contri-
bution was to be made to understand the presumed gap between the 
natural and social sciences.
We hope that such a definition of the scientific goal and approach 
to research will provide insight into the described and theoretically 
postulated differences between the natural and social sciences. In other 
words, we hope it will provide an answer to the question about whether 
these differences are really as deep as the dominant theories and the-
sis in the sociology of science and scientific knowledge deem them to 
be. We also hope that this book will encourage even more complex re-
search that will not accept a priori the gap between the natural and 
social sciences as an undoubted, proven and almost fatal rift, but will 
question and investigate empirically in its various social and cognitive 
dimensions and layers.
14
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Apart from the cognitive expectations, our book could also have 
a double social purpose. On one hand, its very questioning of differ-
ences establishes a kind of bridge between the self-sufficient scien-
tific communities of the natural and social sciences. If the assump-
tions about fresh developments in the mode of knowledge production 
(Gibbons et al., 1997) turn out to be even partly true, such self-suffi-
ciency will no longer be sustainable. Even without this aspect, empiri-
cal insight into the specificities of the cognitive and social organisa-
tion of the other scientific area can make communication between 
them easier, which is especially important in articulating scientific 
policy. On the national level, this type of communication is more re-
alistic in the small Croatian scientific community than in the com-
munities of large countries. Furthermore, the transformation of the 
scientific system, especially the evaluation system, has not yet been 
completed. Therefore, it is important for the Croatian natural and 
social science communities to become better acquainted with one an-
other, thus reducing potential tensions, especially those concerning 
the criteria for evaluating research and researchers, and, consequent-
ly, those connected with research funding.
The organisation of the book itself has been adapted to its thematic 
content, so it has been divided into two parts dealing with the impor-
tant aspects of the social and intellectual organisation of the natural 
and social sciences. While the first part focuses on the most relevant 
elements of the social organisation of these areas – the professional 
profile and productivity of the research staff, the second part discusses 
the cognitive convictions of the members of these two scientific com-
munities. Apart from this difference in content, there is also another 
methodological distinction between the two parts of the book: whereas 
the first part contains quantitative analysis, the second part covers the-
oretical and qualitative empirical works.
The first chapter of the first part of the book entitled the Social 
and Professional Profile of Natural and Social Scientists compares the 
most important socio-professional characteristics of the scientific per-
sonnel of the two observed areas. The socio-demographic composition 
and social background of scientists, their professional socialisation, 
their organisational and scientific context, and their position and role 
in Croatian and international scientific institutions and communities 
are the starting points for the sociological analysis and comparison of 
the two scientific areas. Most importantly, this chapter also brings a 
15
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description of samples and tests of their representativeness. In her em-
pirical analysis, author Branka Golub compares the findings of the web 
survey with the results of earlier project team studies. The comparison 
is based on a set of the sociologically most relevant indicators of the 
professional profile of Croatian scientists, which has been followed up 
for decades, from one survey to another.
The second chapter analyses the patterns and factors of the self-
reported productivity of two groups of scientists. Since the Croatian 
surveys also continuously monitor the research productivity of scien-
tists, it was also possible to make comparisons here with previous re-
sults obtained on subsamples of natural and social scientists. The editor 
of the book, Katarina Prpić, and her co-author, Marija Brajdic Vukovic, 
have not only compared the data on the most important types of re-
spondents’ career and five-year publications, but also analysed the ob-
served trends of changes in these types of productivity. Where possible, 
the authors have compared their findings with the results of foreign 
studies. This chapter also includes an analysis and comparison of po-
tential productivity factors – socio-demographic, socialisational, quali-
ficational, organisational and gatekeeping predictors of productivity, in 
the natural just as in the social sciences.
Bibliometric research of the productivity of all doctors of natural 
and social sciences is presented in the third chapter by Maja Jokić and 
Adrijana Šuljok. The pioneering nature of the work cannot be overem-
phasised. Bibliometric analyses conducted so far in Croatia, largely by 
natural and medical scientists, have been partial in regards to the range 
of the scientific fields, number of authors and span of time covered, 
whereas this analysis covered all the WoS (ISI) and Scopus publications 
of each scientist. This will allow interrelations to be made with other 
known and available characteristics of authors, and consequently in fu-
ture sociological analyses and productivity comparisons of sexes, age 
groups, scientific fields, institutions, most productive authors, etc. It 
was not possible to reach this analytical level in the first, general over-
view and data analysis. One of the special values of this work is that it 
gives the first comprehensive bibliometric analysis of the output of the 
social sciences. 
The second part of the book, dedicated to the cognitive convic-
tions of natural and social scientists, consists of four papers, with two 
chapters focusing on scientific quality, and the remaining two on scien-
tific objectivity. Within the framework of each of these important top-
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ics of science studies, a qualitative empirical analysis is preceded by a 
theoretical overview. To be more precise, the concept of the book relies 
on its aspiration to encompass complementary, wider theoretical dis-
cussions that cannot be included in the presented empirical research, 
which are also the first Croatian studies of scientists’ perceptions of 
scientific quality and objectivity – studies that are generally not very 
frequent. Thus, the theoretical contributions in the book constitute a 
kind of theoretical (preliminary) framework for subsequent qualitative 
research.
Sven Hemlin opens the second part of the book with a chapter en-
titled What is scientific quality? His work begins with the concept of 
scientific quality and its factors, supported by the findings of psycho-
logical and sociological research. The paper then presents the results 
from several of Hemlin’s empirical studies, ranging from research on 
scientists’ quality perceptions, to analyses of researchers’ assessment 
behaviour based on documents on peer reviews in the process of ap-
pointing Swedish scientists to academic positions or in evaluating grant 
applications. The final part of the work presents an overview of new, 
largely sociological views of the changes in the relation between sci-
ence and society. These new models also bring a new understanding of 
scientific quality and its evaluation. The chapter provides an overview 
that offers a hypothetical framework and a classification of categories 
necessary for the empirical research of scientific quality.
The next chapter, written by the editor of the book and Adrijana 
Šuljok, brings an empirical comparison of natural and social scientists’ 
perceptions of scientific excellence. The paper analyses qualitative data, 
open-ended answers by respondents in the web survey in which they 
defined quality and expressed their opinions on its measurability. Since 
this was the first study of Croatian scientists’ perceptions of research 
quality, the most suitable methodology was qualitative. Therefore, a 
combined system of quality categories or of elements of two Nordic 
studies was drawn up for the needs of the analysis, and it was adapted 
to the obtained empirical material. It allowed the respondents’ answers 
to be classified and then compared regarding the parts of the research 
process most often stressed by natural and social scientists in their defi-
nitions of quality, and regarding the attributes of excellence they most 
often ascribe to them.
Franc Mali presents an epistemological view of scientific objec-
tivity in the third chapter of this part of the book. After comparing 
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objectivity in natural and social research, the author concentrates on 
the social sciences, especially on the significant contribution of classi-
cal sociological thought to the basic epistemological principles of the 
field. Along the lines of the mentioned contribution, Mali indicates 
that it is heuristically more productive in the social sciences to connect 
the critical-analytical and hermeneutical approach and draw together 
quantitative and qualitative methodology. An understanding of the 
epistemological structure of science is also key to understanding its so-
cial organisation. The chapter focuses on the social sciences with a dual 
goal: to inform the widest scientific public about the scarcely known 
specificity of objectivity in this scientific area, but also to remind social 
scientists themselves of its intricate nature.
In the final chapter of the second part of the book, Katarina Prpić 
sets out a qualitative analysis of natural and social scientists’ percep-
tions of objectivity. The empirical basis of the paper is the respondents’ 
answers to the open-ended questions on scientific objectivity obtained 
in the web survey. Since the sociological studies of science have not 
developed a categorial system for the empirical analyses of objectivity, 
Stephan Fuchs’s (1997) classification of definitions of objectivity has 
been adapted to the empirical material. Respondents’ answers were cat-
egorised into perceptions that objectivity refer to the scientists’ charac-
teristics, to the nature of the research process, and to the relation be-
tween knowledge and reality. Apart from the definitions of objectivity 
provided by natural and social scientists, their opinions on the possi-
bility of achieving objectivity in their research field are also compared.
These studies and analyses, briefly outlined above, will try to find 
the answer to the following question: do the key professional charac-
teristics, publication practices and cognitive convictions of natural and 
social scientists corroborate the social and cognitive gap emphasised 
by analysts of science which, it seems, is also frequently promoted by 
practising scientists?
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Part I. 
The profile and productivity 
of natural and social scientists
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Branka Golub
The social and professional profile of natural 
and social scientists
1. Social position and socio-professional differentiation of 
scientists
As its first step, a sociological analysis of one or more individual 
social segments requires an overview of the general context and of sim-
ilar analyses that preceded it. Precisely for this reason, any outlining 
of the social and professional profile of natural and social scientists in 
Croatian science should be placed within the framework of studies of 
scientists’ social and professional position and their role in general.
This type of research in the sociology of science and the sociology of 
scientific knowledge has for years been more common in underdeveloped 
scientific communities (countries such as Venezuela or Croatia, for exam-
ple) than in the scientific environments that have for decades been setting 
the main course and content of sociological research of science. This ne-
glect of the social roots and differentiation of scientists has been repeated-
ly highlighted and evidenced in detail by sociologist Katarina Prpić in her 
analyses. According to Prpić, the reluctance of sociologists of science to 
tackle that primarily sociological problem is not in the least incidental. It 
is grounded in the very theoretical and empirical orientation of the older 
and more recent disciplinary mainstream. However, following the line of 
demarcation between the Mertorians and the social constructivists, the 
former cover some aspects of the social position and role of scientists, de-
spite the fact that the functionalist concept did not find the functionally 
unimportant factors of scientists’ life and work pressing (Merton, 1974; 
Mitroff et al., 1977; Zuckerman, 1977; Cole and Cole, 1981; Berry, 1981; 
Allison et al., 1982; J. Cole, 1987), whereas constructivists largely focus 
on the content of science and usually remain on the microanalytical level 
(Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay, 1983). In other words, with the exception of 
occasional and partial investigation of the sociological position and role of 
scientists, the topic never became a distinct subject or a relevant problem 
and content feature in the mainstream of social analyses of science in the 
last century, and neither has it become one today.
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On the other hand, we have the example of a peripheral scientific 
environment, such as the Croatian scientific community, which has 
been a subject of this type of sociological research for years. Individual 
segments of the social and professional position and role of scientists 
and researchers in their social and institutional environment have been 
monitored and studied, partially at first, and then increasingly more 
systematically. Unlike the developed scientific communities where 
good research conditions and a high standard of living have long been 
a given, the social position of Croatian science and the living and work-
ing conditions of scientists and researchers have been inadequate for 
years. And that has made them intriguing for research. The marginal 
social position of science and its chronic underfunding were the endur-
ing characteristics of all the different stages of the socialist development 
of Croatian society. A similar situation also continued in the times of 
turbulent change, as well as during the time of the stabilisation of the 
new social organisation, that is, in the changed political, legal and in-
stitutional environment.
The first studies of this type date back to the 1970s (Koričančić, 
1971; Previšić, 1975). The continued investigation of the position and 
role of Croatian scientists in the 1980s and the intensification and 
deepening of the studies in the 90s can largely be credited to the efforts 
of a team of collaborators formed around regular research programmes 
at the Institute for Social Research (of the University) in Zagreb. The 
two latest studies were conducted in 2004 – one on a representative 
sample of Croatian scientists, and the other as a web survey covering 
all doctors of science in the field of the natural and the social sciences. 
The findings of these and all earlier studies conducted over a period 
of almost forty years constitute a respectable tradition in the socio-
professional analysis of Croatian scientists. Thus, these analyses have 
been established as a relevant complex of problems and content worthy 
of research, at least within the framework of a smaller social entity and 
within one of the peripheral scientific communities.
The most imposing topics with which the socio-professional back-
ground was introduced into the studies of Croatian scientists, and 
which were theoretically elaborated and empirically founded in this 
period, were the following:
– assistants’ social position (Cifrić et al., 1984);
– determining the basic characteristics of the human potential of 
science and identifying and classifying three marginal groups 
in the Croatian science of the 1980s (Prpić, 1984, 1987);
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– changes in the social profile of Croatian scientists investigated 
repeatedly in the 1980s, 1990s and at the start of the new mil-
lennium (Golub, 1990; Golub and Šuljok, 2005);
– social and professional characteristics of the scientific and 
technological potential and actors in the innovation subsystem 
(Prpić et al., 1992);
– socio-professional determinants of scientific productivity (Prpić, 
1990, 1991; Prpić and Brajdić Vuković, 2005);
– professional and social position of young researchers (Prpić, 
2000, 2004);
– socio-professional profile of scientific and social elites (Golub, 
1997; Krištofić, 1997; Čengić, 1997);
– social and professional determinants of scientists’ drain abroad 
(Prpić, 1989; Golub, 1988, 2000, 2004, 2005);
– scientists’ professional ethics (Prpić, 1997);
– interrelation between science and the public (Prpić, 2005).
2. Socio-professional portrait of Croatian scientists
The starting point for conceptualising the previous analyses of the 
socio-professional characteristics of Croatian scientists was the simple 
hypothesis that scientific activity, research and the production of new 
knowledge, just like topics regarding the wider interrelation between 
science and other social actors or groups, cannot be interpreted, ana-
lysed and completely understood without knowledge of the overall life 
and professional situation of scientists and researchers.
The analyses of the social position and basic professional char-
acteristics of the Croatian scientific potential and the analyses of the 
changes that occurred in the course of the transformation of Croatian 
society in the process of transition were based on conceptual and theo-
retical knowledge and the rare studies of the issue in the world and 
on the empirical findings of the position and role of Croatian scien-
tists in the social system and the scientific subsystems of earlier years 
(Prpić, 1984, 1987). The continuity of research on the problem concep-
tually defined the basic determinants of the socio-professional profile 
of Croatian scientists. The stages in which the profile was formed were 
investigated based on chronology and content. The socio-demographic 
origin was always the starting point, which was then followed by the 
social origins and collection of data on social origin and the conditions 
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of early socialisation. The next step was the education and preprofes-
sional scientific socialisation as the potential determinants of the fu-
ture career in science. Scientific education, linked to the qualification 
structure, and the context of the institution and the field completed the 
widest framework of the determinants of the social and professional 
profile of scientists. Together with the elaboration of the components of 
the social position of scientists in the wider social community, the sur-
vey of their family, housing and financial situation provided the basic 
empirical insight into their life outside science and into their social and 
financial status.
Based on several studies, and especially those highlighting the 
changes connected to the transition of Croatian society, the profiling of 
Croatian scientists can be outlined in the following way.
The latest socio-demographic analysis made in 2004 indicated the 
still (too) old structure of the total Croatian scientific population and 
noticed signs of its rising feminisation. In the 1980s it was already no-
ticed that the rejuvenation of the scientific potential was conducted by 
employing a large share of young women scientists. The trend also con-
tinued in the final decade of the last century, so the recent gender struc-
ture reflects the gradual recruitment of women: the proportion of wom-
en scientists in the generational structures is the greatest in the younger 
age brackets, successively decreasing towards the older age groups.
The feminisation of Croatian science, which has largely been 
achieved by rejuvenation, is a consequence of the long marginalisation of 
the scientific, research and development sectors back in socialist times, 
but also of its even greater pauperisation in the early 90s. The inadequate 
social treatment of science and permanent financial neglect had a long-
term effect on the composition of the scientific potential. Financially 
undervalued, but very demanding and including a long initiation pe-
riod, the scientific profession was becoming increasingly more unat-
tractive as a career or vocation. Persons with lower income expectations 
were more inclined to opt for a career in science, which facilitated the 
entry of more young women into science. This type of feminisation of 
science, connected to the negative social and economic trends, has also 
been recorded in Russian science (Mirskaya, 1995). However, Russian 
feminisation was not so much a result of the inflow of women scientists 
as of the drain of their male colleagues to foreign countries.
Drain processes, hiding under the established terms brain waste 
and brain drain, did not bypass the Croatian scientific community ei-
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ther. The drop in, or dispersal of, the scientific personnel in the first 
half of the 90s can be ascribed to these processes which also contrib-
uted to the process of feminisation of Croatian science. The narrowing 
down of the stratum of the middle generation of scientists, that is, the 
drop in the number of scientists in their forties, is a consequence of the 
increased scientists’ drain at the time when – in the midst of war and 
social transformation – the social, professional and even family stand-
ard of living of the majority of scientists was deteriorating rapidly.
The starting social position of the generation of scientists caught 
up in the transition is the base for a comparison of the socio-profes-
sional characteristics of Croatian scientists. Based on early socialisation, 
measured by the level of the father’s education and the place of residence 
while growing up, the starting social position already indicated a ten-
dency for the selection of scientists from higher social strata in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The movement of the sociological process towards more 
educated families can be studied also within the scientific population 
itself. Comparing the indicators of the starting year of transition (1990) 
with the latest available empirical data (2004) indicates a significant de-
crease in the share of fathers with elementary education, and a rise in the 
share of highly educated fathers. Analysing the social background of the 
young(est) generation of scientists tends to show a share of fathers with 
a higher level of academic education, especially fathers with a master’s 
or doctoral degree. There are some indications of a closing process of 
reproduction of scientific personnel, that is, a strengthening of the self-
reproduction process in this segment, which was generally slightly more 
evident in biomedicine and the social sciences and humanities.
The other aspect of the greater narrowing of the social origins of 
the Croatian scientific potential is the loss of new generations in the seg-
ment of talented persons from deprived social environments that were 
not able to nurture the natural potential of their children. The failure 
to recognise and develop the talents and creativity in the overall child 
and adolescent population led to the dissipation of human potential. 
This was a loss to the essential resources of national as well as scientific 
development. This finding was especially important in the atmosphere 
of the transformed social structure of overall Croatian society during 
the transition, which caused a pauperisation of a great portion of the 
population and caused pronounced social stratification.
Available career pattern indicators, examined in the initial year 
1990, and the latest available year of transition, 2004, indicate signifi-
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cant differences in the patterns of scientists’ performance in climbing 
the career ladder in the pre-transition and transition periods, partly 
thanks to the different patterns of the science policy and partly thanks 
to the new tendencies of the social environment. Today, there are in-
creasing numbers of excellent university students who enter the world 
of science directly from university already with preprofessional experi-
ence in research and published papers. There are fewer experts formed 
in other activities and accomplished as experts in their field who take 
up work in scientific institutions. It is evident that academic degrees 
and scientific ranks are obtained more comprehensively and earlier, so 
one can quite soon expect an insignificant number of unqualified and 
a greater number of younger and middle-aged scientists in the seg-
ment of scientists in the highest scientific ranks, although the old(er) 
age groups still prevail in that segment. Judging by the formal scientif-
ic degrees and ranks obtained according to strict procedures, there are 
more competent scientists today, bringing the Croatian scientific cor-
pus closer to the international (European) criteria. In addition, there 
are more scientists with a knowledge of foreign languages, and more 
scientists with some education, training or specialisation acquired 
abroad. This is a direct consequence of the more accessible channels 
of international scientific communication, but also of the tendency of 
creating wide socio-professional networks, more open to Croatian sci-
entists as well.
Professional activity, research and dissemination of knowledge 
take place within two separate, but functionally intertwined, areas. 
The first is the socio-organisational environment where the division 
of science tasks into research, teaching and development is reflected 
in the types of scientific institutions. The other environment is the 
scientific fields that make up the socio-cognitive framework of the 
scientific profession. And while the cognitive differentiation of sci-
ence reflected in scientific fields is something that reflects the internal 
dimension and developmental logic of science, and thus the autono-
my of science itself, the institutional system is far more liable to the 
(organisational) interventions of the wider social environment. This 
is precisely what happened to the scientific institutions in Croatia in 
the fourteen years of transition, between 1990 and 2004. Particularly 
great changes took place in the management and organisation of uni-
versity institutes which were turned into public (state) institutes, and 
in the former industrial institutes, but also in the research depart-
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ments in the economy, which were completely disappearing or whose 
R&D function was eroding due to the economic collapse of the early 
1990s.
The changes in the institutional system were reflected in the 
structure of the personnel in the primarily research, teaching or de-
velopmental dimensions of scientific work. However, the most striking 
changes come down to the trend of increasing competition of the scien-
tific and teaching staff at universities, and a reduction in the segment 
of institutes and especially research and development, which is almost 
obsolete today. The rejuvenation of the pool of scientists that followed 
this path of institutional restructuring showed the best results in the 
academic sector which has the youngest personnel potential, and much 
worse results in the institute and development sectors which have the 
older (oldest) potential.
In the majority of previous analyses, the scientific fields have also 
proved to be a dividing factor within the scientific profession. There were 
only few respondents whose characteristics did not vary between these 
socio-cognitive entities. They attracted and recruited people of differ-
ent demographic and social profiles, all the way down to identifying the 
differences in the gender and age structure and socio-spatial and social 
and educational origin. Scientists profiled by fields also partly differed 
in terms of education and initial scientific socialisation. Although to 
a certain extent they showed differences in the rejuvenation of some 
disciplines, scientific fields manifested much greater diversification of 
new scientists in terms of their formation and professional socialisa-
tion. This is also clear in the differing patterns of professional careers, 
especially direct entry into the scientific profession, further education 
abroad and the mode of acquiring scientific competence through the 
system of scientific degrees and ranks. However, the most striking dif-
ferences were noticed in productivity.
3. Natural and social scientists
The cognitive differentiation of science, expressed in differing cog-
nitive objects, structures and styles within different scientific fields, was 
conceived back in the 1970s and 1980s (Bourdieu, 1975; Becher, 1981, 
1989; Liebau and Huber, 1985). Even then, researchers drew attention to 
disciplinary patterns that could be identified in layers, supported by the 
social organisation of scientific work (Whitley, 1984).
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Selecting the natural and the social sciences to address diverse as-
pects of scientific work, socio-professional characteristics and scientists’ 
achievements should certainly be explained. In doing so, the impor-
tance of discoveries in the natural sciences, which become the driving 
force of overall social and civilisation development, can be descriptively 
highlighted. On the other hand, the importance of the social sciences 
that enlighten, interpret and predict the effect of that knowledge and 
new technologies on humankind and society in general should not be 
neglected either.
However, positioning the natural and the social sciences on the scale 
of the hard and soft sciences, seems far more important. Establishing 
routine research and its fragmentation in cognitively more restricted 
sciences leads to protocolisation and different styles of work and re-
search, which can thus affect the initiation, scientific socialisation and 
overall career pattern of persons focusing on those fields. The cogni-
tively non-restrictive sciences, whose cognitive objects and methods are 
not that firmly defined, and whose research findings are more open 
and much more uncertain, may have a completely opposite effect. The 
findings of the thus confronted natural and social sciences will also be 
interesting at the level of the analysis of scientific production (produc-
tivity), and epistemic concepts (objectivity) and perceptions of scien-
tific quality, while the socio-professional profile of scientists, outlined 
with the logic and method of a certain type of science, will be the first 
step along that path.
3.1. Empirical grounds: web survey and sample of doctors of the 
natural and social sciences
The sociological view of the socio-cognitive peculiarities of the 
natural and the social sciences, which is the topic of this book, will be 
based (just like our topic of the social and professional differences/sim-
ilarities of natural and social scientists) on the results of a web survey 
conducted in 2004. Since this chapter, more than any other in the book, 
focuses on the very producers and promoters of knowledge within the 
two selected fields, thus focusing on persons whose references, charac-
teristics and attitudes are analysed, it seems logical to briefly present 
those actors.
The survey covered all the 1,131 doctors of the natural sciences 
and all the 809 doctors of the social sciences listed in the Registry of 
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Scientists and Researchers at the Ministry of Science, Education and 
Sports of the Republic of Croatia in June 2004.1 On average, one quarter 
of the respondents answered the survey, or, to be more precise, 477 sci-
entists or 24.7% of the surveyed scientists. Natural scientists respond-
ed to the survey in greater numbers – 27.4% (310), whereas the social 
scientists’ response rate was lower – 20.6% (167). This fact seemed to 
have influenced the greater representativeness of answers provided by 
natural scientists, although such answers could not be considered truly 
representative.
Sociological studies based on web surveys have only recently 
appeared, but they can no longer be ignored in scientific research 
(Solomon, 2001), despite the fact that they are limited in scope. Thus, 
the experiences regarding the usual response rates are rather limited 
in this type of research. For example, Kaiser (2002) reports a 39% re-
sponse rate for Norwegian scientists, while Iranian researcher Heydar 
Janalizadeh Choobbasti puts the response rate of British academics 
(Royal Society members) at around 19% in his doctoral thesis.
The most similar mode of reaching respondents is mail surveys 
which have been used quite often precisely on scientific populations. 
Comparing experiences, the response rates have differed greatly, rang-
ing from 25% (Markusova et al., 1996) or 33% (Eastwood et al., 1996), 
and 50% (Hemlin and Gustafsson, 1996), to the extremely high response 
rate of 78% (Kyvik, 1989) or 89% (Hagstrom, 1974). Our experiences with 
mail surveys conducted in 1984, 1990 and 2004 showed the willingness 
of the Croatian scientific population to respond to the mail survey, most 
similar to Hemlin and Gustafsson’s surveys in scope, recording a re-
sponse rate of slightly less than 50%. The response rate of natural and 
social scientists to the 2004 web survey was half that figure.
 1 It seems methodologically fair to point out that the database of Croatian scientists at the 
Ministry of Science, Education and Sports was rather disordered and incomplete in 2004. Our ex-
perience indicates two pieces of evidence of such a state. Firstly, the Institute for Social Research 
in Zagreb conducted other research on a sample of one in five Croatian scientists the same year. 
The out-of-datedness of the Registry and non-transparent records were noticeable even then. 
Judging from the reactions of scientists to the questionnaire survey, (some) former scientists who 
had gone abroad or who had found employment in other walks of life were also listed. There were 
also retired and dead scientists on the lists, and junior researchers were registered according to 
two different principles (some were on the list with other scientists, other were listed separately). 
Secondly, the Ministry’s website contained a notice dated 4 March 2005 announcing the upcom-
ing compilation of a new database, or Scientists’ Registry, into which all the data from the existing 
list would be transferred in the first phase. The need to update the list used in the two mentioned 
studies the year before confirms the inaccuracy of the records at the time.
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In order to present the restricted representativeness of such a sam-
ple reached via the internet, limited by the (un)willingness of scientists 
to respond to the survey, but also by the deficiencies of their records, 
we examined the differences between some available socio-professional 
characteristics of the overall population of doctors of the natural and 
social sciences and the realised sample.
A chi-square test determined that natural scientists in the sample 
differed from their population in only one of the four controlled variables 
(gender, age, type of scientific institution, scientific fields), while social 
scientists differed in all the variables. The gender and age structure of the 
sample of natural scientists deviated insignificantly from the gender and 
age structure of natural scientists. Furthermore, the institutional distri-
bution of natural scientists in the sample and the corresponding popula-
tion did not show any significant differences. Thus, while representative-
ness in terms of selected socio-professional characteristics exists on the 
level of the overall area of the natural sciences, it is lost at the level of in-
dividual fields. The investigated deviation (unrepresentativeness) of the 
natural scientists was determined precisely at the level of scientific fields. 
As the first table (1) shows, more biologists, geographers and geologists 
answered the survey, while mathematicians, chemists and physicists re-
sponded to a lesser extent. A similar analysis by field of social sciences 
showed that sociologists, psychologists and politologists completed the 
survey disproportionately more than they were represented in the sam-
ple, while legal scientists, economists and educationists responded to a 
lesser degree. Only the response rate of IT scientists was proportional. 
Furthermore, considering the statistically significant deviations of the so-
cial scientists, it can be said that women and younger scientists and scien-
tists working at institutes completed the survey disproportionately more 
frequently, while men, older scientists and scientists working in higher 
education and institutes such as industrial institutes, health care institu-
tions, R&D units of other institutions, but also the Croatian Academy 
of Sciences and Arts, and the National Meteorological and Hydrological 
Service, completed it disproportionately less frequently.
4. Social and socialisational elements of disciplinary 
differences among scientists
Certain aspects of the social and professional position and role of 
scientists, mentioned in the introduction were investigated more par-
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tially and occasionally than systematically. The certain neglect of the 
social roots and mutual differentiation of scientists, which can partly 
be justified by the concepts and views of the constructors and leaders of 
the major directions of modern sociology, does not imply that no such 
investigations took place. The findings of H. Zuckerman, for example, 
show that 82% of Nobel Prize winners who grew up in the USA (71 
of them) come from families of a higher social and financial status. 
Their fathers were most often members of different vocations – high 
school teachers, priests, college professors, medical doctors, engineers, 
lawyers, managers or business owners (the fathers of 54% of laureates 
belonged to the former, and 28% to the latter group) – a significantly 
more elite social background than that of American doctors of science 
of approximately the same age (47.8% of their fathers were members 
of the professions, managers and business owners), not to mention the 
population of employed men (Zuckerman, 1977).
In his doctoral dissertation, Xie (1989) studied the social context 
and potential influences in the process of educating American scien-
tists. He focused particularly on the demographic and social character-
istics and the social background of scientists in various scientific fields 
and disciplines (physics, mathematics/statistics, biology, social scienc-
es). According to his findings, the disciplinary differences found in the 
recruitment of scientists of different social backgrounds are eliminated 
or become insignificant at the level of scientists who had completed 16 
years of education. Social deprivation, which was the disturbing factor 
in regular education and in acquiring the preconditions for their future 
careers in science, was cancelled or lost in levelling out the average val-
ues in different scientific fields by the persons who managed to com-
plete the process and achieve the preconditions of academic education 
despite an adverse social background.
By the same token of investigating the social background and 
gender differentiation of scientists as the possible origins of the devia-
tions from the norm of universalism in science (the Mertonian tradi-
tion) and on a random sample of 788 Danish scientists (618 from the 
social sciences, 83 from information sciences and 87 from the natural 
sciences and medicine), Andersen (2001) also came to the conclusion 
that social selection worked much more strongly through the proc-
ess of education, and even before the decision on one’s scientific ca-
reer is made. Differences found later among scientists in the process 
of building their careers in science that can be linked to gender and 
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preprofessional social differentiation were not grounded on empirical 
evidence in a way that they should be interpreted through a pattern 
of deviation from the universalism norm or as (gender or social) dis-
crimination.
Bormann and Enders (2004) went one step further in an analysis 
of the advanced scientific career of German doctors of science in six 
disciplinary fields – biology, electrical engineering, German language, 
mathematics, sociology, business studies (economics). The control 
group was made up of university-educated researchers without a doc-
toral degree. The breakdown of results on the influence of the social 
background and gender on education and career success by discipline 
was statistically largely insignificant, and many of the links were weak. 
However, in the context of gender and social inequality, these two au-
thors highlighted two points.
First, the results of the influence of the individual characteristics 
of social background in obtaining a doctoral degree did not indicate 
any exclusive academic self-reproduction. The majority of doctors of 
science came from families without university education. On the other 
hand, the analysis showed that doctors of science were selected in four 
out of six scientific disciplines considering (1) social background and (2) 
gender compared to the control group of university-educated respond-
ents. (1) Doctors of science in electrical engineering, German language, 
mathematics and business studies (economics) more frequently came 
from parents with higher education and secondary education than the 
persons from the control group. (2) Doctors of science in the fields of 
biology, German language, mathematics and sociology were more fre-
quently men than the respondents who had only a university degree in 
the same disciplines. Bormann and Enders allow that the results may 
reflect also the gender differences in opportunities for scientific suc-
cess, as well as the improper procedures in education. In support, they 
quote studies written in German (Allmendinger et al., 1999; Bochow, 
Joas, 1987) which showed the difficulties that women face when being 
granted the status of young scientists in a male-dominated environ-
ment. According to Krűger (1999), many women do not ascribe their 
educational success to their capacities, but to some fortunate set of cir-
cumstances. A Spies and Schute study (1999) points out that women 
are much more pessimistic in estimating their own potential and op-
portunities for success than men, while Bischof-Kőhler (2002) reports 
in an empirical study the widely underestimated female sensitivity to 
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minor mistakes, and its effect on women’s more modest educational 
and business success.
Second, the findings of the studies on the influence of gender and 
social background on career success after obtaining a doctoral degree in-
dicated the far greater influence of gender. Ten, fifteen or twenty years 
after obtaining a doctoral degree, the influence of social background on 
the career was hardly noticeable any more. It seems that, according to 
the authors, the “need for inequality” was largely met in the process of 
selection in the course of education. However, an analysis of later suc-
cess in their career indicated the significant influence of gender on two 
out of the three criteria. Furthermore, certain differences were noticed 
in the employment of women and men doctors of science at faculties 
and in science. In terms of expressed career achievements within and 
outside the sectors of higher education and research, statistical analyses 
showed that gender, alongside other potential influences on the career, 
was the source of differences in biology and in business studies (eco-
nomics). Considering the third criterion of analysis – income – male 
doctors of science had better pay per hour than their female colleagues 
in all disciplines. The greatest differences between genders were mani-
fest in business studies (economics).
Bormann and Enders conclude their analyses aware of the insuf-
ficient knowledge of the mechanisms that produce inequality, which 
prevents them from directly interpreting the mechanisms as violations 
of equality. The complex picture of interrelations between social selec-
tion and self-selection in producing inequalities among scientists pre-
supposes the elimination of uncontrolled lateral influences, that is, the 
achievement of experimental (unambiguous) results.
5. Socio-demographic characteristics of doctors in the natural 
and the social sciences
Narrowing down the issue of disciplinary differences in the socio-
professional profiling of scientists to two scientific areas, the social and 
natural sciences, and to the population of scientists with a doctoral de-
gree, will necessarily show an empirical deviation from case analysis. 
What was seen as the inability to reach far-reaching conclusions due to 
the methodological limitations in the previous example of analysis of 
disciplinary differences in the socio-demographic selection of German 
doctors of science will apply to the Croatian case as well, especially bear-
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ing in mind the limitations of the sampling procedure. However, this 
does not mean that a possible analysis does not have to be conducted.
The socio-demographic breakdown of the overall population of 
Croatian scientists, and the socio-demographic breakdown of all scien-
tists by scientific fields, can be read from the results of parallel research 
done in 2004, and changes in the biological substratum in the socio-
democratic structure can be identified in research conducted in 1990 
and in some earlier studies2 (Golub, Šuljok, 2005).
(1) Changes in the gender structure of Croatian scientists in the 
identified fourteen-year period were manifest in the increased share of 
female researchers in the overall scientific potential by a significant 11.7 
structural points. More precisely, in 1990, the proportion of women 
came to 34.2%, and in 2004 it grew to as much as 45.9%. However, there 
is also a background to such an increase in the transition period.
Rejuvenation of the pool of scientists, identified back in the 1980s, 
largely took place in the process of the increased hiring of young fe-
male researchers. According to the Registry of Scientific Workers and 
Researchers at the Republic Committee for Science, Technology and 
IT (on 30 June 1985), there were 31.5% women in the total scientific 
potential, but only 17.9% of them in the oldest age group of scientists. 
Their share grows in the younger age groups. For example, there were 
as many as 43.2% of female researchers among scientists under the age 
of 30.
Our findings from 2004 show that the trend continued in the last 
decade of the previous century, when the share of the youngest women 
researchers (under 30) in the generational gender structure came to 
56.9%, while the share of women researchers between 30 and 40 years 
of age was even greater, standing at 58.3%. The share of women above 
that age limit dropped below the average share of women in the over-
all scientific population, amounting to 43.9% for female scientists in 
their forties, 43.0% in their fifties and only 25.0% in their sixties. The 
process of rejuvenation of the scientific potential by hiring an increas-
 2 The 1990 and 2004 studies covered the complete scientific population – scientists and re-
searchers working at universities (faculties), institutes and R&D units in economics and the pub-
lic sector registered at the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia 
with identical or very similar batteries of questions. The final samples of 8.6%, 921 respondents 
in 1990 and 915 respondents in 2004, were only partly representative of the overall population 
of scientists, taking into account the mail survey and the non-responses that accompany this 
method. However, they were representative in terms of gender in both studies, i.e. at both points 
of time.
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ingly greater number of young women is more than obvious.3 Their 
predominance in the younger age groups can be identified from scien-
tific (under)qualification, which shows that female holders of a master’s 
degree accounted for a greater share (53.7%), and female doctors of sci-
ence were underrepresented (42.9%).
According to the latest available data, women outnumber their 
male colleagues today in the social sciences and humanities (58.7%) 
and in the natural sciences (54.4%). As the young population (female 
scientists under 35), they were also already more numerous in biomedi-
cine (67.7%) in 1998, but today their total number (although relatively 
greater than the proportion of women in overall Croatian science) has 
remained below half (47.3%) compared to their colleagues in biomedi-
cine.
These findings suggest that the process of feminisation has taken 
place in some scientific areas over the last ten, and sometimes even 
twenty, years, but we cannot even talk of scientific fields since there are 
no conditions for detailed analysis. It is noticeable that feminisation 
has advanced the most in the social sciences, humanities and natural 
sciences (Table II, appendix). Biomedicine had also already been caught 
up in this process in the 1980s (51.9%),4 so it even witnessed a slight 
masculinisation in the period of transition, despite a still above-average 
share of women in the field (47.3%). The biotechnical (39.2%) and tech-
nical fields (23.4%) were the slowest in giving in to the process, so these 
sciences, especially the technical sciences, have traditionally remained 
more male than female occupations.
Returning after this general overview to the object of our study 
– the population of doctors of the natural and the social sciences – 
we should first point out that the list of the Registry of Scientists and 
Researchers at the Ministry of Science, Education and Sports in 2004 
contained 517 female doctors and 614 male doctors of the natural sci-
ences, and 306 female doctors and 501 doctors of the social sciences. 
The proportion of female doctors in the natural and the social sciences 
 3 Sociological analyses of contemporary society generally show that the (more) balanced 
representation of genders in individual disciplines does not necessarily imply a (more) equal so-
cial treatment and position of women in society. Furthermore, increased employment of women 
in certain economic and social activities as a rule correlates with the social and economic mar-
ginalisation of those activities.
 4 The data were obtained by investigating the characteristics of the personnel potential of 
science in 1983. The study was conducted by the Institute for Social Research of the University 
of Zagreb.
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in a ratio of 46%:38% also shows the significantly greater (qualification) 
competence of women in the natural than in the social sciences. If we 
support this with the data on the age structure of doctorate holders in 
the two scientific areas, then the greater contingents of social scientists 
in the older age brackets (see Table I, appendix) only support the con-
clusion on the lower qualifications of female scientists in the social sci-
ences, considering that the qualifications are achieved in time.
(2) The dominant characteristic of Croatian scientists, which also 
goes back decades, their (too) high average age, has not been set off to 
this day, not even by the rejuvenation process that has gained momen-
tum over the last ten years or so. Comparing the extreme age strata, it 
is revealed that the oldest scientists, over sixty years of age (13.7%), are 
still more prevalent in the overall scientific potential than the youngest 
scientists under thirty years of age (7.1%) who are only entering the sci-
entific system. Moreover, their share increased compared to the fist year 
of the transition when the oldest scientific population accounted for 
8.8% of human resources. Scientists in their thirties witnessed a stand-
still in the relevant period of fourteen years (1990: 26.5%; 2004: 27.9%), 
and only scientists in their fifties (1990: 24.8%; 2004: 27.8%) recorded a 
slight rise. However, the intellectually and scientifically (most) potent 
forty-year-olds (aged 40 to 49) became/remained the truncated genera-
tion, with the age stratum dropping by a whole 7 structural points (1990: 
30.5%; 2004: 23.5%). Since a large share of scientists in their fifties and 
sixties (41.5%) will complete their active careers or they will be draw-
ing them to a close in the next ten years, a narrow stratum of leading 
producers of new knowledge,5 today’s forty-year-olds (23.5%), will not 
be a sufficient bridge to transfer the accumulated knowledge and expe-
rience to new generations who will be entering the professional world 
of science. It is precisely the slump in the generation of forty-year-olds 
that is the weak spot of the human potential of Croatian science today.
In terms of the age division of scientists by fields (Table II), the con-
tingent of the youngest scientists (under 29) proved to be the strongest 
in the technical sciences (11.6%), thirty-year-olds are extremely strong 
in biotechnology (43.2%), forty-year-olds (28.2%) and fifty-year-olds 
(34.0%) are most prevalent in medicine compared to other disciplines, 
while sixty-year-olds and even older scientists are most frequently en-
gaged in natural (15.2%) and even medical sciences (14.7%). Having 
 5 Cole, 1979; Kyvik, 1988.
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in mind the fifty-percent contingent of scientists under the age of 40, 
biotechnical sciences have become the scientific field with the young-
est average scientific potential, thanks to the strong segment of thirty-
year-olds and a significant segment of younger scientists. The medical 
sciences, with 62.7% of scientists over 50 years of age, however, are the 
opposite – this is the field with the oldest human potential in Croatian 
science.
The age distribution of doctors of science in the natural and the 
social sciences, as already mentioned regarding their breakdown by 
gender, has shown greater efficiency in the process of rejuvenation with 
competent staff (with scientific qualifications) in the natural than in 
the social sciences (Table I, appendix). Thus, the youngest contingent 
of doctors of science in the natural sciences (aged 30 to 39), accord-
ing to the data provided by the competent ministry for 2004, reaches 
9.2%, and in the social sciences 5.5%. The stratum of forty-year-olds 
(40–49) was also stronger in the natural (27.8%) than in the social sci-
ences (25.7%). Quite the reverse, the strata of older doctors of science, 
fifty-year-olds, sixty-year-olds and older scientists were more prevalent 
in the social than in the natural sciences.
Since the gender and age breakdown of doctors of science from 
the sample obtained in the web survey was selectively representative of 
the scientific fields – it was representative for the natural sciences, and 
selected for the social sciences – the textual overview of the basic demo-
graphic variables of gender and age was limited to this official informa-
tion on the population. Their unreliability (described in the section on 
sampling) should also be kept in mind.
Table 1 shows the gender and age differentiation of doctors of sci-
ence who responded to our web survey. Since the representativeness 
of the sample was selectively weighed in the way described above, the 
results of testing the significance of the differences between the gender 
and age distribution of respondents from the natural and the social sci-
ences should be taken with reserve. According to the level of chi-square 
significance, the differences were not statistically significant, and natu-
ral and social scientists should not differ by basic demographic vari-
ables. However, since women doctors of the social sciences and younger 
social scientists answered the web survey in greater numbers, the data 
have to be taken with some reserve. With the same qualification, we 
also report the finding that doctors of the natural sciences and doctors 
of the social sciences were of roughly the same age (50 or 51) on aver-
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age. The youngest doctors in both scientific fields were twenty-nine-
year-olds, while the oldest were seventy-year-olds (statutory age limit 
for regular employment).
Table 1. Gender and age structure of doctors of the natural and the social 
sciences (web survey)
Natural sciences
(310)
Social sciences
(167)
GENDER
Female
Male
Total
48.7
51.3
100.0
53.6
46.4
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
 1.042
1
0.307
AGE
under 39
40 – 49
50 – 59
60 and older
Total
20.8
26.6
31.8
20.8
100.0
13.8
32.9
35.9
17.4
100.0
Average age
Standard deviation
Youngest person
Oldest person
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
50
9.94
29
70
–0.632
473
0.528
51
9.63
29
71
6. Socialisational and educational characteristics of doctors of 
the natural and the social sciences
The early socialisational context of growing up connected with the 
educational level of parents and the socio-spatial environment has for 
several decades been the subject of especially in the period of transi-
tion, between 1990 and 2004 (Golub; Šuljok, 2005).
The earliest analyses conducted in the 1970s and 1980s showed the 
tendency of social selection of scientists. The wider basis of the selec-
tion, or the shift of the social origin to the more urban and educated 
segments of society, was already noticeable in the reproduction of the 
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Croatian highly-educated population that did not originate from all 
socio-professional strata, but was socially selected. The scientific pro-
fession, as a primarily intellectual activity, has been becoming socially 
less accessible to talented persons in society, regardless of the socio-
economic stratum.
The changes in the social basis of scientists’ origin have become 
sociologically transparent lately in two of its characteristics: the type 
of settlement the surveyed scientists mostly lived in before completing 
their elementary education, and the father’s education.
The statistically significant differences in socio-spatial origin, 
identified by comparing the data from 1990 and 2004, indicating the 
greater domination of persons socialised in urban environments, only 
showed that the pre-transition processes of selection gained even more 
ground. Medium and large Croatian cities such as Osijek, Split and 
Rijeka, together with the city of Zagreb, recorded a nine-structural-
point increase in the prevalence of scientists from urban environments 
compared to the rural, peripheral or small-town locations (60.5% in 
1990, 69.5% in 2004).
The educational status of the family in which the primary sociali-
sation took place showed, even more markedly than the socio-spatial 
indicator the shift to the more elite social origins of Croatian scien-
tists. In a country whose population even nowadays has only a slim 
stratum of 7.3% of highly-educated inhabitants, the share of 39.6% of 
university-educated fathers of today’s scientists, including 9.9% hold-
ers of master’s or doctoral degrees, is more than a significant shift to 
the pronouncedly elite source groups, especially bearing in mind the 
time span from the fathers’ generations to the generations of today, in 
which the educational attainment of the population has been growing 
progressively.
The shift of the socialisation process to more educated families 
has been observed recently even within the scientists’ population. A 
comparison of indicators from the first year of transition with the data 
of 2004 shows that the share of 25% of scientists from 1990 whose fa-
thers had only elementary education dropped to only 11.8% in 2004. 
In contrast, the share of 28.7% of highly-educated scientists’ fathers in 
the 1990 survey increased to 39.6% in a period of fourteen years. If the 
analysis of social background is limited to the youngest scientists (un-
der 35 years), the share of fathers with academic education grows to 
even higher values, to 42.2%, and fathers with a master’s or doctoral de-
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gree in science to even 12.6%! Such figures recorded in this segment al-
low us to conclude that the process of the self-reproduction of scientists 
is closed in this segment, and was slightly more evident in biomedicine 
and the social sciences and humanities (the differences between sci-
entific fields in terms of the fathers’ education were determined at the 
chi-square level of 36.386; df = 20, p = 0.01).
(1) Our studies were the first to examine the educational structure 
of mothers alongside the educational structure of fathers in the investi-
gation of the indicators of the social origin of doctors of the natural and 
the social sciences (Table 2). Although no statistically significant dif-
ferences were found between the natural and social scientists in terms 
of the education of their mothers and fathers, some differences can 
nevertheless be noticed. First, fathers were on average more educated 
than mothers in both strata. Both parents of doctors of the social sci-
ences had only elementary education (28.7% of mothers and 15.0% of 
fathers) slightly more often than the parents of doctors of the natural 
sciences (26.9% of mothers and 11.3% of fathers). At the level of two-
year postsecondary and university education, both mothers and fathers 
of natural scientists have a slight advantage. Furthermore, it is interest-
ing that the share of mothers and fathers with a master’s or doctoral 
degree is almost the same in both scientific fields. And mothers are 
even (!) slightly more represented. This finding could be said to be in 
accordance with similar findings (Xie, 1989; Andersen, 2001) that sup-
port the thesis on satisfying the need for or necessity of (gender and 
social) inequality in the course of the process of education. The share 
of around 11% of parents with a master’s and doctoral degree whose 
children are today doctors of the natural and the social sciences of all 
age groups, including seventy-year-olds, has more weight in supporting 
the thesis on the self-reproduction of the scientific profession than the 
piece of data on 12.6% of fathers of young scientists (under 35 years of 
age) who also had formal proof of the highest educational and scientific 
competence.
(2) Judging from the socio-educational characteristics, scientists 
present a narrow segment of the Croatian population which has suc-
ceeded in bringing together in their socialisation their individual ca-
pacities, verified by academic performance, and the positive socialisa-
tional effects of the environment outside school, primarily the closest 
family which substituted the part of the stimulating and developmental 
roles that the school and the whole society failed to perform.
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Table 2. Parents’ level of education and university performance of doctors of the 
natural and the social sciences (web survey)
Natural 
sciences
(310)
Social 
sciences
(167)
MOTHER’S EDUCATION
Elementary 
High school (skilled worker + secondary school)
Two-year postsecondary and university
Master’s, doctoral degree
Total
 26.9
 35.0
 27.2
 11.0
100.0
 28.7
 37.7
 22.2
 11.4
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
  1.464
  3
  0.691
FATHER’S EDUCATION
Elementary
High school (skilled worker + secondary school)
Two-year postsecondary and university
Master’s, doctoral degree
Total
 11.3
 39.8
 38.2
 10.7
100.0
 15.0
 37.7
 36.5
 10.8
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
  1.342
  3
  0.719
UNDERGRADUATE ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
Good
Very good
Excellent
Total
  3.6
 62.3
 34.1
100.0
  4.8
 62.3
 32.9
100.0
Average grade
Standard deviation 
Lowest grade
Highest grade
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  4.31
  0.533
  3
  5
  0.459
473
  0.646
  4.28
  0.548
  3
  5
The examined differences of the university performance of doc-
tors of the natural and the social sciences did not show any statistical 
relevance. Their performance at undergraduate examinations ranged 
from good (3) to excellent (5), and the average grade of natural and so-
cial scientists at university can be rounded up to 4.3.
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However, a comparison of the undergraduate academic perform-
ance of doctors of science from both areas with the undergraduate 
performance of all scientists, regardless of scientific qualifications 
and field of work and research, shows some differences. At the level 
of students with the grade “very good”, hardly any differences were 
found, but they are evident on the level of “good” and “excellent” stu-
dents. Doctors of science were rarely only “good” students, and they 
were “excellent” students much more often (Table 3). This becomes 
more evident when compared to the generation of 1990, since the pool 
of doctors of science changed only slightly in terms of average age 
(50.5 years). Hence, the differences between the academic perform-
ance of the total population of scientists and doctors of the (natural 
and social) sciences are declining over time, but are still statistically 
relevant.
Table 3. Academic success of Croatian scientists (1990 and 2004 samples) and 
doctors of the natural and the social sciences (2004 web survey)
Undergraduate 
academic 
performance 
sciences
Sample of 
Croatian 
scientists 1990
(921)
Sample of 
Croatian 
scientists 2004
(915)
Doctors 
of the natural 
sciences
(310)
Doctors 
of the social 
sciences
(167)
Good
Very good
Excellent
Total
 22.0
 61.8
 16.1
100.0
 10.2
 63.3
 26.5
100.0
  3.6
 62.3
 34.1
100.0
  4.8
 62.3
 32.9
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
160.589
       2
  0.000*
 26.367
       2
  0.000**
 20.010
       2
  0.000***
  7.428
       2
  0.000****
*  Significance of differences in samples of scientists (1990) and doctors of the social and natural sciences
**  Significance of differences in samples of scientists (2004) and doctors of the social and natural sciences
*** Significance of differences in samples of scientists (2004) and doctors of the natural sciences
**** Significance of differences in samples of scientists (2004) and doctors of the social sciences
7. Working and professional environment
Earlier analyses of the socio-demographic determinants and the 
socialisational and educational environment as elements of social back-
ground did not show greater differences between the preprofessional 
determinants of the future careers of doctors in the natural and the so-
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cial sciences. Noting the only partial representativeness of the sample, 
the findings of the web survey did not select them either by age or by 
gender. With minor discrepancies, the findings were the same for the 
educational status of the mother and father and for the undergraduate 
academic performance.
At the level of the overall scientific population, according to the 
findings of the earlier studies, scientific fields did to a certain extent 
define rejuvenation. It was shown that different scientific fields did to 
a degree attract persons of different social or demographic profiles. 
However, to a far greater extent the young scientists socialised and 
developed professionally in different ways depending on their fields. 
This was evident in the different patterns of professional career, and 
especially the patterns of scientific productivity. The following analyses 
show the extent to which the population of doctors of the natural and 
the social sciences will repeat these findings.
In the working and professional environment, we investigated the 
variables of scientific competence, patterns of professional advance-
ment (career), institutional context, professional position and roles, 
focusing on the division of scientific roles, participation in the wider 
scientific community, networking and scientific achievements.
7.1. Scientific education (competency) in the natural and social 
sciences
The scientific career, in the sense of development and the final 
reach of overall scientific achievements, is built on the different pat-
terns of synergic action of a larger number of constituents of a career 
(Hermanowicz, 2007). Advancement in science is “reinforced” by sci-
entific qualifications. The change in the qualification patterns in the 
Croatian public can be traced in the data on scientific degrees and sci-
entific ranks. For example, a 1983 study determined that only 39.7% of 
registered scientists had a doctoral degree that year. Since this study 
already indicated a shift of samples to strata of higher qualifications 
compared to the total scientists’ population, this finding had to be com-
plemented with available records. According to the three-year older 
statistics, the share of doctors of science in the Croatian scientific pop-
ulation was even smaller, only 34.8%. At the same time, 42.8% of the 
scientific potential that was involved directly in the scientific process 
did not have any scientific degree. This means that almost half of the 
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scientific potential that was engaged in science and research had only 
university education in the 1980s. Since 54.7% of scientists over fifty 
years of age still did not have a doctoral degree at that time, it is esti-
mated that a great number of them completed their professional careers 
in science without the complete formal education.
Significant differences in qualifications recorded from 1990 to 
2004 indicate some significant changes that took place in the scien-
tific system. The process of transition witnessed an almost threefold 
drop in the share of scientists without any scientific degrees in favour 
of a rising share of doctors of science who make up by far the biggest 
segment today (Table III, appendix). The acute improvement in the 
qualifications structure of Croatian scientists is primarily the result of 
the strict demands for advancement, under the threat of termination 
of employment unless the researcher’s scientific competence rises in a 
given period. The strict criteria of initiation of the new generations of 
scientists also go by the token of higher qualifications, despite the fact 
that they do not have any more significant effect now in the mass of 
total potential.
(1) Table III (appendix), presenting the determinants of the profes-
sional and career patterns of the overall population of Croatian scien-
tists, indicates that five scientific areas (natural, technical, medical, bio-
technical sciences and social sciences and humanities) differ in the edu-
cational structure of their scientists.6 At the level of doctors of science, 
the biggest differences are evident between the technical and medical 
sciences. While in the technical sciences doctors of science accounted 
for one half of the scientists’ potential (51.3%) in 2004, they reached 
two thirds in medicine (66.5%). The differences between the natural 
and the social sciences were not that pronounced: 63.2% of doctors of 
the natural sciences compared to 59.7% of doctors of the social sciences. 
The factor that can raise the lower qualification structure of the social 
sciences is the share of scientists without any scientific qualifications: 
14.6% of social scientists and 10.4% of natural scientists did not hold, or 
have not (yet) obtained, a master’s or doctoral degree.
(2) The next step in scientific competence, building on the earlier, 
formal education achieved in master’s or doctoral studies, is scientific 
ranks. When selecting a scientist to a certain rank, the scientist’s pub-
lished papers (scientific ranks) and lectures (academic ranks) are evalu-
 6 Chi-square = 25.485; df = 8; p = 0.01.
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ated, in accordance with set procedures and criteria. Differences be-
tween doctors of the natural and the social sciences proved significant 
in terms of this criterion (Table 4).
Table 4. Components of scientific education (competence) in the natural and the 
social sciences
 Natural sciences 
(310)
Social science
(167)
SCIENTIFIC RANK
Without (scientific) rank
Research associate
Senior research associate
Research adviser 
Total
 14.2
 37.7
 19.9
 28.2
100.0
  5.5
 40.5
 24.5
 29.5
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
  4.129
  1
  0.042
ACTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF 
FOREIGN LANGUAGES
No foreign languages
One foreign language
Two foreign languages
Three or four languages 
Total
  3.6
 48.0
 38.0
 10.4
100.0
  5.4
 48.9
 34.3
 11.4
100.0
Average number of languages
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  1.57
  0.785
  0.262
472
  0.793
  1.55
  0.856
PASSIVE KNOWLEDGE OF 
FOREIGN LANGUAGES
No foreign languages
One foreign language
Two foreign languages
Three or four languages 
Total
 22.1
 34.4
 32.8
 10.7
100.0
 23.0
 37.6
 30.9
  8.5
100.0
Average number of languages
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  1.40
  1.219
  1.056
471
  0.292
  1.28
  1.029
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According to the data from the web survey, doctors of the social 
sciences acquire their first scientific rank more quickly and easily than 
doctors of the natural sciences. As we know, the very act of obtaining a 
doctoral degree does not change the position of the assistant, unless oth-
er selection criteria for the position of a research associate in a research 
institute, or for the rank of assistant professor, are met. In the structure 
of scientific ranks, social scientists had better results even in higher re-
search career grades. Among them, senior research associates (associ-
ate professors) and research advisers (full professors) are relatively more 
numerous. Considering their age, ranging from thirty-year-olds to sev-
enty-year-olds, today’s doctors of science went through different stages 
of strictness in the selection processes in the research career pathway. In 
the effort to raise the quality of Croatian scientific production to meet 
global and European criteria, we have been witnessing greater demands 
in selection procedures in terms of quality and quantity (publishing in 
refereed and/or international publications). We have also witnessed a 
greater uniformity of criteria among scientific fields, to the detriment of 
the scientific fields whose object of study is not universal, but marked by 
(natural or social) specificities and localities.
The differences noticed in the pattern of the research career path-
way in the natural and the social sciences are probably a consequence 
of the milder criteria in the social sciences. It is a matter of speculation 
whether the differences will be cancelled out by the scientific policy of 
harmonising the criteria for advancement in the two fields. However, 
if the (stricter) criteria of the natural sciences are automatically trans-
ferred to the field of the social sciences, irrespective of the specificities 
of the objects of study (the Croatian social and economic environment), 
quite the reverse effect is possible – the differences may increase, but to 
the detriment of the social sciences.
(3) The universal dimension of science and the universality of sci-
entific work itself have imposed the need for linguistic education. In 
smaller and scientifically peripheral countries like Croatia, this is a 
fundamental requirement for engagement in science.
Linguistic competence in the field, that is, active and passive knowl-
edge and use of foreign languages by doctors of the natural and the so-
cial sciences, does not show any statistically relevant differences. Half of 
natural and social scientists have achieved almost equal results in basic 
linguistic competence, that is, active use of one foreign language. With 
statistically insignificant differences, there are slightly more doctors of 
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the natural sciences proficient in two foreign languages, and more doc-
tors of the social sciences who do not have an active knowledge of any 
foreign languages. The share of polyglots remains almost the same in 
both scientific fields.
Not even the passive use of foreign languages, that is, reading and 
understanding scientific and expert texts without the capacity to speak 
a foreign language, creates a difference between natural and social 
scientists. There are only slightly more natural scientists with passive 
knowledge of several languages, and slightly more social scientists with 
passive knowledge of only one or no foreign language.
7.2. Professional (career) advancement of natural and social 
scientists
The basic dimension of career advancement in science, as we have 
already said, is determined above all by attaining academic degrees 
(masters and doctoral) and promotion into ranks. For this reason, the 
career pattern can also be based on the temporal dimension of attain-
ing degrees and ranks.
Table 5 shows the age of natural and social scientists on gaining their 
doctoral degrees, and the initial age at selection for a specific rank. From 
all the dimensions of the formal research career pathways, natural and 
social scientists manifested significant statistical differences only in the 
age on gaining a doctorate. The median age of the natural scientists on 
obtaining a doctoral degree was 35.3 years, while social scientists record-
ed the median age of 38.3. The youngest persons in both fields on earning 
their doctorate were only 27 years old at the time. The oldest social scien-
tist at the time of obtaining the doctorate was 54, while the oldest natural 
scientist was even older, 57 year of age. Although the frequency distribu-
tion on the age scale is irregular, it is possible to identify the modal and 
median values that differ by field. Thus, most natural scientists earned 
their doctoral degrees at the age of thirty-two (32), and then at the age of 
thirty-four (30), whereas the greatest number of social scientists earned 
their degrees at the age of thirty-four (14), thirty-five (14), and thirty-eight 
(13). Furthermore, one half of all natural scientists earned their doctoral 
degrees at 33.5 years of age, while one half of social scientists did the same 
at the age of 37.5. A summary by most of the indicators (with the excep-
tion of the oldest new doctorate holder) shows that the natural scientists 
earned their basic precondition for further career much earlier.
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Table 5. Patterns of professional (career) promotion by field
Natural sciences 
(310)
Social sciences 
(167)
AGE AT DOCTORATE
Under 30
31 – 35
36 – 40
41 – 45
46 and older
Total
 18.9
 45.6
 19.6
  9.6
  6.3
100.0
  8.2
 30.8
 28.9
 21.4
 10.7
100.0
Average age
Standard deviation
Youngest person
Oldest person
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
 35.3
  5.865
 27
 57
 –5.258
458
  0.000
 38.3
  6.025
 27
 54
AGE AT ELECTION FOR 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
Under 30
31 – 35
36 – 40
41 – 45
46 – 50 
51 and older 
Total
  2.7
 26.1
 35.2
 18.9
  6.3
 10.8
100.0
  4.8
 22.6
 32.3
 20.9
 14.6
  4.8
100.0
Average age
Standard deviation
Youngest person
Oldest person
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
 40
  6.668
 29
 57
 –0.026
171
  0.979
 40
  6.354
 30
 56
AGE AT ELECTION FOR SENIOR 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
Under 35
36 – 40
41 – 45
46 – 50
51 – 55
56 and older
Total
  6.9
 15.5
 22.4
 29.3
 17.3
  8.6
100.0
  2.6
 15.8
 26.3
 36.9
 10.5
  7.9
100.0
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Natural sciences 
(310)
Social sciences 
(167)
AGE AT ELECTION FOR SENIOR 
RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
Average age
Standard deviation
Youngest person
Oldest person
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
 46.5
  7.037
 30
 62
 –0.069
 94
  0.945
 46.6
  6.188
 34
 59
AGE AT APPOINTMENT FOR 
RESEARCH ADVISER
Under 40
41 – 45
46 – 50
51 – 55
56 and older
Total
  4.8
 21.7
 38.6
 24.1
 10.8
100.0
  0.0
 17.4
 39.1
 26.1
 17.4
100.0
Average age
Standard deviation
Youngest person
Oldest person
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
 48.9
  5.521
 37
 64
 –1.455
127
  0.148
 50.3
  4.931
 42
 63
The better starting position of the natural scientists, however, 
did not lead to faster progress up the career ladder. Natural and so-
cial scientists did not manifest any statistically significant differences 
in terms of age on earning their ranks, as shown in Table 5. Having 
in mind the data from the previous table which indicated that social 
scientists performed better at all levels of the research career grades, 
without any difference in the age structures of the natural and social 
scientists (Table 1), the findings could indicate two different career 
patterns in the social and the natural sciences. For example, out of 
the 18.9% of natural scientists who earned their doctorates before 
the age of thirty, only 2.7% were selected to their first rank (research 
associate or assistant professor) before the age of thirty. In contrast, 
of the 8.2% of social scientists who also completed their doctorates 
before the age of thirty, 4.8% were appointed to their first scientific 
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rank by the age of thirty. In selection to higher ranks, cases of fast 
promotion take place according to the opposite pattern: by the age of 
thirty-five, 6.9% of natural scientists and only 2.6% of social scien-
tists have been selected to the rank of senior research associate (as-
sociate professor), and by the age of forty, 4.8% of natural scientists 
was selected to the position of research adviser (full professor), but 
no social scientists.
Without crossing the line of empirical evidence, we can conclude 
that, despite the earlier age of obtaining the doctorate, scientific ca-
reer advancement in the natural sciences is relatively slower (and also 
harder). Later, natural scientists’ careers advance faster than the social 
scientists’ careers. Naturally, this trend, implied from the frequencies, 
was not statistically significant.
Despite the insignificant difference in earning individual scientific 
ranks between the fields, an examination of the responses yielded some 
more interesting information. Scientists become research associates in 
both fields at the age of 40 on average, senior research associates at 46.5, 
and research advisers at an average age of 48.9 years in the natural and 
50.3 years in the social sciences. Furthermore, the first scientific rank 
earned at the youngest age was at the age of twenty-nine in the natural 
sciences, and at the age of thirty in the social sciences. The youngest 
natural scientist was appointed senior research associate at the age of 
30, and the youngest social scientist at the age of 34. The earliest ap-
pointment to the highest (professional) rank was made in the natural 
sciences – at the age of 37 – while in the social sciences it was completed 
at the age of 42.
7.3. Institutional and organisational context
Scientists’ professional activity takes place within two separate, 
but functionally intertwined, contexts – scientific fields as the socio-
cognitive frameworks of the scientific profession on the one hand, and 
the socio-organisational framework reflecting the division of work in 
science into research, education and development within the respective 
types of scientific institutions on the other. While scientific fields re-
flect the cognitive differentiation of science within different but inter-
twined fields, and reflect the internal dimension of science itself, the 
institutional system of scientific activity is more greatly subject to the 
organisational interventions of the wider social environment. Moreover, 
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contemporary science of the developed world cannot rest on the models 
of linear impregnation of three types of research with relevant institu-
tions, so the triple helix and endless transition model is applied on the 
relation between industry, university and the government (Etzkowitz; 
Leydesdorff, 1998).
Scientific institutions in Croatia witnessed significant reorganisa-
tion in the period of transition between 1990 and 2004, but not mod-
ernisation. The management and organisation of university institutes 
underwent particularly significant changes with the change of their 
status to public institutes under the 1993 Scientific Research Activity 
Act. Former industrial institutes and R&D departments in the business 
sector experienced similar changes, with an erosion of their research 
and development function or their complete disappearance due to the 
economic collapse in the early 1990s.
(1) The changes in the institutional system naturally also altered 
the personnel structure in the primarily research, educational or devel-
opmental dimension of scientific work. Data from Table 6 thus indicate 
the increased concentration of the already most numerous scientific 
personnel at universities by a full ten structural points. On the other 
hand, the share of scientists working at institutes and other scientific 
institutions dwindled.
Table 6. Structural changes in the context of institution and field 
(samples of Croatian scientists from 1990 and 2004)
1990 2004
SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTION
Faculty
(Public) institute
Other institutions
Total
 51.2
 22.2
 26.6
100.0
 61.4
 16.4
 22.2
100.0
Chi-square = 39.013; df = 2; p = 0.00
SCIENTIFIC FIELD
Natural sciences
Technical sciences
Biomedical sciences
Biotechnical sciences
Social sciences and humanities
Total
 16.6
 31.3
 19.3
  9.9
 22.9
100.0
 20.0
 20.7
 28.5
  8.1
 22.6
100.0
Chi-square = 81.919; df = 4; p = 0.00
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Since the R&D sector is presented together with other institu-
tions such as health care institutes, the Croatian Academy of Sciences 
and Arts (HAZU), the Meteorological and Hydrological Service 
(DHMZ), the Lexicographic Institute, and similar institutions, due 
to the shrinking share and for the needs of comparison with the situ-
ation in 1990, the reduction in the personnel potential in the seg-
ment of other institutions does not seem that dramatic. According 
to official sources from 1991, industrial institutes employed 1,360 
researchers in 1991, while the number dropped to 502 ten years later 
in 2001.7 This accounted for a drop in the share of the R&D sector 
in the structure of total scientific and research potential from 13.3% 
to only 5.5%. An even greater shrinking of the sector is indicated by 
the findings that 18.8% of the personnel of the industrial institutes 
and research units in the business sector in 1990 had declined to only 
6.0% of personnel in industrial institutes or R&D units in companies 
in 2004.
Slovenia, whose institutional structure was less academic and sig-
nificantly more development-oriented than Croatia’s, is a very graphic 
example. The institutional distribution of R&D in Slovenia is evident 
from a larger share of companies (20%), a significantly smaller share of 
universities (43%), a slightly greater representation of public institutes 
(19%), and a much greater share of other institutions (22%).8 The share 
of other institutions in Croatia, without an R&D sector came to only 
16.2% in 2004.
On the cognitive level of differentiation of Croatian science, we 
have to draw attention to the stagnant stratum of the social sciences 
and humanities, and the increased presence of the natural sciences (by 
3.4 structural points) within the overall pool of scientists between 1990 
and 2004.
The institutional division of natural and social scientists in 2004 
(Table IV, appendix) indicates significant differences by fields: a far 
greater number of public institutes in the natural sciences (superiority 
of the Ruđer Bošković institute in terms of personnel), a greater number 
of faculties in the social sciences, and a higher frequency of other insti-
tutions in the natural sciences.
 7 Source: Registry of Scientists and Researchers at the Ministry of Science and Technology of 
the Republic of Croatia – on 31 December 1991 and June 2001.
 8 According to the data stated in UNESCO’s studies of scientific potential of the transition 
countries of South-Eastern Europe (Prpić, 2002).
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The structure of the natural and the social sciences in the insti-
tutional context (presented in Table 7) confirms the same significant 
differences in the distribution of the most qualified scientific potential. 
Thus, according to the findings of the web survey, of the total number 
of doctors in the natural and the social sciences, there were 44.2% of 
natural scientists in public institutes, as compared to 15.6% of social 
scientists; there were 44.5% of natural scientists at faculties, and as 
many as 80.8% of social scientists; other institutions employed 11.3% of 
natural scientists, and only 3.6% of qualified social scientists.
Table 7. Structure of doctors of the natural and the social sciences by 
institutional context and type of research
Natural sciences
(310)
Social sciences
(167)
TYPE OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 
INSTITUTION
Public institute
Higher-education institution
Other institutions*
Total
 44.2
 44.5
 11.3
100.0
 15.6
 80.8
  3.6
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
 58.524
 2
 0.000
TYPE OF RESEARCH
Basic research
Applied and development
Mixed-type research
Total
 61.4
 15.9
 22.7
100.0
 23.4
 38.3
 38.3
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
65.275
 2
 0.000
*  Industrial institutes, research/development units within other institutions, HAZU, DHMZ, health care 
institutions and similar
A comparison of the institutional division of doctors of the natu-
ral and the social sciences with the institutional division of the total 
Croatian scientific potential indicates the following relations. Compared 
with the average in public institutes (16.4%), the share of doctors of the 
social sciences is close to the average (15.6%), while the share of doctors 
of the natural sciences (44.2%) is significantly higher. With the aver-
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age in higher-education institutions (61.4%), the share of doctors of the 
natural sciences is underrepresented (44.5%), while doctors of the so-
cial sciences are overrepresented (80.8%). Compared with the average 
in other institutions (22.2%), doctors of science are underrepresented 
in both fields – slightly less in the natural sciences (11.3%), and signifi-
cantly more in the social sciences (3.6%). These findings indicate the 
concentration of the most qualified scientific personnel in the research 
sector of the natural sciences, and lower-qualified personnel outside 
the university and research sectors in both fields.
(2) The organisational context of the scientific profession is also 
determined by the type of research, apart from the mentioned field 
and institutional patterns. To be more precise, the type of research is 
an important socio-cognitive framework of the scientific profession 
that expresses different goals of scientific activity. These goals can be 
strictly cognitive, but also socially practical or economically profitable. 
The earlier division to basic research, applied research, and experimen-
tal development is rather outdated today and it is mostly connected to 
the already abandoned division into the pure science that the academic 
scientist is engaged in, and the applied, commercial science in the busi-
ness sector. These borders are much more flexible in developed socie-
ties, and certain types of research are intertwined. The strict division of 
work between scientific research institutions has been abandoned, and 
corporate institutes are also engaged in basic research today. Similarly, 
universities and scientific institutes also frequently engage in applied 
research. Whitley (1984) pointed out their increasing relevance back in 
the 1980s.
Since only a minor number of scientists work on experimental 
development in Croatian science, they are still (which is usual here) 
merged with applied research in processing and recording the findings. 
Table 7 shows doctors of the natural and the social sciences that mani-
fested statistically significant differences according to the research ty-
pology modified in this way. Thus, significantly more natural scientists 
were engaged in basic research (61.4% of natural scientists compared 
to 23.4% of social scientists), and more social scientists worked on ap-
plied research and experimental development (38.3% of social scientists 
compared to 22.7% of natural scientists). Mixed-type research, which 
became quite usual in the world a long time ago, was represented in 
the population of doctors of the social sciences at 38.3%, and in the 
population of doctors of natural science at 22.7%. If the figures were the 
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other way around, we could perhaps conclude that the one-third share 
of mixed-type research was an indicator of stimulating scientific activ-
ity, but since this concerns the social sciences, it is more probable that 
it relates to so-called market research which is conducted in parallel to 
the underfunded research programmes of primary scientific activity 
due to the lack of funding. Such research was encouraged mostly by 
scientific policy and its goals, and to a lesser extent by commissions 
by the potential beneficiaries of scientific results, so it cannot be a true 
measure of the modernisation of Croatian science.
7.4. Professional position and role of doctors of the natural and 
social sciences
The professional position and role of scientists are determined by 
macrosocial conditions, but also by the division of the professional ac-
tivities on the microlevel of the institution and the macrolevel of the 
Croatian and international (European) scientific community. Since it 
was not possible for the first level of the general social and material de-
terminants of the position and role of the scientist to be covered by this 
study, their professional position was investigated on two other levels. 
Operationally, the basic characteristics of the professional position of 
doctors of the natural and the social sciences were investigated with 
the help of the indicators in the division of research and executive jobs 
and roles in scientific institutions, the division of collaborative and in-
fluential roles in the scientific (Croatian and international) commu-
nity, and at the level of scientists’ networks. Scientific productivity and 
production, as components of professional roles and status, are dealt 
with separately in the chapter on scientific production because of their 
fundamental importance in the overall scientific career.
7.4.1. Patterns of division of research and executive tasks by field
The basic research activity of doctors of the natural and the social 
sciences was studied in terms of their engagement in local and interna-
tional projects and through the quantitative and (in one segment) qual-
itative dimension of their research engagement (Table V, appendix).
(1) Engagement in projects is the basic professional obligation 
of every scientist in the Croatian scientific system, so the differ-
ences in project engagement are not, as can be expected, manifested 
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by fields.9 However, differences surface at the level of five-year par-
ticipation in international projects.10 The more substantial access of 
Croatian natural scientists (60.7%) to international research activi-
ties and their participation in international research teams on joint 
projects have a double footing. The more universal object of research 
in the natural sciences has allowed the greater presence of natural 
scientists, and at the same time this is a reflection of the longer pres-
ence of Croatian natural scientists in the international scientific hubs. 
In contrast, Croatian social scientists were disadvantaged in the in-
ternational division of tasks in two ways. They were limited by the 
specific and locally-determined object of research, and a more signifi-
cant breakthrough into the international research market is of rather 
recent date. It is widely known that in the early socialist times, in 
the 1950s, and even in the early 1960s, scientists largely emigrated, 
and international collaboration was possible to a limited extent only 
to natural scientists and scientists of a similar profile, while interna-
tional cooperation in the social sciences was more an exception than 
a rule.11 In later years, when the restrictions and distrust of coopera-
tion with foreigners relaxed, the entrance of the social scientists to 
the international scientific scene did not take place either. The inertia 
of scientific cooperation within the country still prevailed, and was 
tolerated by the scientific system. Institutional encouragement and 
the pressure from science policy for the Croatian scientific commu-
nity to open up in all fields of research, including the social sciences, 
are of recent date, and are connected to the transitional restructuring 
of the scientific system. Political expectations embodied in demands 
for international reviews and publishing in international journals 
have only recently become an instrument in scientific promotion. 
The finding showing 49.4% of social scientists, with doctoral degrees 
  9 Insignificant differences in engagement in domestic projects by field were expressed in 
chi-square = 2.635; df = 1, p = 0.105.
 10 Insignificant differences in engagement in international (foreign) projects by field were 
expressed in chi-square = 5.628; df = 1, p = 0.018.
 11 The breaking off of communication with the world in 1946 had a long-lasting impact 
within the framework of the former socialist system. Even the most accessible mode of in-
ternational cooperation, publishing in international journals, was established only later, and 
only in some fields. Yugoslavia, for example, ranked 48th among 172 countries by the number 
of published works of its scientists in the field of the natural and technical sciences in in-
ternationally renowned scientific/professional journals in 1988. The situation in the social 
sciences was much worse: it ranked 61st on the list of 143 countries (P. Glavač, in: Mežnarić, 
1990: 40).
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in their fields, involved in international projects from 1999 to 2004 
should be considered in the described context.
(2) At the level of local projects where no differences were noticed 
between the fields thanks to the mandatory engagement of doctors 
of science in projects, a difference in the five-year project load was, 
however, determined.12 The greatest number of scientists were work-
ing on two and even three projects at a time, with natural scientists 
being in the majority with this level of workload. Social scientists were 
in the lead with the relatively greater involvement in one project, but 
also with the greater involvement in a large number of projects. In 
the observed period, 8.4% of social scientists worked on four projects, 
9.0% worked on five projects and as many as 11.4% of social scientists 
worked on six or more projects. There were around half fewer natural 
scientists at that level of activity. Expressed in median values, natural 
scientists worked on 2.7 projects in total in a five-year period, and so-
cial scientists on 3.7.
With the greater representation of natural scientists in interna-
tional research, a borderline significance of differences between fields 
according the intensity of cooperation and extent of involvement in 
international projects has been noted.13 It was reflected in the almost 
equal proportion of natural and social scientists with one international 
project (around 29%), but also with a greater stratum of natural sci-
entists with two (18.3%), and three and more international projects 
(13.1%). The average number of international projects came to 1.2 in 
the natural sciences, and 0.9 in the social sciences.
(3) The qualitative dimension of information on scientists’ project 
engagement and load refers to the division of research work and the 
influence in such a division of tasks. The theoretical basis of the needed 
information at the qualitative level is the concept of the routine and key 
research roles (Prpić, 2000). They make up one of the most important 
forms of the division of tasks in science, especially in developing team 
work. The role of the leader (project, team) implies their key role in the 
selection of the topic, or object of the research, their key position in the 
formulation of research objectives, selection of methods and modes of 
processing findings, in the division of subtopics and sections of the re-
 12 Significance of differences between fields in the number of domestic projects is expressed 
on the level of t-values = 3.249; df = 469, p = 0.001.
 13 Borderline significance of differences between fields by number of international projects 
is expressed on the level of t-values = 1.950; df = 469, p = 0.052.
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search, and their key role in the finishing of the research – elaboration 
of results and writing reports. Depending on the size of the teams and 
the division of tasks in the team, the cooperation and position of the 
members of the team does not have to necessarily exclude decisive par-
ticipation in any of the mentioned research tasks. However, the leader’s 
position is, by definition, key. The routine tasks in the research process 
are usually divided among all members of the team, but the manager 
does have the key role in their distribution.
The pattern of the key and routine tasks in the research process 
and the influence of the leader on their distribution did not neces-
sarily include the lack of a key role in the collaborative status for the 
doctoral population. They key role is something that is (re)defined 
in the team work of qualified scientists by project segments, from 
one stage to another, in the course of the whole research process, 
and the scientist’s autonomy is greater than in some other activities. 
The distribution of the management role in the local14 and interna-
tional15 projects of natural and social scientists did not show any sta-
tistically significant differences between the analysed fields. Slightly 
fewer than one third of doctors of the natural (31.3%) and the social 
sciences (28.1%) were engaged only as collaborators in local projects 
in the five-year period from 1999 to 2004. In contrast, the majority 
of the two-thirds of doctors of the natural and the social sciences 
performed the leading role in at least one of the projects in the same 
period. At the same time, the share of persons with leading positions 
in a great number of projects was two times greater in the popula-
tion of social scientists. The average number of local projects with 
leadership roles came to 1.24 for natural scientists, and 1.49 for social 
scientists. The insignificant differences between the natural and so-
cial scientists in the frequency of leadership roles even at the level of 
international projects lead to the conclusion that scientists’ engage-
ment and their international reputation in both fields are balanced, 
regardless of the wider scientific cooperation of the natural scientists 
and their longer tradition in cooperation. Eminent persons from the 
social sciences, despite their scarcity, succeeded in engaging in inter-
national scientific cooperation more quickly, and even established a 
 14 Statistical insignificance of differences between fields by the number of leading roles in 
local projects is expressed on the level of t-value = –1.643; df = 334, p = 0.101.
 15 Statistical insignificance of differences between fields by the number of leading roles in 
international projects is expressed on the level of t-value = 1.726; df = 294, p = 0.085.
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reputation as experts in their field who can model and lead research 
projects.
(4) The frequency of executive and coordinating roles in a scien-
tific institution and its organisational units – departments, divisions, 
centres, institutes and similar – was investigated in connection with the 
distribution of the influence and power of natural and social scientists 
at the microinstitutional level. In total, 36.9% of natural scientists and 
43.1% of social scientists performed an executive role at the organisa-
tional level or at the helm of an institution, and the differences among 
them by fields were not statistically relevant.16
7.4.2. Patterns of participation and roles in the scientific community 
by field
Professional and scientific organisations, international associa-
tions of scientists, and involvement in the editorial boards of profes-
sional and scientific journals and in peer reviews are only a few of the 
forms of professional integration of scientists into the wider, Croatian 
and international scientific community. These types of professional as-
sociation and scientific work form a framework of scientific commu-
nication, which defines the standards and rules of professional work 
and conduct for a certain scientific field or discipline. Considering the 
doctoral population of the natural and the social sciences, it seemed 
important to investigate this segment of scientific, professional and so-
cial activity in both scientific areas (Table VI, appendix).
(1) One of the positions with the potential power to define stand-
ards and influence on the (re)distribution of topics and quality of 
scientific work is membership in editorial boards of scientific and 
professional journals. Significant differences were seen between 
the natural and social scientists’ participation in editorial boards at 
both local17 and international levels.18 As many as one half of all the 
social scientists surveyed participated in editorial boards of a local 
journal, according to the responses provided by the doctorate hold-
ers, while significantly fewer natural scientists performed that role 
(21.8%). This may be the most prominent case where the non-repre-
sentativeness of the social sciences was evident through its leaning 
 16 Chi-square = 1.762; df = 1; p = 0.184.
 17 T-value = –6.801; df = 466; p = 0.000.
 18 T-value = –2.429; df = 466; p = 0.016.
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to the more eminent doctoral structure, while the representativeness 
of the natural sciences presented more realistic results. Membership 
of an editorial board of international journals also showed positive 
correlations with social scientists, but the differences by fields were 
not particularly expressed: 17% of social scientists compared to 9.2% 
natural scientists.
The gatekeeping role of the scientist, as a measure of their esteem, 
can be operatively defined and identified in several ways: as mentor-
ship and membership of an examining committee in master’s and doc-
toral programmes, engagement in editorial work in scientific journals, 
but also in peer reviews. Within the context of an empirical search 
for the distinctive components of the professional position and role 
of a scientist (doctor) of the natural and the social sciences, signifi-
cant differences appeared in the scope of the role of natural and social 
scientists as reviewers. As many as 85% of doctors of the social sci-
ences reviewed the work of local peers in the five years between 1999 
and 2004, and as many as 43.6% of social scientists reviewed a great 
number of papers. On average, every doctor of the social sciences re-
viewed 7.5 papers produced by their Croatian colleagues in the period 
of five years, whereas every doctor of the natural sciences reviewed 
only 1.8%.19 In contrast, the greater activity of natural scientists in in-
ternational peer reviews is evidence of the greater exposure and inter-
national activity of natural scientists. On average, every doctor of the 
natural sciences reviewed 4.2 papers by their foreign colleagues in the 
course of five years, and every doctor of the social sciences reviewed 
half that number of papers, 2.1.20 To sum up, greater differences by 
field were seen at the level of reviews of Croatian peers in favour of 
social scientists, while smaller, but still statistically significant, differ-
ences were evident at the level of the review of foreign peers in favour 
of natural scientists.
(2) The presence of natural and social scientists in the wider sci-
entific community outside their original institution was also prac-
tically observed via professional and scientific organisations. Their 
primary task is to promote scientific knowledge and interest, to ad-
vance the profession and scientific field and discipline, determining 
and protecting professional rights and obligations, and laying down 
rules of scientific activity and professional behaviour (code of profes-
 19 T-test = –9.481; df = 468; p = 0.000.
 20 T-test = 2.009; df = 468; p = 0.045. 
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sional conduct and code of ethics). Participation and an active role in 
Croatian associations proved to be different in the natural sciences 
than in the social sciences,21 but it was similar in terms of interna-
tional organisations22. Despite the fact that membership in scientific 
organisations, with the minimum engagement (payment of member-
ship fee), provides some rather practical benefits – personal visibil-
ity and access to a wider circle of colleagues, information on devel-
opments in the line of work (field, discipline), discounts for books, 
journals, etc., as many as 20.7% of doctors of the social sciences were 
not members of any association, while there were significantly fewer 
disinterested doctors of the natural sciences (9.4%). The differences 
between the fields were also seen in the structure of membership. 
While natural scientists were more inclined to membership in only 
one association (32.5%), or in a great number of associations (14.3% in 
four or more associations), social scientists were mostly members of 
two associations (29.3%) or only one original association (28.6%). On 
average, natural scientists participated in two Croatian associations, 
while social scientists took part in 1.6 associations. Furthermore, the 
active engagement of natural scientists in the executive and operating 
bodies of professional and scientific associations makes them stand 
out statistically compared to social scientists. The latter worked in ex-
ecutive and operating structures significantly less (18.8%), and natu-
ral scientists significantly more (29.6%).
However, international associations did not distinguish our re-
spondents accordingly. To be more precise, their membership in foreign 
associations ranged in insignificant differences from average member-
ship in one association in the natural sciences to 1.2 associations in the 
social sciences. In contrast to the Croatian associations, social scien-
tists were slightly more active in the executive and operating bodies of 
foreign associations: 10.9% of Croatian scientists and 7.5% of Croatian 
natural scientists took part in their operation.
 21 Significance of differences between the social and the natural sciences in membership in lo-
cal associations was determined on the level of t-value = 3.149; df = 470, p = 0.002. Significance of 
differences between the social and the natural sciences in membership of executive and operating 
bodies in local associations was determined on the level of t-value = 2.255; df = 470, p = 0.025.
 22 (In)significance of differences between the social and the natural sciences in membership 
of international associations was determined on the level of t-value = –1.619; df = 470, p =0.106. 
(In)sig nificance of differences between the social and the natural sciences in membership of 
executive and operating bodies in foreign associations was determined on the level of t-value = 
–1.886; df = 470, p = 0.060.
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7.4.3. Patterns of scientists’ networks by field
The self-sufficient, loner scientist, working as a one-man-band (to 
use the pop-culture expression), has almost completely disappeared 
from contemporary science. It is atypical and almost impossible in the 
majority of scientific fields and disciplines to survive independently in 
science and on the project market outside organisational, financial and 
institutional structures and research, project and group gatherings and 
associations. Science has changed its internal structure since the times 
of the giants of science and progenitors of many scientific disciplines, 
multiplying many times over the areas, disciplines, fields and drawers 
in which the results of the immeasurable pieces of research are classi-
fied. Today, scientists are double-bound: they are bound to the results 
of the research of other scientists, but also to cooperation with others. 
Team work is one of the most relevant characteristics of the social or-
ganisations of science. The web survey of doctors of the natural and 
the social sciences also collected data on regular cooperation in joint 
research, both in permanent teams and in flexible research groups. 
Furthermore, considering our respondents’ participation in interna-
tional projects, the scope of international cooperation and exchange of 
information with international colleagues were also investigated, even 
where no firm collaborative connections had been established (Table 
VII, appendix).
Natural and social scientists differed in the scope of their coopera-
tion, both in the Croatian23 and international framework,24 while no 
statistically significant differences were found at the level of exchange 
of information.25 The average number of local collaborators in joint re-
search amounted to 4.6 in the natural sciences and 3.6 in the social sci-
ences. However, the slight differences in average values hide the much 
greater differences in distribution and range of the circle of collabo-
rators. In response to the question on the number of colleagues with 
whom they were working on joint research in a permanent research 
team and in flexible research groups alike, almost one quarter of social 
scientists (24.1%) said they mostly worked alone! There were much few-
er independent natural scientists (6.2%). The modular value of natural 
scientists that referred to the most frequent form of cooperation was 
 23 T-value = 2.078; df = 469; p = 0.038.
 24 Chi-square = 15.533; df = 1; p = 0.000.
 25 Chi-square = 0.042; df = 1; p = 0.838.
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found among the highly cooperative natural scientists who, as a rule, 
cooperated with six or more collaborators (22.1%), while the modular 
value of social scientists showed a model of cooperation with two col-
laborators (19.3%). These differences emerge from the very structure of 
the objects of the two fields, and they partly reflect their different com-
plexity and the depth of analysis, which requires a different approach 
to research.
The frequency of cooperation at the international level also showed 
the significant advantage of the natural sciences. Regular cooperation 
with international colleagues was established by 63.4% of doctors of 
the natural sciences, and by only 44.6% of doctors of the social sci-
ences. The distribution of information with international colleagues 
was almost equal in both fields: 72.4% of natural scientists and 71.5% 
of social scientists conducted regular communication without any firm 
cooperation.
7.4.4. External signs of acknowledgment or distinctive scientific 
excellence
An excellent person is created as a result of the personal ambition 
and capacity to mould oneself in permanent and intense mental and 
physical effort. The pursuit of one’s own vocation and the aspiration 
to authenticity is a life project that only the best can achieve. Only few 
meet these anthropological preconditions and are capable of build-
ing themselves into a highly-qualified person in one field of human 
activity.
Scientific excellence and the success of a scientist can be measured 
in several ways. Practically, acknowledgment by the scientific commu-
nity and by the wider social public can be expressed in review proce-
dures, citations, recognisability in the international scientific commu-
nity, awards, etc. Since the valorisation of the scientific work of natu-
ral and social scientists on the basis of the production of books and 
journals is discussed in the chapter on scientific production, and the 
perceptions of scientific quality in the chapter of that name, we will 
only touch upon the external signs – the scientific recognisability of 
our respondents in the international context and their awards. The data 
presented in the appendix (Table VIII) shows that natural and social 
scientists did not differ statistically by any of the external measures of 
scientific excellence.
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(1) More than half of the respondents gave a positive answer to 
the question whether and how often they were invited to go abroad to 
conduct research or cooperate with foreign colleagues over the course 
of five years (1999–2004) with paid expenses, or to teach at a foreign 
university or visit a scientific institution, deliver a lecture at a scien-
tific conference, and so on. The highest-profile scientists in those two 
fields were those who received the most invitations: 18.9% of natural 
scientists and 21.5% of social scientists with four or five invitations 
in five years. This practically means that the segment of around one 
fifth of the most exposed natural and social scientists was invited to 
perform a scientific activity abroad with covered expenses at least 
once a year.
Apart from being a good measure of recognition, invitations from 
abroad also proved potentially efficient (“dangerous”) as a brain drain 
mechanism. The 2004 study of the overall scientific population indi-
cated that invitations from abroad (with covered expenses) were pre-
dictable among the set of variables pertaining to scientific prominence 
and the potential brain drain (beta-index = 0.102; p = 0.01) (Golub, 
2005).
(2) An award for scientific work is the most direct expression of 
acclaim for a scientist. It is confirmation of the value of their body 
of scientific work or of an individual achievement (written or ma-
terial work). Croatia’s fundamental award system in science was 
established by the 1995 Croatian National Science Award Act. The 
awards are presented by the Republic of Croatia (Parliament) for ex-
ceptional achievements in scientific research, for the expansion of sci-
entific knowledge, and for scientific achievements in the application 
of the results of scientific research. Scientists, researchers and junior 
researchers can receive a national award (cash prize and certificate) 
in the form of (1) lifetime achievement award,26 (2) annual science 
award27 and (3) annual award for the popularisation and promotion 
 26 The lifetime achievement award is presented to esteemed scientists for their overall scien-
tific work which presents their personal contribution to the expansion of scientific knowledge 
and the application of results of research and scientific activity (Article 3, Croatian National 
Science Awards Act).
 27 The annual award is presented for (1) significant scientific achievement (esteemed sci-
entific work or a body of works which significantly contributes to the expansion of scientific 
knowledge), (2) scientific discovery (internationally recognised scientific work that produces a 
significant breakthrough in the scientific field), (3) prominent work by a junior researcher, (4) 
the application of results of scientific work (significant technological achievements manifested 
in its special quality or distribution) (Article 5, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the same Act).
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of science28 in all six scientific fields. Furthermore, awards for scien-
tific contributions are also presented by scientific field every year by 
the Croatian Academy of Arts and Sciences (Josip Juraj Strossmayer 
Award), and there are also other award systems, such as the Ruđer 
Bošković award for achievements in natural science, awarded by the 
Ruđer Bošković Institute.
Natural and social scientists were on a par by this indicator as well. 
The total number of rewarded scientists hovered around one quarter of 
the surveyed doctors in both fields (Table VIII, appendix). This piece of 
information should be compared with the 38.5% of eminent Croatian 
scientists and 13.2% of all scientists who received awards in 1995 and 
1990. Doctors of science ranked somewhere between the scientific 
elite29 and the overall scientific population in the award-winner rating, 
in compliance with the scientific excellence rating, according to which 
a doctoral degree in science was a springboard for top achievements in 
science.
An international award can be a measure of excellence in a person’s 
scientific contribution even more than a domestic award. The great-
est scientific achievements of Croatian scientists were made by two 
Nobel Prize winners, natural scientists Lavoslav Ružička and Vladimir 
Prelog, neither of whom, however, belonged to the Croatian scientific 
community. International awards for scientific achievements of lower 
rank were presented to (according to our survey) 6.5% of Croatian doc-
tors of the natural sciences and 4.2% of Croatian doctors of the social 
sciences. In terms of absolute numbers, this means that there were 15 
laureates with one international award, 4 laureates with two awards 
and one laureate with three awards among 310 natural scientists. Three 
of the 167 surveyed social scientists won one international award, two 
won two awards respectively, and one social scientist won three and one 
won four international awards.
(3) Since our respondents did not show any differences at the level 
of external signs of scientific excellence measured by international rec-
 28 The annual award for the popularisation and promotion of science is presented for a 
contribution in the dissemination of scientific knowledge, as manifested in the popular pres-
entation of valuable professional and scientific publications and other forms of presentation 
(Article 4).
 29 The population of eminent Croatian scientists consisted of scientists listed in the bio-
graphical directory Who is Who in Croatia (Maletić, 1993), who lived in Croatia and who were 
(still) active scientists in 1995 at a maximum age of 70.
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ognisability and awards by field, we tried to bring together a certain 
number of variables of the scientific, working and professional envi-
ronment to identify natural and social scientists with above-average 
results indirectly or in the segment of extreme values. Following that 
line of reasoning, attention was focused on the highest achieved ranks, 
early promotion in their career, exceptional linguistic education (poly-
glotism), intense project engagement, exposed gatekeeping roles, activ-
ity outside institutions in the wider scientific community, and regular 
international cooperation.
Data from Table 8 indicate the following differentiations by 
field. Natural scientists achieved better results in terms of early ca-
reer advancement. Thus, almost two-thirds of natural scientists had 
acquired their doctoral degrees by the age of 35, and one quarter of 
them had already been selected to the highest rank by the age of 45. 
In contrast, social scientists advanced more slowly in their career, 
but they scored better in the highest ranks in the overall structure of 
scientific ranks. At the level of above-average linguistic competence, 
natural and social scientists did not show any differences: one-tenth 
of the former and one-tenth of the latter could be considered multi-
lingual. A high level of engagement in projects in the five-year period 
pertained to local projects for social scientists, and to international 
projects for natural scientists – one-tenth of doctors of the natural 
sciences performed the leading role in two or even more internation-
al projects.
Along the same lines of local and foreign exposure, the division 
was also seen in high engagement in peer reviews: a great number 
of Croatian works were reviewed by exposed social scientists, and a 
great number of international works by exposed natural scientists. 
And while established social scientists were far more present in edito-
rial boards of both local and international journals, established natu-
ral scientists manifested greater activity at the level of management 
and working bodies of Croatian professional and scientific associa-
tions. Finally, regular scientific cooperation is the great trump card 
and advantage of the natural scientists. Almost two-thirds of doctors 
of the natural sciences cooperate regularly with foreign colleagues, 
and, consequently, the indicator cannot be a measure of exposure or 
extreme achievement in science, but more of an indicator of the readi-
ness of Croatian natural scientists to meet the demands of contempo-
rary science.
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Table 8. Patterns (conditions) of scientific eminence by field
Variables of (preconditions of) 
scientific eminence
Natural 
sciences 
(310)
Social 
sciences 
(167)
Significance 
of 
differences
Highest scientific rank: senior research associate and 
research adviser 48.1% 54.0% Significant
Early doctorate (under 35 years of age) 64.5% 39.0% Significant
Early election for research adviser (under 45 years) 26.5% 17.4% Significant
Multilingualism (active knowledge of 3 and more 
foreign languages) 10.4% 11.4% Insignificant
Five and more domestic projects in five-year period 
1999–2004 10.0% 20.4% Significant
Three and more international projects in five-year 
period 1999–2004 13.1%  9.0% Significant
Leading position in international projects (1999–2004) 10.8%  4.2% Significant
Great number of domestic peer reviews in five-year 
period (6 and more)  8.5% 43.6% Significant
Great number of international peer reviews in 
five-year period (6 and more) 19.3% 11.3% Significant
Member of two or more editorial boards of 
Croatian journals  4.3% 18.7% Significant
Member of editorial board of an international journal  9.2% 17.0% Significant
Member of management/operating bodies of Croatian 
scientific/professional organisations 29.6% 18.8% Significant
Member of management/ operating bodies of foreign 
scientific/professional organisations  7.5% 10.9% Insignificant
Regular cooperation with foreign colleagues 63.4% 44.6% Significant
8. Recapitulation of the differences in the working and 
professional environments of natural and social scientists
As the earlier part of this chapter focused on the above-aver-
age results achieved by natural and social scientists, the recapitula-
tion should certainly identify and underpin the set of variables of 
the working and professional environment at the level of the average 
values that showed statistically significant differences between the 
natural and socials scientists. The following overview will thus ig-
nore all the previously presented indicators of the position and role 
in the scientific community that did not show any differential char-
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acteristics, in order to highlight only the distinctive dimensions of 
the two fields.
Even a cursory glance at the data in Table 9 reveals two different 
cognitive and organisational environments pertaining to the natural 
and social sciences respectively. While the domination of the academic 
institutional structure is indisputable in the social sciences, the insti-
tutional pattern of everyday scientific activity is much more expressed 
in the natural sciences. If we recall the institutional structure within 
fields, the frequency of faculties in the natural sciences is on a par with 
institutes (around 44% in both cases). However, the frequency of fac-
ulties in the natural sciences is much lower than the average level of 
the academic sector in Croatia (61.4%), not to speak of the comparison 
with the social sciences where academic institutions are especially pro-
nounced (80.8%).
The section on the institutional and organisational context touched 
upon a certain artificiality and anachronism in the typological divi-
sion of research into fundamental, applied and developmental research, 
considering the recent trend of relaxing the strict demarcation among 
them. Even from that position, the findings obtained from the respons-
es of the Croatian doctors of science indicate significantly different 
research content and goals realised in the natural and social sciences. 
While the natural sciences in Croatia were primarily marked by ba-
sic research, the social sciences reached a certain balance in practising 
various types of research, with a more pronounced share of mixed-type 
research (38.3%).
From the typological point of view, the basic professional activity 
of an average Croatian natural scientist is far more connected to the 
institutes than that of the average Croatian social scientist, or even 
more than that of the average Croatian scientist (Table III, appendix). 
In their cognitive and research efforts, they are more focused on the 
content and goals that are primarily achieved within the framework of 
so-called basic research projects. Their earlier rise in the professional 
scientific career allowed them to acquire scientific education relatively 
early – they win their doctoral degree as thirty-year-olds on average 
(at 35.3 years of age). Their career is not limited to the smaller and 
locally-determined scientific community, but is focused to a rather 
great extent on regular cooperation with international colleagues in 
international and European scientific centres (63.4%). Consequently, 
they participate extensively in international projects (60.7%), with an 
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average of 1.2 projects in the five-year period between 1999 and 2004. 
They make ties to the international scientific community also in other 
forms of cooperation, such as the high rate of international peer re-
views, 4.2 papers in five years. The average natural scientist stands 
out on the Croatian scientific scene with greater scientific cooperation 
and prominence in scientific and professional associations.
Table 9. Patterns of the working and professional environment at the level of 
statistical significance (p ≤ 0.05) by field
Variables of working and 
professional environment
Natural sciences
(310)
Social sciences
(167)
Type of scientific research institutions Public institutes Faculty
Type of research Fundamental Applied, development, 
mixed-type
Scientific rank Worse structure Better structure
Average age at doctorate 35.3 38.3
Engagement in international projects in 
five-year period 1999–2004 60.7% 49.4%
Average number of domestic projects in 
five-year period 1999–2004  2.7  3.7
Average number of international projects in 
five-year period 1999–2004  1.2  0.9
Average number of domestic peer reviews in 
five-year period 1999–2004  1.8  7.5
Average number of international peer reviews in 
five-year period 1999–2004  4.2  2.1
Membership in editorial boards of Croatian
journals (average number)  0.3  0.8
Membership in editorial boards of foreign 
journals (average number)  0.1  0.3
Membership in Croatian scientific, professional 
organisations (average number)  2.0  1.6
Membership in management and operating 
bodies of Croatian scientific, professional 
organisations (average number)  0.4  0.2
Average number of Croatian collaborators in 
joint research  4.6  3.6
Regular cooperation with foreign colleagues 63.4% 44.6%
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In contrast, the average Croatian social scientist is most often em-
ployed in a higher-education institution (80.8%). Alongside research 
activity, the average social scientist is primarily focused on teaching 
and transferring knowledge and acquired research experience to the 
new generations in the field. The goal and the content of the research 
are focused on the fundamental determinants of social and economic 
reality, but also to a far greater extent on the developmental aspect of 
social and economic relations, and the mixed type of projects that in-
corporates the fundamental, developmental and applied postulates of 
the selection of the object and goals of research. The relatively better 
qualification structure in the social sciences, measured by the scale of 
ranks, is attained despite the later time of obtaining degrees – the av-
erage social scientist wins a doctoral degree almost at the age of forty 
(at 38.3 years of age). In contrast to the Croatian natural scientist who 
is more engaged in the international division of work, and is far more 
present at different levels and in different segments of the world and 
European scientific scene, the Croatian social scientist had many more 
professional engagements in Croatia, working on 3.7 projects on aver-
age in the observed period of five years (1999–2004), and reviewing as 
many as 7.5 papers by local authors in the same period. The average 
social scientist also participated in editorial boards and/or committees 
of local journals more frequently, and the only segment of the interna-
tional activities where they scored better than the natural scientist is in 
the publishing segment, where the social scientist was a member of the 
editorial board of international journals.
At the end of the final overview of the relevant distinctive compo-
nents of the working and professional position of the natural and social 
scientist, let us repeat the analyses of the socio-demographic and so-
cialisational and education variables that did not show any significant 
differences between the analysed fields. Having in mind the limitations 
of the methods and conduct of the web survey, it can be underlined in 
conclusion that the natural and social sciences did not rejuvenate and 
recruit selectively, but they scientifically socialised and professionally 
marked their personnel potential in somewhat different ways. The dif-
ferences in the approach and evaluation of certain aspects of socialisa-
tion, but also of the different cognitive, institutional and organisational 
structure and the preference of different patterns in the selection and 
approach to scientific topics and social and scientific goals, also resulted 
in certain differences among natural scientists and social scientists in 
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the manner described above. Far greater differences will be manifested 
in the sector of scientific productivity, whose determinants were only 
implied at this level of analysis.
References
ALLISON, Paul D., LONG, Scott J., KRAUZE, Tad K. (1982). Cumulative advantage 
and inequality in science. American Sociological Review, 77 (5): 615–625.
ALLMENDINGER, J., FUCHS, S., VON STEBUT, J. (1999). Drehtür oder Pater 
Noster? Zur Frage der Verzinsung der Intergration in wissenschaftliche 
Organisationen im Verlauf beruflicher Werdegänge von Wissenschaftlerinnen 
und Wissenschaftlern. In: C., Honegger, S. Hradil, RF., Traxler (Eds.): Grenzenlose 
Gesellschaft? Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 96–107.
ANDERSEN, Heine (2001). The norm of universalism in sciences. Social origin and 
gender of researchers in Denmark. Scientometrics, 50 (2): 255–272.
BECHER, T. (1981). Towards a definition of disciplinary cultures. Studies in Higher 
Education, 6:109–122.
BECHER, T. (1989). Academic tribes and territories: Intellectual enquiry and the cul-
tures of the disciplines. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
BERRY, Collin (1981). The Nobel scientists and the origin of scientific achievement. 
The British Journal of Sociology, 32 (3): 381–391.
BISCHOF-KÖHLER, D. (2002). Von Natur aus anders. Die Psychologie der Geschlechts-
unter schiede. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer.
BOCHOW, M., JOAS, H. (1987). Wissenschaft und Karriere: zum beruflichen Verbleib 
des akademischen Mittelbaus. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
BORMANN, Lutz, ENDERS, Jürgen (2004). Social origin and gender of doctoral de-
gree holders. Impact of particularistic attributes in access to and in later career 
attainment after achieving the doctoral degree in Germany. Scientometrics, 61 
(1): 19–41.
BOURDIEU, P. (1982). The specificity of the scientific field and the social conditions 
of the progress of reason. Social Science Information, 14: 19–47.
CIFRIĆ, Ivan, MAGDALENIĆ, Ivan, ŠTAMBUK, Maja (1984). Društveni položaj 
asistenata u SR Hrvatskoj /Social position of junior researchers in the Socialist 
Republic of Croatia/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu. (typed)
COLE, Stephen (1979). Age and Scientific Performance. American Journal of Sociology, 
25 (4): 613–632.
COLE, Jonathan R., COLE, Stephen (1981). Social stratification in science. Chicago/
London: The University of Chicago Press.
COLE, Jonathan R. (1987). Women in science. In: D. N. Jackson, Ph. Rushton (Eds): 
Scientific excellence. Origins and assessment. Newburg Park/Beverly Hills/
London/New Delhi: Sage, 359–375.
74
BRANKA GOLUB
ČENGIĆ, Drago (1997). Inovacije i modernizacija hrvatskih poduzeća: pristupna 
razmatranja /Innovations and modernization of Croatian companies: access 
discussions/. In: B. Golub, B. Krištofić, D. Čengić: Znanstvene i privredne elite 
/Scientific and economic elites/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja u 
Zagrebu, 67–99.
EASTWOOD, Susan, DERISH, Pamela, LEASH, Evangeline, ORDWAY, Stephen 
(1996). Ethical issues in biomedical research: Perception and practices of post-
doctoral research associates responding to a survey. Science and Engineering 
Ethics, 2 (1): 89–114.
ETZKOWITZ, Henry, LEYDESDORFF, Loet (1998). The endless transition: A “triple 
helix” of university-industry-government relations. Minerva, 36 (3): 203–208.
GOLUB, Branka (1988). Odliv mozgova: socijalni profil istraživača-migranata /Brain 
drain: a social profile of migrant scientists/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istra-
živanja Sveučilišta u Zagrebu /Institute for Social Research in Zagreb/.
GOLUB, Branka (1990). Promjene socijalnih i profesionalnih značajki znanstveno-
istraživačkog kadra u Hrvatskoj/Jugoslaviji /Changes in the social and profes-
sional characteristics of scientists in Croatia/Yugoslavia/. In: K. Prpić (Ed.): 
Znanstveno-tehnološki kadrovski potencijal Hrvatske /Scientific and technological 
human potential of Croatia/. Zagreb: SIZ znanosti Hrvatske; Republički zavod za 
društveno planiranje Hrvatske; Institut za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu, 3–20.
GOLUB, Branka (1997). Socioprofesionalni profil znanstveničke elite /Socio-
professional profile of scientific elites/. In: B. Golub, B. Krištofić, D. Čengić: 
Znanstvene i privredne elite /Scientific and economic elites/. Zagreb: Institut za 
društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu, 9–40.
GOLUB, Branka (2000). Potencijalni (profesionalni i vanjski) egzodus mladih znan-
stvenika / Potential (professional and external) exodus of young researchers/. 
In: K. Prpić (Ed.): U potrazi za akterima znanstvenog i tehnološkog razvoja /In 
search of the actors of scientific and technological development/. Zagreb: Institut 
za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu, 129–186.
GOLUB, Branka (2004). Hrvatski znanstvenici u svijetu: socijalni korijeni u prostoru i 
vremenu /Croatian scientists in the world: Social roots in space and time/. Zagreb: 
Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu.
GOLUB, Branka (2005). Napuštanje znanstvenog poziva i/ili znanstvene karijere 
u Hrvatskoj /Abandoning the scientific vocation and/or scientific career in 
Croatia/. In: K. Prpić (Ed.): Elite znanja u društvu (ne)znanja /Knowledge elites in 
the knowledge(less) society/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu, 
185–229.
GOLUB, Branka, ŠULJOK, Adrijana (2005). Socijalni profil znanstvenika i njegove 
mijene (1990.–2004.) /Social profile of scientists and its changes (1990–2004)/. 
In: K. Prpić (Ed.): Elite znanja u društvu (ne)znanja /Knowledge elites in the 
knowledge(less) society/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu, 
123–183.
HAGSTROM, Warren O. (1974). Competition in science. American Sociological 
Review, 39 (1): 1–18.
75
 THE SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PROFILE OF NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
HEMLIN, Sven, GUSTAFSSON, M. (1996). Research production in the arts and hu-
manities: A questionnaire study of factors influencing research performance. 
Scientometrics, 37 (3): 417–432.
HERMANOWICZ, Joseph C. (2007). Argument and outline for the sociology of sci-
entific (and other) careers. Social Studies of Science, 37 (4): 625–646.
HUBER, Ludwig (1990). Disciplinary cultures and social reproduction. European 
Journal of Education, 25 (3): 241–261.
KAISER, Matthias (2002). Commissioned research in Norway: What money can buy 
– Intermediate results from a nationwide study on the normative implications 
of contract research. Power point presentation at the SSTNET workshop: The 
commercialization of public research and higher education, 13th to 15th September 
2002, Ljubljana.
KNORR-CETINA, Karin D., MULKAY, Michael (1983). Introduction: Emerging 
principles in social studies of science. In: K. D. Knorr-Cetina, M. Mulkay (Ed.): 
Science observed: Perspectives on the social study of science. London/Beverly Hills/ 
New Delhi: Sage, 1–17.
KORIČANČIĆ, Slavko (1971). Analiza o znanstveno-stručnom i znanstveno-nas-
tavnom osoblju u institutima, znanstvenim jedinicama i visokoškolskim nas-
tavnim ustanovama u Hrvatskoj /Analysis of professional and teaching person-
nel at institutes, scientific units and higher-education institutions in Croatia/. 
Zagreb : Institut za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
KRIŠTOFIĆ, Branimir (1997). Manageri i modernitet /Managers and modernity/. In: 
B. Golub, B. Krištofić, D. Čengić: Znanstvene i privredne elite /Scientific and eco-
nomic elites/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu, 41–65.
KRÜGER, H. (1999). Geschlecht – eine schwierige Kategorie. Methodisch-methodo-
logische Fragen der “Gender”-Sensibilität in der Forschung. In: A. Neusel; 
A. Wetterer (Eds.): Vielfältige Verschiedenheiten. Geschlechterverhältnisse in 
Studium, Hochschule und Beruf. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 35–60.
KYVIK, Svein (1988). Age and scientific productivity: Differences between fields of 
learning. The Study of science and technology in the 1990’s: Abstracts. Amsterdam: 
Society for Social Studies of Science; European Association for the Study of 
Science and Technology, 140–141.
KYVIK, Svein (1989). Productivity differences, fields of learning, and Lotka’s law. 
Scientometrics, 15 (3/4): 205–214.
LIEBAU, E., HUBER, L. (1985). Die Kulturen der Fächer. Neue Sammlung, 25: 314–
339.
MARKUSOVA, Valentina A., GILYAREVSKII, R. S., CHERNYI, A. I., GRIFFITH, B. 
C. (1996). Information behavior of Russian scientists in the “Perestroika” period. 
Results of questionnaire study. Scientometrics, 37 (2): 361–380.
MERTON, Robert K. (1974). The Sociology of science. Theoretical and empirical inves-
tigations. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
MEŽNARIĆ, Silva (Ed.) (1990). Politika i mjere u vezi s odljevom mozgova iz Jugoslavije 
/Politics and measures regarding brain drain from Yugoslavia/. Zagreb: Institut za 
migracije i narodnosti Sveučilišta u Zagrebu /Institute for Migration and Ethnic 
76
BRANKA GOLUB
Studies of the University of Zagreb/; Beograd: Mihajlo Pupin Institute; Zagreb: 
Ruđer Bošković Institute. (Typed)
MIRSKAYA, Elena Z. (1995). Russian academic science today: Its societal standing 
and the situation within the scientific community. Social Studies of Science, 25 
(4): 705–725.
MITROFF, Ian I., JACOB, Theodore, TRAUTH MOORE, Eileen (1977). On the shoul-
ders of the spouses of scientists. Social Studies of Science, 7 (3): 303–327.
PREVIŠIĆ, Jozo (1975). Znanstveni kadar u SR Hrvatskoj /Scientific personnel in 
the Socialist Republic of Croatia/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja 
Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
PRPIĆ, Katarina (1984). Kadrovski potencijal znanosti: rezultati istraživanja provede-
na u SR Hrvatskoj u 1983. godini /Scientific personnel: The results of a Croatian 
empirical study in 1983/ .Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu.
PRPIĆ, Katarina (1987). Marginalne grupe u znanosti /Marginal groups in science/. 
Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
PRPIĆ, Katarina (1989). Odliv mozgova: tok i činioci vanjskih migracija znanstvenika 
/Brain drain: Flow and factors of scientists’ external migrations/. Zagreb: Institut 
za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
PRPIĆ, Katarina (1990). Znanstvena produktivnost istraživača između minimalizma 
i maksimalizma /Scientific productivity between minimalism and maximalism/. 
In: K. Prpić, B. Golub: Znanstvena produktivnost i potencijalni egzodus istraživača 
Hrvatske /Scientific productivity and the potential exodus of Croatian researchers/. 
Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 1–61.
PRPIĆ, Katarina (1991). Odrednice znanstvene produktivnosti /Scientific productivity 
determinants/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u Zagrebu.
PRPIĆ, Katarina, GOLUB, Branka, ČENGIĆ, Drago (1992). Ogledi o znanstvenom i 
inovacijskom sustavu /Assays on scientific and innovation system/. Zagreb: Institut 
za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 109.
PRPIĆ, Katarina (1997). Profesionalna etika znanstvenika /Scientists’ professional eth-
ics/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u Zagrebu, 143.
PRPIĆ, Katarina (2000). Profesionalni i društveni položaj mladih istraživača /
Professional and social position of young researchers/. In: K. Prpić (Ed.): U 
potrazi za akterima znanstvenog i tehnološkog razvoja /Searching for actors in 
science and technology development/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja 
u Zagrebu, 21–127.
PRPIĆ, Katarina (2002). Size, structure and dynamics of R&D personnel. In: N. Švob-
Đokić (Ed.): Research and development policies in the southeast European coun-
tries in transition: Republic of Croatia. Zagreb: Institut za međunarodne odnose, 
46–73.
PRPIĆ, Katarina (2004). Sociološki portret mladih znanstvenika /A sociological por-
trait of young scientists/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja Sveučilišta u 
Zagrebu.
77
 THE SOCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL PROFILE OF NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENTISTS
PRPIĆ, Katarina (2005). Znanost u očima javnosti i znanstvenika /Science in the eyes 
of the public and scientists/. In: K. Prpić (Ed.): Elite znanja u društvu (ne)znanja 
/Knowledge elites in the knowledge(less) society/. Zagreb: Institut za društvena 
istraživanja u Zagrebu, 233–289.
PRPIĆ, Katarina, BRAJDIĆ VUKOVIĆ, Marija (2005). Znanstvena proizvodnja i 
produktivnost /Scientific production and productivity/. In: K. Prpić (Ed.): Elite 
znanja u društvu (ne)znanja /Knowledge elites in the knowledge(less) society/ 
Zagreb: Institut za društvena istraživanja u Zagrebu, 23–92.
ROCHE, M., FREITES, Y. (1992). Rise and twilight of the Venezuelan scientific com-
munity. Scientometrics, 23 (2): 185–206.
SOLOMON, D. J. (2001). Conducting web-based surveys. http://PAREonline.net/getvn.
asp?v=7&n=19 retrieved 17 April 2004.
SPIES, K., SCHUTE, M. (1999). Warum promovieren Frauen seltener als Männer? 
Psycho logische Prädiktoren der Promotionsabsicht bei Männern und Frauen. 
Zeitschrift für Sozialpsychologie, 30: 229–245.
WHITLEY, Richard D. (1984). The intellectual and social organization of the sciences. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
XIE, Yu (1989). The process of becoming a scientist. Dissertation. Madison: The 
University of Wisconsin.
ZUCKERMAN, Harriet (1977). Scientific elite: Nobel laureates in the United States. 
New York/London: The Free Press/Collier-Macmillan Publishers.
78
BRANKA GOLUB
Appendix – Tables
Table I. Representativeness of the sample of natural and social scientists considering 
some socio-professional variables (web survey)
Natural sciences Social sciences
Population Sample Population Sample
N % N % N % N %
GENDER
Female
Male
Total
 517
 614
1131
 45.7
 54.3
100.0
150
158
308
 48.7
 51.3
100.0
306 
501 
807
 37.9
 62.1
100.0
 89
 77
166
 53.6
 46.4
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
 1.118
 1
 0.290
17.417
 1
 0.000
AGE
30 – 39 years
40 – 49 years
50 – 59 years
60 and older
Total
 104
 314
 333
 380
1131
  9.2
 27.8
 29.4
 33.6
100.0
 64
 82
 98
 64
308
 20.8
 26.6
 31.8
 20.8
100.0
 44
207
261
295
807
  5.5
 25.7
 32.3
 36.6
100.0
 23
 55
 60
 29
167
 13.8
 32.9
 35.9
 17.4
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
 6.938
 3
 0.074
13.937
 3
 0.003
TYPE OF SCIENTIFIC 
RESEARCH INSTITUTION
Public institute
Higher-education institution
Other institutions*
Total
 451
 553
 127
1131
 39.9
 48.9
 11.2
100.0
137
138
 35
310
 44.2
 44.5
 11.3
100.0
 75
704
 28
807
  9.3
 87.2
  3.5
100.0
 26
135
  6
167
 15.6
 80.8
  3.4
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
 2.653
 2
 0.265
 7.836
 2
 0.020
SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
Mathematics
Chemistry
Biology
Physics
Geo-sciences**
Psychology
Educational sciences*** 
Law
Economics
Political sciences
Sociology
Information sciences
Total
 127
 420
 243
 232
 109
1131 
 11.2
 37.2
 21.5
 20.5
  9.6
100.0
 22
 98
 85
 57
 40
302
  7.3
 32.5
 28.1
 18.9
 13.2
100.0
 71
129
128
309
 48
 66
 56
807
  8.8
 15.9
 15.9
 38.4
  5.9
  8.2
  6.9
100.0
 20
 21
 15
 54
 11
 25
 11
157
 12.7
 13.4
  9.6
 34.4
  7.0
 15.9
  7.0
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
16.649
 4
 0.002
19.728
 6
 0.003
*  Industrial institute, research/development units within other institutions, HAZU, DHMZ, health care 
institutions and similar
** Geography, geology
*** Pedagogy, disability studies, kinesiology
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Table II. Demographic and socialisational and educational characteristics of Croatian 
scientists by scientific fields (2004 sample)
Natural 
sciences
(182)
Technical 
sciences
(188)
Medical 
sciences 
(258)
Biotechnical 
sciences
(74)
Social 
sciences and 
humanities
(206)
GENDER
Female
Male
Total
 54.4
 45.6
100.0
 23.4
 76.6
100.0
 47.3
 52.7
100.0
 39.2
 60.8
100.0
 58.7
 41.3
100.0
Chi-square = 58.842; df = 4; p = 0.00
AGE
Under 29
30 – 39 years
40 – 49 years
50 – 59 years
60 and older 
Total
  8.9
 26.3
 23.5 
 26.3
 15.1
100.0
 11.6
 28.6
 20.1
 25.9
 13.8
100.0
  1.9
 21.2
 28.2
 34.0
 14.7
100.0
  6.8
 43.2
 14.9
 24.3
 10.8
100.0
  7.8
 32.0
 23.8
 24.8
 11.7
100.0
Average age = 45.8; F-ratio = 4.393; significance of F-ratio = 0.00
FATHER’S EDUCATION
Elementary and uncompleted high school
Vocational school
High school
Two-year higher education
Faculty, academy, four-year higher education
Master’s degree, doctoral degree
Total
 10.4
 12.6
 28.0
 13.2
 27.5
  8.2
100.0
 13.2
 18.0
 19.6
 10.6
 28.0
 10.6
100.0
  8.1
 12.3
 18.5
 12.7
 37.7
 10.8
100.0
 23.0
 13.5
 25.7
 14.9
 14.9
  8.1
100.0
 12.1
 13.1
 19.9
 16.5
 27.7
 10.7
100.0
Chi-square = 36.386; df = 20; p = 0.01
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE 
AT UNIVERSITY
Good
Very good
Excellent
Total
  6.7
 65.6 
 27.8
100.0
 13.2
 67.2
 19.6
100.0
 14.3
 61.8
 23.9
100.0
  8.1
 75.7
 16.2
100.0
  5.8
 55.3
 38.8
100.0
Average grade = 4.2; F-ratio = 7.312; significance of F-ratio = 0.00
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Table III. Institutional and formal constituents of the professional and career patterns by 
scientific field (2004 sample)
Natural 
sciences
(182)
Technical 
sciences
(188)
Medical 
sciences
(258)
Biotechnical 
sciences
(74)
Social sciences 
and humanities
(206)
SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTION
Public institute
Faculty
Other institutions
Total
 34.3
 47.5
 18.2
100.0
  7.0
 79.6
 13.4 
100.0
  9.0
 45.1
 45.9
100.0
 17.6
 68.9
 13.5
100.0
 18.0
 74.6
  7.3
100.0
Chi-square = 182.388; df = 8; p = 0.00
SCIENTIFIC DEGREE
No scientific degree
Master’s degree
Doctorate
Total
 10.4
 26.4
 63.2
100.0
 20.6
 28.0
 51.3
100.0
  6.2
 27.3
 66.5
100.0
 16.2
 21.6
 62.2
100.0
 14.6
 25.7
 59.7
100.0
Chi-square = 25.485; df = 8; p = 0.01
SCIENTIFIC RANK
No rank, associate
(Senior) assistant
Research associate 
Senior research associate
Research adviser
Total
 18.2
 31.3
 20.5
 10.8
 19.3
100.0
 22.9
 34.1
 12.3
 11.2
 19.6
100.0
 30.2
 21.8
 16.7
 17.1
 14.3
100.0
  9.6
 39.7
 24.7
  9.6
 16.4
100.0
 14.6
 31.3
 18.7
 18.7
 16.7
100.0
Chi-square = 44.641; df = 16; p = 0.00
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Table IV. Career patterns by field (2004 sample)
Natural 
sciences
(182)
Technical 
sciences
(189)
Medical 
sciences
(260)
Biotechnical 
sciences
(74)
Social sciences 
and humanities
(206)
AGE
n (907)
Average age 
Standard deviation
Youngest respondent 
Oldest respondent 
F-ratio = 4.393
Significance of F-ratio = 0.00
179
 45.9
 11.8360
 26
 70 
189
 45.1
 12.2723
 25
 69 
259
 48.1
 10.0982 
 26
 67
74
43.2
11.5575
26
69 
206
 44.6
 11.3585
 24
 72
AGE AT MASTER’S DEGREE
n (236)
Average age 
Standard deviation
Youngest master’s degree winner
Oldest master’s degree winner
F-ratio = 4.324
Significance of F-ratio = 0.00
 47
 32.9
  6.51
 25 
57
 53
 31.6
  5.68
 25
 50
 69
 35.5
  5.68
 26
 50
16
32.2
 5.65
27
50
 51
 32.0
  5.35
 25
 50
AGE AT DOCTORATE
n (552)
Average age 
Standard deviation
Youngest doctorate holder 
Oldest doctorate holder 
F-ratio = 6.377
Significance of F-ratio = 0.00
114
 35.6
  5.93
 27
 55
 97
 39.1
  6.35
 27
 64
172
 38.9
  6.56
 27
 58
46
36.7
 5.10
28
50 
123
 38.0
  6.17
 28
 58
AGE AT ELECTION TO THE RANK 
OF RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
n (148)
Average age 
Standard deviation
Youngest person
Oldest person
F-ratio not significant
 35
 40.8
  6.66
 32
 56
 21
 40.1
  7.32
 30
 64
 40
 43.3
  7.50
 32
 59
17
40.5
 5.29
35
51
 35
 41.6
  6.52
 30
 56
AGE AT ELECTION TO THE RANK 
OF SENIOR RESEARCH ASSOCIATE
n (124)
Average age 
Standard deviation
Youngest person 
Oldest person
F-ratio not significant
 18
 45.1
  6.00
 35
 56
 20
 45.8
  6.46
 35
 57 
 42
 46.1
  6.18
 35
 59 
 7
42.1
 3.93
37
49 
 37
 46.1
  7.25
 35
 62
AGE AT ELECTION TO THE RANK 
OF RESEARCH ADVISER
N (145)
Average age 
Standard deviation
Youngest person 
Oldest person
F-ratio not significant
 33
 49.3
  5.45
 40
 59
 34
 49.9
  5.79
 39
 62
 36
 48.5
  5.53
 38
 59
12
50.3
 4.90
43
56
 30
 49.9
  6.60
 40
 64
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Table V. Structure of doctors of the natural and social sciences by professional (research 
and leading) activities
Five-year period 1999 – 2004 Natural sciences (310)
Social sciences 
(167)
ENGAGEMENT IN LOCAL PROJECTS
No engagement
Engaged
Total
  1.0
 99.0
100.0
  3.0
 97.0
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
  2.635
  1
  0.105
ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL PROJECTS
No engagement
Engaged
Total
 39.3
 60.7
100.0
 50.6
 49.4
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
  5.628
  1
  0.018
NUMBER OF LOCAL PROJECTS
No projects
One project
Two projects
Three projects
Four projects
Five projects 
Six and more projects
Total
  1.0
 10.5
 42.6
 28.3
  7.6
  4.3
  5.7
100.0
  3.0
 12.6
 29.9
 25.7
  8.4
  9.0
 11.4
100.0
Average number of projects
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  2.73
  1.515
 –3.249
469
  0.001
  3.74
  5.037
NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL, FOREIGN PROJECTS
No projects
One project
Two projects
Three and more projects
Total
 39.5
 29.1
 18.3
 13.1
100.0
 50.9
 29.8
 10.3
  9.0
100.0
Average number of projects
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  1.18
  1.427
  1.950
469
  0.052
  0.91
  1.456
NUMBER OF LOCAL PROJECTS WITH LEADING ROLE
No leadership
One project
Two projects
Three and more projects
Total
 31.3
 36.5
 23.0
  9.2
100.0
 28.1
 34.1
 19.8
 18.0
100.0
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Five-year period 1999 – 2004 Natural sciences (310)
Social sciences 
(167)
NUMBER OF LOCAL PROJECTS WITH LEADING ROLE
Average number of projects
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  1.24
  1.519
 –1.643
334
  0.101
  1.49
  1.563
NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL, FOREIGN PROJECTS
WITH LEADING ROLE
No leadership
One project
Two and more projects
Total
 76.1
 13.1
 10.8
100.0
 88.5
  7.3
  4.2
100.0
Average number of projects
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  0.40
  0.875
  1.726
294
  0.085
  0.24
  1.023
EXECUTIVE OR LEADERSHIP ROLE
No 
Yes 
Total
 63.1
 36.9
100.0
 56.9
 43.1
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
  1.762
  1
  0.184
Table VI. Participation and roles in scientific community by field
Natural sciences
(310)
Social sciences
(167)
MEMBERSHIP IN CROATIAN EDITORIAL BOARDS
Not a member
Member of one editorial board
Members of two editorial boards
Member of three and more editorial boards
Total
 78.2
 17.5
  3.3
  1.0
100.0
 50.9
 30.4
 13.9
  4.8
100.0
Average number of memberships
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  0.27
  0.569
 
 
 –6.801
466
  0.000
  0.76
  0.999
MEMBERSHIP IN FOREIGN EDITORIAL BOARDS
Not a member
Member of one editorial board
Members of two or more editorial boards
Total
 90.8
  7.6
  1.6
100.0
 83.0
 11.5
  5.5
100.0
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Natural sciences
(310)
Social sciences
(167)
MEMBERSHIP IN FOREIGN EDITORIAL BOARDS
Average number of memberships
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  0.12
  0.430
 –2.429
466
  0.016
  0.32
  1.282
DOMESTIC PEER REVIEWS IN FIVE-YEAR PERIOD
No reviews
One review
Two reviews
Three reviews
Four reviews
Five reviews
Six or more reviews
Total
 49.0
 12.3
 14.3
  6.5
  2.6
  6.8
  8.5
100.0
 15.0
  4.2
  9.0
  7.2
  9.6
 11.4
 43.6
100.0
Average number of peer reviews
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  1.85
  3.250
 –9.481
468
  0.000
  7.46
  9.337
FOREIGN PEER REVIEWS IN FIVE-YEAR PERIOD
No reviews
One review
Two reviews
Three reviews
Four reviews
Five reviews
Six and more reviews
Total
 41.3
 11.0
 10.0
  8.4
  4.2
  5.8
 19.3
100.0
 56.9
  9.6
  9.6
  4.8
  2.4
  5.4
 11.3
100.0
Average number of peer reviews
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  4.16
 12.608
  2.009
468
  0.045
  2.13
  4.203
MEMBERSHIP IN CROATIAN ASSOCIATIONS
Not a member
Member of one association
Member of two associations
Member of three associations
Member of four associations
Member of five and more associations
Total
  9.4
 32.5
 28.2
 15.6
  9.1
  5.2 
100.0
 20.7
 28.6
 29.3
 16.5
  4.3
  0.6
100.0
Average number of memberships
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  2.01
  1.398
  3.149
470
  0.002
  1.60
  1.300
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Natural sciences
(310)
Social sciences
(167)
MEMBERSHIP IN FOREIGN ASSOCIATIONS
Not a member
Member of one association
Member of two associations
Member of three or more associations
Total
 43.5
 31.5
 18.2
  6.8
100.0
 39.0
 29.3
 17.1
 14.6
100.0
Average number of memberships
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  0.99
  1.457
 –1.619
470
  0.106
  1.21
  1.426
MEMBERSHIP IN EXECUTIVE AND OPERATING 
BODIES OF CROATIAN ASSOCIATIONS
Not a member
Member of executive and operating bodies of one 
association
Member of executive and operating bodies of two or 
more associations 
Total
 70.4
 22.8
  6.8
100.0
 81.2
 13.9
  4.9
100.0
Average number of memberships in executive 
and operating bodies
Standard deviations
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  0.38
  0.677
  2.255
470
  0.025
  0.24
  0.554
MEMBERSHIP IN EXECUTIVE AND OPERATING 
BODIES OF FOREIGN ASSOCIATIONS
Not a member
Member of executive and operating bodies 
of one association
Member of executive and operating bodies 
of two or more associations 
Total
 92.5
  6.5
  1.0
100.0
 
 89.1
  7.3
  3.6
100.0
Average number of memberships in executive 
and operating bodies
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  0.09
  0.336
 –1.886
470
  0.060
  0.16
  0.533
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Table VII. Patterns of scientist’s networks by field
Natural sciences
(310) 
Social sciences
(167)
NUMBER OF CROATIAN COLLABORATORS 
IN JOINT RESEARCH
Working alone
One collaborator
Two collaborators
Three collaborators
Four collaborators
Five collaborators
Six and more collaborators
Total
  6.2
  4.6
 17.7
 18.0
 14.4
 17.0
 22.1
100.0
 24.1
  6.6
 19.3
 13.9
 11.4
  9.6
 15.1
100.0
Average number of Croatian collaborators
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  4.55
  3.808
   2.078
469
  0.038
  3.5
  6.247
FOREIGN COLLABORATORS
No regular cooperation 
Regular cooperation
Total
 36.6
 63.4
100.0
 
 55.4
 44.6
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
 15.533
  1
  0.000
EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION WITH FOREIGN 
COLLEAGUES WITHOUT STRONGER COOPERATION
Do not communicate regularly
Communicate regularly
Total
 27.6
 72.4
100.0
 28.5
 71.5
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
  0.042
  1
  0.838
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Table VIII. Division of visible scientific excellence
Natural sciences
(310) 
Social sciences
(167)
NUMBER OF INVITATIONS FROM ABROAD
No invitations
One invitation
Two invitations
Three invitations
Four and more invitations
Total
 43.0
 16.6
 13.7
  7.8
 18.9
100.0
 
 40.5
 11.0
 14.1
 12.9
 21.5
100.0
Average number of invitations
Standard deviation
T-value
Degrees of freedom
T-test significance
  2.1
  3.311
 –0.811
468
  0.418
  2.36
  3.233
AWARDS FOR ACHIEVEMENTS IN SCIENCE
No awards
Awards
Total
 76.9
 23.1
100.0 
 72.3
 27.7
100.0
Chi-square
Degrees of freedom
Chi-square significance
   1.259
  1
  0.262
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Self-reported research productivity: patterns and 
factors
1. Knowledge production – the key to understanding 
socio-cognitive differences between sciences?
Theoretically, research production and productivity might be the 
key to understanding the differences between individual sciences and 
entire scientific areas, especially between the natural and social scienc-
es. In binary and contrastive, and even in bipolar typologies of science, 
these fields are considered paradigmatic examples of restrictive and 
non-restrictive, hard and soft, codified and non-codified, exact and 
non-exact scientific (sub)fields (Pantin, 1968, according to Whitley, 
1977; Biglan, 1973a; Merton, 1974; Whitley, 1977; Becher 2001). Despite 
their conspicuousness, differences in the quantity, type and scope of 
research publications by natural and social scientists are rarely stressed 
by the creators of the typologies of scientific fields, and are even more 
rarely corroborated by the existing evidence on scientific productivity 
in these scientific areas.
The neglect of the obvious in these, but also in more complex, clas-
sifications of science (Whitley, 1984; Fuchs, 1992) is surprising, especially 
since a specific thesis with a strong empirical stronghold in research pro-
duction could be derived from their fundamental assumptions. Namely, 
one could assume that the dominant types and quantity of publications 
in individual scientific areas and fields stem from the differences in the 
mode of knowledge production, that is, differences in the intellectual and 
social organisation of individual sciences. Even if theoreticians, who fo-
cus on the deeper epistemic and social aspects of disciplinary differentia-
tion, did not have a need for such a thesis to classify sciences, the crea-
tors of the classifications of sciences based on empirical research, such as 
Becher and Biglan, did not give it enough attention either.
Based on an empirical classification of science with the help of 
multidimensional scaling founded on the assessments of respondents-
scientists on the similarities among 36 scientific fields or disciplines, 
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Biglan examined the relation between the scientific fields obtained in 
this way on one hand, and the structure and output of university de-
partments on the other. He started from the more complex hypothesis 
that different research subjects presuppose and contribute to the dif-
ference in university organisation. Therefore, he studied the extent to 
which the said scientific fields differ in terms of scientists’ social co-
hesion, their teaching, scientific, professional and administrative per-
formance, and their output – their publication productivity and success 
in training doctors of science (Biglan, 1973a, 1973b). However, in the 
context of current scientific insights in the relations between publica-
tion productivity and scientific fields, his results were rather trivial. He 
established that the so-called hard or paradigmatic sciences – natural 
sciences, biosciences and (bio)technical sciences – use more succinct 
forms of reporting their findings. Consequently, more articles and few-
er monographs were published in this area than in the so-called soft 
non-paradigmatic, social sciences and humanities. The applied scienc-
es, which include (bio)technical, economic and educational disciplines, 
however, publish more technical reports than the pure sciences, or the 
natural sciences, biosciences and (other) social sciences and humani-
ties, to be more precise (Biglan, 1973b).
Becher does not believe that a very clear statistical pattern in the 
publishing process could be identified from quantitative analyses of 
productivity! For that reason, he touched upon only three aspects of 
publication productivity in his interviews with top, elite scientists: a) 
span of time from submitting an article to a scientific journal until it 
is published; b) length of paper; c) number of papers that a scientist 
should publish within one year. All three elements showed great, easily 
measurable disciplinary differences. Thus, the time span from submit-
ting an article for publication ranged from three months for a prelimi-
nary paper in physics, and two to three years for publishing a paper in 
a renowned journal in modern linguistics. An eminent historian or lin-
guist is expected to publish one paper of eight to twelve thousand words 
(32–48 standard pages) per year, especially if writing a book at the same 
time. In contrast, the expected annual output in biochemistry is ten 
or more multi-authored papers, often with fewer than 2,000 words or 
8 standard pages. Preliminary papers are even shorter – only three to 
four pages in physics (Becher and Trowler, 2001: 112–113).
On the other hand, when explaining the differences and patterns 
identified in their comparisons of different scientific areas and fields, 
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productivity analysts often refer to typologies, the most widely known 
distinction between the hard and soft sciences in particular. It is used in 
interpretations of different quantities and qualities of disciplinary pro-
duction, most often the number and citation rate of research publications, 
but usually without any deeper explanations of disciplinary patterns and 
factors of research productivity. Nevertheless, the results of those studies 
provide an important empirical context to evaluate the findings of this 
study, just as its theoretical starting points are inspired by (un)derived 
hypotheses on the deeper socio-cognitive conditions of the easily acces-
sible and recordable differences in research productivity.
That is why we are interested in the findings of studies of produc-
tivity in the natural and social sciences, or even in their individual dis-
ciplines. Are there any patterns of scientific productivity typical of the 
two scientific areas, and, if so, how are they differentiated? Have they 
changed over the last twenty-five years, and in what ways? Are we wit-
nessing a levelling out of differences, or are they replicating, perhaps 
even increasing? We present a brief overview of the findings of the most 
important comparative studies covering average scientific productivity 
in the natural and social sciences, and the types of publications, the 
share of mono-authored and co-authored papers, and, finally, the ori-
entation towards a national and international scientific public.
The indicators of the average research productivity of scientists 
from individual fields or disciplines over a shorter or longer period of 
time are not appropriate for all scientific fields, which makes compari-
sons more difficult and leads to diverse results. This refers to biblio-
metric analyses based on selective bibliographic and citation databases, 
as much as to analyses based on self-reported data from questionnaire 
surveys. The former neglect books and all journals not indexed in the 
WoS (Web of Science) and similar databases, which is their greatest 
defect in the context of the social sciences and humanities. The lat-
ter, however, take into account all the publications, but credit one and 
the same paper to each of its co-authors, and they usually count every 
book as one publication. This approach favours the production of co-
authored articles, which are typical of the natural, (bio)technical and 
medical fields, and therefore also discriminates against the social sci-
ences and humanities.
Thus, disciplinary differences in scientists’ output in four natural 
and two social disciplines examined by Cole (1979) are also inevitably 
overvalued to the advantage of the former field. Cole established that in 
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the period from 1965 to 1969 the greatest number of articles was pub-
lished by American chemists (13.0), with geologists, mathematicians 
and physicists lagging far behind, with an average of 6.1, 5.6 and 5.1 pa-
pers published in journals respectively. Psychologists and sociologists 
differed significantly in terms of average output, with 5.4 and 4.1 arti-
cles published respectively in the observed period (Cole, 1979: 962).
A more recent American study covering the period from 1988 to 
1992 showed a similar relation between the natural and social sciences. 
The average productivity of university professors in graduate, doctoral 
training came to 9.03 articles published in journals in the field of the 
biosciences, 7.32 in the physical sciences and mathematics, and only 
2.57 in the social sciences, including behavioural sciences (Dundar and 
Lewis, 1998: 620). These comparisons do not acknowledge the peculi-
arities of knowledge production and publication in the social sciences 
and humanities, but they analyse them using the same category system 
suitable for the natural and other sciences.
After turning all publications of Norwegian university professors 
from the 1979–1981 period into article equivalents, by assigning dif-
ferent scores to individual publications depending on their type and 
number of authors, Kyvik obtained two sets of different data for the ob-
served scientific areas. Natural scientists had a greater average number 
of original publications than social scientists – 5.3 compared to 4.6, but 
the average number of article equivalents of the latter was far great-
er than that of the former – 5.9 compared to 3.9 (Kyvik, 1989: 208). 
Although based on self-reported data, the findings provide a more com-
prehensive and more suitable comparison of total average productivity 
in two fields that are often considered socio-cognitively opposites. A 
more recent study by the same author supports this conclusion. Using 
only the original data from the survey, he also established differences 
in favour of the productivity of university professors in the natural sci-
ences. Over the period from 1998 to 2000, they published 10.1 papers 
compared to 7.9 papers published by social scientists (Kyvik, 2003: 38).
Accordingly, the previous indicators of average research produc-
tivity in the natural and social sciences are not satisfactory, since their 
results vary depending on the range of the covered scientists and their 
papers, both those indexed in highly-selective tertiary publications and 
those self-reported in questionnaire surveys. This makes international 
comparisons even more dubious, since they are restrictive in the former 
case, and methodologically unbalanced in the latter. However, taking 
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into account the trends of changes in the quantum of productivity or in 
the quantity of publications in the scientific fields compared here, the 
most sensible comparisons are those within the same scientific popula-
tion, whose production is measured in (almost) the same way.
This comparison indicates a marked increase in the average pro-
ductivity of Norwegian natural and social scientists in the relevant pe-
riod of twenty years (1980 – 2000). It grew by 190.6% with the former, 
and by 171.7% with the latter. These are the original data, while the real 
growth is significantly lower if we take into account the type of publi-
cation, co-authorship and the response rate of the three surveys. Kyvik 
(2003: 43) estimates a 30% growth for the overall scientific population. 
The systematic pressure on researchers’ productivity, embodied in the 
old slogan publish or perish, is obviously not easing.
If the differences in the average output (measured by the total 
number of published scientific papers) are still not transparent, the dif-
ferences in the importance of individual types of publications in both 
areas are rather expressed. They are already noticeable at the level of 
their proportion in the total number of scientific publications. Kyvik 
(2003: 39) established that books make up 9% of the total number of pub-
lications by social scientists, and 3% of natural scientists’ publications. 
Furthermore, the share of books published in the period 1980–2000 is 
stable in both scientific fields, while the share of scientific articles in 
them increased at the expense of reports. Summing up the findings of 
different studies, Hicks (1999: 201) estimated that books might account 
for at least 40% and maybe even 60% of social science publications.
More over, disciplinary differences within the social sciences can 
also be great. According to a study on productivity of British social 
scientists, books make up 29% of publications in political science, and 
only 8% in statistical methods (Hicks, 1999: 210). Significant discipli-
nary oscillation in the proportion of books in the total output was no-
ticed with Dutch social scientists – from 40% in general linguistics and 
history, to 25% in Dutch linguistics (Hicks, 1999: 196).
However, what is more important than the number and share of 
books is their effect on knowledge production in the social sciences. 
Nederhof’s findings (2006: 84–85) assert that sociological books have 
a three times greater citation rate than scientific articles, and a similar 
ratio was established for economics as well. Based on an analysis of em-
pirical papers, Hicks (1999: 201) concludes that 40% of citations in the 
social sciences refer to books. If citation rate is taken as an indicator of 
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the impact or use of scientific papers, books obviously carry much great-
er weight in the social sciences than one would expect based on their 
frequency in scientific production, although the most influential books 
are not necessarily the most cited, as was determined by comparing the 
citation rate and ranking of sociological books by (one quarter of) the 
members of the Australian Sociological Association (Gläser, 2004).
In any case, the proportion, influence and impact of books are un-
doubtedly greater in the social than in the natural sciences, where jour-
nal articles dominate. The differences are, with reason, ascribed to the 
peculiar cognitive styles based on the different intellectual and social 
organisation of science. Shorter forms of reporting research findings 
are more appropriate to paradigmatic fields with a greater obsolescence 
rate of scientific knowledge, the natural sciences above all. There is no 
need to explain at greater length the theoretical background and re-
search methods, because they are fully evident to those familiar with 
the paradigm. The age of the literature or references used is also con-
sidered an indicator of the speed of scientific knowledge obsolescence. 
It is lower in the paradigmatic sciences, just like the period in which 
a scientific paper will be cited on average. Thus, the natural and the 
social sciences and humanities differ also in citation distribution over 
time (Nederhof, 2006).
Scientific fields marked by paradigmatic pluralism – the pre-par-
adigmatic sciences, primarily the social sciences and humanities, ac-
cording to Kuhn – are characterised by more extensive papers in jour-
nals and the greater impact of books. Scientists have to describe and 
support more extensively their own approach, hypothetical framework, 
research methods and criteria for evaluating their contribution to the 
investigated problem (Biglan, 1973b). Books, at least in sociology, more 
frequently present qualitative analyses, theoretical considerations and 
scientific syntheses.
The same conclusion emerges from an empirical analysis which 
found that American sociological books and journal articles did not 
differ significantly by their subjects, although books more often focused 
on sociological theory, political processes and institutions, as well as 
life cycle. They key differences between them are the methods and the 
data. Books most often use qualitative analyses and data (58.8%) and 
they rather frequently focus on textual analyses (27.5%). In contrast, 
journal articles rest on quantitative data and analyses (70.0%), and use 
qualitative analyses even more seldom than textual analysis (Clemens 
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et al., 1995: 459). Based on these and other research findings (on citation 
rates of books and articles, and institutional affiliation, gender and age 
of their authors), it can be concluded that books and articles have dif-
ferent, but complementary, roles in sociology. Books are renowned and 
influential achievements whose impact goes beyond the very discipline, 
while advancement up the career ladder for the majority of scientists is 
based on journal articles (Clemens et al., 1995).
Furthermore, the greater role and impact of books in the social 
sciences and humanities, as an Australian study established, is based 
on their role as strongholds in knowledge production which provide 
everyday research with a stable focus. The impact of books can also be 
based on the “national” importance of their topics. These sciences have 
specific topics that can be uninteresting to the international scientific 
public, while at the same time being of extreme importance to the na-
tional scientific community. Precisely such topics have prevailed in the 
most influential sociological books (Gläser, 2004). Obviously, the same 
logic of the different international and national importance of scientific 
books can also be applied to numerous journal articles in the social sci-
ences and humanities.
A very important and extremely differentiated characteristic of 
scientific production is co-authorship. Numerous bibliometric stud-
ies and scarce (longitudinal) surveys show very different disciplinary 
patterns of co-authorship. The greatest differences were found between 
the natural sciences on one hand and the social sciences and humani-
ties on the other (Nederhof, 2006). Thus, Kyvik found great differences 
in the frequency of co-authorship in the natural and social sciences, 
but also important changes in both areas over the last two decades of 
the previous century. The proportion of co-authored publications in 
the total number of publications in the natural sciences increased from 
57% (1979–1981) to 84% in the final phase of that period (1998–2000). 
The proportion of such papers in the social sciences was far lower, but 
it grew from 20% in the initial stage to 43% in the final stage of the rel-
evant period (Kyvik, 2003: 42). Co-authored publications turned from 
a more important form of scientific production in the natural sciences 
to the predominant form, while they doubled in the social sciences, 
reaching a respectable level, not far from one half of the total scientific 
production.
Even more significant than the proportion of co-authored publica-
tions is the data on the number of scientists who published such papers. 
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The proportion of co-authors and their increase in the natural sciences 
followed the level and dynamics of co-authored publications, ranging 
from 60% at the start (1979–1981) to 86% at the end of the observed 
period (1998–2000). The social sciences also showed a rise in the pro-
portion of scientists who published at least one co-authored paper from 
37% to 64% (Kyvik, 2003: 43). However, the proportion of co-authors, 
as we can see, exceeds the proportion of co-authored papers, which 
supports the claims that a co-authored paper, obviously scarcer in the 
social scientists’ output, does not bear the same weight as in the hard 
sciences. In addition, we could even say that it does not have the same 
socio-cognitive character.
Co-authorship is considered an indicator of scientific coopera-
tion and even team work. However, that is not all. The prevalence and 
increasingly greater citation rate of this type of scientific paper have 
also given rise to the claim about their greater cognitive and epistemic 
value. The functional explanation of the scope and growth of scien-
tific cooperation claims that it allows the cognitive goals of scientific 
communities to be met, by securing better social and material condi-
tions of research (Wray, 2002). The importance of scientific coopera-
tion is also explained by factors reported in the empirical studies of the 
scientist-respondents themselves, who rank collaborators’ special com-
petences indispensable for resolving the research problems at the top 
of their list, and only then mention scientific equipment and the data 
that the collaborators possess, and other social and intellectual reasons 
(Thorsteinsdöttir, 2000; Melin, 2000).
The relation between scientific cooperation and co-authored papers 
has been empirically investigated by studies that try to answer the ques-
tion whether scientific cooperation truly encourages scientific output 
and/or its quality. At first sight, it seems that the findings corroborate 
the starting hypothesis, thanks to the greater quantity and longevity 
of citations earned by co-authored papers (Beaver, 2004) or due to the 
connection between scientific cooperation and productivity (Lee and 
Bozeman, 2005). However, the authors themselves are rather cautious 
when, in the former case, they stress the preliminary and partial nature 
of their findings, or when, as in the latter case, they bring attention to 
their ambiguity. The mentioned co-authors warn that cooperation is 
an important predictor of productivity when measured by the number 
of all publications of each of the (co-)authors. However, when measure-
ment is made by dividing every co-authored paper with the number of 
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authors and assigning only the resulting part of the paper to each of the 
authors, no significant association between cooperation and productiv-
ity is found (Lee and Bozeman, 2005). Accordingly, research conducted 
so far indicates that the relation is not as simple and unambiguous as 
the creators of science policy, and even scientists themselves, claim.
The implications of these studies are of special importance for the 
social sciences where research cooperation and co-authorship can have 
a different intellectual and social character. From the social standpoint, 
scientific cooperation, including team work, does not mirror the high 
level of specialisation and hierarchical organisation and division of re-
search tasks typical of laboratory sciences. In the social sciences, it is 
often founded on thematic fragmentation or splitting of project tasks, 
which then makes the publishing of a series of mono-authored papers 
possible. For this reason, the contribution of every co-author in a co-
authored paper is more marked and clearer than in multi-authored 
publications in the natural and other hard sciences.
International scientific cooperation often does not even include 
single, shared research of one and the same scientific problem. It rather 
refers to parallel investigations that share the subject and methodol-
ogy, but are carried out separately in different countries with the aim 
of comparing a social phenomenon or process in different societies. 
Such cooperation can result in generalisations, but it usually also shows 
the socio-cultural, national peculiarities or even specificities of certain 
groups of society. Co-authored works will then be comparisons of so-
cial phenomena in different socio-cultural environments, and the col-
laborators’ eligible complementary knowledge includes an understand-
ing of and familiarity with the concrete social context of the country 
where a certain problem is investigated.
Alongside the frequency of co-authorship, the greatest differences 
in publication productivity between the natural and social sciences are 
found in the range of the scientific public to whom the findings of the 
research are reported, according to the differences in the universality of 
the phenomena studied by both groups of scientists. Thus, natural sci-
entists are oriented towards the international scientific public, publish-
ing their papers mostly in international journals. Social scientists more 
frequently communicate to the local public, due to the primary focus on 
an investigation of their own society, and they more often publish their 
papers in national and regional periodicals, books or reports (Nederhof 
et al., 1989; Hicks, 1999; Nederhof, 2006).
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In his studies based on respondents’ self-reported data, Kyvik 
found differences between the natural and social sciences in the (inter)
national orientation of scientific publications. The frequency of papers 
in a foreign language in the total number of natural science publica-
tions grew from a high 80% in the period 1979–1981 to 89% in the final 
period (1998–2000). A significantly more dramatic growth of publica-
tions in a foreign language, mostly English, was recorded in the social 
sciences – from 30% in the initial period to 51% in the final period. 
While the proportions of natural scientists who published paper(s) in 
a foreign language equalled the proportion of such publications at the 
beginning and the end of the overall observed period, the portion of 
social scientists with such papers increased at a much faster rate, start-
ing at 49% in the initial period and climbing as high as 73% in the final 
period under study (Kyvik, 2003: 41). These findings imply that many 
Norwegian social scientists occasionally publish at least one paper in a 
foreign language, thus making it accessible to the international scien-
tific public.
Although the differences in the international visibility of publica-
tions from these two fields are still great, the social sciences have obvi-
ously taken a great step towards the global scientific scene, driven by 
the greater pressure of science policy to follow the model of the natural 
sciences. This is certainly not merely for external reasons, but it is also 
prompted by the social scientists’ need for wider acknowledgement of 
the importance and recognisability of their own scientific efforts, espe-
cially when communicating to international colleagues with whom they 
share many research interests and topics, at least in developed Western 
countries. Nederhof and Van Wijk (1997) compared the topics of social 
and behavioural studies in the USA, Great Britain, France, Germany 
and the Netherlands, and they came to the conclusion that the bulk 
of the topics reflect transnational scientific interests, but also that the 
five countries have numerous shared political and social problems. The 
exceptions were some topics of the political sciences, some welfare and 
health care issues and geographic location. Some other groups of so-
cially, techno-economically and culturally related countries would cer-
tainly show great similarities as well.
Differences in the international visibility and accessibility of natu-
ral and social science papers are also connected to the problem of dif-
ferent representation in bibliographic and citation databases, especially 
the most selective ones – the Web of Science (WoS), with the most re-
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nowned indexes such as SCI for the natural, technical and biosciences, 
SSCI for the social sciences, and A&HCI for the arts and humanities. 
While SCI has extensive coverage of natural science articles, even over 
80% or as much as 90% in some fields, coverage of the social sciences 
and humanities is significantly lower (Nederhof, 2006: 90). It is mark-
edly uneven, so SSCI’s coverage of articles published by Dutch social 
scientists ranged from 62% in experimental psychology and only 2% in 
public administration (Nederhof et al., 1989: 427).
Nederhof (2006) gives these and all other mentioned differences in 
the production of the natural and social sciences to argue that biblio-
metric monitoring of publications in the fields of the social sciences and 
humanities must not rely on the same methodological assumptions as 
in the monitoring of productivity in other sciences. The analysis should 
be expanded to include data on the books and papers not registered in 
the WoS databases.
Comparisons of the published output of the social sciences in dif-
ferent countries also support this conclusion. For example, slighter 
differences were found in the citation culture of social scientists from 
six western countries – Australia, France, Canada, Germany, USA and 
Great Britain. German social scientists make the least use of papers 
published in journals covered by the most renowned citation databas-
es (WoS), while their American colleagues use them the most – the 
former have a 35% citation rate of papers from WoS journals, while the 
latter have a slightly higher rate – 39% (Van Leeuwen, 2006: 139). In 
other words, it seems that there are great transnational similarities in 
the production of the social sciences.
The overview of empirical comparisons of productivity in the natu-
ral and social sciences conducted so far suggests two conclusions. The 
first refers to clear and significant differences in the patterns of publish-
ing scientific papers, the cognitive and professional role in their field 
or area, and in (non)collective authorship, obsolescence, (inter)national 
public, citation cultures and their coverage by tertiary publications and/
or electronic databases that index scientific periodicals. Despite the sim-
ilarities arising from the cognitive and social nature of scientific under-
taking in general, scientific publications, as intellectual products of the 
natural and social sciences, do differ. Any comparison that does not take 
into account these differences cannot be methodologically sound, just as 
any science policy that attempts to unify them instead of at least partly 
acknowledging their differences cannot be fruitful.
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The second conclusion accentuates the great differences recorded 
in those same patterns, and even highlights their increasing conver-
gence. The changes are particularly dramatic in the social sciences 
where some of the key characteristics of scientific publications have 
changed considerably in a relatively short period, over the last twenty 
years or so. Their resemblance to natural science production is grow-
ing, especially in terms of increasing co-authorship and the interna-
tionalisation of the public. The only plausible sociological explanation 
highlights the influence of the scientific system and policy, since such 
great changes can be explained only by systemic factors. It seems that 
we are indeed witnessing the coming true of the famous prophecy of 
the early 1980s that the expansion of science policies, and the coordi-
nation and central planning of scientific research, would promote the 
levelling out of differences and lead to increasing similarities in the 
social organisation and intellectual ideals of different scientific fields 
(Whitley, 1984).
Thus, we come to the biggest problem in comparative studies of 
scientific productivity, which is their insufficient theoretical ground-
ing. Although they do use some of the theoretical explanations of the 
differences in the productivity of the natural and social sciences, these 
studies usually do not start from theoretical hypotheses of the socio-
cognitive differentiation of individual sciences. And it is precisely such 
hypotheses that seem to be the key to a deeper understanding of the 
differences in scientific productivity.
2. Hypothetical and methodological framework of the study
Current (sociological) knowledge of scientific production in dif-
ferent scientific fields, especially in the natural and social sciences, 
as well as existing Croatian studies, encouraged a (re)formulation of 
the question of the productivity puzzle, as J. Cole and H. Zuckerman 
(1984) called it two decades ago. Despite a great number of studies on 
research productivity, comparisons of overall scientific areas are still 
scarce, both in the ever more present bibliometric analyses and in the 
few questionnaire surveys. The focus of comparisons is usually indi-
vidual (sub) disciplines, so they lack a broader view of the similarities 
and differences in the intellectual production of the natural and so-
cial sciences. Furthermore, comparisons are usually directed only to 
some types and forms of production, thus failing to provide broader 
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knowledge in terms of time span and the most important types of pro-
ductivity. Finally, there are only few studies investigating the factors of 
productivity, and even fewer of them examine productivity factors for 
each scientific area.
Therefore, the main goal of this study focused on a comparative 
insight into the characteristics, patterns and factors of the research pro-
ductivity of natural and social scientists. Apart from this general scien-
tific goal, it is important to obtain broader knowledge of research pro-
duction of the Croatian scientific community, or, to be more precise, 
of its members engaged in the natural and social sciences. Set in such 
a way, the basic goals of the study allow some cognitive contribution to 
be made to the social studies of science, and help form a scientific basis 
for a Croatian science policy.
Organisational theories of science present the broadest theoreti-
cal starting point of the research since they are the ones within the 
sociology of science that explain plausibly the socio-cognitive differ-
ences between scientific fields (Whitley, 1984; Fuchs, 1992). Thus, 
they provide a hypothetical and interpretative framework of the in-
vestigation of the differentiated patterns of scientific productivity. 
The latter can be explained and understood only if they are perceived 
as a manifestation of deeper differences in the intricate, but also inter-
dependent, social and intellectual organisation of individual sciences. 
This study does not aim to empirically test theories of scientific fields, 
but we hope it will make an indirect contribution in that direction 
as well, since the fundamental theses of organisational theories were 
built into the hypothetical framework and conceptualisation of the 
research.
We therefore do not expect only to establish distinctions between 
the natural and social sciences in research productivity patterns, that is, 
in the frequency of some types of publications in their overall produc-
tion, but also in terms of predictors of the observed types of production. 
If publications are a result of knowledge production, then its relevant 
social and organisational characteristics should also be significant pre-
dictors of researchers’ productivity. Considering the differences in the 
social organisation of these fields and the peculiarities of their modes 
of knowledge production, one can expect differences in the composi-
tion, but also in the contribution that significant predictors make in 
explaining the major types of productivity in the natural and social 
sciences.
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Starting from this hypothetical framework, the basic concepts are 
operationalised with special attention to ensuring comparability with 
the findings of productivity studies conducted on the overall Croatian 
scientific population or its strategically important subgroups, such as 
eminent or young scientists (Prpić, 1990, 1990, 1994, 1996a, 1996b, 
2000, 2007). As in the previous studies, research productivity has 
been defined as publication productivity. Since it is sensitive to the 
observed period, it is important to know its longer and shorter time 
span, so this study took into account the career productivity – total 
scientific and professional output – and the five-year productivity of 
scientists.
Career scientific productivity is measured by the self-reported 
number of all scientific publications by respondents from the natu-
ral and social sciences in the course of their career; they were also 
asked to report the number of papers published in the journals cov-
ered by Current Contents and (S)SCI databases. In parallel to scien-
tific productivity, career professional productivity is measured by the 
number of expert publications by respondents-scientists in the course 
of their overall career. Professional production has been monitored in 
Croatian research since the beginning of the 1970s, too (Previšić, 1975). 
Production of these types of papers, popular science and other papers 
targeting a wider (expert) public has been investigated in more detail in 
the areas of the social sciences and humanities (Nederhof et al., 1989; 
Nederhof and Meijer, 1995).
Five-year productivity was limited only to scientific publications by 
respondents over the course of five years before the survey, both mono-
authored and co-authored. Furthermore, the number of their papers 
published in the same period in foreign publications (books and jour-
nals), regardless of the number of authors, has also been determined.
Apart from questions about research productivity, the question-
naire also included a set of other questions on the most important so-
cial, professional, and career characteristics of respondents and their 
scientific and organisational background. These characteristics were 
treated as possible predictors of productivity, and they will be listed 
later in the paper. The course of the first ever web survey conducted in 
the Croatian scientific community and the samples of scientists from 
the natural and social sciences are described in detail in the first chap-
ter of the book (Golub, 2009), so there is no need to describe them again 
here. However, the reader should be reminded that the subsample of 
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natural scientists consisted of 310 respondents, while the subsample of 
social scientists consisted of 167 respondents.
The findings were processed statistically using the SPSS package 
(version 11.5). After the basic analyses, univariate and multivariate 
methods of data processing were used. The former included t-tests and 
analyses of variance (with post hoc tests) in order to determine the sig-
nificance of differences in the productivity of the natural and social 
sciences, as well as differences between individual fields in each area. 
Among the multivariate methods, regression analyses were used to es-
tablish significant predictors of research productivity in both observed 
areas.
3. What and how much do natural and social scientists publish?
3.1. Publication patterns in the two scientific areas
Different publication patterns of natural and social scientists 
are evident from the quantity of their overall publications as well as 
from particular types of works published in the course of their careers 
and in a five-year period. Table 1 sets out comparisons of the average 
number of publications by respondents (mean-M) from the observed 
fields, standard deviation (SD) and the result of a t-test for every indi-
vidual type of publication.
Even a quick inspection of the data in the table shows that all types 
of productivity, except career scientific productivity, indicate signifi-
cant statistical differences in both time spans. The absence of such dif-
ferentiation in the average number of all scientific publications might 
be related to the age composition of the subsamples. The subsample of 
social scientists is significantly younger than the comparable popula-
tion of the whole area, whereas there is no significant age difference 
between the sample and the population of natural scientists (Golub, 
2009). The picture of career productivity obtained for the former may 
be somewhat distorted.
And thus starts the comparison of the overall scientific production 
in the course of the career and five-year period, with the social sci-
ences faring significantly, but not greatly, better in the five-year period 
analysis. These findings are actually in line with the results of earlier 
Croatian studies of productivity on samples of the research population 
from 1990 and 2004. According to them, differences in the average ca-
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reer scientific production in these two areas are insignificant, just like 
the differences in the five-year output, as shown by the more recent of 
the two studies (Prpić and Brajdić Vuković, 2005). However, at the turn 
of the 1990s, social scientists were markedly more productive in the 
shorter period (Prpić, 1990).
Table 1. Average number of publications (mean) by natural and social scientists, 
with t-tests results1
Career and five-year productivity Scientific area Mean
Standard 
deviation t p
All professional publications Natural 
Social 
 9.31
21.35
20.89
28.78 4.75 0.000
All scientific publications Natural
Social
39.31
40.84
38.05
41.64 0.40 0.686
All scientific papers in journals indexed in 
(S)SCI and CC 
Natural
Social
22.97
10.10
25.24
15.01 6.95 0.000
All scientific and professional publications Natural
Social
48.50
62.27
49.67
59.43 2.674 0.008
Mono-authored scientific publications in 
the five-year period
Natural
Social
 1.72
 8.70
 3.13
 9.17 9.455 0.000
Co-authored scientific publications in 
the five-year period
Natural
Social
10.81
 6.66
11.36
 8.76 4.068 0.000
Scientific papers published in international 
publications in the five-year period
Natural
Social
 9.26
 5.36
 7.99
 6.99 5.308 0.000
All scientific publications in the five-year 
period
Natural
Social
12.23
15.35
10.54
12.15 2.876 0.004
Collated to the presented international comparisons of the pub-
lication productivity in the natural and social sciences, our findings 
proved persistently more balanced. Considering that they also meth-
 1 The sum of average values of professional and scientific publications does not add up to 
the average of their total number, and the same situation repeats with mono-authored and co-
authored publications whose sum does not equal the average number of all scientific publica-
tions by respondents in the five years from November 1999 to November/December 2004. This 
applies to both scientific areas. Differences are minimal, merely in decimal points, and they re-
sult from the missing data for one of two types of publications. Exclusion of those questionnaires 
would needlessly cut the size of the sample by 8 respondents in career, and by 13 respondents in 
five-year output.
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odologically undervalue the productivity of the latter in favour of the 
former group of sciences, it seems that the Croatian social science com-
munity has witnessed a proliferation of publications. This is also sup-
ported by the available international comparisons, even though they 
are not completely fair in terms of methodology either, because our 
subsamples are professionally more selective. However, the data con-
cerning the Norwegian university professors of the natural and social 
sciences (Kyvik, 2003: 40) show that they publish 3.4 and 2.6 works per 
year respectively on average. Croatian natural scientists are less pro-
ductive, with their yearly average of 2.4 papers, while social scientists 
are more productive than their Norwegian colleagues with an average 
3.1 publications published per year.
The key characteristics of the scientific system in the socialist 
period favoured hyperproduction in the social sciences, especially its 
tendency to evaluate the quantity and not the quality of publications. 
The criterion of quantity was not accompanied by the introduction of 
international evaluation standards, as was the case in the hard sciences. 
Naturally, the local orientation of publications prevailed which, thanks 
to less demanding criteria, encouraged superproductivity, also sup-
ported by opportunities for productive researchers to earn extra fees 
inside and outside their institution. Considering the persistency of ex-
cessive and insufficiently selective productivity, it is clear that the com-
petitive science system introduced in the post-socialist period did not 
sufficiently encourage a change in the publication practice of the social 
sciences. The differences in other types of publications generally follow 
the regularities and patterns of the scientific context determined by the 
research and analyses of other authors.
However, let us return to the comparisons of respondents’ career 
production. Whereas no significant differences between areas were 
found in its overall corpus, the difference in the number of papers pub-
lished by scientists in journals and publications indexed in the S(SCI) 
and CC databases is statistically significant and great. The majority of 
natural scientists’ scientific papers (58.5%) were published precisely in 
these publications, whereas social scientists are credited with only a 
quarter of such papers – 24.8%. Although the result was in line with 
the findings of foreign studies, it is correctly understood as a rough 
indicator of the relation between the observed scientific fields and not 
necessarily the actual share of SCI/CC papers in the career production 
of one or the other group of scientists.
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Although the differences stem from the non-selective scientific 
system of the socialist period, they cannot be completely attributed to 
it. To be more precise, there was no tangible proliferation of this type 
of production in the post-socialist period either, since the bibliomet-
ric indicators in social sciences would have been significantly better 
than those obtained (Jokić and Šuljok, 2009). General underfunding of 
scientific research, especially social science projects, discouraged any 
deeper changes in publication practices. International social journals 
often prefer empirical papers, and the opportunities and the scope of 
such research depended directly on insufficient material support for 
research projects. Furthermore, publishing in foreign languages in the 
social sciences and humanities most often includes the costs of transla-
tion and/or proofreading, as international journals from these fields 
expect the text to be polished in terms of language.
The reflection of the anti-intellectual social and political climate 
on science policy had an additional adverse effect on the social and 
material position of individual segments of the scientific community 
in the area of the social sciences and humanities. Generalisations about 
the total ideological indoctrination of the social sciences and the fa-
vouring of some philosophical, sociological and pedagogical (sub)dis-
ciplines to the detriment of others with national content in the previous 
period were not founded on expert analyses and data. Yet, they were 
official because they were made public by the National Research and 
Development Program (1998: 282).2
Even some natural scientists could not resist the theses on the com-
plete dogmatic ideologisation of the social sciences and humanities as 
the principal factor of the provincialisation of their output (Klaić, 1995). 
The long influence of Marxist and then national ideology on the so-
cial sciences and humanities and their publications is not disputable. 
However, a serious evaluation should be based on expert empirical anal-
yses, and not on ideological qualifications of the opposing ideology.3
 2 Unfortunately, such assessments had a negative effect on the financial support to the “de-
nounced” scientific institutions and researchers in the social sciences and humanities: on the 
funding of their research projects, publications, scientific equipment and employment of junior 
researchers. A future empirical analysis could confirm this statement.
 3 In sociology, such analyses were made in the early 1990s: an analysis of themes and types 
of sociological papers (Šporer, 1990); (citation) analysis of scientific characteristics of three so-
ciological journals (Dukić, 1990); analysis of characteristics of doctoral theses from the field of 
sociology (Lažnjak, 1990); analysis of the situation and prospects of Croatian sociology based on 
the perceptions of eminent sociologists (Štulhofer and Murati, 1993).
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Nevertheless, the chief generator of the very limited orientation of 
social science output towards the international scientific scene is the 
science system. It still generates insufficiently thought-out measures 
with adverse material consequences for scientific research, such as cuts 
in the average amount of grants for scientific projects and the “model” 
of project-based funding of doctoral courses for junior researchers. This 
is particularly detrimental to social sciences, where project funding has 
been significantly lower on average. To put it briefly, research and ma-
terial support required for social scientists to turn more strongly to the 
international scene has still not been established.
On the other hand, scientific evaluation in the social sciences and 
humanities does not take into account the more demanding bibliomet-
ric criteria that should include at least a minimal, and for these scien-
tific areas a suitable number of papers in the publications indexed in 
WoS and similar bibliographic and citation databases, at least for top 
scientific ranks. The social sciences cannot be equated with the natural 
sciences, but a combination of peer review and bibliometric indicators is 
usual in the developed world. It is even realistic to expect that Croatia’s 
accession to the European Union will necessarily increase the pressure 
of science policy makers on boosting WoS-indexed output in order to 
improve the country’s ranking in the international comparisons that 
the European R&D statistics founds precisely on these databases.
Professional publications, monitored only in the longest period, in 
the course of the overall career, are a special aspect of research produc-
tivity. The average number of these publications is significantly greater 
in the social than in the natural sciences, in line with the findings of 
previous studies. Furthermore, a drop was noticed in the proportion 
of such works in the total career publications of social scientists over 
the last fourteen years – from 58.9% to 53.1%, compared to the rise in 
a much smaller proportion of these publications in the total output of 
natural scientists – from 30.1% to 34.0% (Prpić, 1990: 126; Prpić and 
Brajdić Vuković, 2005: 70). The proportions of this type of publications 
found in this research, probably due to the greater professional selec-
tion of samples, are also differentiated in both areas, but they were con-
siderably lower – 19.2% and 34.3%.
The greater frequency of professional papers in many applied and 
technical sciences and in the social sciences and humanities compared 
to the natural sciences is explained by the different types of audience 
scientists communicate to. Natural scientists mostly communicate 
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to other scientists, but social scientists also do so to the widest pub-
lic. Addressing the non-scientific public is related to the importance 
of numerous social studies for various policies (Nederhof, 2006). For 
the same reason, experts who are not scientists could be defined as the 
third type of audience that scientists address, as was already pointed 
out regarding papers from the technical sciences (Nederhof and Meijer, 
1995). In the social sciences, such experts are also the interested compe-
tent public or potential beneficiaries of the results of social research.
Differentiated professional productivity also influences the sig-
nificant differences in scientists’ total career production, which covers 
both types of publications – scientific and non-scientific, but after the 
detailed analysis of career productivity it does not require any addi-
tional attention. What is more interesting are the patterns of scientific 
productivity in the five years before the survey. Although they indicate 
significant differentiation among the observed areas, the biggest differ-
ences are found in the average number of mono-authored publications, 
those being five times more frequent in the social sciences. The ratio 
of mono-authored and co-authored publications was also different, the 
latter being significantly more frequent in the natural sciences. Co-
authored publications make up the dominant majority of production 
in the natural sciences (86.4%), while the number of mono-authored 
papers is several times lower. Contrary to that, the majority of publi-
cations in the social sciences are mono-authored publications (56.6%), 
although the proportion of co-authored publications does exceed two 
fifths – 43.4%.
Kyvik (2003) established similar proportions, already mentioned 
above. They indicate stable relations in the output of the natural and 
social sciences, which is confirmed by the results of the investigations 
conducted on the samples of the Croatian scientific population. The 
2004 survey established an almost exact share of mono-authored pa-
pers in the production of the social sciences (56.9%), and a slightly less-
er share of co-authored papers in the natural sciences – 82.5% (Prpić 
and Brajdić Vuković, 2005: 70). Compared to the findings of the 1990 
survey, when the respective proportions came to 75.0% and 65.1%, the 
frequency of mono-authored publications declined considerably in the 
social sciences, while the frequency of co-authored papers in the natu-
ral sciences grew noticeably (Prpić, 1990: 126).
This brings us to the conclusion that the changes in the patterns 
follow global trends, and the most important factor of the rise in co-
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authorship is the increasing specialisation and distribution of research 
tasks, which boosts various forms of team work and scientific coopera-
tion in general. The role of national and international science policies 
that encourage scientific cooperation and team work, thus affecting 
co-authorship, is also important. Finally, technological development, 
especially the expansion of e-mail, has made communication and co-
operation among scientists much easier and faster.
The changes are even faster and greater in the social sciences, de-
spite their peculiarities. The introduction of a competitive system to 
award grants and funding to scientific projects in Croatia spurred an 
expansion of empirical research in the social sciences, especially in 
some fields. For example, theoretical papers dominated in sociology in 
the 1980s (Šporer, 1990), which stimulated individual scientific work. 
Today, only 10% of the newly accepted sociological projects are theoret-
ical, and the others include empirical research, or, at least, analyses of 
secondary data. It is clear that such scientific development will increase 
the role of research teams and collaborative groups.
The differences in the average number of international publica-
tions authored by respondents from the two scientific areas are also sig-
nificant: they make up 75.7% and 34.9% of the total five-year scientific 
output of respondents from the natural and social sciences. What is the 
prevailing pattern for the former is still a minority publication prac-
tice for the latter. Changes in researchers’ publication habits have been 
very dynamic in both areas. According to an older survey of the sci-
entific population on the eve of transition, a Croatian natural scientist 
published 44.2% of papers in international journals and books, while a 
social scientist had only 6.1% of such papers (Prpić, 1990: 126). A more 
recent survey of the same type showed great growth in both fields. 
Its findings show that natural scientists already have over two-thirds 
(68.6%) of foreign-published papers in their five-year output, whereas 
social scientists have almost one quarter (24.5%). However, this is less 
than the findings of the web survey show, probably because it covered 
more selective subsamples of respondents.
Since the survey focused on respondents’ foreign publications, their 
papers in Croatian scientific journals covered by the (S)SCI database 
and published in English were excluded. In other words, respondents’ 
total scientific publications available to the international scientific pub-
lic are more numerous than the papers published in foreign journals 
and books. This piece of information is relevant and indicative since 
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8 out of 10 Croatian journals included in SCI are published in English 
(Andreis and Jokić, 2008). In the social sciences, the proportion is much 
smaller since only one in three SSCI journals is published in English.
One does not have to stress that the international visibility of sci-
entific publications is greater if they are available in English, even if 
they are not covered by WoS. For this reason, the findings of this study 
are more exclusive than Kyvik’s, because he took into account precisely 
papers in English. Although it might not be quite correct methodologi-
cally to make any comparisons, the growth dynamics of internationally 
visible production in both countries reflects global trends in publica-
tion practice in the natural, but also in the social, sciences.
Only in the transition period did the Croatian social science com-
munity receive stricter criteria for scientific promotion, which for the 
first time conditioned employment in scientific institutions that had 
previously been guaranteed. For the first time, the criteria included a 
certain number of papers in journals indexed in the Current Contents 
database or in local publications of equal quality. Most researchers 
from this area advanced professionally thanks to the local CC journals 
and equivalent local publications, while a minority of social scientists 
focused more on publishing in international journals, especially in 
some scientific fields. In the natural sciences, the international criteria 
of evaluation had been present even before, in the socialist period, but 
a considerable growth was noticed in the proportion of international 
publications, which draws the conclusion that the change in the overall 
scientific system led to an increase in the global visibility of papers au-
thored by Croatian natural scientists.
To conclude briefly, the natural and social sciences do indeed 
practise different publication patterns. They simultaneously witnessed 
deep changes in all observed forms and aspects of research productiv-
ity – from the relation between scientific and professional production, 
whose frequency and role differ in the two fields, to the reduction of 
great differences in the prevalence of co-authorship and mono-author-
ship, in the international communication of scientific results, and even 
in their presence in the most selective scientific publications. The dif-
ference in these patterns and the dynamics of their development can be 
explained sociologically only if the differences in the social organisa-
tion and the mode of knowledge production and in the cognitive styles 
of the natural and social sciences are taken into account. However, the 
reduced difference in the publication practices is not the result of an 
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autonomous development process that would lead to a social and cogni-
tive convergence, although the influence of the intrascientific changes 
is certainly present, but the convergence is strongly promoted and en-
couraged by the science policy.
3.2. The challenge of homogeneity of the natural sciences: 
disciplinary patterns of productivity
The extent to which the differences between the natural and so-
cial sciences conceal different publication patterns within each of these 
scientific areas can be shown by comparing individual scientific disci-
plines or fields. For this purpose, variance analyses were made using 
post hoc tests, which show the significance of differences in the average 
number of observed types of career and five-year research publications 
for all fields within both areas. The results for the natural sciences are 
presented in Table 2, and they show the average (mean) number of pub-
lications (M) and standard deviation (SD) with the significance of dif-
ferences in average productivity between individual fields (ANOVA).
Differing patterns and even the quantity of research production in 
the natural fields are evident from the data. Almost all forms of publica-
tion productivity in both time spans vary significantly by individual sci-
ences. In the career span, the most significant are the relations between 
professional and scientific papers, and the share of papers in internation-
al publications, as they indicate relevant characteristics of knowledge 
production – the quantum of scientists’ non-scientific work and focus 
on the international scientific public. Professional papers, however, do 
not only cover publications that popularise science and target the broad-
est public, as they are operatively defined by some authors (Nederhof et 
al., 1989; Kyvik, 2003), but they also include papers targeting the widest 
circle of experts (Nederhof and Meijer, 1995) and also textbooks.
Differences in the production of professional publications in the 
natural sciences are significant, and they are manifested in the average 
number of such papers in the geosciences on the one hand, and physics 
and chemistry on the other (the level of significance is 0.004 and 0.007 
respectively). On average, a geoscientist publishes almost five times 
more non-scientific papers than a physicist, and three (and more) times 
more papers than a chemist. An even more interesting and important 
proportion is the share of professional and scientific papers in every 
individual field: one third (33.7%) of all publications in the geosciences 
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are non-scientific papers, compared to 14.3% in chemistry and half the 
portion, 7.1%, in physics. However, the proportion of these papers is 
close to one third (31.8%) in mathematics, and nearly a quarter (22.8%) 
in biology.
Table 2. Average number of  publications in the natural sciences - means 
(M) and standard deviations (SD), with ANOVA results (F-ratios and their 
significance)*
Career and five-year 
productivity
Biology
N = 84
Chemistry
N = 97
Geosciences
N = 40
Mathematics
N = 22 
Physics
N = 56
All professional publications 
F = 4.081; sig. = 0.003
M
SD
11.35
24.60
 9.98
10.41
19.46
39.03
 9.77
 9.98
 4.04
 7.92
All scientific publications
F = 3.224; sig. = 0.013
M
SD
38.44
40.44
36.41
37.03
38.35
34.50
20.95
20.50
52.52
40.39
All scientific papers in journals
indexed in SCI and CC 
F = 7.254; sig. = 0.000
M
SD
21.32
18.95
26.04
29.69
12.30
14.82
 8.50
10.67
34.13
30.02
All scientific and professional 
publications
F = 1.938; sig. = 0.104
M
SD
49.86
59.16
41.76
30.89
58.49
64.58
30.73
24.08
56.58
43.66
Mono-authored scientific 
publications in five years
F = 2.403; sig. = 0.050
M
SD
 1.39
 3.13
 1.52
 2.77
1.55
2.67
 3.55
 3.78
 1.96
 3.43
Co-authored scientific 
publications in five years
F = 5.142; sig. = 0.001
M
SD
10.86
13.12
 9.34
 8.68
10.56
 8.45
 4.64
 4.72
16.07
14.62
Scientific papers in foreign 
publications in five years
F = 6.433; sig. = 0.000
M
SD
 9.12
 8.04
 8.48
 6.76
 6.70
 5.80
 6.36
 5.85
13.50
 9.99
All scientific publications in 
the five-year period
F = 6.170; sig. = 0.000
M
SD
11.05
 7.55
10.88
 9.01
12.15
 9.39
 8.18
 6.19
18.15
15.83
* The same methodological note as in the Table 1 applies
Thus, the share of non-scientific work and publications in the pro-
fessional activities and publications of natural scientists shows signifi-
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cant variations, but also certain regularity: it is most frequent in the 
natural sciences whose results are at least partly applicable, but have 
to be presented and disseminated to specialist-users, which increases 
non-scientific productivity in the geosciences and individual biological 
disciplines. Since the latter are a part of the curriculum of biomedical 
and biotechnical sciences, this can also contribute to the quantity and 
proportion of professional papers in these fields. Professional publica-
tions in mathematics could be made up of papers dealing with applied 
mathematics, as well as university textbooks and handbooks for the 
needs of training in the natural and technical sciences.
The differences in the average output published in journals in-
cluded in the ISI and WoS databases are even greater. Mathematicians, 
followed by geoscientists, publish significantly fewer papers in those 
journals than physicists, chemists and biologists.4 The relative number 
of papers covered in SCI is in keeping with the said differences as well. 
The share of these most distinguished publications in the total number 
of scientific works published in the course of the career is significantly 
lower in the geosciences (32.1%) and mathematics (40.6%) than in bi-
ology (55.5%), and especially physics (65.0%) and chemistry (71.5%). 
Explanations of the differences are offered by scientists themselves 
from their respective fields.
For example, Šikić (1998) draws attention to the cognitive and so-
cio-organisational peculiarities of mathematics and the basis of its dis-
tinction from other sciences, especially the natural sciences. They are 
the reason why in this field, with a great number of relatively scarcely 
populated (sub)disciplines, fewer papers are produced and published, 
but with long-standing relevance, citation rates are lower but long-
term, and thus interest in secondary and tertiary publications is com-
paratively weaker too. Therefore, WoS data is not suited to cognitive 
and publication practice in mathematics.
Some natural scientists also indicate the different levels of gener-
ality of research in various fields. Geology is one of the sciences that 
study regional and national specificities alongside global phenomena. 
The scientific picture of the earth is often created as a mosaic – from the 
narrowest regional level to the supraregional and global level (Herak, 
 4 The level of significance of differences between the SCI production of mathematicians 
compared to physicists, chemists and biologists is 0.000 in the first two comparisons and 0.001 
in the third. Differences in the average number of such publications by geoscientists and physi-
cists, chemists and biologists are significant at the level of 0.001, 0.005 and 0.047 respectively.
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1998). Such a gradual cognitive course and the importance of regional 
and national topics is necessarily reflected in the (lesser) opportunities 
for publishing in journals covered by the most selective bibliographic 
and citation databases.
Respondents’ five-year foreign/international publications partly 
resemble the career-long production covered by the SCI. On average, 
physicists publish more papers in these publications than mathemati-
cians, geoscientists, and chemists, and the differences are significant 
at the level of 0.002, 0.001 and 0.030 respectively. However, an analysis 
of the share of foreign publications in total five-year production shows 
that physicists are no longer the most prolific scientists with 74.9% of 
their papers published in foreign/international journals (and biologists, 
with 74.4%, have almost the same result), lagging behind chemists 
and mathematicians (78.1% and 77.7% respectively), but still ahead of 
geoscientists with 55.3% of their papers published in foreign journals. 
The mathematicians’ orientation to the global scientific scene is much 
greater than the data on SCI publications may indicate, which shows 
how important it is to avoid the automatic application of the same cri-
teria to the overall area of the natural and mathematical sciences.
The structure of five-year scientific productivity regarding co-
authorship is also very revealing, providing more information than a 
comparison of the average number of publications. Thus, the number 
of mono-authored scientific publications is on average greater in math-
ematics than in biology, and there are significantly fewer co-authored 
papers than in all other sciences – physics, biology, geosciences and 
chemistry (the level of significance is 0.000, 0.006 and 0.008 in the last 
two fields). On average, even chemistry has fewer co-authored papers 
than physics (the level of significance is 0.027).
Observing the incidence of co-authored publications in total five-
year scientific production, it is evident that it is very high and simi-
lar in all the fields of the natural sciences – from 89.1% in physics, 
88.7% in biology, 87.2% in geosciences and up to 86.0% in chemistry. 
Mathematics, with a relatively high share of mono-authored publica-
tions (43.3%) and comparatively the lowest share of co-authored works 
(56.7%), thus stands out from the publication practice of other sciences 
in this area. Team work is most prevalent in the natural sciences, re-
gardless of their differences in social organisation and dominant type 
of research – laboratory research, field research or mixed-type. In con-
trast, thanks to the reliability of literature, smaller groups of scientists, 
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and even individual scientists alone, can conduct research in math-
ematics (Šikić, 1998). A study of mono-authored papers published by 
scientists working at Israeli universities also showed that mathematics 
differs significantly from the natural sciences in terms of a relatively 
greater portion of such publications (27%). The author of the study as-
sumes that the share would be even greater if applied mathematics was 
excluded from the study (Farber, 2005).
The findings undoubtedly confirm the assumption that the area 
of natural science is not homogenous in knowledge production and in 
its products either, and that the scientific fields have developed their 
recognisable patterns of career-long and five-year productivity. Each 
mode of knowledge production has a corresponding type of produc-
tivity. In fields such as physics and chemistry – fields whose topic and 
subject of study are universal, which have laboratory-based knowledge 
production and highly developed specialisation and team work – high 
average productivity dominates, along with production focused on the 
scientific public, the maximum international visibility of publications, 
and co-authorship.
In geosciences – characterised by more local, regional and national 
specificities in the subject of research, greater applicability and devel-
oped field research that requires team work – high productivity also 
includes considerable professional production directed at the non-sci-
entific public, and a comparatively lower international orientation and 
a stronger national focus in publishing results, and co-authorship.
Biology shows a certain mixture of characteristics of both types 
of knowledge production since it encompasses some subfields whose 
subject of interest may have local, regional and even national specifi-
cities, such as botany or zoology. It uses laboratory but also field re-
search, includes developed team work and, to a certain extent, applied 
research. Consequently, biology shows a stronger local orientation of 
publications and a greater share of professional papers than the “pure” 
laboratory fields, together with relatively high average productivity, 
with internationally oriented production, but also comparatively lower 
visibility.
Finally, mathematics is a scientific field that is characterised by 
prominent specificities of intellectual and social organisation: great 
fragmentation of its (sub)disciplines including applied (sub)disciplines, 
a high level of trustworthiness of results, longevity and usability of 
literature, and a relatively high proportion of individual work and a 
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comparatively lower level of development of team work. These socio-
cognitive characteristics and mode of scientific production are also 
accompanied by lower average career and short-term productivity, a 
considerable level of mono-authorship, a relatively high production of 
professional publications, and an international orientation in publish-
ing results, which does not necessarily include most selective biblio-
graphic and citation databases.
The implications of these results are twofold: theoretical and prac-
tical. The theoretical implications confirm that the complex typologies 
of scientific fields (Whitely, 1984; Fuchs, 1992) are superior to bipolar 
typologies in explaining different patterns of productivity within the 
same scientific area. The latter cannot interpret disciplinary patterns 
of productivity, while more complex ones can, since they classify indi-
vidual natural (sub)disciplines into different scientific fields, defined 
according to their important socio-cognitive characteristics. The 
practical implications of the findings of this study warn that science 
policy should not encourage uniform criteria of evaluation based on 
researchers’ productivity. Imposing the physical sciences’ publication 
model as the general pattern – a tendency noticed in scientific policies 
already back in the 1980s (Whitley, 1984) – is not justified even within 
the natural sciences, let alone in other scientific areas.
3.3. Differentiation of research productivity in the social sciences
The heterogeneity of productivity patterns in individual social 
sciences has been established by various, mostly bibliometric, analy-
ses (Nederhof et al., 1989; Hicks, 1999; Nederhof, 2006; Van Leeuwen, 
2006) which have produced some partial indicators of disciplinary dif-
ferences in the area. The study enables a broader comparison of basic 
types of research production in the main social fields. Table 3 shows the 
average (mean) number of publications (M) and their standard devia-
tions (SD), with testing of the significance of differences in the observed 
types of long-term and five-year production between the compared so-
cial sciences (ANOVA).5
 5 Due to the scarce number of respondents from some social sciences, and based on their 
relatedness, pedagogy, special education and kinesiology were grouped together in the usual 
category of education sciences. The same system was, at least partly, applied for the scientific 
fields of the political and legal sciences (11 and 15 respondents respectively), while information 
sciences with 11 and social work with only 3 respondents make up the residual category of other 
sciences.
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It is immediately evident from the table that there was no signifi-
cant differentiation in the productivity of individual fields in the course 
of the career, but differentiation existed in the five-year period, which 
raises the question whether the social sciences are more homogenous 
than the natural sciences. It will be remembered that the (sub)sample 
is significantly younger than the population of social scientists, which 
might result in a lower level of differentiation of their career produc-
tion, which is always strongly influenced by the scientist’s age.
Furthermore, insignificant differences are not necessarily small 
differences, and many sociologists recommend that they should not 
be dismissed lightly. Such measurable differences arise in all forms of 
career output of social scientists, but the publication patterns of indi-
vidual sciences can be more precisely read from a structural analysis. 
It shows that professional production is the greatest in the educational 
sciences, nearly one half of the total number of publications published 
over the course of the respondents’ career (46.6%), which is understand-
able considering the extent of their scientific knowledge application in 
the overall educational system and its special segments. In the so-called 
other sciences, primarily information sciences, economics and legal 
and political sciences, the share of professional production is 38.9%, 
35.4% and 34.4%, based on the need to bring scientific findings closer 
to application and to potential users, from the widest public, the expert 
public, to political, economic and social decision-makers.
Sociology (26.2%) and psychology (25.3%) stand at the rear with 
the lowest share of professional publications. The relatively lowest in-
cidence of such papers in the professional activity of scientists from 
these fields rests on very different intellectual and social premises, es-
pecially on the application of scientific knowledge, which is developed 
and organised in institutionally different ways. Psychological scien-
tific knowledge is applied in practice by numerous psychologists who 
work in education, the economy, health care and government appara-
tus, which makes up a broad institutional basis for the competent and 
socially rooted practical application of (new) knowledge. In contrast, 
the application of sociological knowledge does not have a tradition 
that comes anywhere close to this, nor does it have social demand, 
an institutional basis nor an educated critical mass of sociologists de-
ployed in various fields of social life and decision-making. Therefore, 
completely different, even opposing, explanations underpin very simi-
lar findings.
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In brief, our results reflect the trends of differentiation determined 
by other studies, whose findings show that the share of professional pa-
pers varies greatly between different fields of social science. Nederhof 
et al. (1989: 428) state in one study that this type of production in the 
social sciences ranges from 9% to 33%, while another study by the same 
author reports that professional publications account for up to 75% of 
total publications from some social sciences (Nederhof, 2006: 88).
Papers published in journals included in SSCI and CC are also 
differentiated by discipline. They abound in information sciences, 
amounting to 48.6%, which is followed by legal and political sciences 
(36.3%) and then, close together, by sociology and psychology (24.9% 
and 24.3%), while educational sciences and economics bring up the rear 
with shares of 18.2% and 17.8%.
Disciplinary differences established here diverge from the findings 
of other, primarily bibliometric, studies, which provide a different pic-
ture of the publishing habits of scientists from individual social sciences. 
Nederhof et al. (1989: 430) find that 62% of papers from experimental 
psychology and only 2% of papers from the field of public administra-
tion were published in journals indexed in the (S)SCI databases. The 
proportion of papers published by Australian social scientists in these 
journals was also differentiated – from 43% in economics, 32% in soci-
ology to 27% in political science (Butler, according to Hicks, 1999: 196). 
Psychology, especially experimental, and economics are the sciences 
with the greatest coverage of their publications in the most selective 
world databases, at least in some countries with developed R&D.
On the other hand, scientific papers published by our respondents 
from the fields of psychology and economics are far more scarce in the 
global databases. The scarcity of psychology papers is especially sur-
prising considering the general nature of their research subject which 
facilitates publishing in international and foreign journals, including 
those indexed in the WoS. The great output in the residual category of 
other, mostly information, sciences is also surprising, as is the relatively 
great WoS coverage of the legal and political sciences, especially consid-
ering the fact that it stems from greater average (S)SCI productivity in 
jurisprudence than in political sciences.
A reliable corrector of the self-reported data on this type of pro-
duction of Croatian social scientists is their bibliometric analysis. As 
will be seen, it not only established that the proportions of natural and 
social scientists with papers indexed in WoS databases were almost in-
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versely proportionate, but it also found great differences among social 
disciplines. Psychologists are in the forefront in this respect with 77.5% 
of scientists with one or more papers, whereas the share of such scien-
tists in the legal sciences comes to only 4.7% (Jokić and Šuljok, 2009: 
153). Although self-reported data from the survey refer to overall career 
productivity, and although the proportion of scientists with WoS-listed 
papers is understandably greater than the proportion of WoS papers in 
the total number of their publications, the differences are so great that 
they warrant a tentative explanation.
Self-reported data were obtained from highly selective samples of 
the natural and social sciences, but the possible distortion of obtained 
data is far greater in the latter. To be more precise, publishing in the most 
relevant international journals is an established and eligible publication 
practice in the natural sciences, on which the scientist’s promotion de-
pends, while in the social sciences such a practice has not been so solidly 
established. For this reason, the professional, age and especially disci-
plinary selectiveness of samples might have distorted the real picture of 
publication practice in individual social sciences. To be more specific, 
the real picture can be changed significantly by the response of several 
highly productive legal experts or by the absence of a few of the most 
productive psychologists due to the fact that the scientific personnel in 
both fields is not particularly numerous. Distortion of the findings can 
also result from the social scientists’ lower awareness of the world biblio-
graphic and citation databases and their almost complete lack of biblio-
metric self-monitoring or bibliometric analysis of their own production, 
which is conducted regularly by many natural scientists.
In other words, in terms of self-reported data, the discrepancies can 
be explained by methodology since they were provided by respondents 
of a more productive age and who were more internationally-oriented 
than most researchers from the social sciences (Golub, 2009). On the 
other hand, following bibliometric analysis, the detected under-rep-
resentation of Croatian social scientists on the international scientific 
scene can be accounted for by the long influence of systemic factors 
that did not create solid conditions and strong stimuli for scientists’ 
greater focus on publishing in the most renowned international jour-
nals. Furthermore, no matter how incomplete the indicators of produc-
tivity in the social sciences provided by the WoS bibliographic and cita-
tion databases are, scientists will have to pay more attention to them in 
their publication strategies in the future.
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Let us see if the five-year production of international publications 
in scientific fields sheds more light on the (un)expected disciplinary 
patterns which can be more or less interpretable here since the selec-
tiveness of the sample reaches scientific fields too. Economics proved 
the most productive science, outdoing sociology, psychology and ed-
ucational sciences – the level of significance is 0.000 in the first two 
comparisons, and 0.013 in the third. From the structural point of view, 
the papers published in international publications make up 43.0% and 
41.1% of the five-year scientific output of economists and researchers 
from the category of other social sciences respectively. Psychologists 
follow, together with researchers from educational sciences and legal 
and political science, who published 30.0%, 29.9% and 28.1% of their 
works in international books and journals respectively. Sociologists set-
tled at the bottom of the ranking, with only 19.1% of papers published 
abroad.
In all the natural sciences, the proportion of international publi-
cations in scientists’ five-year output is greater than the share of WoS 
publications in the total output in the course of their career, and the 
same expected pattern is also noticed in the social sciences. The big-
gest and the smallest discrepancies in the proportion of these two types 
of publications are the most interesting for interpretation. The great-
est divergence is found in economics, which has the smallest share of 
papers covered in world databases, and, according to the bibliometric 
analysis, it also has a small portion of authors with such papers (Jokić 
and Šuljok, 2009). Contrary to these findings, economists are generally 
to a great extent oriented to publishing abroad and are focused on the 
international scientific public. This certainly applies to our respond-
ents, although it is rather questionable in terms of the overall Croatian 
scientific community of economics.
A reverse, although minimal, discrepancy can be noticed in so-
ciological output, and it results from the inclusion of the Društvena 
istraživanja (Social Research) journal, issued six times per year in 
Croatian, in the ISI/WoS database. In other words, Croatian sociolo-
gists tend to use the opportunity to publish papers in a local journal 
and in their own language rather than to publish in international jour-
nals and books in foreign languages. Almost needless to say, the latter 
papers are in fact more visible internationally than the scientific output 
indexed in international databases, but which in reality are accessible 
only at the national level. Considering the openness of the mentioned 
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journal to other social sciences and humanities, works by social sci-
entists published in that journal probably make up a significant, and 
perhaps a major, part of their total production covered by those index-
es. However, such a publication pattern nevertheless renders scientific 
production of the social sciences more provincial, even when, formally 
analysed, it does not seem to be so.
Mono-authored and co-authored publications by respondents 
from the five-year period show significant differences by disciplines. 
Psychologists on average publish fewer mono-authored papers than legal 
and political scientists, economists and sociologists, and differences are 
significant at the level of 0.011, 0.000 and 0.013 respectively. Researchers 
from educational sciences publish fewer mono-authored papers than 
economists, and the level of significance of the difference is 0.025. Average 
co-authored production is differentiated by the fields of the social sci-
ence, and a significant difference is found between economics, which has 
the greatest average number of publications, and the legal and political 
sciences, which have the lowest average output of this type.
The authorship structure in five-year scientific production is most 
relevant for obtaining a deeper insight into disciplinary differentiation 
in the social sciences. Mono-authored publications are the prevailing 
way to communicate research results in the legal and political sciences, 
and their share comes to a staggering 89.5%. Such works make up over 
one half of publications published in the five-year period in sociology 
and economics – 57.8% and 54.0% respectively. The proportion of mo-
no-authored publications in educational and other sciences is 44.2% 
and 45.5% respectively, which means that co-authored works are a ma-
jority here, although not a great majority. Psychology is dominated by 
co-authorship and team work, with only 29.3% of mono-authored pub-
lications.
The more “in-office” scientific work, theoretical or desk research 
based on the use of secondary data there is in the field of social science, 
the greater the share of scientists’ individual work, even when they are 
brought together in project teams. From this follows the high propor-
tion of mono-authorship in jurisprudence (93.9%) and political science 
(80.8%). On the other hand, the more empirical research there is fo-
cused on collecting primary data and requiring team work, the greater 
the frequency of co-authored publications by researchers from that sci-
entific field. Co-authored publications dominate psychology precisely 
for that reason.
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Returning to the initial question on the homogeneity or heteroge-
neity of the social sciences, the findings allow for some, at least hypo-
thetical, conclusions. Regardless of the relevant common features, the 
social sciences are very heterogeneous. Just like the natural sciences, 
they too differ in terms of the generality of their subjects, the region-
al and (trans)national peculiarities of the subject, the applicability of 
knowledge, the modes of knowledge production and social organisa-
tion, and, consequently, patterns of research productivity. Since selec-
tiveness of the sample may have conditioned even greater disciplinary 
distortions of the picture of scientific productivity than in the natural 
sciences, a clear typology in terms of their production cannot be made 
in the social sciences as was done in the natural sciences.
It seems that every scientific field constitutes a special type of re-
search production and productivity, even when it shares some char-
acteristics with another field. For example, psychology and sociology 
show a resemblance in the proportion of professional work and pub-
lications, papers in WoS journals, average scientific and total career 
productivity, and papers published in international publications. At 
the same time, they also show important differences, primarily in co-
authored and team work and, according to the bibliometric study, in 
their international orientation and visibility.
This internal socio-cognitive diversification of the social sciences 
is explained by theories of scientific fields. Their authors claim that 
individual subdisciplines, such as certain disciplines of economics or 
psychology, and even sociology, are closer to some natural sciences by 
their important characteristics. Other subdisciplines, however, which 
are markedly textual and rhetorical, are considered closer to the hu-
manities, sometimes even to literature (Whitley, 1984; Fuchs, 1992). 
Differentiation of the social sciences is also confirmed by the already 
mentioned bibliometric analyses that measure the differences in the 
quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the productivity of indi-
vidual fields and specialities in this area.
Despite its methodological limitations, this study has also corrob-
orated disciplinary differentiation in the social sciences. Its findings 
show patterns of research productivity that can be explained only if 
they are observed as the result and final product of certain processes of 
knowledge production. Then, one can explain why orientation towards 
the widest public and expert public is stronger in some social sciences, 
and weaker in others. Then we can interpret why some (sub)fields are 
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dominated by mono-authored publications, while others have more co-
authored publications, and it becomes clear why in some social sciences 
publishing in international publications (but not necessarily in WoS 
journals) is a more frequent, and in others a less common, practice.
4. What factors can explain research productivity?
The hypothetical framework of our study includes the claim on the 
differences in the structure and power of the factors that interpret the 
career and five-year productivity of natural and social scientists. This 
thesis derived from earlier sociological investigations into the factors of 
scientific productivity. Mertonian sociologists empirically studied the 
social stratification of science and examined universalism in the social 
system of science. They were thus also interested in the relation between 
productivity and the important professional characteristics of scientists 
and the reward system in science (Cole and Cole, 1981; Allison and 
Stewart, 1974; Reskin, 1977; Long, 1978; Long et al., 1979; Allison, 1980; 
Long and McGinnis, 1981; Allison et al., 1982).
Croatian studies of scientific productivity used a more elaborate 
hypothetical matrix which seeks social determinants of scientific pro-
ductivity in a complex of socio-demographic characteristics of scien-
tists, the characteristics of their professional socialisation, their sci-
entific qualifications, their organisational context and organisational 
roles, especially in the division of labour and influence in the scien-
tific institution, as well as influential roles in the wider local and in-
ternational scientific community (Prpić, 1991, 1994). In the last twenty 
years, other sociological studies have also found productivity factors 
in structural and organisational variables (Xie and Shauman, 1998; 
Teodorescu, 2000; Fox and Mohapatra, 2007).
Taking into account the theses of organisational theories on the 
interdependence of the intellectual and social organisation of science 
(Whitley, 1984; Fuchs, 1992), it was possible to go one step further. It 
was expected that the productivity predictors would be structured dif-
ferently within individual scientific fields and areas, that is, that their 
research production would be interpreted with different compositions 
of individual, organisational and systemic factors from the same set to 
a different extent (Prpić, 1991, 1996a).
Thus, eight multiple regression analyses (with stepwise inclu-
sion) were carried out for both observed areas in which the types of 
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research productivity were treated as dependent variables. The same 29 
socio-demographic, socialisational, qualificational, organisational and 
so-called gatekeeping characteristics of respondents made up a set of 
predictors or independent variables.6 The results of regression analyses 
for the career and for the five-year productivity of natural and social 
scientists are presented in Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7.
Table 4 contains statistically significant predictors of the profes-
sional, scientific and overall career productivity of natural scientists, 
as well as predictors of the quantity of papers published in journals 
covered by the WoS bibliographic and citation databases. Significant 
predictors explained well the overall career productivity (56.5% of its 
variance), then scientific (54.3%) and SCI/CC production (52.7%), and 
finally the quantum of professional publications (50.6% of the vari-
ance). Three characteristics of the respondents – their older age, multi-
ple membership in international scientific organisations, and (young-
er) age at the time of their doctorate – made the greatest individual 
contribution to explaining the career research productivity of natural 
scientists.
The connection between age and publication productivity accu-
mulated over the course of the professional career is both expected and 
logical. Scientists as a rule have more published works the older they 
are. On the other hand, although an early doctorate is a common pro-
fessional pattern in the natural sciences, a younger age in obtaining the 
doctoral degree may affect the greater career productivity of natural 
scientists (Prpić, 1996a). Finally, international professional integration, 
even at the level of membership in scientific associations, that is, at the 
lower level of integration, encourages productivity because it ensures 
communication with colleagues and regular information on the re-
search priorities and results of the relevant scientific community. The 
connection is shown not only by the comparisons of the natural and 
social sciences in the Croatian studies of the scientific productivity of 
eminent and young researchers (Prpić, 1996a, 2000), but also by an in-
 6 These are: gender; year of birth; mother’s and father’s education; performance at univer-
sity; age at doctorate; active and passive knowledge of foreign languages; type of institutional 
affiliation; type of research; leadership position in a scientific institution; local and interna-
tional awards received; number of domestic and international projects – in total and with lead-
ership; reviews of domestic and foreign colleagues’ papers; paid invitations for participation 
in research, for delivering lectures or talks abroad; membership in local and foreign editorial 
boards of scientific publications; membership in local and international scientific organisations 
and their bodies; number of domestic and foreign collaborators in research; frequency of regular 
communication with foreign colleagues without firm cooperation.
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ternational study conducted in as many as ten countries.7 According to 
its findings, the same variable significantly predicts scientific produc-
tivity in some other countries as well (Teodorescu, 2000).
Table 4. Statistically significant predictors of career productivity of natural 
scientists (beta weights significance < 0.05)
Predictors 
Publications in the whole career 
Professional
beta
Scientific
beta
SCI/CC
beta
Total
beta
Age (year of birth)
Age at doctorate
Number of foreign languages – passive knowledge
–
 0.155
 0.178
–0.525
–0.272
–
–0.497
–0.325
–
–0.354
–0.135
 0.143
Type of institution (academic – non academic)
Type of research (basic – other)
Leading international/foreign projects (number)
–
 0.094
–
–
–
–
 0.144
–0.152
 0.126
–
–
–
Membership in foreign/international
scientific associations (number)
Membership in bodies of foreign/international 
scientific associations (number)
Membership in local scientific associations (number)
Membership in local editorial boards
 0.531
–
–
 0.229
 0.232
–0.122
–
–
–
–
–
–
 0.399
–0.097
 0.120
–
Reviewing local colleagues’ works (number)
Reviewing foreign colleagues’ works (number)
Communication with foreign colleagues
without scientific collaboration (number)
Invited (paid) stays abroad (number)
–
–
–
–
 0.174
 0.106
 0.112
 0.216
–
 0.216
–
 0.197
 0.206
–
–
 0.168
Multiple correlation – R
Multiple determination – R2
F ratio
F-significance
 0.711
 0.506
52.477
 0.000
 0.737
 0.543
37.512
 0.000
 0.726
 0.527
40.420
 0.000
 0.752
 0.565
40.641
 0.000
The significant predictors of productivity of natural scientists are 
distributed differently in predictor structures that contribute to the 
explanation of the quantity of individual career publications. The in-
tegration of scientists in the international scientific community, but at 
 7 These are Australia, Brazil, Chile, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, USA and 
Great Britain.
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the lowest level of membership in its associations, makes the greatest 
contribution to professional productivity, and is much less predicted 
by influential gatekeeping roles on the local scientific scene, that is, 
in the editorial boards of domestic scientific journals and other pub-
lications. Since researchers’ age is not a significant predictor of pro-
fessional output, which is even greater for those who obtained their 
doctoral degree at a later age, this type of productivity is evidently 
determined more by some contextual variables, such as disciplinary 
ones. They seem to be, as the previous analysis has shown, crucial for 
the extent and share of professional work and output.
In contrast to the simple profile of non-scientifically prolific re-
spondents, the profile of the scientifically most productive respondents 
is significantly more complex and professionally more elite or more ex-
clusive, although it also includes the (older) age of natural scientists, 
with their productivity growing the most with their age, and with a 
younger age at their doctorate. To be more precise, the publishing of 
the great(est) number of scientific works in the course of the career de-
pends, apart from on age, on the intensity of communication and con-
nection with colleagues from the international scientific community.
The internationally most visible SCI/CC scientific production is 
best explained by the respondents’ older age, by the younger age at the 
doctorate, and then by more frequent international peer reviews and 
invited (paid) stays abroad. Productivity indexed in international da-
tabases is even more exclusive than overall scientific production, since 
it is more strongly associated with more reviews of foreign colleagues’ 
papers and leadership roles in international projects.
Thus, not all forms of research productivity can be explained 
equally well using the same variables from the same predictor set. One 
regularity also appeared: the more esteemed production in these sci-
ences is, the more exclusive its professional and social background is, 
too, since it is less connected with lower levels of professional integra-
tion, and is better explained by influential roles in the international 
scientific community.
Table 5 presents the results of regression analyses referring to the 
five-year scientific productivity of natural scientists, that is, the sta-
tistically significant predictors of the total number of scientific works 
published in that period, and mono-authored and co-authored publica-
tions separately, as well as the quantum of international publications by 
respondents.
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Table 5. Statistically significant predictors of five-year productivity of natural 
scientists (beta weights significance < 0.05)
Predictors
Five-year publications
Mono-
authored
beta
Co-authored
beta
Inter-
national
beta
Total 
beta
Level of mother’s education
Average grade at undergraduate studies
Age at doctorate
Number of foreign languages – passive knowledge
–0.125
–
 0.128
–
–0.135
–
–
 0.207
–
–
–
–
–0.175
–0.155
–
–
Type of research (basic – other)
Collaboration in foreign/international projects 
(number)
Number of local collaborators in research
Number of foreign collaborators in research
–
–
–0.135
–
–
–
–
 0.235
–
–
–
 0.192
–0.123
 0.130
–
 0.210
Membership in foreign/international scientific 
associations (number)
Membership in local scientific associations (number)
Membership in bodies of local associations (number)
Membership in foreign/international editorial 
boards (number)
 0.232
–
–
 0.194
 0.192
–
–
–
–
 0.135
–0.163
–
 0.140
–
–0.125
–
Reviewing local colleagues’ works (number)
Reviewing foreign colleagues’ works (number)
Invited (paid) stays abroad
Number of foreign/international awards for 
scientific work
–
–
 0.158
–
–
–
 0.259
–0.154
–
 0.212
 0.391
–0.116
 0.154
–
 0.252
–
Multiple correlation – R
Multiple determinant – R2
F ratio
F-significance
 0.446
 0.199
10.618
 0.000
 0.489
 0.239
13.277
 0.000
 0.570
 0.325
20.514
 0.000
 0.538
 0.290
11.331
 0.000
At first glance, it is evident that, compared to the career output, 
the respondents’ five-year productivity has been explained to a much 
lesser extent. This primarily refers to the respondents’ mono-authored 
papers, with 19.9% of explained variance, the type of publications 
which are not characteristic of this area, and even relates to typical, 
co-authored papers with a slightly greater percentage of 23.9. The total 
amount of published scientific papers follows with an even higher por-
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tion (29.0%) of explained variance, while the respondents’ international 
publications rank first with 32.5% of variance accounted for.
The impact of the respondents’ age on their productivity disappears 
in this time span, and the greatest individual contribution to individual 
types of productivity is shown by invited and paid stays abroad, and 
the number of international collaborators in joint research. If member-
ship in international scientific associations is also taken into account 
as the third strongest predictor, it becomes evident that the five-year 
productivity of natural scientists rises with the researchers’ stronger 
orientation towards the international scientific scene. The negative re-
lation between the level of the mother’s education and the scientist’s 
productivity is interesting, as it shows that respondents whose mothers 
do not have an academic education publish more works, which can be 
affected by another variable that has not been considered here, such as 
the scientific field.
Two types of five-year production are the most important for de-
tailed analysis: the quantity of all scientific publications and of papers 
published in international publications. Apart from the strongest pre-
dictors, each of the two profiles of the (most) productive respondents 
also includes other significant factors such as membership in interna-
tional associations, reviewing foreign colleagues’ papers, and collabo-
ration in international projects, which additionally indicate the key im-
portance of international networking and the orientation of scientists 
for knowledge production in the natural sciences.
Some of these factors have greater importance in the five-year pro-
duction than in the career output, due to the dominant influence of the 
variables of age and years of professional activity on the overall quan-
tum of publications. However, even in that long time span, the contri-
bution of international scientific engagement to scientists’ productivity 
is seen precisely in the respondents’ most visible works. The predictors 
of the short-term and career productivity of natural scientists confirm 
the already shown key importance of international networking and in-
tegration in this scientific area (Prpić, 1996b).
International orientation and communication in science can also 
be connected to the concept of social capital which is used increasingly 
more in sociological empirical studies of gender differentiation, but 
also in studies of productivity in science (Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Lazega 
et al., 2006; Ziherl et al., 2006; Prpić, 2007). As important as it is for 
scientific production in the natural sciences, international social capi-
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tal can be even more important in smaller scientific communities with 
modest material resources.
A finding of a bibliometric study which shows a great rise in inter-
national co-authorship in six different natural disciplines over the last 
decade of the previous century is very important for this discussion. 
The study did not find any significant differences in growth rates.8 The 
author of the study concludes that global dynamics is a more impor-
tant determinant of scientific cooperation than the differences in the 
intellectual organisation of individual fields (Wagner, 2005). The said 
findings still cannot form firm empirical verification for broader gen-
eralisations, but they are in line with the results we obtained for the 
eminent Croatian natural scientists and the population of natural sci-
ences. International cooperation is the key factor for the interpretation 
of high scientific productivity in the natural sciences.
The predictors of the career productivity of social scientists and 
the extent to which they contribute to its explanation are presented in 
Table 6. The first discernable difference between the observed scientific 
areas refers precisely to the extent to which the variances of individual 
types of career productivity were explained in the social sciences. The 
proportion ranges from 49.5% of variability in scientific production, 
47.6% of variance in all professional and scientific publications, 41.9% 
of variability in professional production and the lowest 17.9% of ex-
plained variance in our respondents’ WoS publications. The latter pa-
pers are not really a typical pattern of productivity in social sciences 
(yet). Significant predictors explain scientific productivity noticeably 
less in the social than in the natural sciences. The smallest difference is 
found in overall scientific production, while the greatest difference is, 
expectedly, observed in the level to which the publications indexed in 
(S)SCI and CC databases are explained.
At the same time, it is evident that age has once again the greatest 
individual influence on different forms of career productivity, as well 
as the age at the doctorate, and invited stays abroad to some extent. An 
older age again has a cumulative effect on productivity which is on aver-
age greater in the older than in the younger generations of scientists. A 
younger age at the doctorate is also a good predictor of the future pro-
 8 Compared disciplines were selected considering the different level of importance of ex-
changing data, use of expensive scientific equipment, exchange of rare or unique resources, or 
exchange of ideas. They were: astrophysics, mathematical logic, polymer science, soil science 
and virology.
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duction of scientists, especially since a degree in the social sciences was 
obtained at a later age, and natural scientists were also more success-
ful in this respect among our respondents (Golub, 2009). Finally, paid 
stays abroad are a sign of the already noticed scientific quality of invited 
scientists, but they also boost their productivity. With regard to career 
productivity, similarities of its strongest predictors confirm that in both 
areas the same benefits of the previous scientific performance accumu-
late over the course of the scientific career (cumulative advantage).
Table 6. Statistically significant predictors of career productivity of social 
scientists (beta weights significance < 0.05)
Predictors 
Publications in the whole career
Professional 
beta
Scientific 
beta
SCI/CC 
beta
Total 
beta
Age (year of birth)
Level of father’s education
Age at doctorate
–0.216
 0.145
–
–0.561
–
–0.354
–0.334
–
–
–0.520
–
–0.283
Number of local collaborators in research
Number of international collaborators
Membership in foreign/international scientific 
associations (number)
Membership in bodies of local scientific 
associations (number)
Membership in local editorial boards (number)
Membership in foreign/international editorial 
boards (number)
 0.129
 0.195
–0.325
–
–
 0.170
–
–
–
 0.266
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
 0.143
–
Reviewing local colleagues’ works (number)
Invited (paid) stays abroad
Number of local awards for scientific work
Number of foreign/international awards for 
scientific work
 0.142
–
 0.149
 0.309
–
 0.286
–
–
–
 0.211
–
–
 0.162
 0.168
 0.201
–
Multiple correlation – R
Multiple determination – R2
F ratio
F-significance
 0.647
 0.419
10.238
 0.000
 0.704
 0.495
32.898
 0.000
 0.423
 0.179
14.839
 0.000
 0.690
 0.476
19.868
 0.000
Apart from the expected influence of age, the composition of sig-
nificant predictors of the respondents’ professional (non-scientific) pro-
ductivity differs from the composition of factors that explain the quanti-
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ty of scientific publications. The non-scientific productivity of scientists 
is most connected to less frequent membership in international scien-
tific associations and to more international/foreign awards for scientific 
work. The connection is contradictory and interesting since the two pre-
dictors are related in content – both concern international communica-
tion and recognition – but opposite in direction. Since the social sciences 
are an area with a relatively high common but disciplinarily differenti-
ated share of professional output, it is possible that the different context 
is the intervening variable that stands behind the seemingly illogical 
connections. The next two significant predictors – more international 
collaborators in research and the greater frequency of membership in 
editorial boards of international/foreign scientific publications – show 
the prominent international orientation of respondents, thus paving the 
way for the interpretation that the contribution of such an orientation 
towards greater professional production is even greater in the social sci-
ences than in the natural scientific fields.
The strongest predictor of social scientists’ scientific output is their 
age, with which the number of their published works also rises. The im-
pact of the younger age at the doctorate is also relatively high, and is on 
average greater in respondents from the social sciences. Thus, it is no 
wonder that those who obtained their doctorate at a younger age pub-
lished more scientific papers in the course of their careers. Paid stays 
abroad and more frequent membership in bodies of local scientific as-
sociations also have a significant role in explaining the variability of ca-
reer scientific output. The top three most influential predictors overlap 
the top three strongest predictors in the natural sciences, which leads 
to the conclusion that career scientific productivity is similar in both 
areas, at least in terms of the factors that interpret it the most. They 
are connected with the accumulative character of career productivity, 
with the earlier acquired scientific qualifications (doctorate), and with 
integration in the international scientific community.
In contrast to the relatively high and, in terms of the composition 
of predictors, rather complex explanation of the production of WoS pa-
pers in the natural sciences, only two variables in the social sciences 
– older age and more frequent invited stays abroad – predict a greater 
quantity of these allegedly globally most visible publications, which is 
rather dubious due to the prevalence of journals in the Croatian lan-
guage. In short, social scientists also simply accumulate this type of 
paper as well in the course of their career, as do those who are (were) 
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more often invited abroad. Overall scientific and professional produc-
tivity is best predicted by the scientist’s age and the age at the doctorate. 
High productivity of this type is tied mostly to the domestic scientific 
scene, but the profile of highly productive scientists turns out to be very 
exclusive professionally because of their gatekeeping roles, and due to 
their local as well as international awards.
The predictors of five-year scientific output in the social sciences 
are presented in Table 7. As expected, all types of scientific produc-
tivity of this span are accounted for to a lesser extent than the career 
output, but they are not significantly behind the comparable output of 
the natural sciences, since the proportions of explained variance were 
30.3% for foreign publications, 27.9% for mono-authored publications, 
26.2% for all five-year publications, and 24.4% for co-authored papers. 
The publishing of mono-authored works is of course explained better 
in the social than in the natural sciences.
Table 7. Statistically significant predictors of five-year productivity of social 
scientists (beta weights significance < 0.05)
Predictors 
Five-year publications
Mono-
authored 
beta
Co-authored 
beta
Foreign 
beta
Total 
beta
Gender
Level of mother’s education
Age at doctorate
Number of foreign languages – active knowledge
 0.182
–0.197
 0.156
 0.264
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
Cooperation in domestic projects (number)
Leading domestic projects (number)
Leading foreign/international projects (number)
–
–
–
 0.237
–
–
–
 0.315
–0.160
–
–
–
Membership in bodies of domestic scientific 
associations (number)
Membership in domestic editorial boards (number)
Reviewing local colleagues’ works (number)
Invited (paid) stays abroad
–
–
–
 0.344
 0.378
–0.206
 0.278
–
 0.150
–
–
 0.339
 0.281
–
 0.265
 0.256
Multiple correlation – R
Multiple determination – R2
F ratio
F-significance
 0.529
 0.279
10.080
 0.000
 0.494
 0.244
10.652
 0.000
 0.550
 0.303
14.534
 0.000
 0.512
 0.262
15.485
 0.000
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The first comparison of average scientific productivity predictors 
reveals some similarities between the two fields. To be more precise, 
the respondents’ invited stays abroad also make the biggest individual 
contribution to explaining all types of production (except co-authored 
publications) in the social sciences. They are followed by more frequent 
participation in the work of executive and working bodies of domestic 
scientific associations, a peculiarity of the social area. In other words, 
high productivity is moulded through international connections and 
networking here as well, but it is also predicted well by influential roles 
in the local scientific community.
What is the professional profile of the most prolific producers 
of mono-authored papers in the social area? These are largely scien-
tists (most) often invited abroad to participate in research, lectures 
and science conferences, and respondents proficient in more foreign 
languages. The profile of prolific co-authors from the social sciences 
indicates their full focus on the local scientific scene: they are more 
often members of bodies of local scientific societies, they review 
more papers by their local peers, they participate in more domestic 
projects, but are less frequently engaged in gatekeeping roles in local 
scientific journals. The findings also show an apparent paradox in 
the scientific output of social scientists. While high mono-authored 
production is connected to international contacts, even invitations 
for cooperation, co-authored production stems from intense scientif-
ic activity in the domestic scientific community. The finding seems 
paradoxical only if observed through the patterns of natural science 
which show a rather high correlation between international and co-
authored production (r = 0.65), and half the correlation between mo-
no-authored and international publications (r = 0.32). These correla-
tions are lower and less discrepant in the social sciences (r = 0.56 and 
0.42, respectively). Accordingly, in the publication practice of the 
social sciences, mono-authored productivity is more strongly related 
to the scientist’s greater international orientation than co-authored 
production is.
Invited stays abroad and a more frequent leading role in local 
projects are the best predictors of the greater quantum of international 
publications of social scientists. The obtained predictor structure con-
nects the real globally visible production of respondents with their in-
ternational communication, but also the leading organisational, project 
roles in the Croatian scientific community. In other words, the most im-
135
 SELF-REPORTED RESEARCH PRODUCTIVITY: PATTERNS AND FACTORS
portant conditions for publishing in international journals and books 
are invited cooperation which requires a certain degree of international 
networking, but also key roles in local scientific projects, which ensures 
the greatest influence on knowledge production and, consequently, on 
publishing results in the country and abroad.
The quantity of all five-year scientific publications of social sci-
entists, regardless of authorship and their orientation on the global or 
local scientific public, is explained to a significant degree by the predic-
tors that also represent a mix of domestic and international scientific 
activity – prominent roles in local scientific associations, local reviewer 
roles and, of course, invited stays abroad.
What conclusions or/and assumptions follow from this compara-
tive analysis of possible factors of research productivity in the natu-
ral and social sciences? The basic conclusion refers to the established, 
and expected, differences in the power and structure of significant 
predictors. Those in greater proportion explain career, professional 
and scientific productivity, especially the quantity of WoS publica-
tions by natural scientists. However, the differences are smaller when 
production is observed over a shorter time span, except for respond-
ents’ mono-authored papers which were explained better in the social 
sciences.
The composition and structure of the significant predictors of re-
search production also differ in the two observed scientific areas. This 
refers to both career and five-year research productivity. In brief, the 
variables of international scientific integration, connections and coop-
eration are more important in the natural sciences than in the social 
sciences which show a greater influence of the locally oriented profes-
sional activity of the respondents on their output.
The structure and prediction power of the productivity factors 
are noticeably different, but not as much as was determined in a com-
parison of the productivity predictors of eminent Croatian scientists 
when a similar, but not identical, set of independent variables was used 
(Prpić, 1996a). Due to the methodological differences, we cannot con-
clude, although we can assume, that the factors of research productiv-
ity in the natural and social sciences may have also changed. This may 
have resulted from the systemic changes in the conditions of knowl-
edge production in the period between the two studies, and especially 
from the changes in the system of promotion and evaluation in science. 
Mandatory and time-conditioned scientific promotion also applied to 
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researchers from institutes who were previously usually exempt from 
such obligations. The criteria of scientific promotion, especially in the 
social sciences and humanities, were made stricter by including inter-
nationally renowned and equivalent publications.
Apart from the determined differences that are smaller than those 
found in earlier studies of Croatian scientists, this study also established 
certain common features in the factors that contribute to the scientific 
productivity of natural and social scientists. This primarily refers to 
predictors that best explain the career and five-year publications of 
the observed groups. For the former, they are age, age at the doctorate, 
and invited stays abroad, and for the latter they are, again, invited stays 
abroad for research, teaching, and science conferences. Thus, the latter 
factor is the “common denominator” of productivity in both cases and 
in both periods, which is in line with the significant association of dif-
ferent types of international communication with scientists’ productiv-
ity found in other studies as well (Kyvik and Marheim Larsen, 1994; 
Teodorescu, 1994).
Since it also includes the most intensive forms of international sci-
entific cooperation, such as work in joint research or in the commu-
nication of scientific results in university teaching and presentations 
at conferences, the factor indicates that the scientist’s presence on the 
global scientific scene is an important basis for scientific production. 
Even more, the predictor is a good indicator of scientists’ social capital 
because (more) intensive international cooperation as a rule presup-
poses their good international connections and networking.
If the picture of scientific productivity might be distorted due to 
the unrepresentative samples of natural and social scientists, agreement 
with the results of previous and other studies indicates that the conver-
gence of the natural and social sciences may not be taking place only 
in the patterns of research productivity, but might also be occurring in 
their underlying determinants.
5. Socio-cognitive differentiation in science and research 
productivity
Returning to our goal and the hypothetical framework of this 
study, it is necessary to assess to what extent it has fulfilled its scientific 
tasks and corroborated the starting hypotheses. Naturally, the meth-
odological limitations of the study, primarily the selectiveness of the 
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sample of natural and social scientists,9 which has not been expressed 
the same in both cases (Golub, 2009), have to be taken into considera-
tion. A statistical check determined that the sample of natural scien-
tists was representative of the population of doctors of sciences all the 
way down to the level of scientific fields in this area, allowing reliable 
conclusions at the level of the overall sample, and consequently some 
generalisations at the level of the natural sciences. The sample of social 
scientists is not representative of their overall area, or even of individual 
sciences, which call for far greater caution in drawing conclusions. By 
covering the overall population of natural and social scientists, biblio-
metric analysis makes up for the methodological deficiencies of this 
investigation of the productivity of the two observed areas (Jokić and 
Šuljok, 2009).
The basic thesis of the study, which expected significant differenti-
ation in patterns and factors of research productivity of natural and so-
cial scientists, was empirically supported by the results of the research.
Firstly, the thesis, as well as the findings of other, mostly less com-
prehensive studies, that the natural and social sciences do indeed prac-
tise different publication patterns has been confirmed. The principal 
forms of career and five-year productivity differ significantly. With 
almost equal career production, the research productivity of the social 
sciences is marked by twice the number of professional papers, where-
as the natural sciences produce two times more WoS-indexed papers. 
While the natural sciences are dominated by co-authored papers, the 
social sciences still have more mono-authored publications. Such pat-
terns and their changes over the last fifteen or so years can be inter-
preted by differences in intellectual and social organisation, the mode 
of knowledge production, and the cognitive styles of the natural and 
social sciences.
Secondly, significant differentiation of scientific productivity does 
not stop only at the level of scientific areas, but can be found within 
them as well. Individual scientific fields developed their own recognis-
able patterns of career and five-year productivity, and each mode of 
knowledge production has its own type of productivity. The natural 
sciences manifest significant socio-cognitive differences between labo-
ratory sciences such as physics and chemistry, geosciences with their 
 9 The often used methods in science studies, postal, and especially electronic surveys, have a 
serious weakness besides a number of advantages, and that is the selective response of scientists.
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emphasis on field research, and biology as a mixed (type of) field, and 
the distinctiveness of mathematics. Thus, the main forms of their re-
search productivity also differ significantly.
Similarly to the natural sciences, the social sciences also differ by 
the generality of their subjects, their regional and national peculiari-
ties, the applicability of knowledge, the mode of knowledge production 
and social organisation, as well as the cognitive style. Thus, they also 
differ significantly by patterns of research productivity, which are not 
as clear typologically as those from the natural sciences.
Thirdly, the expected difference between the natural and social 
sciences in the composition and contribution of significant predictors 
of the basic types of productivity has also been established empirically. 
The career professional and scientific productivity of natural scientists, 
especially the number of their WoS publications, has been explained 
better than that of social scientists, while the differences were slighter 
in five-year production. The composition of productivity predictors 
also differs considerably, so the researchers’ international cooperation 
and connections are the most important factors in the production of 
the natural sciences, whereas the social sciences also show the greater 
influence of the orientation of the scientists’ professional activity on the 
local, domestic scientific community.
At the same time, our study also identified the predictors with the 
greatest individual contribution to scientific output in the natural and 
social sciences. One of them – invited stays abroad for research, teach-
ing and science conferences – explains productivity well in both areas 
and in both time spans. It is also an indicator of the scientists’ social 
capital as it presupposes their international integration.
Fourthly, comparisons with the results of earlier Croatian and 
other international studies indicate that deep structural changes have 
taken place in the principal forms of research productivity: in respect 
of scientific and professional productivity, co-authorship and mono-
authorship, and the international visibility of results and their inclu-
sion in the world’s most selective bibliographic and citation databases. 
The similarity of the most powerful individual predictors of research, 
especially scientific production, indicates, however, the possibility that 
the convergence of the natural and social sciences does not take place 
only in productivity patterns, but also in its underlying determinants. 
Convergence in the development of publication practices and modes of 
knowledge production, taking place over a relatively short period, can-
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not be interpreted sociologically with the intrascientific process of social 
and cognitive uniformisation. It was undoubtedly strongly policy-driven 
and sociologically predicted long ago (Whitley, 1984).
Fifthly, these findings have wider theoretical implications. Although 
the study did not have the task of empirically testing the theories of sci-
entific organisations (TSO), it does make an indirect contribution. On 
the one hand, it provides some kind of empirical support to their theses 
on the mutually intertwined intellectual and social organisation of the 
fields of science and their socio-cognitive differentiation, and, on the 
other, it indicates that without a suitable theoretical basis, these results 
would constitute merely common-sense empirical data, whose mean-
ing and importance could escape even the most attentive of observers.
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Productivity and its impact in the ISI and 
Scopus citation databases from 1996 to 2005
1. Introduction: problem, previous research, theoretical and 
hypothetical starting points
The need to empirically investigate and describe the specificities 
of scientific communication, bibliometrically defined by published pa-
pers and citation analyses in individual fields and disciplines, usually 
arises from the competitive relations and limited financial resources of 
scientific research. The results of such studies underpin the theoretical 
basis of scientific communication and generate insights into the devel-
opment of science and individual scientific disciplines. Indeed, they are 
one of the segments of the sociology of science, that is, the science of 
science.
In almost all countries, the system of evaluation of scientific work 
is based on bibliometric analyses, peer reviews, or a combination of the 
two approaches. Until recently, the citation databases of the Institute 
for Scientific Information, Philadelphia, USA(ISI), the Science Citation 
Index (SCI), the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), and the statistics 
database Journal Citation Reports (JCR) were the basic instruments of 
bibliometric studies. With the establishment of the Scopus (Elsevier)1 
citation database late in 2004, the system of the evaluation of scientific 
output gained a new dimension. The development of Google Scholar2 
will also certainly have an influence on the evaluation system in sci-
ences.
The organisational concept of the ISI citation databases, SCI, SSCI, 
A&HCI (Arts&Humanities Citation Index), known today under the 
commercial name WoS (Web of Science), and that of Scopus differ fun-
damentally. While the idea of the selection and inclusion of journals 
in the ISI citation databases is based on Bradford’s law of scattering, 
 1 http://info.scopus.com/overview/what/ (retrieved on July 9, 2007).
 2 http://scholar.google.com/intl/en/scholar/about.html (retrieved on July 9, 2007).
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Scopus has a much broader definition of inclusion of primary sources 
of information. Even though Google Scholar will not be included in this 
research, we believe it deserves mention as a new system in evaluating 
scientific work. Google Scholar has a much greater range of sources of 
scientific literature than Scopus and a greater capacity for monitoring 
their citation rates, and it is intended to eventually cover all more or less 
relevant electronically available sources of information from around 
the world. This provides the global scientific community with the op-
portunity to evaluate the relevant sources itself, without any restric-
tions, conditionally speaking, instead of letting commercial secondary 
sources make the selection. Since the topic of this paper is to empiri-
cally investigate scientific productivity and its impact, the issue hinted 
at here is too broad to be considered in greater detail in this paper.
Let us first explain Bradford’s Law in order to more easily under-
stand the differences between the ISI and Scopus citation databases. 
Bradford’s Distribution, the Law of Scatter, or the Law of Scattering of 
fields in journals, states that the greatest number of articles discussing 
a certain problem is found in a smaller number of journals, or, in other 
words, that the greatest number of journals cover these problems in 
one or two articles (Bradford, 1934). The most productive journals in 
a given field are called the “core”, which consists of a relatively small 
number of journals with the greatest number of articles on a certain 
problem. Depending on the field, there are two or more zones of jour-
nals that include proportionally fewer articles on a certain topic, but 
in a greater corpus of journals. Such distribution can be defined in the 
approximate ratios 1 : n : n2 ...
For precisely this reason, ISI’s citation databases have been cov-
ering less than 10% of global scientific production in all fields since 
they were established in the 1960s, thus generating the so-called “core” 
of the world’s knowledge. In practice, SCI was covering around 600 
journals in the field of the natural and applied sciences in the 1960s, 
and today, the number comes to around 7,000! The citation database 
WoS, consisting of all three citation databases (SCI, SSCI and A&HCI), 
covers around 9,000 journals from across the world today. Since the 
number of journals has increased just over ten times on the global level, 
the percentages remain the same.
For almost every scientist in the world, being part of the so-called 
core of the world’s knowledge is a formal acknowledgment of the sci-
entist’s value and is part of the existing global evaluation system. In 
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a smaller scientific community, such as Croatian, where, in addition, 
English is not the mother tongue but a lingua franca, inclusion in the 
core of the world’s knowledge is certainly an important indicator of the 
evaluation of its scientific work.
Furthermore, the inclusion of papers in ISI citation databases cer-
tainly implies that the papers were subject to international review pro-
cedures, which differ in strictness, but require that the formal condi-
tions of the journals be met and that the paper be eligible both in terms 
of the topic and content. Being listed in the most selective databases 
may offer scientists the opportunity to become more visible to the over-
all scientific community. Their papers’ citation count, still one of the 
fundamental indicators of assessing the impact of a scientist’s work, 
can reveal how interesting and useful their work is to the global scien-
tific community.
New technological achievements offer new ways of measuring the 
extent to which a paper is read, browsed or saved, which is certainly an 
indicator of the potential impact of the paper. One of the more recent 
proposals of methodology for evaluating scientific work was presented 
and implemented by Chen et al. (2007). They introduced the PageRank 
Google algorithm which covers the network of citations of a certain 
journal or scientist, and ranks a certain paper based on the number of 
citations and type of sources citing it.
The originators of Scopus were led by an idea to select journals into 
their database that was somewhat different from that of ISI. Scopus, 
like WoS, is a multidisciplinary bibliographic and citation database 
processing the content of over 15,000 journals, more than 750 collec-
tions of papers presented at conferences, patents and other sources of 
information3 from across the world. It seems that the idea of this bib-
liographic and citation database is to offer scientists relevant, scientifi-
cally and professionally selective, multidisciplinary sources on a signif-
icantly broader platform than ISI’s. There is reason to assume that this 
approach to the organisation of the citation database came from the 
relatively large discontent of European scientists, primarily those from 
the Nordic countries, France and Germany, with the ISI/Thomson’s se-
lection of journals covered by WoS, that is, its selection policy. To be 
more precise, the excessive domination of Anglo-American journals, 
especially in some fields (Carpenter and Narin, 1981; Sivertsen, 1993), 
 3 http://info.scopus.com/overview/what/ (retrieved on 25 September 2007)
146
MAJA JOKIĆ, ADRIJANA ŠULJOK
and not only in the social sciences and humanities, but even biomedi-
cine, is considered one of the key deficiencies of WoS. This problem 
also certainly affects citations and the principle of the general acces-
sibility of scientific information.
In order to obtain as comprehensive a picture of the publishing 
productivity of Croatian social and natural scientists as possible, we 
used the capacities of both citation sources. We assumed that there was 
a difference between individual fields of science, or the social and natu-
ral sciences respectively, in the number of published papers and cita-
tions, simply due to the different concepts of the selection of sources of 
information in WoS and Scopus. Since Scopus covered over 60 Croatian 
journals from all scientific fields, and WoS indexed 13 Croatian jour-
nals in the same period from 1996 to 2005, it is logical to expect that the 
number of papers will show significant differences in some scientific 
fields.
Whether a paper was published in a local or international journal 
is a relevant factor for an assessment of the paper, just like the status of 
the journal within a discipline. It is not at all the same to publish a pa-
per in an international journal with an established and clearly defined 
review procedure, which also usually includes two competent reviewers 
(alongside the editor), and in a national journal in the mother tongue 
with perhaps one review. The scientific field makes a difference as well. 
A paper in the field of the humanities or dealing with a specific prob-
lem in the social sciences could be of much greater importance for the 
local scientific audience which it targets if it is published in a national 
journal than if it is published in a WoS journal which does not attract 
any significant interest at the international level.
However, this claim would hardly hold water for the majority of 
works in the field of the natural science. For this reason, one should be 
quite careful when assessing scientific productivity in the natural and 
social sciences respectively. Moed (2005) points out that the social sci-
ences and humanities, unlike the natural sciences, do not have a well-
defined methodology for evaluating scientific activity. The adoption 
of the evaluation system of the natural sciences, and its “mechanical” 
application to the social sciences and especially to the humanities, is 
hardly justifiable in theory. It is extremely important to bear in mind 
the specificities of a particular field, such as scientific communication, 
publishing habits (preference of monographs, domestic or foreign jour-
nals), as well as the citation system. The social sciences are a rather 
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heterogeneous group of disciplines. Psychology, psychiatry and fields 
closer to biomedicine (classified as social sciences by ISI in all of its 
classifications), but also economics, are closer to the natural sciences in 
terms of methodology, and citation database analyses are to a certain 
extent suitable for them. Moed claims that sociology, political science 
and anthropology tend more towards the humanities, that the book 
is a crucial communication medium, and that the so-called national 
publication model is much more relevant for them than the citation 
databases.
For some social science fields, such as law or some disciplines of 
political science or geography as a field of natural science, national 
sources are considered the key communication channel since they 
deal with the specific problems that are of greatest concern to the lo-
cal scientific and professional community. However, as far as a more 
extensive study or development of an idea that could interest the wider 
scientific community is concerned, it is important to publish in prestig-
ious international journals, thus contributing to the development of the 
discipline, but also to the recognisability of the author, or the institu-
tion and the country.
The impact of a certain scientific paper is at the time mostly meas-
ured by the citation count and analysis. Citation analyses include dif-
ferentiation between different types of citations, self-citation and in-
dependent citations, clusters, qualitative citation analyses, analyses of 
journals and authors cited, the context in which the paper is cited, posi-
tive or negative citation, etc.
Measuring the number of citations that a certain paper earns re-
quires great caution. Not only different disciplines, but also individual 
branches and narrow fields within one discipline cannot be compared 
without additional indicators and explanations. It is especially danger-
ous to compare the scientific productivity of the natural and social sci-
ences uncritically. The methodology of some fields of the social sci-
ences, such as psychology, information science, kinesiology, and eco-
nomics is closer to that of the natural sciences, so citation databases are 
much more applicable to them than to legal science or some disciplines 
of political science.
Apart from the number of published works, the number of cita-
tions earned, and the average number of citations per paper, in this 
study we applied for the first time in Croatia a relatively new biblio-
metric indicator, the h-index. The physicist J. E. Hirsch (2005), aware 
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of the weaknesses of the existing indicators of scientific productivity, 
the number of papers published, and their impact, measured by the 
total number of citations, the average number of citations per paper, 
and the number of papers with an above-average number of citations, 
attempted to introduce an indicator that could be used to measure the 
wider impact and recognisable influence of the work of an individual 
scientist – the h-index.4 A scientist has an h-index of h if he or she 
has h publications that are cited at least h times. In practice, if an au-
thor published 10 papers over a certain period, and if each of those 
ten papers was cited at least ten times, the author’s h-index will be 10. 
Batista et al. (2006) purport that the h-index has several advantages: it 
combines productivity with impact and it is not sensitive to extreme 
values in the sense of papers without citation or with few citations, as 
well as to papers with an above-average number of citations. It also 
directly indicates the most relevant papers in terms of citations ob-
tained. However, the h-index is sensitive to the comparison of fields, 
even within one discipline, for example of theoretical physics and high 
energy physics (Egghe, 2007). Batista et al. and van Raan (2006) warn 
that it is important to investigate the effect of the number of authors 
on the total number of citations in the interpretation of the h-index. 
They proved that the higher the number of authors, the greater the 
number of self-citations, which can directly boost the h-index unless 
self-citations are excluded.
In practice, the exclusion of self-citation, an option inherent in 
both Scopus and WoS, is still not reliable. Furthermore, it is important 
to define the precise scope of the term self-citation. The manual search 
and extraction of self-citations requires a great amount of time, and it 
is very difficult to conduct on a greater sample of authors.
Batisa et al. assume that the frequency of publication and delays 
in publishing also affect the h-index, and Van Raan points out that the 
type of article also affects the h-index. It has been proven that review 
papers are cited much more frequently than original scientific work. 
The scientist’s age is also relevant. Apart from the most widely used 
bibliometric indicators for evaluating scientific activity, the h-index is 
(apart from the above) also an important indicator for the interpreta-
tion of an individual scientific field or discipline.
 4 The h-index was developed by Jorge Hirsch, a physicist from the University of California 
in San Diego in 2005. Hirsch’s goal was to qualify the impact and quantity of scientists’ indi-
vidual production. http://info.scopus.com/june_07/#2 (retrieved on 6 July 2007)
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With this study, we wanted to gain insight into the scientific pro-
ductivity of doctors of science in the fields of the social and natural 
sciences, and the impact of those papers, as measured by their cita-
tion count. Furthermore, we expect the results to indicate the extent to 
which the applied bibliometric indicators are actually appropriate for 
individual scientific fields. We decided to compare Scopus and WoS 
starting from the hypothesis that Scopus is the more appropriate data-
base as a relevant source of information for works created in Croatia, 
especially those in the field of the social sciences. We also started from 
the hypothesis that Scopus was more suitable to evaluate papers from 
some natural science fields, such as geography and geology, which are 
classified as so-called national sciences in Croatia.
2. Methodology
The starting point of our study was the identification of the popu-
lation of doctors of the natural and social sciences. To be more pre-
cise, the study covered all Croatian scientists holding a doctoral degree 
in the natural or social sciences and employed in registered scientific 
institutions5 in Croatia. The data were obtained from the Ministry of 
Science, Education and Sports of the Republic of Croatia, reporting the 
situation in June 2004.
In total, 1,938 Croatian scientists, doctors of science, were identified 
and classified in 9 fields of the social sciences: psychology, pedagogy, 
legal science, economics, political science, sociology, special education, 
kinesiology, and information science, and 6 fields of natural sciences: 
mathematics, chemistry, physics, biology, geography, and geology.
We embarked on an investigation into scientific output and its im-
pact as measured by the number of citations earned by searching the WoS 
(SCI Expanded and SSCI) ISI/Thomson citation database, and the Scopus 
citation database (Elsevier) for the period from 1996 to 2005. Both data-
bases are available to the Croatian academic community in the internet 
version at the following URL addresses: http://portal.isiknowledge.com/
portal.cgi and http://www.scopus.com/scopus/home.url.
Since the time span is an important indicator in our study, it is 
necessary to stress that the database search by year may include a 
 5 Doctors of science who were not employed in registered scientific institutions, but, for 
example, in companies whose core activity was not science and research, were not included in 
the list of scientists and researchers delivered by the Ministry.
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smaller number of papers from the previous year. For example, jour-
nals published near the end of 1995 and processed in WoS in 1996 will 
be reported as papers published in 1996 in the search. There is also the 
possibility, but a much smaller one, that 2006 is covered in 2005 be-
cause some journals, especially those with more intensive publication 
dynamics, might be published ahead of time.
Since we had a familiar population of scientists, the most reliable way 
of obtaining accurate data was to search by surname and forename, or 
by the initials of each of the 1,938 researchers. The main reason for this 
approach of collecting data is based on the fact that there are a greater 
number of scientists with the same forename and surname. It happened 
also that sometimes even up to 5 scientists from our sample had the same 
forename and surname, and were engaged in completely different fields. 
In order to obtain relevant data, each scientist had to be matched to their 
own paper. A useful tool in the WoS database is the option to link an au-
thor with the field or fields they are active in. The option is currently of 
far greater quality in WoS than in Scopus. We assume that it is because 
ISI has a more sophisticated classification of scientific fields and the fields 
relate to the journals indexed by WoS and are statistically processed in its 
JCR (Journal Citation Reports) database. Since Scopus does not have such 
tools at hand, and for other reasons, it is not reliable to use the option of 
the field as an additional indicator to determine authorship more easily.
The problem we encountered while looking into the scientific ac-
tivity of female scientists is their inconsistent use of two surnames, 
that is, the use of different variants of the surname. To illustrate, we 
report possible variants: Jurić-Perić, A.; Perić-Jurić A.; Perić, A.; Jurić, 
A. Unless we are aware of this fact, the possibility of making mistakes 
is not insignificant.
The mistakes that were more noticeable in Scopus than in WoS 
were wrongly assigned addresses of authors, which required additional 
research. The same goes for linking individual authors with their clas-
sification of the fields. A paper was often classified in several different 
fields, which did not correspond to the actual situation. Another specific 
problem was the female scientists who had two surnames, and WoS and 
Scopus would register them under their forename, and both surnames 
would be given as initials. We solved this problem by using our own long 
experience in database search and our knowledge of the authors.
Thus, the collected data are based on an analysis of papers and 
their citations for each scientist, that is, for each individual author. In 
151
PRODUCTIVITY AND ITS IMPACT IN THE ISI AND SCOPUS CITATION DATABASES FROM 1996 TO 2005
our case, we made a distinction between scientists and authors, because 
some scientists from this population did not publish any works. Each 
author, regardless of his position in a co-authored paper, was assigned 
equal authorship. In practice, if a paper was authored by two or more 
scientists, and they were all a part of our sample, the paper was ascribed 
to each of the authors as theirs.
The software used at the time of the search did not offer a reliable op-
tion of selecting types of works included in the analysis. For that reason, 
we used all types of works and contributions in searching the number of 
registered works by one individual author in WoS and Scopus. In prac-
tice, this means that, apart from articles, that is, original scientific arti-
cles, the analysis also included meeting abstracts and letters. The differ-
ence that the exclusion of all other publications except articles from our 
analysis would make to the findings on the scientific activity of scientists 
from our sample could only be researched later. However, looking into 
the categorisation of articles in WoS and Scopus, based on our own expe-
rience, we determined that there was no consensus. Professional papers 
and even reviews were often classified as articles or scientific papers.
The data on the number of citations refer exclusively to papers pub-
lished by the authors from our sample in the period from 1996 to 2005. 
It is extremely important to point out that we took the number of cita-
tions both from WoS and Scopus based on their options of automati-
cally ascribing citations and the number of citations to a specific paper. 
However, we did not analyse mistakes in the process, such as whether 
the forename and surname, journal or bibliographic data connected to 
the paper were written correctly.
Due to the limited time, we did not embark on citation analyses 
at the level of separating self-citation from independent citation in this 
study. Although both databases offered the option to exclude self-cita-
tion from the search, we did not use the option because we tested the 
option and determined that the results were unreliable. This remark 
refers to Scopus in particular.
It is very important to say that the search was conducted in the 
course of one week, in July 2007, because WoS and Scopus are updat-
ed once a week, usually at the beginning of the week. In practice, this 
means that the data in the databases remained unchanged during that 
week. If we had extended the search to two or more weeks, the data on 
the number of citations would no longer be the same, and the h-index 
value might also be different.
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We took the values of the h-index for each individual author directly 
from both databases. Both WoS and Scopus offer the automatic option 
of using the h-index, which made our work much easier. However, even 
though we said that self-citations were not excluded from the citation 
count, it should be noted that self-citations were not excluded in the h-
index either, which might significantly change the findings regarding 
some of the authors, or individual scientific fields.
Thus, the number of published works in the period from 1996 to 
2005, the number of citations from those papers and their h-index in 
the WoS and Scopus databases were determined and examined for each 
author, or, more precisely, 807 doctors of the social sciences and 1,131 
doctors of the natural sciences, which was a very time-consuming task.
Since scientific fields are an important socio-cognitive framework 
of scientific productivity, and since earlier studies had determined the 
existence of disciplinary peculiarities, that is, differences in productivity 
in certain fields (Biglan, 1973, according to Prpić and Brajdić Vuković, 
2009; Prpić and Brajdić Vuković, 2005; Kyvik, 2003; Prpić, 1991), we be-
lieved that each area (and field) should be approached independently. For 
that reason, we calculated the average number of papers per scientist for 
each individual scientific field, the range of the number of published pa-
pers, the percentage of doctors of science who did not publish any papers 
within the given period, both in WoS and in Scopus. Extreme values of 
the number of papers, citations and h-index were expressed, and specifi-
cities in publishing in Croatian journals included in WoS were highlight-
ed. Descriptive analyses of differences, that is, specificities in terms of 
the mentioned indicators, were made for the social and natural sciences.
Since this paper is just the first step in more extensive research of 
scientific productivity and its impact, the task is primarily descriptive 
– to bring attention to an overview of the major characteristics of pro-
duction and the impact of every individual field or area, leaving more 
complex analyses for future studies.
3. Results of the study
3.1. Productivity and visibility of social scientists
The social sciences, as well as the natural sciences, possess spe-
cificities that are expressed through the dominant type of publications 
in which the findings of studies are published, through the number of 
journals, citation habits, or, in one broader definition, through differ-
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ences in scientific communication. In Croatia, the term “social scienc-
es” encompasses the already mentioned fields of psychology, sociology, 
pedagogy, economics, legal science, special education, kinesiology and 
information science.
The study covered the population of 807 doctors of social sciences 
from the said scientific fields who published a total of 831 papers (Table 
1) in the period from 1996 to 2005 according to the data from the SSCI-
WoS database. The findings show that the average productivity of doc-
tors of social science was 1 published work in a ten-year period.
Table 1. Scientific productivity of doctors of social sciences according to WoS 
and Scopus data in the period 1996-2005
Scientific field
0 
papers
(%)
1 – 5
papers
(%)
6 – 9
papers
(%)
10 and more
papers
(%)
Total 
papers
Psychology
(N=71)
WoS
Scopus
22.5
16.9
38.0
40.8
28.2
31.0
11.3
14.1
 344
 355
Pedagogy
(N=42)
WoS
Scopus
61.9
61.9
35.7
35.7
 2.4
 2.4
0
0
  33
  31
Legal science
(N=128)
WoS
Scopus
95.3
89.1
 4.7
10.9
0
0
0
0
   7
  20
Economics
(N=309)
WoS
Scopus
84.5
69.9
14.9
28.5
0
 1.3
 0.6
 0.3
 105
 188
Political science
(N=48)
WoS
Scopus
87.5
79.2
10.4
16.7
 2.1
0
0
 4.2
  17
  48
Sociology
(N=66)
WoS
Scopus
36.4
37.9
47.0
40.9
12.1
12.1
 4.5
 9.1
 182
 227
Special education
(N=39)
WoS
Scopus
69.2
25.6
30.8
69.2
0
 5.1
0
0
  20
  78
Kinesiology
(N=48)
WoS
Scopus
62.5
50.0
33.3
45.8
 2.1
 2.1
 2.1
 2.1
  58
  75
Information sc.
(N=56)
WoS
Scopus
73.2
60.7
23.2
30.4
 1.8
 5.4
 1.8
 3.6
  65
  90
Total WoS
Scopus
73.0
61.8
21.2
30.6
 4.0
 4.8
 1.9
 2.7
 831
1112
Analysing the share of productive scientists, that is, those who pub-
lished at least one paper in the relevant period, we determined that the 
share is only 27%. This means that as many as 73% of doctors of social 
sciences did not transmit any scientific messages via the so-called most 
prestigious journals included in the SSCI-WoS database. The number of 
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papers published per author ranged from 1 to 38, with only one author 
at the extreme end with 38 published papers. The highest percentage 
of scientists, 21.2% of them, published from 1 to 5 papers, while only 
1.9% of them produced 1 or more papers per year. The papers published 
by the most productive 1.9% of scientists make up 29.1% of the total 
number of published papers. The average values of scientific produc-
tivity for individual fields within the social sciences are presented in 
Graph 1.
The 831 papers published were cited 1,873 times in total, or 2.25 
times per paper on average. We obtain a slightly different picture of the 
citation status when we take into account that out of 27% of scientists 
who published at least one paper, 61% of them earned one or more cita-
tions of their works, including all types of self-citation, while 39% of 
authors remained unnoticed as regards the citation of their papers.
Since there were not many comprehensive bibliometric studies 
made for the social sciences as a whole, there were few data to compare 
our findings. We took the data offered by ISI/Thomson in its commer-
cial product, the statistics database Essential Science Indicators (1995–
2005), as one of the landmarks.
Graph 1. Average number of papers per scientist for particular fields of social 
sciences according to WoS and Scopus
5.00
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According to these data, the average number of citations per paper 
in the social sciences at the global level was 3.38, not including eco-
nomics. Considering all the specificities of the social sciences, espe-
cially their national orientation, our finding of 2.29 citations per paper, 
excluding economics, indicates much lesser visibility of papers from 
the social sciences created in Croatia (Table 2). However, when mak-
ing this claim, one should certainly bear in mind the methodological 
limitations of the research arising from the fact that we did not study 
the precise time when the papers were published. More exactly, it is not 
at all irrelevant for the citation count whether a paper was published in 
1996 or in 2005.
Table 2. Citation of doctors of social sciences according to data from WoS and 
Scopus in the period 1996–2005
Scientific field/
citation (author)
No citation
(%)
Citation
(%)
Total 
citations
Average number of 
citation per paper
Psychology WoS
Scopus
14.5
 6.8
85.5
93.2
1064
1489
3.1
4.2
Pedagogy WoS
Scopus
75.0
62.5
25.0
37.5
   1
  17
0.4
0.5
Legal science WoS
Scopus
66.7
85.7
33.3
14.3
   9
  18
1.3
0.9
Economics WoS
Scopus
43.8
64.5
56.2
35.5
 211
 167
2.0
0.9
Political science WoS
Scopus
50.0
50.0
50
50
   6
  16
0.4
0.4
Sociology WoS
Scopus
42.9
29.3
57.1
70.7
 180
 388
1
1.7
Special education WoS
Scopus
83.3
55.2
16.7
44.6
   4
  23
0.2
0.3
Kinesiology WoS
Scopus
 5.6
25.0
94.4
75.0
 247
 268
4.3
3.6
Information science WoS
Scopus
53.3
54.5
46.7
45.5
 140
 245
2.2
2.7
Total WoS
Scopus
39.0
44.5
61.0
55.5
1873
2631
2.3
2.4
It was possible to calculate the values of the h-index for the social 
sciences as a whole only for the mentioned 61% of authors who pub-
lished at least one paper or were cited at least once in the relevant time 
156
MAJA JOKIĆ, ADRIJANA ŠULJOK
span according to WoS data. The values obtained ranged from 1 to 6, 
with the majority of cited authors recording an h-index value of 1 (57.9% 
of them). Only 9% of authors had an h-index of 4 or over (Table 3).
Table 3. Values of the h-index for social sciences (cited authors) according to 
WoS and Scopus (expressed in %)
Scientific field / h-index 1 2 3 4 and higher
Psychology WoS
Scopus
 46.8
 50.9
29.8
21.8
12.8
12.7
10.6
14.5
Pedagogy WoS
Scopus
100.0
 83.3
0
16.7
0
0
0
0
Legal science WoS
Scopus
100.0
100.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economics WoS
Scopus
 66.7
 72.7
22.2
24.2
 7.4
 3.0
 3.7
0
Political science WoS
Scopus
100.0
 80.0
0
20.0
0
0
0
0
Sociology WoS
Scopus
 66.7
 58.6
16.7
27.6
 4.2
 3.4
12.5
10.3
Special education WoS
Scopus
100.0
100.0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Kinesiology WoS
Scopus
 35.3
 50.0
47.1
22.2
 5.9
10.0
11.8
16.7
Information science WoS
Scopus
 57.1
 60.0
28.6
10.0
0
10.0
14.3
20.0
Total WoS
Scopus
 57.9
 63.2
25.6
20.5
 7.5
 7.0
 9.0
 9.4
In contrast to the scientific production of Croatian social scien-
tists referenced in the WoS database as described above, our expecta-
tions regarding the Scopus database were somewhat different. We as-
sumed that the data obtained from the Scopus database would provide 
a slightly different picture, at least in terms of the number of published 
papers. Our assumption was based on the fact that Scopus includes a 
greater number of local and international journals than WoS. The data 
obtained (Table 1) show that our corpus of scientists published more 
papers indexed in Scopus than in the WoS base, 1,112 in total. The 
average number of publications per scientist was 1.4. However, only 
38.2% of scientists published, or, in other words, 61.8% of social scien-
tists did not publish any papers in the analysed period. The number of 
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published papers ranged from 1 to 41, with only one scientist publish-
ing the extreme number of papers. On average, only 2.7% of scientists 
published 1 or more papers per year in the relevant period, with only 
two authors publishing 35, or 41 papers within the ten years. Those 
2.7% of scientists published 30.26% of papers in total.
The published papers had 2,631 citations in total, which is 2.4 cita-
tions on average per paper. In fact, 55.5% of authors had 1 to 404 citations 
of their works in the period 1996–2005. In other words, 44.5% of scien-
tists who published at least one paper, and in reality as many as 6 papers, 
were not cited once. In this case too, as in the case of WoS, the warning 
applies regarding the methodological limitation of the study regarding 
the lack of information on the time the papers were published.
According to the citation count, 171 scientists had an h-index value 
of at least 1, which makes up 21.2% of scientists in total. The h-index 
ranged from 1 to 7, with 63.2% of scientists for whom the value could 
be calculated scoring 1 on the h-index. Only 9.4% of cited scientists had 
an h-index value of 4 or higher.
A more comprehensive overview of the specificities of scientific 
activity of our population of scientists, measured by publishing pro-
duction and impact as reflected in the number of citations for over-
all social sciences, is obtained by an analysis of each individual field 
(Tables 1, 2, and 3, and Graph 1). Since there was a wealth of data for 
every discipline, we are not able to analyse each of them individually. 
Instead, we focus on making a synthesis and in summing up the most 
relevant and most interesting findings.
As we can see from Graph 1 and Table 1, psychology stands out 
as the social discipline with the biggest average number of published 
articles in the analysed period. Sociology follows with lower average 
production, which, however, still stands out noticeably from the av-
erage production of the other social disciplines. Our data, WoS and 
Scopus, indicate that these two fields also have the lowest proportion 
of unproductive scientists who did not publish a single article in ten 
years. Psychology is the absolute leader here as well, with “only” 22.5% 
of unproductive researchers, a share very similar to that of the natural 
sciences. Another relevant piece of information is that over one half of 
papers authored by psychologists were published in renowned interna-
tional journals. The share of papers that psychologists publish in the lo-
cal journal Društvena istraživanja (Social Studies) is also relatively high. 
However, although psychology and sociology are the most productive 
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social disciplines, it is important to highlight the differences between 
them. Thus, it is obvious that psychologists are not only more produc-
tive than their colleagues in the field of sociology, but they are also 
focused on renowned international journals.
The leading position of psychology, followed by sociology as the 
most productive social disciplines can be partly explained by the na-
ture of the subject and topics of these two social disciplines, especially 
psychology. The general nature of the topics of psychology favours 
publication in international journals. At the same time, the relatively 
high average production in sociology can be explained by the relatively 
high frequency of local sociological journals in the analysed databases, 
especially in Scopus. Thus, it is logical for the quantity of their scientif-
ic communication, measured by publishing, to be significantly higher 
than average in the social sciences.
In terms of the average output referenced in the WoS and Scopus 
databases, scientists in the field of information science and kinesiology 
are lagging slightly behind psychologists and sociologists, with an aver-
age output hovering around the social scientists’ average.
It is very interesting that economists, one of the most productive 
groups of social scientists on the global scientific scene, turned out to 
be the least productive, together with legal scientists. Unfortunately, 
the real reasons for the extremely low scientific output of the great-
est number of doctors of economic sciences in the world’s most pres-
tigious economics journals remains to be investigated in the future. 
With regard to legal science, one should have in mind the specificities 
of scientific communication within the legal sciences as a field, as well 
as the potential interest of the international scientific public in the 
law of a small transitional country. It is also important to consider the 
publishing habits and the system of evaluating the published works of 
our scientists–lawyers. It is well-known that all law schools in Croatia 
have their own journals and that the majority of scientists, who are 
also university professors, publish various monographs.
Graph 1 also indicates that social scientists are in general some-
what more productive in the Scopus database than in WoS. This is most 
evident in two social fields: special education and political science. As 
we have already explained, the Scopus database covers a much broader 
spectrum of journals, at least those preferred by Croatian disability and 
political scientists, but also social scientists. Doctors of special educa-
tion from our population largely publish in local journals, primarily 
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in Hrvatska revija za rehabilitacijska istraživanja (Croatian Review of 
Rehabilitation Research), and this in over 80% of cases. It is also inter-
esting that the majority of papers, over 90% of them, represented in 
the Scopus database published by political scientists, were published 
in Croatian journals of a relatively broad spectrum – ranging from the 
journal Socijalna psihijatrija (Social Psychiatry), Promet (Transport), 
Građevinar (Civil Engineer), Pomorstvo (Journal of Maritime Studies), 
Socijalna ekologija (Social Ecology), Alcoholism, Društvena istraživanja 
(Social Studies) to Hrvatska revija za rehabilitacijska istraživanja 
(Croatian Review of Rehabilitation Research).6 A lesser number of pa-
pers was also published in internationally renowned journals such as 
Electoral Studies or International Social Work.
If we analyse the citation count (Table 2), we will see that kinesiolo-
gists (alongside psychologists) are among the social scientists whose pa-
pers have the biggest impact. The two fields also have the lowest share 
of uncited authors. The results for psychology were expected. Even 
though we initially found an explanation for the high citation of publi-
cations authored by kinesiologists in the interdisciplinary nature of the 
field and its methodology which is close to that used by the natural and 
biomedical sciences, the real reason was determined only after a more 
detailed citation analysis. The above-average self-citation rate influ-
enced the relatively high number of citations per paper. For this reason, 
the data, which at first sight suggest a relatively high level of visibility of 
Croatian kinesiologists in the WoS, distort to a certain extent the real 
picture of the impact of kinesiology papers.
The least cited publications are those authored by scientists from 
the fields of pedagogy, political science and special education. If we 
attempt to explain the results, we should certainly consider the spe-
cificities of these social disciplines that can explain their slighter im-
pact. However, the most probable causes lie in the publishing habits. 
Primarily, the habit of publishing in Croatian journals, which publish 
only papers in the Croatian language, makes these works inaccessible 
to the potentially interested international scientific community. The 
existing system of evaluating scientific work and of promotion to aca-
demic degrees and scientific ranks which does not encourage scientists 
to publish in prestigious international journals presents an additional 
problem. We believe that the fact that the field of pedagogy has the 
 6 The Politička misao (Political Thought) journal, as the leading Croatian political science 
journal, was not indexed in the WoS and Scopus databases in the analysed period.
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longest tradition in publishing a scientific journal also carries weight. 
The Napredak (Progress) journal has been issued without any inter-
ruptions, and with several changes of title, since 1857 and is in a way 
a landmark in scientific communication. This is the reason why our 
results concerning the publishing and visibility of papers in pedagogy 
were to a certain extent unexpected.
Information science and economics earned citation rates very close 
to the average for social scientists’ publications, but only in WoS publi-
cations. It is interesting that economics, one of Croatia’s least produc-
tive social disciplines, has a citation rate for its publications in the WoS 
database very close to the average citation rate for social sciences. A 
possible explanation is that economics publishes “little, but of quality”. 
Furthermore, since economics is a very extensive and “densely pop-
ulated” discipline, with the greatest number of scientists of all social 
sciences (in Croatia), it is clear that the number of persons potentially 
interested in various topics is much greater than in some “scarcely pop-
ulated” disciplines.
From the aspect of the h-index (Table 3), which combines citation 
and average productivity, psychology fared best, followed by kinesiol-
ogy, sociology and information science. If we compare our findings for 
information science (Table 3), for example, with the data obtained by 
Cronin and Meho (2006) and Oppenheim (2007), we would hardly be 
satisfied. Cronin and Meho were the first to conduct a study compar-
ing the h-index and the total number of citations for information sci-
ence. However, since this was an analysis of the 31 most cited scientists 
from information science faculties in the USA in the period from 1999 
to 2005 according to the SSCI most cited IS scholars, and our analysis is 
based on all scientists, it would be unfair to draw comparisons. We can 
only mention incidentally that the h-index ranged from 5 to 20 in the 
said study. The authors proved that there was a strong positive correla-
tion between the h-index and the number of citations, suggesting that 
the total citation count was indeed a reliable indicator of the impact 
and influence of scientists’ papers. The mean value of the h-index for 
information science was 11, with the highest extreme reaching 19, and 
the lowest 5, excluding self-citations. Oppenheim analysed British sci-
entists from the field of Library and Information Science, calculating 
the mean h-index value at 7. Since the findings of his study do not refer 
only to eminent scientists, they are comparable to ours. Table 3 shows 
that Croatian information science scholars largely have an h-index of 
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1. Alongside the fact that information science is a young and smaller 
field (Cronin and Meho, 2006), and especially in Croatia, the findings 
of our study could be additionally explained by the specificities in the 
subfields, the smaller pool of scientists, or the lack of critical mass, as 
well as by the extremely great dispersion by various institutions.
3.2. Productivity and visibility of natural scientists
The situation regarding the classification of natural sciences seems 
much clearer at first sight when compared to the specificities of the 
social sciences in Croatia and in ISI. However, difficulties arise when 
the two systems have to be harmonised. ISI/Thomson uses different 
classification systems depending on the database. Thus, in the case of 
the JCR (Journal Citation Reports) database, the natural and applied 
sciences are classified in 169 fields and subfields, while the Essential 
Science Indicators database uses a system of 22 fields for the whole sci-
ence. If we decide to follow the Essential Science Indicators system, 
which we consider more acceptable in terms of depth of classification, 
difficulties arise concerning biology and chemistry, and even more 
so in the case of physics. The field of biology is a single field accord-
ing to the Croatian classification system, but it includes as many as 5 
out of 22 fields according to ISI, these being: Biology & Biochemistry, 
Environmental Sciences/Ecology, Microbiology, Molecular Biology & 
Genetics, and Plant & Animal Science. We present this example only as 
an illustration, in order to avoid misunderstandings in the interpreta-
tion of results.
Our population of natural scientists is made up of 1,131 doctors 
of science from the fields of mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, 
geology and geography.
According to the SCI-expanded WoS data, the scientists published 
a total of 11,925 papers in the period from 1996 to 2005, an average of 
10.5 papers per author. Statistically, every scientist published at least 
1 paper for every year of the studied period. In fact, papers were pub-
lished by 88.4% of scientists, while 11.6% of doctors of natural sciences 
published no papers registered in the SCI Expanded WoS database 
(Table 4).
The number of papers published per author ranged from 1 to 162, 
with 44.2% of authors publishing 1 to 16 papers per year on average. 
These 44.2% of authors published 77.1% of the papers. Average scien-
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tific productivity values for individual fields within the natural science 
are presented in Graph 2.
Table 4. Scientific productivity of doctors of natural sciences according to the 
WoS and Scopus data in the period from 1996 to 2005
Scientific field 0 papers(%)
1 – 9 papers
(%)
10 and more 
papers
(%)
Total 
papers
Mathematics 
(N=127)
WoS
Scopus
26.8
26.8
57.5
59.1
15.7
14.2
  754
  752
Chemistry
(N=420)
WoS
Scopus
 6.4
 7.4
46.6
39.8
46.9
52.9
 5031
 5693
Physics
(N=232)
WoS
Scopus
 3.0
 4.3
38.8
38.3
58.2
57.3
 3510
 3377
Biology
(N=243)
WoS
Scopus
 6.2
 7.0
59.6
49.0
34.2
44.0
 2369
 2680
Geography
(N=33)
WoS
Scopus
60.6
 6.1
39.4
84.5
0
 6.1
   34
  121
Geology
(N=76)
WoS
Scopus
36.8
17.1
56.6
71
 9.2
11.8
  227
  320
Total WoS
Scopus
11.6
 9.5
49.4
47.1
39.1
43.4
11925
12943
Graph 2. Average number of papers per scientist for individual fields of natural 
sciences, according to WoS and Scopus
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The 11,925 papers published in journals indexed in the WoS data-
base earned a total of 74,842 citations, with an average of 6.3 citations 
per paper (Table 5). Out of the 1,000 scientists who published at least 
one paper, 5.4% of them did not receive a single citation, including self-
citations. We were not able to make a comparison with the Essential 
Science Indicators that we made for the social sciences due to differ-
ences in the classification of science.
Table 5. Citation of doctors of natural sciences according to the WoS and Scopus 
data in the period from 1996 to 2005
Scientific field/ 
citations (authors)
Uncited
(%)
Cited
(%)
Total 
citations
Average number 
of citations per 
paper
Mathematics WoS
Scopus
12.9
17.2
87.1
82.8
 2105
 2233
2.8
3.0
Chemistry WoS
Scopus
 2.8
 3.1
97.2
96.9
31395
35678
6.2
6.3
Physics WoS
Scopus
 0.9
 1.8
99.1
98.2
28702
24292
8.2
7.2
Biology WoS
Scopus
 6.6
 3.5
93.4
96.5
11345
13625
4.8
5.1
Geography WoS
Scopus
76.9
48.8
23.1
51.2
   21
   59
0.6
0.5
Geology WoS
Scopus
 8.3
20.6
91.7
79.4
 1274
 1464
5.6
 4.06
Total WoS
Scopus
 5.4
 6.6
94.6
93.4
74842
77351
6.3
6
Values of the h-index for scholars from all the natural sciences to-
gether ranged from 1 to 20 and could be ascribed to the majority of 83.6% 
of scientists, that is, 94.6% of authors. The h-index could not be calcu-
lated for 16.3% of doctors of natural sciences who make up the group 
of doctors of natural sciences who did not publish any papers or who 
did not receive any citations. An h-index value of 1 was determined for 
15.5% of cited authors. An h-index value of 10 and above for the natural 
sciences taken as a whole is considered a very high value, which means 
that each of the authors published at least 10 papers and that each of the 
papers received at least 10 citations (Table 6). The category of the most 
productive and most cited authors is made up of 4.6% authors.
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As we have already mentioned, the h-index was introduced as a 
scientometric indicator in 2005, which is the reason why relatively 
few study results have been published so far. The results obtained by 
Iglesias and Pecharroman (2007) can serve for at least a partial com-
parison with our findings. Their data show that biologists have an al-
most two times greater h-index than physicists, which was not estab-
lished in our case.
Table 6. Values of the h-index for natural sciences (cited authors) according to 
WoS and Scopus expressed in (%)
Scientific field/ 
h-index  1 2 3 4 and higher
Mathematics WoS
Scopus
40.7
39.0
28.4
26.0
11.1
10.4
19.8
24.7
Chemistry WoS
Scopus
10.7
11.4
14.9
15.4
18.1
13.3
56.3
59.9
Physics WoS
Scopus
 9.4
10.1
11.2
11.5
18.4
17.9
61.0
60.6
Biology WoS
Scopus
18.8
15.1
21.1
18.3
18.8
19.3
41.3
47.2
Geography WoS
Scopus
33.3
75.0
66.7
25.0
0
0
0
0
Geology WoS
Scopus
25.0
30.0
36.4
28.0
22.7
26.0
0
16.0
Total WoS
Scopus
15.5
16.2
17.8
16.8
17.9
15.9
48.8
51.0
According to the data obtained from Scopus, our population of 
doctors of science from all fields of the natural sciences published 
12,943 papers in total, which averages 11.4 papers per scientist. In real-
ity, 90.5% of scientists published that number of papers, that is, 9.5% of 
scientists did not publish any papers in the given period. Furthermore, 
43.3% of scientists published one or more papers per year on average. 
The number of published papers ranged from 1 to 156 in total, with 
only one author publishing 156 works. This finding bears even greater 
relevance due to the fact that the papers are from the field of mathemat-
ics, where at the global level the average number of works published per 
author in one year was considerably lower than the result achieved by 
the author from our population!
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The mentioned 12,943 papers received 77,351 citations in total, 
which makes up an average of 6 citations per paper. The authors who 
did not receive a single citation made up a group of 2.8% of the overall 
population of doctors of natural sciences, and 6.6% of authors were not 
cited at all.
The values of the h-index ranged from 1 to 22 per scientist. For 
15.6% of scientists from the total population of natural sciences it was 
not possible to calculate an h-index, while 13.7% of them had an h-in-
dex of 1. Values of 5 and higher were determined for 31.5% of scholars.
A more comprehensive picture of scientific productivity and its 
impact on individual fields of natural sciences can be obtained on the 
basis of the information from Tables 4, 5, and 6, and Graph 2.
We have to point out once again that we are not able to analyse 
every discipline individually due to the excessive amount of data, which 
is why we will focus only on summing up the most relevant findings.
If we look at the findings for scientific productivity, citation and 
the value of the h-index, we notice that the physicists from our corpus 
rank first. They have on average the greatest number of papers per sci-
entist, the greatest number of authors with 10 or more papers in the 
said period, that is, they have the most authors with at least one paper 
per year, and this according to both WoS and Scopus. Their papers also 
have the greatest average number of citations, and the authors have on 
average the greatest h-indices. According to Hirsch (2005), the crea-
tor of the indicator, a “successful physicist” should have an h-index of 
20 over 20 years, while an “extraordinary physicist” should have an h-
index of 40, and a “truly unique individual” 60 and more. If we take 
into account that our study covered a period of ten years, we already 
have physicists who meet the criteria of “successful physicists”. To be 
more precise, 9.5% of physicists from our population have an h-index 
between 10 and 20 (Table 6).
Chemistry follows physics in all criteria, and biology ranks third, 
while geology ranked third only in terms of the average number of cita-
tions per paper.
If we compare our results with the global average according to the 
1995–2005 Essential Science Indicators for an average number of cita-
tions per paper in these three fields, then physicists have above-average 
results, chemists are relatively close to the global average, and biolo-
gists have considerably poorer results on average. The said finding can 
be explained by the established standards of scientific communica-
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tion in these fields, and by the relevant ministry’s evaluation system. 
Physicists, chemists and the majority of biologists, especially molec-
ular biologists and geneticists, are simply not recognised within rel-
evant scientific circles unless they publish in prestigious international 
journals. It is important to point out that none of the Croatian physics 
journals is included in the WoS-SCI Expanded database, which means 
that all physicists’ papers were published in prestigious international 
journals. However, some chemists published a greater share of their pa-
pers in the Croatian journals Croatica Chemica Acta and Chemical and 
Biochemical Engineering Quarterly. At the same time, it is important 
to say that even the most productive chemists published in the most 
prestigious international journals. This especially refers to the chemists 
from the Ruđer Bošković Institute. In order to give a full overview, we 
should also state that all the mentioned papers were co-authored by five 
or more authors per paper, which is an accepted publishing model in 
chemistry at the global level.
The biologists from our sample are engaged in a relatively broad 
spectrum of research in the field of biology – from botany, zoology, ma-
rine biology, ecology to molecular biology, which is also evident from 
the 36 different institutions in which they are working. This diversity 
is manifested in the specificities of scientific communication, and it is 
difficult to expect equal scientific productivity from biologists engaged 
in plant biology or zoology, environmental research, biodiversity or 
molecular biology. Our preliminary studies show that biologists, un-
like physicists and some chemists, cooperate less with colleagues from 
abroad, and they publish papers with fewer co-authors. In order to ob-
tain a more comprehensive insight, it should be mentioned that some 
of their works were published in Croatian journals indexed in WoS – 
Periodicum biologorum and Collegium antropologicum.
Mathematics has a special place in our study for several reasons, 
but primarily due to a high average number of citations per paper (Table 
5) compared to the global average, which came to 2.6 citations per pa-
per in the period from 1995 to 2005 according to Essential Science 
Indicators. It also has a special place for having one author publish 162 
papers in ten years, which is rare even in the world’s strongest scien-
tific communities. However, the fact that this scientist is an editor of 
the Mathematical Inequalities & Applications journal, which has been 
indexed by SCI since its first issue, might shed some light on this pecu-
liarity. The third specificity of this discipline is the relatively high share 
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of authors who published at least one paper per year in the studied pe-
riod (Table 4).
Geology has for a long time had the status of a so-called national 
science in Croatia. In practice, this has included the administrative 
control of publishing research results, which did not necessarily favour 
publishing in international journals. However, the presented findings 
indicate that the situation has been changing significantly (Table 4, 
5 and 6, and Graph 2). It is especially important that geologists’ pub-
lished papers received 5.6 citations on average, which can be considered 
relatively satisfactory, compared to the 1995–2005 Essential Science 
Indicators (7.49 citations per paper). According to the data from WoS, 
all these papers were published in relevant international journals.
Geography certainly has a special place in the natural sciences. 
Anglo-American classifications of science categorise geography part-
ly as one of the geosciences, and partly as a social science, which is 
also important for the interpretation of the data obtained in this study 
(Table 4, 5 and 6, and Graph 2). Thanks to its peculiar characteristics 
in the system of natural sciences, geography unsurprisingly manifested 
significant discrepancies from the model of scientific communication 
of other natural sciences. As expected, Scopus produced a significantly 
greater number of papers than WoS, since it covers Croatian journals 
from the field of geography. We expected the papers to be potentially 
interesting to the European scientific community, but that was not the 
case. One of the reasons may be the fact that the papers were written 
in Croatian and they were not quite accessible to potentially interested 
scientists. An analysis of journals where the mentioned papers were 
published showed that over 90% of them were Croatian, most of all 
Društvena istraživanja (Social Studies) and to a lesser extent Periodicum 
biologorum.
4. Conclusion
This study is the first in Croatia to show precise data on the scien-
tific productivity (and its impact) of doctors of the social and natural 
sciences in the period from 1996 to the end of 2005, based on a search of 
the WoS (SSCI and SCI-expanded) and Scopus citation databases.
However, let us highlight several important facts first. First, bib-
liometric analyses such as this one that cover exclusively output pub-
lished in journals indexed in the WoS and Scopus databases favour the 
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natural sciences. The limitations of this method have to be highlighted 
in order to avoid inaccurate generalisations of results to overall produc-
tion, which in social sciences also includes journals indexed by other 
relevant databases. It is also indisputable that the share, importance 
and influence of books are incomparably greater in the social than in 
the natural sciences, which are dominated by journal articles (Prpić 
and Brajdić Vuković, 2009).
Secondly, co-authorship is the prevailing form of scientific pro-
duction in the natural sciences (Kyvik, 2003), while the proportion of 
co-authored papers is lower in the total number of publications in the 
social sciences (Prpić and Brajdić Vuković, 2009). Since co-authored 
articles were ascribed to each author in this study, it is very likely that 
the natural sciences were additionally favoured in terms of the quantity 
of papers, since co-authorship is still much more common to the natu-
ral sciences.
Thirdly, natural scientists are more focused on the international 
scientific community and are more inclined to publish in international 
journals. Social scientists, however, more often publish in national and 
regional journals due to their primary focus on the study of their own 
society. However, social sciences are also ever more present on the inter-
national scientific scene (Nederhof et al., 1989; Hicks, 1999; Nederhof, 
2006).
The fourth fact concerns bibliographic and citation databases, es-
pecially WoS. Journals from the natural sciences are far more repre-
sented in that database than those from the social sciences (Nederhof, 
2006), and thus it is logical to expect natural scientists to have greater 
output.
Considering the facts stated in the recapitulation above, we are 
driven to the following conclusions. The first is that there are vari-
ous differences in the analysed characteristics between the two fields. 
Although the natural sciences are probably favoured for the above-stat-
ed reasons, the existing differences are still sufficient to draw tenable 
conclusions.
Thus, the natural sciences absolutely dominate the social sciences 
in terms of WoS and Scopus productivity, citations and the h-index. 
The fact that, according to WoS, the average number of papers per sci-
entist in the social sciences was 1, and in the natural sciences 10.6, is 
very indicative. In the social sciences, 73% of scientists did not publish a 
single paper referenced in the WoS, while there were only 11.6% of such 
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scientists in the natural sciences. In terms of the impact of scientific 
activity, measured by the number of citations (WoS) for social sciences 
as a whole, the average citation rate was 2.25 per paper. The impact of 
scientific activity was very different in the natural sciences – the aver-
age number of citations per paper was 6.3. The h-index for the social 
sciences ranged from 1 to 6, and it could be calculated only for 16.5% of 
scholars. The natural sciences, however, had an h-index ranging from 
1 to 20, and the values could be calculated for as many as 87% of sci-
entists.
It is important to point out that the natural sciences, compared to 
the social sciences, not only keep up with the average international fig-
ures, but often fare above average. Thus, in the natural sciences, physics 
and mathematics are above average by all indicators compared to other 
fields, but also compared to average global results.
Social scientists, however, still lag behind the global indicators, 
which can be explained in the following way. Firstly, Croatian social 
scientists are more focused on investigating their own society, and they 
are thus more inclined to publish in national journals. Secondly, only a 
small share of the local social journals is indexed in the WoS database. 
Thirdly, Croatian social scientists publish in Croatian journals that are 
included in the WoS, with the Društvena istraživanja (Social Studies) 
journal holding a special place. There is no need for any special discus-
sion on the importance of publishing papers in English for transmitting 
scientific information to the relevant scientific community. National 
journals included in WoS have a special place in the natural sciences 
as well, especially in biology and chemistry, but, unlike the Društvena 
istraživanja (Social Studies) journal, they publish all their papers in 
English. The fourth reason why social scientists lag behind can also be 
found in the internal norms, that is, the “criteria and models” of scien-
tific communication that exist in different social disciplines. We could 
say that there has been much less encouragement in the social sciences 
to publish in renowned international journals than in the natural sci-
ences.
The second conclusion of our study undoubtedly indicates that the 
differences in the basic characteristics that we have analysed show a 
relatively great oscillation between disciplines. Each field has its own 
peculiarities and the criteria that seem suitable for one field do not have 
to be appropriate for all disciplines. Thus, for example, one certainly 
needs to question the validity of using the WoS or Scopus database as 
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a measuring instrument (in awarding a scientific rank, or the like) in 
fields such as legal science, where over 90% of scholars have been ex-
cluded. Furthermore, although it is categorised only as a natural sci-
ence in our official classification of scientific fields, geography is much 
more similar to the social than to the natural sciences in terms of the 
results obtained regarding its scientific productivity and impact. Thus, 
not only should the bibliometric monitoring of publications from the 
field of the social sciences and humanities not rest on the same meth-
odological assumptions that apply to the natural sciences (Prpić and 
Brajdić Vuković, 2009), but it is also clear that different disciplines 
within the same area have different patterns of scientific communica-
tion. One should certainly bear this in mind when creating a science 
policy and criteria for promotion in science.
The third conclusion of this study regards the comparison of the 
two bibliographic and citation databases used in the research. Even 
though we assumed that scientific output would be much greater, es-
pecially for the social sciences, the results do not completely support 
this thesis.
To conclude, our comparative study of productivity in the natural 
and social sciences and their respective individual disciplines supports 
the already familiar thesis on the specificities of scientific fields and 
their patterns of productivity. It confirms that the indicators and stand-
ards of average scientific output and impact that apply to the natural 
sciences cannot be uncritically transferred and applied to the social sci-
ences.
Since this study has provided only indications of scientific pro-
ductivity and impact for the social and natural sciences in Croatia and 
on a specific population, a deeper insight into scientific productivity 
referenced in the WoS and Scopus databases would require additional 
research and analysis.
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Part II.
The cognitive convictions of natural 
and social scientists
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Sven Hemlin
What is scientific quality?
1. Introduction
Scientific quality is judged and evaluated by scientists in a number 
of ways, for example when a manuscript is submitted to a journal and 
reviewed by peers, when a grant application is reviewed, when a can-
didate for an academic position is scrutinised, and on other occasions. 
Most of these evaluations of scientific quality are made by scientists 
themselves. This is done by means of the peer review system. In addi-
tion, scientists also make use of scientific indicators to evaluate science 
and its actors.
However, it is not only scientists that evaluate science. Actors out-
side the scientific community are also interested as recipients of scien-
tific results and applications, and therefore have an influence on how it 
is assessed. For example, of interest to people are the clinical therapies 
for strokes or depression, environmental technology innovations that 
reduce pollution, and the manner that different organisational prob-
lems may be overcome. Furthermore, the commercial sector and poli-
ticians depend on the results from a scientific community. If science 
is not of high quality, if it does not give rise to new knowledge and 
advanced technologies, and if it does not contribute to commercially 
exploitable innovations and increase the wellbeing of people, then it 
will not prevail.
Therefore, scientific quality is dependent on the perceptions of 
various individuals and social groups in science, and also in society 
at large. This means that we must take into account the social psy-
chology studies of scientific quality. How is scientific quality perceived 
by scientists, and also by others? What perspectives do they have on 
scientific quality? What criteria of scientific quality are used in the 
judgments and evaluations of scientific outcomes? Is there a common 
view of scientific quality? How do perceptions of scientific quality vary 
between actors in science and in society at large? Such questions can 
be answered by social psychologists and in empirical studies of scien-
tific quality (e.g. Feist, 2006; Hemlin, 1993; Shadish, 1998). Previously, 
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this was an issue mostly dealt with by philosophers of science and ap-
proached in a normative way. Psychological studies can bring empiri-
cal research findings on perceptions of scientific quality to elucidate 
how quality is viewed.1 Moreover, and importantly, empirical research 
can analyse how quality perceptions are used in practice, that is, when 
assessments of scientific contributions are conducted.
This chapter will start with a description of a framework for view-
ing scientific quality. Secondly, a presentation is made of a number of 
empirical findings concerning scientific quality. Finally, current chang-
es in the views and assessment practices of scientific quality are out-
lined, and conclusions are drawn. The analysis of scientific quality and 
the empirical results in this chapter are based on a body of theoretical 
and empirical studies by the author of this chapter and by colleagues.
2. Theoretical framework of scientific quality
Research assessments or evaluations of scientific quality are part 
of a context where several different factors interact and where the in-
terplay between the factors is essential to understand the concept of 
quality in science.2
Figure 1 presents a system of factors which is, I argue, important 
in research evaluations. The systems model bears some similarity to 
previous attempts to describe how research develops in interaction with 
external factors (e.g. Törnebohm, 1983). However, this model is new in 
that it should be viewed as a description of factors influencing evalua-
tions of research and scientific quality.
All factors in Figure 1 have a number of characteristics. The in-
terplay between the factors means that these characteristics will be in-
fluenced. Further on, I describe each of the factors in the figure and 
present examples of the features of each factor, as well as relevant litera-
ture connected to the features.
The six factors in the framework are: the research product, the re-
searcher, the research environment, research effects, research financing, 
organisation and policy, and research evaluation. In my view, all of these 
factors are to a greater or lesser extent taken into consideration in the 
evaluation of scientific quality by those who carry out the evaluation.
 1 Of course, other disciplines such as sociology and political science can also be helpful. 
 2 This is further complicated by the fact that not only is the real interplay between different 
factors important, but also the evaluators’ conceptions of this interplay.
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Figure 1. Context factors in research evaluations
Indicators
of Scientific
Quality
Effects of Quality Indicators
Researcher
Research Policy
Research
Environment
and Research
Resources
Research
Product
State of
Knowledge
Society
Intrascientific
Effects
Extrascientific
Effects
Societal Goals
Scientific Goals
2.1. The research product
The object of evaluation is the research product, i.e. the end-
product of research. This may be all the research carried out within a 
discipline, or just one scientific article. Relevant characteristics of the 
research product might be its breadth, depth, the clarity of the prob-
lem statement, the fulfilment of methodological demands, etc. These 
characteristics are supposed to be connected with the research product 
itself, and form the starting point for evaluation.
When scientific quality is evaluated, the object of evaluation is 
typically one or several documents which describe the research effort. 
These evaluations may be based on empirically generated, as well as 
normatively or theoretically formulated, quality criteria. A number of 
criteria have been suggested in the literature. For example, Smigel and 
Ross (1970) found that scientists ranked highest (in order) the criteria 
“interesting”, “significant, meaningful”, “well written”, “informative 
and useful”, “good methodology” and so on. Kuhn (1977) also suggest-
ed normative criteria related to scientific theory, which should show 
“accuracy”, “consistency”, “scope”, “simplicity” and “fruitfulness”. In 
a volume on the psychology of science, McGuire (1989) discussed cri-
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teria of scientific quality. He made a distinction between intrinsic cri-
teria (e.g. internal consistency, novelty) and extrinsic criteria (e.g. the 
author’s status, usefulness for valued human goals) in evaluating sci-
entific explanations. In the same volume, Shadish (1989) added a dis-
tinction apart from the internal – external one. Science aims to achieve 
certain goals, e.g. truth, but also uses inputs and operations to achieve 
these goals, for example falsification. Shadish named these two compo-
nents “outcome” and “process”. Further analysis, review and categori-
sation of quality criteria in the literature can be found in Hemlin and 
Montgomery (1990).
2.2. The researcher
A research product is carried out by one or several researchers whose 
world view, knowledge, interest, intelligence and personality influence 
the direction and accomplishment of the research product. A number 
of authors have pointed out that the competence and the personality of 
the researcher is important for the quality of the research (see reviews 
by Feist, 2006; Hemlin et al., 2004). According to studies using a factor 
analysis of personality traits, the creative researcher should be ambi-
tious, compulsive, enduring, seeking definiteness, intelligent, intellectu-
ally curious, dominant, orderly, authoritarian, non-seeking of help and 
advice, not fun loving, aggressive, showing leadership, independent, de-
fensive, not meek, impatient, motivated and non-supportive. The three 
best predictors of research effectiveness were achievement, motivation 
and ambition according to Rushton et al. (1983) in studies of profes-
sors of psychology. Type A behaviour, i.e. strong and continuously force-
ful behaviour to achieve more in a short time and under pressure, was 
found among successful, male researchers (Matthews et al., 1980). The 
contribution of intelligence above an IQ score of 120 to successful re-
search was small, according to a review of studies by Albert (1975). In his 
review of the literature (2006), Feist found the following characteristics 
to be more salient of creative scientists than less creative scientists: in the 
cognitive domain, openness and flexibility; in the motivational domain, 
a scientist was driven and ambitious; and finally in the social domain, 
the traits of dominance, arrogance, hostility, self-confidence, autonomy 
and introversion were typical of high-quality scientists. However, we 
still lack evidence of the directional influence between personality traits 
and scientific excellence.
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Scientists have traditionally been viewed as more rational than 
others. However, Mahoney (1979) rejected the picture of the scientist 
as “rational man”. Researchers, no less than other people, are affected 
by motivational and emotional factors, which in turn affect science 
and rationality. These ideas also go along with the results of Mitroff ’s 
study (1974), where the author found that Apollo moon scientists pos-
sessed deep intellectual, affective and personal commitment in their 
endeavour.
Age and creativity were reviewed by Simonton (1988) who found 
that lyric poetry, pure mathematics and theoretical physics showed 
early peaks (around the early 30s or even late 20s) in the age curves 
for creative output, while peaks were late (the late 40s or even 50s) in 
history, philosophy, and medicine. However, in many disciplines, re-
searchers reached a maximum output rate in the intermediate years 
(around 40 years). Simonton also reported that the correlation between 
the eminence of psychologists and the age at which they contribute 
their most influential work was almost exactly zero (a result that goes 
for the arts as well). According to Feist (2006), the relation between age 
and productivity (quantity and quality) in science can be viewed as an 
inverted U. The peak across all fields is found at the age of forty, but 
different peaks occur for various disciplines, that is, they happen earlier 
for mathematics and later for biology, to take two examples.
A path analysis of the publishing productivity of psychologists 
showed that ability (a multiple indicator based on four data sources, 
mainly test scores), graduate programme quality, early productivity, 
the quality of the first job (i.e. ratings of departments on the quality 
of the faculty and its effectiveness in training scholars) and the gender 
of the researcher were causal antecedents across disciplines (Rodgers 
and Maranto, 1989). More interestingly, it was found that ability played 
an important role for all other predictors, suggesting the crucial role 
of the person, the researcher, and his/her competence. Another find-
ing of importance reported by Rodgers and Maranto (1989) was that 
gender had a significant effect on the quantity, but not on the quality, 
of research. This finding indicates that women in psychology produced 
less than men, but they produced at the same level of quality. Earlier 
results have shown large gender differences in rank and salary that can-
not be explained by differences in productivity or departmental pres-
tige (Cole, 1979; Rodgers and Maranto, 1989). Studies by Cole (1979) in 
the 1970s among women with PhDs in the natural and social sciences 
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showed that women were less productive as well as less cited than men. 
In the same study, ability and IQ measures of researchers with PhDs 
were high for both men and women.
2.3. The research environment
Immensely important for the research product is the research en-
vironment. For example, colleagues, students, premises, and the supply 
of research resources such as economic means and equipment form a 
scientist’s research environment. The environmental and resource fac-
tors might influence the research effort more or less directly, but also 
indirectly through the relevance of the environment for the motivation 
and interests of the individual researcher.
An early review by Barron (1963) demonstrated that research crea-
tivity was stimulated by environments characterised by great freedom 
and lack of order. Research effectiveness, measured as productivity per 
time unit and group member and number of citations for the group, 
was found in one study to increase in the technical area with larger 
groups (Wallmark et al., 1973). However, group size was shown in an-
other review not to be correlated with the individual output of scientists 
(Hicks and Skea, 1989).
In a study of successful researchers and information habits 
(Kasperson, 1978), it was found that the creative researcher was active 
in seeking information and exposed her/himself to an abundance of 
information inside and outside the research area. Leadership in high 
performing research groups was characterised by the experience and 
competence of professors and senior lecturers (Pelz and Andrews, 1966; 
Stankiewicz, 1980). A recent review of the literature on leadership and 
creativity revealed that apart from expertise it was essential for mem-
bers of research groups to receive leadership support in various ways 
(Mumford et al., 2002).
In conclusion, the reviewed studies concerning the researcher and 
her/his environment present a picture of the successful researcher as one 
characterised by strong ability, an IQ score of around 120 but not neces-
sarily higher, strong motivation, ambition and achievement. According 
to recent studies of creative knowledge environments, a scientist’s en-
vironment can be summarised and divided into three main factors, i.e. 
cognitive, social, and physical factors, where it is clear that the first two 
exert the most direct and dominating influence. Further, it is shown 
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in several studies in this review that the psychosocial climates of re-
search groups are connected to the creative output of scientists. One 
repeated finding is that research group climates should mainly be open 
and allow freedom to scientists. Secondly, a heterogeneous composition 
of the group is important to promote creativity. Thirdly, it was found 
that group leadership, as mentioned above, influences group creativity 
in two main ways, that is, by expertise and social support to groups. 
Finally, rich information sources, good knowledge management, and 
access to frontline knowledge are typical of creative knowledge envi-
ronments (Hemlin et al., 2004; Hemlin et al., 2008; Hemlin, 2006).
2.4. Research effects
Research can be viewed as having two main effects, i.e. intrasci-
entific and extrascientific effects (e.g. Elzinga and Jamison, 1984). The 
intrascientific effects denote effects on the current state of scientific 
knowledge within the research area (e.g. if the research effort leads to 
the development of theories or methods). There might also be long-
term effects (e.g. if the research product leads to a situation where new 
theories will be more easily formulated in the future). The extrascien-
tific effects might concern the effects a research product has on society 
in the broad sense, e.g. groups of individuals in a country, the whole 
country, or all humankind. The extrascientific effects may be more or 
less direct or long term, and may be positive or negative. Positive effects 
are, for example, cures for diseases, new technologies such as safer ve-
hicles, and improvements in the welfare of people. Bad research effects 
which could be judged as negative are the development of military arms 
or environmentally harmful technologies.
Intrascientific and societal factors are not only influenced by dif-
ferent research products, but they too influence research or rather how 
a researcher chooses problems and the methods to accomplish the 
work. Within the scientific community, as well as in society general-
ly, value systems, ideologies, politics and markets exert an influence 
on the research carried out and also on how the research is evaluated. 
Several scientists have noticed the significance of different scientific 
views or paradigmatic views for the evaluation of scientific results (De 
Mey, 1982; Kuhn, 1970; Törnebohm, 1983). The significance of societal 
factors on science was emphasised early on by Hessen and Bernal (see 
Elzinga and Jamison, 1984), and by Merton (1938) in his classical study 
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on influences from the military area and from the mining industry on 
the direction of research in England in the 1800s. The Swedish soci-
ologist Brante (1984) presented a number of examples of how positions 
in scientific disputes can be explained with reference to personal and 
political factors. Proponents and followers of the Strong programme in 
Great Britain claim that all scientific knowledge is of social origin, or, 
as it is now coined, is socially constructed (e.g. Mulkay, 1979; Woolgar, 
1989).
According to several authors, the extrascientific or societal effects 
of research are of the highest importance, although intrascientific ef-
fects are not neglected as an indirect means for the advancement of man 
and society. To this group of authors, one could include Hessen and 
Bernal (see Elzinga and Jamison, 1984), who were among the first to 
focus on the science and society link. This school of thought, based on 
pragmatism and Marxism, views basic and applied research as if it had 
the same ultimate goal, that is, positive effects on society. According to 
this school, quality in science should be viewed by the effects of science 
on society.
A large number of philosophers of science (e.g. McMullin, 1983; 
Niiniluoto, 1990) emphasise the intrascientific effects of science, i.e. 
whether the results contribute to scientific progress and ultimately 
the truth (or truthlikeness) of a phenomenon. The intrascientific ef-
fect of the research process must, in the opinion of these authors, be 
the primary purpose of science, independent of the societal effects. 
According to this view, the quality of science must be assessed by its 
internal effects.
2.5. Research financing, organisation and policy
The influence that intrascientific and extrascientific factors exert 
on research and its evaluation can be directed by research policy, which 
is the term for all activities aimed at steering research. This activity is 
often carried out by research councils and other funding authorities. It 
can also be carried out within the scientific community itself. For ex-
ample, editors of scientific journals and researchers arranging scientific 
conferences have a more or less pronounced policy for their activities.
The direction of research within the frame of a research policy 
cannot easily be separated from societal interests originating more or 
less from outside the scientific community. As Fridjonsdottir (1983) re-
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marked, we can talk about a process of interaction between a national 
direction of research policy and activities within the scientific commu-
nity. Similar views were proposed by Toulmin (1964) who emphasised 
that the successful direction of research presupposes that the research 
community is well integrated into society. Lakatos (1976) also showed a 
clear interest in society’s role for science. He claimed that universal cri-
teria, as opposed to elite criteria, should be applied to distinguish pro-
gressive research from bad research. According to Lakatos, scientists 
themselves should not decide on the criteria alone. Instead, they should 
guide societal committees (consisting of researchers and laymen) in the 
distribution of research funding. This is also a common topic in certain 
EU research programmes and in national contexts within the EU, for 
example in Denmark.
The criteria used for directing research are supposed to be similar 
to the criteria used for the evaluation of research products. Therefore, 
it should be relevant to distinguish between internal (intrascientific) 
evaluation criteria and external (societal) evaluation criteria (see De 
Mey, 1982; Fridjonsdottir, 1983; Weinberg, 1963). The emphasis laid 
on these criteria and the way in which they are measured by means of 
quality indicators are apparently dependent on the prevalent research 
policy. In this way, evaluations are part of an ever-changing cycle in 
which the criteria for quality assessments occasionally change through 
the effects of previous research on the current state of scientific knowl-
edge, on society, and on research policy.
The relations between scientific quality and financing, and or-
ganisation and research policy have not been empirically investigated 
to the same extent as the previously mentioned factors, but they have 
indeed been very much debated. However, attempts have been made 
to study the differences in research output for basic, government and 
research council financed research versus research financed by sec-
toral funding.3 In the Swedish case and in many other countries, re-
search funding is channelled through four main sources. First, grants 
are channelled to research directly following governmental decisions 
to universities as block grants (to hire research staff and as basic re-
sources for equipment). Secondly, research councils can fund scientists 
for projects after peer review (approved grant applications). Thirdly, 
 3 Sectoral funding denotes government funding to societal or political sectors such as the 
military, construction, and energy sectors. Sectoral organisations in Sweden conduct research 
on their own and hire university researchers on contract research.
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sectoral organisations such as the Energy Authority can provide money 
for university research on assignment or after an application from uni-
versity scientists. Sectoral research in countries other than Sweden (e.g. 
Germany, Norway) is often done by scientists at institutes rather than 
at universities. Fourthly, industry or other private funding sources can 
fund research at universities.
An interesting point regarding funding sources is that they influ-
ence the perceived quality of research. It is often found that sectorally 
funded researchers regard sectoral financing as a good means for in-
creasing the quality of the research output. However, researchers funded 
in other ways, especially researchers with grants from research councils, 
often have negative views about sectoral funding as a means to enhance 
the quality of the research. Sectoral funding of research was criticised 
by Elzinga (1988). He argued that sectoral funding of short-term and 
quasi-research projects leads to “deinstitutionalization”, which results 
in a negative change and dissolution of the disciplinary structure of 
academic research. Hence, it is tempting to draw the conclusion that 
the “deinstitutionalization” of academic research described by Elzinga 
will have an impact on scientific quality. However, more positive views 
from scientists on external funding and its consequences for science 
were found in a Finnish study by Nieminen (2005).
Studies on research organisation were carried out by Foss Hansen 
(1988) who claimed that a number of control mechanisms influence 
research activities. She stressed mechanisms such as dialogue (within 
or between research departments), scientific norms (universalism, dis-
interestedness, etc), markets (the publishing market, the grant market, 
etc.), bureaucracy (exerted by funding agencies, university councils 
and local departmental offices), and democracy. The latter two mecha-
nisms were proposed to work indirectly in influencing the conditions 
for research. Bureaucracy was excluded from the list of “good” mecha-
nisms, since it is suitable only for routine tasks, and those tasks are not 
characteristic of science. Markets are also less “good” than the others, 
because researchers who adjust strongly to different markets may af-
fect the scientific quality in a negative way (e.g. choosing a research 
problem might be influenced by opportunism). In sum, according to 
Foss Hansen (1988), a favourable research policy for scientific quality 
should de-emphasise bureaucratic control and set restrictions on mar-
ket mechanisms. The quality of research might also, according to this 
line of reasoning, be attributed to how governments finance research 
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and the way funding agencies and bureaucracies work (see also Elzinga, 
1988).
Figure 1 above also presents two other causal cycles. One cycle con-
cerns the effects the result of an evaluation has on the present research 
policy, which in turn can lead to a change in the research evaluation 
criteria. This cycle might presumably, and in the normal situation, be 
viewed as smaller changes to the present evaluation criteria within the 
frame of intrascientific and societal goals. The second cycle is viewed 
as the direct effects of an evaluation on the researcher, which might 
lead to an adjustment of his/her research in favour of the criteria used. 
This effect might in the next period increase the possibilities for an 
improved outcome in new evaluations. Such processes of adaptation 
can evidently become serious problems for future research on research 
evaluation, and for research itself.
2.6. Research evaluations
Finally, Figure 1 shows that evaluations (in the box labelled 
Indicators of Scientific Quality) might be influenced by factors external 
to the research product under scrutiny. On the one hand, the research-
ers’ characteristics, such as position, age, or personality, influence the 
evaluation. On the other hand, environmental factors might be impor-
tant, e.g. the status of the department that the researcher belongs to. 
How background factors influence the final outcome of research evalu-
ation is an issue which is often discussed in the literature. Moreover, as 
can be seen in the figure, other factors may also influence evaluations.
2.7. An attempt to define scientific quality
The system presented in Figure 1 shows in a number of ways why 
it is difficult to precisely define the concept “scientific quality”. First, 
scientific quality might correspond to a smaller or a larger part of the 
framework. A simple way of solving the problem would be to let scien-
tific quality correspond to the methods used to assess scientific quality. 
The definition would then correspond to the box labelled Indicators 
of Scientific Quality in Figure 1 and be equivalent to an operational 
definition of scientific quality. However, such a definition makes it dif-
ficult to discuss how to assess scientific quality in the best way. It is 
important to know which aspects one wants to assess in order to make 
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judgments on different methods or indicators. Scientific quality might 
then be defined in terms of the different characteristics of a research 
effort (stringency, originality, etc.). Another possibility is to widen the 
definition to encompass the intrascientific and extrascientific effects of 
a research effort that have either taken place or are forecasted.
I have now touched upon another difficulty in defining scientific 
quality, namely that this concept might correspond to uncertain effects 
and to effects that have not yet occurred. This problem implies that it 
will be difficult to achieve a precise definition because there might be 
different views to decide upon the research effects that have not yet 
occurred. In the history of science, there have been many examples of 
such unpredictable effects. A depressing example is the development of 
the atomic bomb as a consequence of research into atomic physics.
The conclusive difficulty in delimiting precisely what is meant by 
scientific quality concerns the nature of research itself, in which per-
ceptions of what constitutes good or bad research vary between dif-
ferent scientific fields and time periods. The causal cycles depicted in 
Figure 1 imply that suitable assessment methods and quality indicators, 
desirable characteristics in research products, and intrascientific and 
extrascientific effects are permanently changing. These changes are the 
results of a process of interactions between new results in science and 
events in the world outside the scientific community.
This does not imply that it is not worth trying to pursue the mean-
ing of scientific quality. I do not want to exclude that consensus is pos-
sible among scientists on a number of generally formulated, universal 
criteria on good research. Let us imagine that good research corre-
sponds to the creation of clarity, the revelation of new connections and 
the beauty of a good theory or interesting results. The emphasis put on 
different aspects of research and the precise meaning of the suggested 
aspects might of course change. To allow such diversity in the meaning 
of good research is probably one of the most important preconditions 
for science to develop fruitfully.
3. Empirical research on scientific quality
As was evident in the previous sections on scientific quality, em-
pirical research in this domain is here viewed as a relational concept. 
It is dependent on at least the presented six factors and their given in-
terplay.
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I will now make an attempt to delimit quality in research to its 
characteristic features. To test our framework and discover how such 
features are perceived and conceptualised, we asked scientists from 
various disciplines in Sweden what they believed was characteristic of 
good science in their fields. This study encompassed 22 scientists and 
gave us a first indication of scientists’ perceptions of important qual-
ity concepts such as novelty, correct methods and a clear writing style 
which could be viewed as properties of the final research product. As a 
result of the study and the literature, we formulated a conceptual sys-
tem that distinguished between different parts of the research process 
comprised of problem, method, theory, results, reasoning, writing style 
(aspects), and the value attached to each part, for instance an original 
result, a stringent method and a clear writing style (attributes) (Hemlin 
and Montgomery, 1990;1993). To validate our conceptual system, we 
constructed a questionnaire for a larger stratified random sample of 
scientists (n = 224) in the main research areas of academia (medicine, 
natural sciences, social sciences, technology, as well as the arts and 
humanities). In the questionnaire, we asked scientists to rate the im-
portance of each aspect in relation to a number of chosen attributes as 
previously described. In addition, we asked scientists to rate the impor-
tance of the factors in the above framework when assessing the qual-
ity of science more generally. However, this approach to the study of 
scientific quality was focused on scientists’ perceptions, which does not 
tell us how scientists behave when assessing scientific quality. To that 
end, we also wanted to know how scientists assess scientific quality in 
their science practice, that is, what criteria are used in peer reviews. In 
other words, we wanted to know not only what scientists perceive of 
research quality, but also if and how they apply their conceptions. To 
study scientists’ quality assessment behaviour, we analysed the docu-
ments of the peer reviews of candidates for the position of professor 
(31 cases, from 1975 to 1984) (Montgomery and Hemlin, 1993). This 
method is feasible in Sweden (and perhaps in some other countries) 
since peer reviews of the candidates are done in writing and the reviews 
are publicly available documents. In addition, we analysed peer review 
documents of psychology grant applications submitted to the Swedish 
Science Council (Hemlin et al., 1995). The results of these studies will 
be described and compared in the following sections.
Our findings have been supported, to an extent that is surprisingly 
high, by similar studies in three other Nordic countries (in Denmark by 
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Andersen, 1997; in Norway by Gulbrandsen and Langfeldt, 1997; and in 
Finland by Kaukonen, 1997).4 The results from the other Nordic coun-
tries were in agreement with our framework and the notion of a con-
cept of scientific quality as a common language composed of aspects 
and attributes. The general finding was that scientists could easily rate 
aspects and attributes of research products to assess quality. For exam-
ple, to use correct methods was perceived as one of the most important 
signs of scientific quality. The findings support our view that a com-
mon language among scientists could be used to assess the scientific 
quality of research products.
The results across all scientific fields including the arts and hu-
manities showed that originality and correct methods were regarded as 
the highest ranked concepts of scientific quality. Some variations were 
found between the different data sets, but methods and novelty were 
generally the highest ranked quality concepts (see Table 1).
Table 1 also shows that researchers were united in perceiving 
methods, problems and results in connection with research quality in 
all studies. Only in the rating data set did we find a deviation where 
reasoning was emphasised above results. Novelty (originality), strin-
gency and correctness were the most favoured attributes, but depth was 
also ranked high in the questionnaire study (Hemlin, 1993). In Hemlin 
and Montgomery (1995), the activity/productivity of the researcher 
featured more frequently than correctness. Breadth was more stressed 
than depth, except for in the rating data. Intrascientific and extrascien-
tific relevance were equally stressed. However, intrascientific relevance 
was more emphasised than extrascientific relevance in the interview 
and rating data. In the data from the free answers, the results were re-
versed. In all the data sets, the most frequent combinations of aspects 
and attributes were correct or stringent methods. In an analysis of dif-
 4 ANDERSEN, 1997: Structured interviews – a formal questionnaire where data were col-
lected in personal interviews/confrontations. A stratified random sample of 876 researchers: 
680 in the social sciences, 99 in computer sciences, and 97 in the sciences and medicine. The 
response rate was 90.0% (788 respondents). GULBRANDSEN and LANGFELDT, 1997: Semi-
structured personal interviews (a large number of rather open questions). N = 64 researchers 
from a non-random but purposeful selection of disciplines in each major academic field (30), 
from research institutes (22) and business companies (12). KAUKONEN, 1997: The survey was 
based on interviews (in 1989–1990) of all active research personnel (professors, lecturers and 
junior researchers) in six university departments/disciplines: zoology, biomedicine, automation 
technology, systems engineering, mathematics and statistics, and social policy. N = 217 (cover-
ing 87% of potential persons, varying between 80 and 100% per discipline. Both closed and open 
questions were used.
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ferences between the soft (social sciences and the arts and humanities) 
and the hard sciences (medical, natural and technical sciences), it was 
consistently shown that soft scientists focused on the theory, reasoning, 
writing style and to some extent on the problems aspects, and on the 
stringency attribute when assessing scientific quality. In comparison, 
hard scientists almost uniformly stressed international relations as the 
best indicator of scientific quality.
Table 1. Emphasis on specific aspects and attributes in four data sets
Emphasised 
aspects or 
attributes
Hemlin and 
Montgomery, 
1990 (interviews)
Hemlin, 1993
(free answers)
Hemlin, 1993
(ratings)
Hemlin and 
Montgomery, 
1993
(documents)
The three most 
emphasised 
aspects
Method
Problem
Results
Method
Problem
Results
Reasoning
Results
Method
Method
Results
Problem
The three most
emphasised
attributes
Novelty
Correctness
Stringency
Novelty
Stringency
Correctness
Correctness
Stringency
Depth
Stringency
Novelty
Activity/
Productivity
Emphasis on 
Breadth vs.
Depth
Breadth
Depth
Breadth
Depth
Depth
Breadth
Breadth
Depth
Emphasis 
on intra-vs. 
extra-scientific 
relevance
Intrascientific
Extrascientific
Extrascientific
Intrascientific
Intrascientific
Extrascientific
Intrascientific
Extrascientific
The three most 
emphasised 
combinations 
of aspects and 
attributes
Correct method
New results
Stringent problem
Stringent method
Correct method
New problem
Correct method
Correct results
Correct reasoning
Stringent method
Stringent writing 
style
New results
Adapted from Hemlin and Montgomery (1993)
The differences between the scientific fields are summarised and 
shown through a multidimensional scaling procedure of results from 
the analysis of responses to all parts of the questionnaire (Figure 2). 
Figure 2 clearly shows different perceptions by hard and soft scien-
tists, which is seen in the way the medical, natural and technical sci-
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ence respondents cluster together to the left in the figure, and the 
social sciences and arts and humanities respondents cluster to the op-
posite side (horizontal axis). Secondly, we can observe that the fields 
within the hard sciences differ with respect to the closeness to or dis-
tance from the soft sciences. The natural scientists are the hardest of 
the scientists, then come the technical scientists, and closest to the 
soft are the medical scientists. Among the soft scientists, it is clear 
that the social scientists are closer to the hard scientists, and the arts 
and humanities respondents take the most extreme position in the 
perceptions of scientific quality in comparison with the hard ones. 
If the vertical axis is considered, we will find that also here the arts 
and humanities take the most extreme position in comparison to the 
others and, rather surprisingly, they are farthest away from the social 
sciences.5
 5 The multidimensional scaling procedure does not lead to fixed labels for the axes. Instead, 
they must be inferred theoretically. The horizontal axis in Figure 2 is suggested as a hard-soft 
sciences quality perception continuum, while the y-axis is more difficult to title. The y-axis 
distinguishes between the arts and humanities, the hard sciences and the social sciences at the 
other extreme.
Figure 2. Multidimensional scaling showing scientific quality conceptions by 
Natural (Nat), Technical (Tech), Medical (Med), Social (Soc) scientists, and 
researchers in the Arts and Humanities (Hum)
Nat Tech
Med
Soc
Hum
Adapted from Hemlin (1993)
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A more detailed picture of the differences between scientific fields 
is shown in Table 2 below. In this Table, the arts and humanities sci-
entists are the most distinct representatives of the soft scientists. From 
the results one can see that they were less interested than the hard sci-
entists in physical research environments, in international contacts, in 
successful research, in intrascientific relevance, in more directed re-
search in industrial and sectoral financing, and in research evaluations. 
Instead, the arts and humanities researchers favoured reasoning and 
the writing style of papers as quality features. In addition, they support-
ed the political and cultural effects of research and increased research 
grants. They also stressed the stringency attributes and theory aspects 
of research efforts, as well as creative research. Another significant 
feature of the arts and humanities researchers was that the individual 
researcher’s brightness was perceived as important. Together with the 
social scientists, they differed from one or more of the hard sciences in 
regard to the favoured aspects of the research effort, that is, theory (in 
free answers), reasoning and the writing style.
Soft scientists laid less stress on international relations, emphasised 
political-cultural effects, were against external influences on research, 
and were less positive to research evaluations than hard scientists. In 
some areas, social scientists came close to the opinion of the natural 
and technical scientists. Productivity and international contacts were 
rated higher by social scientists than by the arts and humanities scien-
tists, but both the researcher’s brightness and increased research fund-
ing were rated lower. However, not surprisingly, social scientists rated 
political-cultural research effects more highly than the hard scientists. 
Technical scientists regarded extrascientific relevance as a criterion of 
scientific quality more than the natural scientists did. Natural scien-
tists favoured economic resources more highly than the technical sci-
entists.
Our results showed agreement on the fundamentals of science. 
They supported the framework, and the components of scientific 
quality appeared in the scientists’ interview answers and were found 
important to scientific quality in the ratings. The aspect and at-
tributes distinction in judgments on scientific quality was generally 
supported in the ratings and was by and large in agreement with the 
free answers. In general, international contacts, intrascientific effects, 
and varied research funding were considered essential for scientific 
quality.
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Table 2. Significant differences in index variables between research fields
Index variable Arts &Humanities
Medical
sciences 
Natural
sciences
Social
sciences
Technical
sciences P
Problem >Nat** .0045
Reasoning >Tech* >Tech* .0073
Writing style >Nat** >Nat* .0009
Stringency >Nat**, 
>Tech* .0050
Extrascientific
relevance >Nat* .0213
International
relations >Hum* >Hum* >Hum* .0001
Creative research >Tech** .0025
Successful 
research >Hum** >Hum* .0001
Personal 
brightness
>Soc*, 
>Nat** .0001
Physical 
environment >Hum** >Hum** .0001
Material-
economic effects >Hum* .0150
Political-cultural 
effects
>Med*, 
>Nat**
>Med**, >Nat**
>Tech* .0001
Against external 
influence on 
research
>Nat**, 
>Tech** >Tech** >Tech** .0001
Block grants 
increase scientific 
quality
>Soc*,
>Tech* >Tech* .0025
External funding 
increases scientific 
quality
>Hum* .0087
Favourable 
attitude to 
research 
evaluation
>Hum**, 
>Soc**
>Hum**,
>Soc* >Hum* .0001
Adapted from Hemlin (1993)
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It was possible to identify differences supporting a distinction be-
tween the hard and soft sciences, since this distinction implies a dif-
ferential emphasis on different factors and characteristics of scientific 
quality. Hard scientists de-emphasised all aspects of the research prod-
uct, which may be an indication that the basics in science are not de-
bated, which supports the conclusion. The theory aspects were stressed 
by the soft, but not by the hard, scientists. This is in line with Kuhn’s 
paradigm theory (1970) where the pre-paradigmatic sciences debate 
fundamental theories enthusiastically, while the paradigmatic (normal) 
sciences focus rather on fact-gathering activities to strengthen already 
existing theories. However, another result contradicted Kuhn’s theory, 
since the soft scientists favoured precision in research just as much as 
the hard scientists, even though one might expect hard scientists to be 
more interested in greater accuracy of results.
Whitley’s (1984) differentiation of scientific fields into restricted 
and configurational sciences could be applied to the results. The hard 
sciences’ de-emphasis of theory aspects of scientific quality concords 
with Whitley’s restricted sciences as characterised by the sharing of 
common theoretical ideals and basic conceptual assumptions, besides 
being task specific and prone to using mathematical formalisms. In 
contrast, objects studied by the soft sciences are approached from com-
peting theoretical perspectives in accordance with the features of the 
configurational sciences. Our finding that reasoning and writing style 
are stressed by the soft sciences researchers is also similar to Whitley’s 
idea that configurational sciences make use of a greater variety of defi-
nitions and analyses of objects than restricted sciences.
Finally, the quality criteria in assessments of psychology grant ap-
plications were studied to validate previous findings from data on the 
perceptions of scientific quality and data from peer review documents 
where candidates for professorship were assessed. We analysed the re-
view protocols (n=413) of grant applications to the Swedish Council for 
Social Sciences and the Humanities between 1988 and 1993 (Hemlin 
et al., 1995). The findings corroborated previous studies to a great ex-
tent, although some differences were found. The theory and method 
aspects, in that order, were the most frequently used aspects by peers in 
psychology. This result coincides with the previous results on favoured 
aspects in the social sciences from the ratings, but in reverse order. The 
stringency, novelty and correctness attributes, in that order, were fre-
quently used to assess grant applications in psychology. In comparison 
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with previous results from the social sciences, we can observe that nov-
elty, stringency and extrascientific relevance, in that order, were most 
favoured. Apart from the third-ranked attribute (correctness), these re-
sults are similar to those of the grant application peers. This had been 
ranked as attribute number four in previous findings. However, extras-
cientific relevance was applied as an attribute in reviews by peers in 
psychology, but ranked one place lower.
In conclusion, peers in psychology appeared to share basic values 
in their reviews of psychology grant applications but also in the way 
they wanted to justify their recommendations to the applicants and to 
other members of the Board of the Social Sciences and the Humanities 
who make the final decision on grants. We should also take into ac-
count that rhetorical purposes, as well as notions about what is socially 
expected from the review protocols, may disguise some of the criteria 
that were applied in the reviews. It is well known that influences such 
as nepotism, sexism (Wold and Wennerås, 1997) and other biases may 
distort peer reviews.
4. Future changes in scientific quality perceptions and criteria
The final section of this chapter is devoted to the future of scien-
tific quality. We have noticed in the period since the empirical studies 
on the perceptions of scientific quality and quality criteria used in peer 
review (from the 1980s up to the mid 1990s) that a lively debate on the 
changes in science and its conditions in society generally has been un-
folding. This debate has occurred as much within the scientific commu-
nity itself (e.g. the “science wars”) as outside, with societal actors taking 
part more intensively. We have witnessed a science policy discussion, 
starting in the 1990s, about a new mode of science, an on-going shift 
from mode 1 (traditional science) to mode 2 (context dependent sci-
ence) (Gibbons et al., 1994) and science in a steady state (Ziman, 1994) 
and the triple helix of universities, industries and governments which 
it is suggested blurs the borders between science and society (Etzkowitz 
and Leydesdorff, 1997).6 All these observations on scientific develop-
ment are still weakly supported by empirical data. However, there are 
some studies that seem to give partial evidence of this “new” science 
(Hemlin, 2000; Hicks and Katz, 1996). If these trends are taken to be 
 6 However, an early observer of changes in scientific knowledge production called it “indus-
trialized science” (Ravetz, 1971).
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true, it would be surprising if they did not cause changes to scientific 
quality assessments and even to scientific quality itself. The big ques-
tions are only how these will change, what factors are changing, and 
what aspects and attributes will be favoured.
In a rather recent paper we discussed the issue of changing quality 
criteria in research evaluations and the consequences of such (Hemlin 
and Rasmussen, 2006). In Table 3, a draft is shown of what we believe 
is happening in the scientific community and its relations to society at 
large in connection to quality criteria and assessment. Our argument in 
the article is that developments in science and new perspectives on sci-
ence are transforming academic quality control into a quality monitor-
ing system that has a process rather than product orientation, uses new 
criteria, has other foci and goals, uses different peers, different evalua-
tion times, and brings new and organisationally based perspectives to 
science and technology studies.
Table 3. The transition from quality control to quality monitoring in science
Dimension Quality Control(product orientation)
Quality Monitoring
(process orientation)
Criteria Scientific Scientific and social
Focus Individual researchers Organisations, networks
Goal Valid, reliable knowledge Socially robust knowledge, learning
Evaluator Traditional peers New peers, users, consultants, lay persons
Evaluation time After production Continuously
Science study 
perspective
1st order: Philosophy and 
sociology of knowledge
2nd order: Knowledge management, 
organisational learning
Adapted from Hemlin and Rasmussen (2006)
The drivers of this change, we argue in the paper, are new forms of 
organisations in knowledge production that are erasing the public and 
private distinction (e.g. Hemlin, 2001). It is not only universities that 
produce socially demanded knowledge in contemporary societies, but 
private knowledge enterprises, knowledge brokers, consultancies and 
think tanks. It appears also that the boundaries in science and society 
are dissolving, such as the distinction between basic and applied re-
search, disciplinary structures (within academia), and the previously 
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strict borders between university, industry and government. For exam-
ple, we have a wide range of university-industry relationships, but also 
a number of university links with the public community. We have also 
noticed a more pronounced end-user orientation in science policies at 
large. There is more emphasis on applications, social accountability, 
and a capitalisation of science in science and science policy discussions. 
For instance, the commercialisation of scientific results is nowadays an 
important research policy goal in many countries. Finally, scientists’ 
behaviour is changing in that heterogeneous skills and knowledge (e.g. 
interdisciplinarity), reflexivity (e.g. putting scientific actions into a so-
cietal perspective), new careers (e.g. in the private sphere), new organi-
sations (e.g. semi-public-private institutions), and new forms of science 
(e.g. by means of visualisations in medical fields) are becoming more 
frequent.
In addition, we also have noticed new views of science influencing 
quality control. They are summarised in the following observations. 
The first is an external view7 of science as expressed, for instance, in 
the book The new production of knowledge (Gibbons et al., 1994) that 
has its roots in the Mertonian tradition of science studies which is em-
pirically based on a critical realist tradition. As opposed to this stance, 
there is simultaneously an internal view of science, as can be found in 
the works by, for example, Latour (1987), which is conceptually rather 
than empirically based and is characterised by a social constructivistic 
epistemology.
The internal view would imply that scientific quality is a relative 
concept resulting from negotiations between scientists in each scien-
tific field, or rather sub-field. This would mean that quality concep-
tions were no longer founded on the evaluation of empirical research, 
methods and findings. Instead, quality issues would be linked to social 
and scientific influence and power, negotiation skills and rhetoric. For 
example, “old boy networks”, the prestige of universities and journals, 
and other social characteristics in the scientific community would win. 
In Merton’s terms, the norm of universalism would no longer be an 
option.
 7 External means in this context a view of scientific knowledge which does not admit that 
social factors can penetrate the epistemological core, but only influence or possibly distort it. 
Accordingly, the epistemological core can only be changed by epistemic arguments. In contrast, 
the internal view of science argues that scientific knowledge is solely socially constructed and 
that the epistemic domain is collapsed into the social (see e.g. Cole, 1992).
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Another feature of the new views of science concerns the problem-
atic distinction between basic and applied science, which is so often 
pronounced nowadays. A number of authors criticised this tradition-
ally fundamental divide in the sciences as outdated and historically bi-
ased (see Stokes, 1997). Moreover, Ziman (2000) argued that basic and 
applied science can both be used as terms about the same research ac-
tivity, depending on the context and who addresses the research. A sci-
entist may carry out basic research, although the grant for the research 
will be designated as funding for applied research by the funding body, 
and where the departmental unit where the research is taking place is 
named “Applied Psychology”.
We have also witnessed a shift in the view of knowledge, from cer-
tified knowledge (“justified true belief”) according to the philosophy of 
science tradition, to socially robust knowledge (Nowotny et al., 2000). 
The latter view is based on a number of features where the most impor-
tant ones are: a pragmatic view of science where knowledge is estab-
lished through its use rather than on certified knowledge; an emphasis 
on interdisciplinarity applied in trading zones where different disci-
plinary-oriented scientists collaborate; and value-integrated knowledge 
where societal values are merged with the intrascientific views of what 
is typically good science.
Another trend in the literature, particularly in science policy con-
texts, emphasises less the individual researcher than the knowledge 
producing organisation in quality assessments by focusing on both 
truthlike knowledge and trustworthy management, as well as the de-
mand for collaboration or collective research (e.g. in networks, centres 
of excellence). This view of science brings the knowledge producing or-
ganisation, rather than the individual scientist or research group, into 
the foreground of quality control.
Furthermore, the division between science and society is viewed in 
a new light. Science is now more of a reflexive, social knowledge work-
ing institution and an open system, which establishes itself by con-
tinuous evaluations, and through science and social partnership. This 
means that the distinctions between science and society are no longer 
as important, but are rather viewed as interacting parts or aspects of 
one system. The traditional social contract between science and society 
in Vannevar Bush’s terms is re-negotiated.
In summary, we argue first that the shift in academic quality con-
trol is related to the skills and abilities of the knowledge environment 
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to learn (this environment can be seen, for instance, as a group, a de-
partment or an organisation). Quality control will change from being 
purely cognitive and epistemological to becoming more than a social 
and organisational phenomenon. This will influence researchers in the 
field of science and technology studies to interact more frequently with 
researchers who have organisations (or organising) as study objects.
Knowledge management and organisational learning will become 
a scientific task rather than a management task. This is the conse-
quence of the observation that science depends to a large extent on its 
ability to reflect and act on its cognitive, social and institutional base. 
Basically, knowledge management is also a task that universities, rather 
than businesses (where the term was invented), should be able to handle 
professionally.
Organisational learning in science will be based on both inter-
nally and externally oriented processes and should be based on an 
open system perspective, where double loop learning can take place 
(Scott, 1981). Such organisational learning processes will internal-
ly entail ways of building, supplementing, sharing and organising 
knowledge and routines. Moreover, the organisational learning proc-
esses directed to the external environment of scientific organisations 
are processes that aim at adaptation and change. An organisational 
learning perspective on quality issues in scientific organisations as 
outlined here will probably be a crucial task for conceptual and em-
pirical research in the future.
5. Conclusion
This chapter has presented a relational view of the scientific qual-
ity concept. Different factors can be taken into account when we con-
ceptualise scientific quality. It can be viewed in terms of a research 
product (e.g. an article), a research environment (e.g. colleagues, 
premises), research effects (e.g. new theories, new medical drugs), 
research financing, organisation and policy (e.g. support to centres 
of excellence), and research evaluation (i.e. how scientific quality is 
assessed). It was further suggested that these factors interact with 
one another. For example, a certain research policy may promote a 
new field in science which favourably meets societal needs. A way to 
delimit scientific quality was suggested by focusing on the research 
product and its properties. According to this view, quality in science 
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could be described in a common language of aspects (e.g. methods) 
and attributes (e.g. originality).
The relational view of scientific quality is a conceptual model which 
is valid over time since it is flexible in the context of changes in the per-
ceptions of scientific quality. The latter part of the chapter looked ahead 
at scientific quality and its assessment. It was suggested that changes 
are occurring in how quality is perceived in science and society. We 
argued that this change would lead to a process rather than a product 
perspective of scientific quality. This implied that the quality criteria 
drifted from science to society, the focus shifted from individuals to 
organisations, the goals changed from valid and reliable knowledge to 
socially robust knowledge, the evaluators incorporated new actors, the 
evaluation times occurred more frequently, and the science studies per-
spective shifted to knowledge management and organisational learning 
perspectives.
The new perspective on scientific quality is compatible with the 
previous framework in that it shifts the focus onto factors other than 
those previously (or currently) applied. Whether or not this is a true 
picture should be subject to empirical tests. And whether or not this 
is beneficial should be discussed by scientists, research policy analysts 
and others. Ultimately, we should be convinced that scientific knowl-
edge is never fixed.
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How do scientists perceive scientific quality?
1. Main directions in scientific quality studies
Studies of scientific quality have been at the centre of attention 
of the sociology of science since its very beginning, usually associ-
ated with Merton and his followers (Ben-David, 1978). The very first 
publications, but especially the most important works in the new field 
within the Mertonian theoretical landscape, discussed scientific qual-
ity, which was initially understood as scientists’ (most) important cog-
nitive or scientific contributions to the body of knowledge of a cer-
tain field (Hagstrom, 1965; Merton, 1973; J. Cole and S. Cole, 1981; 
Zuckerman, 1977). The establishment of the Science Citation Index 
and citation analysis, of which Derek de Solla Price (1965) is generally 
believed to be the founding father, spurred investigations into scien-
tific excellence, not only in the sociology of science, but also in the 
wider field of the social studies of science, and the broadest research 
in science studies.
Scientific quality is not a topic reserved exclusively for researchers 
of science – philosophers, sociologists, historians, psychologists, politi-
cal scientists, scientometricians, and information scientists – as it has 
attracted other researchers from all scientific areas and from the most 
diverse scientific fields. For the practical needs of their (sub)discipline, 
they attempt to define professional, cognitive and ethical standards, 
specified criteria of promotion in science, or simply set down instruc-
tions for reviewers of scientific publications and projects. Observing 
the widest circle of researchers of science, and especially the more nar-
row circle of social scientists in that area, we can identify three major 
streams of empirical research and evaluations of scientific quality.
The first stream includes numerous bibliometric studies of scien-
tific excellence, which is often identified with the visibility of scientific 
production, mostly articles by individual scientists, research teams, 
individual fields or specialities, university departments, individual in-
stitutions or even whole universities, and even countries or regions of 
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the world. Other important indicators of quality, such as the impact 
factor of science journals, are also based on citation rates. Despite the 
numerous and well-founded criticisms that they reduce scientific qual-
ity to citations, bibliometric methods have established themselves as 
a methodological tool that can be very useful in obtaining a deeper 
insight into scientific excellence when combined with other approach-
es and methods (Garfield, 1979; Gläser and Laudel, 2001; Van Raan, 
2004; Leydesdorf, 2005). In the research practice of the hard sciences, 
bibliometric indicators of scientific quality (citations received) are one 
of the key measures of scientific promotion, research funding and, in 
Bourdieu’s terms (2004), other symbolic forms of recognition trans-
formed into resources and awarded to scientists for their scientific con-
tributions.
The second stream focuses on investigating the oldest evaluation 
system, that is, the qualified judgments or assessments of scientific 
work, or peer reviews. Being liable to subjective influences, peer re-
views are a frequent topic of various studies that often aim to determine 
the level of universalism in evaluating the quality of individual papers, 
the scientist’s overall research work, the production of project teams or 
even of some (sub)specialties (for example in review studies). The stud-
ies investigate the criteria and adequacy of judgments, the forecasting 
accuracy in the evaluation of future research (project proposals), the 
evaluator’s or reviewer’s bias, and the influence of the researcher’s pro-
fessional position and standing in evaluating research and publications 
(Chubin and Hackett, 1990; S. Cole, 1992; Hemlin and Montgomery, 
1993; Luukkonen, 1995; Hemlin et al., 1995; Frankel and Cave, 1997; 
Gläser and Laudel, 2005). Normative studies, which focus on critical 
analysis of the criteria for evaluating scientific excellence, trying to 
enhance them in the hard sciences (Buchholz, 1995), as well as in the 
social area (Breuer and Reichertz, 2001), also belong to this course of 
research. Regardless of subjective influences in the process and result 
of evaluation, peer review is still considered irreplaceable in the science 
evaluation system.
Due to the disadvantages of both evaluation systems – the quanti-
tative type, especially bibliometric procedures, and peer reviews – there 
is also a third, mixed type of approach that investigates and compares 
the results of peer reviews and bibliometric analyses. However, this is 
not a new trend in sociological and psychological studies. It was pre-
cisely the high correlation of citation rates and peer reviews that formed 
207
 HOW DO SCIENTISTS PERCEIVE SCIENTIFIC QUALITY?
the basis for identifying quality with the visibility of scientific papers 
(Cole and Cole, 1981). The two approaches were connected in later stud-
ies as well, showing (depending on the field or problem under study) 
various relations between the evaluations of competent colleagues and 
citations. Some of the studies confirmed the great concurrence of the 
two evaluation procedures (Rinia et al., 1998; Bornmann and Daniel, 
2006b). Others brought attention to the bias of peer reviews, while the 
third stressed citation counts as a good, but fallible, indicator of the 
quality of most creative works (Shadish et al., 1995; Bornmann and 
Daniel, 2006a). The fourth group of studies draws attention to some of 
the weaknesses of both evaluation procedures (Aksnes and Taxt, 2004; 
Reale et al., 2007), while the fifth group shows a lack of significant cor-
relations between the scientist’s citation rate and peer reviews (Sonnert, 
1995; Gläser, 2004). Despite the rather disparate findings, both proce-
dures are used in the evaluation practice of a number of hard fields, 
and investigations into their successfulness and interrelation are very 
promising (Tijssen, 2003; Van Raan, 2004).
A separate, smaller corpus within the second research stream con-
sists of the studies of perceptions of scientific quality. The studies are 
based on various theoretical starting points, and they use qualitative 
methods such as interviews and open-ended questions and/or quanti-
tative methods such as ratings of closed responses/items on multi-point 
scales. In order to determine our theoretical and methodological start-
ing point, it is important to provide a brief analysis of studies, exclud-
ing the already presented studies from the Nordic countries (Hemlin, 
2009).
In contrast to the already mentioned study by Smigel and Ross 
(1970), whose analysis of assessments by reviewers of the Social Problems 
journal established that papers were usually accepted because they 
were found interesting, important or significant, or well-written, Chase 
started off from Merton’s theoretical claims on scientific norms. Out 
of the ten criteria offered for evaluating scientific papers, respondents 
from selected departments of the top ten American universities ranked 
logical rigour, replicability of research, clarity of style, and conciseness 
and originality as the most important criteria. Significant differences 
were found among (105) natural scientists and (86) social scientists in 
ranking the importance of the majority of criteria, including the most 
significant ones. The former valued replicability and originality as the 
most important standards, while the latter considered logical rigour the 
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most important criterion. The two groups of scientists showed no sig-
nificant differences in ranking clarity of style and conciseness (Chase, 
1970).
In interviews with 90 scientists from the Nordic countries whose 
work was subject to evaluation procedures, Luukkonen (1995) also 
asked the respondents about the criteria which they believed were used 
in the evaluation procedure. Most of them listed the usual criteria of 
quality such as originality and innovation. In addition, some other cri-
teria, such as experiments, verifiability, international publication, vis-
ibility and international cooperation, also dominated the fundamental 
natural sciences.
Another Nordic study also determined disciplinary differences in 
the concepts of quality, and this on the basis of 33 semi-structured in-
depth interviews with Finnish scientists from four fields of science – 
physics, biology, sociology and history (Kekäle, 2000, 2002). Physicists 
avoided defining quality and focused on the methods of its evaluation. 
In their opinion, the international review system was objective, reli-
able and the best way of evaluating quality. Biologists highlighted the 
same aspects of quality evaluation, but they did not show such firm 
conviction in the objectivity of international peer reviews. Sociologists 
defined quality using general terms such as interesting or fruitful study, 
but they also pointed out some general common criteria of high quality: 
good questions related to appropriate paradigms, extensive literature, 
reflexivity, and, especially, new perspectives created by the research. 
Historians highlighted reliability and accuracy as the main criteria of 
quality research (Kekäle, 2002: 73–74).
We can also draw indirect conclusions on the criteria of scientific 
quality on the basis of the importance that Croatian scientists, both 
eminent and young, attached to the professional values or standards 
of their field. Eminent natural and social scientists ranked conceptual 
precision at the very top, at the same time ascribing great importance 
to some other characteristics of scientific work, but nevertheless rating 
them lower. They did not differ significantly in evaluations of general 
logical rigour and stylistic precision, but they showed significant and 
great differences in evaluating the importance of precise measuring 
(Prpić, 1997: 75–76). Young researchers also attached the greatest im-
portance to conceptual precision, ranking it first (natural scientists) or 
second (social scientists). Logical rigour and stylistic precision ranked 
much lower, and no significant differences were noticed in those above-
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average evaluations of its importance as were seen in the importance 
given to precision in measuring (Prpić, 2004).
More recent studies, just like the Nordic studies presented in 
the previous chapter, show marked similarities in the concepts used 
by practising scientists to determine scientific quality, regardless of 
whether they are allowed to freely state their opinions or whether they 
are asked to rate the significance of predefined elements of quality. The 
similarities certainly provide good foundations for defining the cat-
egory system important in the empirical analysis of scientific quality, 
assuming that such a study is epistemically relevant.
2. Approach and methods
2.1. Goals, hypotheses and methods
As the overview and analysis of empirical studies show, studies of 
scientists’ perceptions of scientific quality are indeed scarce among the 
impressive body of works focusing on bibliometric evaluations of qual-
ity and peer reviews. With the exception of a few older works, most of 
the studies of scientists’ perceptions were conducted in the 1990s in the 
Nordic countries. These countries had adopted the Swedish research 
policy which was formed in the 1970s and 1980s, so that, in addition 
to the scientific interest of Nordic science researchers, changes in the 
scientific, and especially evaluation systems, also stimulated their in-
vestigations into scientific quality.
Both cognitive and policy interests have driven this study of the 
perceptions of quality of the Croatian scientific community. To be more 
precise, regarding the former dimension, it is not sufficient to know 
only the evaluation procedures and the criteria that the so-called gate-
keepers or elite reviewers really use when evaluating scientific contri-
butions in their field. It is equally important to gain insight into the 
broader intellectual and value landmarks of the members of the scien-
tific community, especially because their citation practices or selection 
of references determine another form of evaluation in science – citation 
rate. Although interest in this topic is minimal within the constructiv-
ist understanding of scientific quality, its relevance is none the lesser. 
A comprehensive insight into the evaluation process in science, includ-
ing its understanding (in the Weberian sense), is not possible without 
knowing these professional values and standards, despite the fact, or 
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precisely because of the fact, that scientific practice deviates from them 
to a lesser or greater degree.
Alongside the cognitive aspect which is especially important to the 
Croatian scientific community because its perceptions of quality have 
not been investigated and are not yet known, the goal of the planned re-
search has its social and practical aspects. In other words, the scientific 
system, especially its evaluation subsystem, will have to be subjected to 
newer and more difficult changes in order to adjust to European and 
world standards, and especially in order to rectify the crucial weak-
nesses manifested in the evaluations of scientific work. The inadequa-
cy, inconsistency and lack of transparency of the criteria for judging 
scientific quality and the insufficiently defined position of bibliometric 
indicators remain the biggest problems of the Croatian evaluation sys-
tem in science. In brief, with empirical insight into the scientists’ crite-
ria for judging quality, that is, insight into the social or value capital of 
the Croatian scientific community, the coming changes in the system 
will be more efficient.
Although conceptions of scientific quality do not represent scien-
tists’ cognitive convictions in the strictest sense of the word, they are 
nevertheless inextricably connected to the perceptions of science and 
the criteria of recognising and acknowledging contributions to knowl-
edge, which are usually the standards for scientists in their own work as 
well. In the sense of the normative or value standards and ideals of sci-
entific research, we can understand the conceptions of scientific quality 
as a form or even an indicator of scientists’ epistemic concepts.
The theoretical starting point of the research is twofold. The wider 
theoretical framework of studying scientific quality, as well as the new 
tendencies in its evaluation that may be brought about by changes in 
the relation of science and society, has been presented in detail in the 
previous chapter (Hemlin, 2009), so there is no need to repeat it here. 
The category system inspired by the framework (also) used in this study 
will be described in the following subsection. However, the basic hy-
potheses of the empirical analysis of scientific quality are not as tightly 
connected to the framework as they are to the even wider sociological 
approach of the whole study.
This approach starts from the basic assumptions of the theories of 
scientific fields (Whitley, 1984; Fuchs, 1992). However, the hypothetical 
framework has been modified by integrating the thesis on the nucleus 
of the shared socio-cognitive characteristics of science which distin-
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guishes it from other forms of cultural and intellectual production in 
society (Prpić, 1997). According to this starting hypothesis, scientists’ 
concepts of scientific quality in the natural and social sciences would 
have to share some relevant characteristics, especially those referring 
to the general properties of quality. On the other hand, they would also 
have to differ in the two observed scientific areas since their cognitive 
practice and style, connected to the corresponding mode of knowledge 
production, also differ.
The most suitable approach in the first study of quality perceptions 
in the Croatian natural and social science communities was the re-
spondents’ free expression of their opinions, revealing their definitions 
of scientific quality and the characteristics they ascribe to it. In short, 
respondents were not offered already formulated answers and defini-
tions of quality. We also wanted to investigate whether Croatian sci-
entists would, like those from the Nordic countries, clearly distinguish 
the research process from its attributes. Finally, we wanted to know 
whether their perceptions would correspond to the concepts of quality 
expressed by scientists from other scientific communities.
The first web survey of natural and social scientists thus also in-
cluded a question on scientific quality. The first chapter (Golub, 2009) 
described in detail the scope of the planned population of scientists, its 
response rate, as well as the characteristics of the obtained samples of 
researchers.
After a brief introduction encouraging respondents to cooper-
ate and focusing their responses on their own disciplinary context 
(Prpić, 2009), respondents were asked the following questions: What 
is scientific quality in your opinion? Can scientific quality be measured? 
In total, 264 natural scientists and 141 social scientists answered the 
first question, securing high response rates of 85.2% and 84.4% re-
spectively. Furthermore, 267 or 86.1% of the former and 141 or 84.4% 
of the latter responded to the second question, thus posting the same 
or almost the same response rate. These are also the final samples of 
respondents (N) for these scientific areas in the analysis of scientific 
quality perceptions.
2.2. Categorial system of perception analysis
The more recent qualitative studies of perceptions of scien-
tific quality have developed somewhat different categorial starting 
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points than those found in older research. Gulbrandsen (2000) dis-
tinguished among four major aspects of quality research based on 
interviews with 64 respondents from universities, institutes and in-
dustry. The first is solidity, which rests on well-founded conclusions, 
sound documentation and data, on consistency and coherence, fac-
tual interpretations, impartiality, clarity and stringency. Originality 
is the second aspect, and it can refer to academic novelty or it can 
be practical in nature and refer to practical problems. The third 
aspect is scientific relevance which rests on cumulativity (comple-
mentarity to other contributions and the opening of new research 
fields) and generality – general principles and research methods. The 
fourth aspect concerns practical utility, long-term or short-term, for 
specific users or broader social sectors – health, economy, and envi-
ronment. Furthermore, he even assumed and showed that tension 
and even conflict among these aspects of quality were unavoidable 
(Gulbrandsen, 2000, 2004).
An even broader category system had been developed earlier in the 
studies of perceptions of Swedish scientists (Hemlin and Montgomery, 
1991; Hemlin, 1993, 2009). It is theoretically more elaborate because it 
brings into play more factors that participate in creating scientific qual-
ity, and on which it depends, and these are: research itself or its product, 
the researcher, the research environment, extrascientific and interscien-
tific research effects, as well as funding and the organisation of research. 
It remains to be determined whether Croatian scientists would identify 
some of these factors, since they were not requested to rate them, as the 
Swedish scientists were (Hemlin, 1993).
The concept of scientific quality rests on the distinction between 
its aspects and attributes. Aspects refer to parts or constituents of the 
research process, from the selection of the research problems and theo-
retical framework of the research, method, reasoning, all the way to 
the final stages of the research: results and style of the published paper. 
Attributes are the properties that are or can be ascribed to any of the 
constituents or phases of the research process, which include: novelty 
or originality, rigour, accuracy, extrascientific and interscientific im-
portance, width, depth and productivity (Hemlin, 1993: 10). In theo-
retical terms, the distinction between aspects and attributes of scien-
tific quality can be useful because it allows quality to be understood 
as a property of the overall research process or its product, but also as 
a property of its individual stages. However, Gulbrandsen’s classifica-
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tion of attributes of scientific quality is probably more consistent and 
economical. In principal, it is possible to combine both classifications, 
thus establishing the third one which includes partly modified aspects 
and attributes of scientific quality.
Theoretical reasons and the consistency of individual categories of 
aspects and attributes of quality were not the only criteria in the modi-
fication of the categorial system, and they were supplemented by their 
adequacy in the classification of the obtained empirical material: the re-
spondents’ open-ended responses. In other words, we intended to build 
a categorial system that would have a double foundation – theoretical 
and empirical. For that reason, we reduced the original aspects of sci-
entific quality, or parts of the research process, to problem, method, 
results/cognitions and publication/production, which means that three 
original aspects – theory, style and reasoning – were excluded from the 
system as separate categories, and production, an attribute in the origi-
nal categorisation, was added as an aspect.
Theory appeared extremely rarely in the respondents’ answers – 
only in two responses of natural scientists and eight times in the re-
sponses of social scientists. Even then, theory was not mentioned as 
a special aspect of research, but rather as its sub-aspect, usually as a 
framework that connects and explains new cognitions or scientific 
results, and more rarely as a starting point in the articulation of the 
research problem.1 It is important to respect the respondents’ line of 
reasoning in such situations, so we classified the references to theories 
in line with their original categorisation as aspects of scientific results/
cognitions or research problems.
The rare explicit mention of theory should not be interpreted as 
the respondents’ indifference to theory. It is more likely that they treat 
it as a given framework, as a measure of quality, and not as its aspect. 
Such a relation could be logical in the paradigmatic sciences that are 
characterised by the saturation of research, with theory in the so-called 
normal phase (Fuchs, 1993; Becher and Trowler, 2001). The pluralism 
of theoretical orientations in the social sciences is usually considered as 
the grounds for controversies and disputes (Fuchs, 1993), which does 
not undermine the importance of theory in research. On the contrary, 
 1 Here follow several examples of context and meaning where respondents mention theory: 
“Connecting the results of different types into a general theory”; “... whose final results are also 
new theories that can be empirically verified”; “effort to contextualise the known results and to 
draw up a theoretical model”.
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disputes only indicate the importance that a certain theory holds for its 
advocates.
The importance of theory for scientists is also indicated by the 
studies of the professional, cognitive and social values of eminent and 
young scientists, since both groups rated the precise concepts and in-
tegrating role of theory very highly in both the natural and social sci-
ences (Prpić, 1997, 1998, 2004, 2005). Finally, Swedish scientists also 
mentioned theory as an aspect of scientific quality more rarely than 
method, problem and, partly, results (Hemlin, 1993).
The style of a science paper was also rarely mentioned in the re-
spondents’ answers: nine times by natural scientists and four times by 
social scientists, more often being mentioned as a component of the 
scientific product, that is, publication: “the good structure and clarity 
of a publication”, “clarity and simplicity of presentation of one’s own 
knowledge”. Thus, we listed style as a new aspect of scientific quality: 
production or publication.2 Reasoning was usually connected to the in-
terpretation of results and data in respondents’ open-ended answers, 
but not to other stages of the research process, although it is neces-
sary in all of them. Having in mind the way respondents themselves 
understood reasoning, stressing its importance in the final part of the 
research process, we also put that aspect into the category of results and 
cognitions.
The latter category included both results and new knowledge 
(cognitions) because respondents do not make a clear distinction be-
tween the two. They call research results answers to the posed scien-
tific question, an advancement in a specific field of science, while the 
link between the results and knowledge was expressly stressed by one 
respondent who said that high-quality results represented “a certain 
breakthrough, that is, bringing a new cognition...”. Thus, inclusion of 
results and cognitions together into the same research aspect is also 
based on the perceptions of the respondents themselves. Finally, pub-
lication of results or scientific production is more often understood as 
 2 Empirical comparisons of the style of scientific publications, especially clarity, showed 
interesting differences among the natural sciences, social sciences and humanities, particularly 
in sentence length, use of the passive voice, and readability. The results of various studies are not 
uniform. Papers in the social sciences and humanities usually use longer sentences and less pas-
sive voice than natural science papers whose readability, measured by the special Flesch Reading 
Ease score indicator, is often greater than that of papers in the social sciences. However, there 
were also disciplinary differences, which indicates a need for further research (Hartley et al., 
2004).
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an aspect, sometimes an indicator, of scientific quality than as its at-
tribute.3 Since publishing is usually the final stage of the research proc-
ess, it is reasonable to treat it as an aspect of scientific quality, which is 
also in line with the respondents’ perceptions. Naturally, there is also 
ground for the opposite standpoint since some studies show that the 
quantity of production is the best predictor for peers’ quality assess-
ments of the scientist’s body of work (Sonnert, 1995). However, in this 
case we have an indicator, and not an attribute, of scientific quality.
We classified the attributes of scientific quality using the typol-
ogy of minimal requests or criteria of scientific quality (Gulbrandsen, 
2000). Accordingly, we distinguished among solidity, originality, scien-
tific and social importance. The mentioned author speaks of academic 
and practical value, while others differentiate between extrascientific 
and interscientific relevance (Hemlin, 1993). However, the terminology 
has to be made as precise as possible and it even has to be brought up to 
date, and needs to establish a conceptual connection with more recent 
sociological theories that insist on the social accountability and reflex-
ivity of scientific research (Gibbons et al., 1997). For this reason, we use 
quite precise syntagms of scientific and social relevance. According to 
our respondents, the first refers to a significant contribution to the field 
of study, to a “lasting contribution to science” and all the way to the 
results that are interesting and important to the scientific community, 
findings that become “a part of the citations in the scientific literature”. 
The other, as in Gulbrandsen (2000), has two dimensions – practical, 
useful and applicable, but also of (the) broad(est) – social and human-
istic importance: a “contribution to the culture of the society to which 
the scientist belongs, and thus also the culture of humankind”, some-
thing new that “improves the lives of people in any way” or “makes the 
world better”.
Originality, like the categorisation of the open-ended answers of 
other authors, included alternative terms used by the respondents, such 
as new, innovative, creative. Solidity denotes a whole set of attributes, 
some of which are very similar, and even identical, to those that both 
Norwegian and Swedish scientists stressed as indicators of scientific 
quality. The biggest subset within the solidity category refers to objectiv-
 3 This is evident from the following respondents’ answers: “show the obtained results in 
internationally renowned journals”; “scientific results published in scientific papers”; “produc-
tion and presentation of scientific results”; “results published in renowned scientific journals”; 
“publishing a scientific paper in a certain science journal indicates scientific quality”.
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ity and the related attributes of the research process and products, such 
as truthfulness, reliability, replicability. The second subset consists of 
demands for the most comprehensive and complete research endeavour 
and outcome, and these are, according to the respondents themselves, 
systematic quality, thoroughness and comprehensiveness. The third 
subset includes coherence, precision, accuracy, adequacy, rigour, clarity 
and similar qualifiers that suggest the perfection of the design and con-
duct of research. Accordingly, solidity in general refers to the highest 
standards or norms of scientific work, professional mastery, or research 
conducted according to the best professional criteria.
3. Natural and social scientists’ concepts of quality
Based on the described categorial system, the respondents’ open-
ended answers were categorised and quantified. Table 1 shows the re-
sults of measuring the frequency of mentions of certain aspects and 
attributes of scientific quality in those answers.4 Having in mind this 
methodological comment, it is clear that natural and social scientists 
more often state attributes than aspects of scientific quality. Their un-
derstanding of scientific quality seems to be more related to the relevant 
characteristics of quality than to individual stages of the research proc-
ess whose excellence can be evaluated. In this respect, they differ sig-
nificantly from the Swedish scientists where no such discrepancy was 
noticed. The Swedish respondents referred to attributes slightly more 
often than they mentioned aspects of quality (Hemlin, 1993). In other 
words, our respondents also distinguish between different phases of 
scientific research and their qualifiers or quality designators, but judg-
ing from the differing frequency of mention, they tend to emphasise 
the distinction more. According to their views, it seems that excellence 
is relatively more often understood as a property of the whole research 
 4 It is important to make a remark regarding methodology which naturally also has sub-
stantive effects. Only the respondents who expressly mentioned at least one aspect or attribute 
were included in the count. The number of such respondents (N) was the basis for calculating 
the percentages. Considering that many answers mentioned several aspects or attributes, this 
was a multiple choice situation. A first look at the number and percentage of respondents who 
highlighted at least one aspect of scientific quality shows that their number is lower than the 
total number of respondents, despite the multiple choice. In terms of attributes, their number 
by far exceeds the number of respondents, which means that more respondents mentioned at-
tributes (at least one) than aspects. The multiple answers were precisely the reason why chi-
square tests were calculated on the basis of frequencies, and thus in fact show the significance of 
differences in the structure of answers, and not  of respondents.
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cycle, from the problem choice, to publications, since the individual 
stages of the cycle are less frequently stressed. Due to such perceptions, 
the aspects mentioned by Croatian scientists are reduced to four basic 
ones, in contrast to the perceptions of Swedish scientists.
Table 1. Frequency of highlighting individual aspects and attributes of scientific 
quality
Categories of scientific quality
Natural scientists Social scientists
N = 248 N = 131
F % F %
ASPECTS OF QUALITY
Research problem
Scientific method
Scientific results/cognitions
Publications/production
29
26
90
48
11.7
10.5
36.3
19.4
18
29
48
14
13.7
22.1
36.6
10.7
Chi-square = 11.707; df = 3; p = 0.008
ATTRIBUTES OF QUALITY
Originality
Solidity 
Scientific relevance
Social relevance
67
97
73
28
27.0
39.1
29.4
11.3
33
84
34
13
25.2
64.1
26.0
10.0
Chi-square = 8.912; df = 3; p = 0.030
Swedish scientists, however, also ranked method, problem and re-
sults in the first three positions (Hemlin, 1993, 2009), which shows that 
their understanding of scientific excellence also focused on those three 
aspects of research. They actually make up the key points or backbone 
of the research process from start to finish.
Let us look at the differences identified in the views of respond-
ents from the natural and social sciences. Scientific results and/or 
cognitions rank at the top in both fields. Even the proportion of re-
spondents who most frequently link scientific quality with research 
results is almost equal, which indicates the relatively higher impor-
tance given to the outcome or the final part of research when evaluat-
ing quality. Other aspects of scientific excellence appear with differ-
ent frequency in statements by respondents from both scientific areas, 
and the slightest differences are identified in stressing the research 
problem, which ranked third both in the natural and social sciences 
(Table 2).
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Table 2. Most frequent aspects and attributes of scientific quality in respondents’ 
answers
Aspects and attributes 
of scientific quality Natural scientists Social scientists
The three most 
frequent aspects
Results/cognitions
Publications/production
Research problem
Results/cognitions
Method
Research problem
The three most 
frequent attributes
Solidity
Scientific relevance
Originality 
Solidity
Scientific relevance
Originality
The three most frequent 
combinations of aspects 
and attributes
Scientific relevance of results
Originality of results
Solidity of method
Solidity of method
Solidity of results
Scientific relevance of results
Significant differences clearly relate to the importance of method 
and production in judging scientific quality. In the natural sciences, 
evaluation of excellence focuses more on publications that present 
new results and knowledge, and in the social sciences on methods, 
which may seem paradoxical at first sight considering the theoretical 
and methodological pluralism of the social, soft sciences. Moreover, 
such an accent seems contradictory to the social scientists’ lesser in-
clination to stress methods of research in their definitions of objec-
tivity (Prpić, 2009), but it may be connected to the disciplinary selec-
tiveness of the sample and the greater response rate of members of 
the empirically oriented social disciplines (Golub, 2009). Significant 
differences between the natural and social sciences were also found in 
the distribution of attributes of scientific excellence. Even though the 
attributes ranked equally in terms of their relative frequency (Table 
2), the difference in the frequency of stressing the second-ranked so-
lidity of research is especially great. It is mentioned by slightly over 
one-third of natural scientists and almost two-thirds of social scien-
tists! This is a surprising result which requires at least a hypotheti-
cal interpretation. The different degree of consensus regarding the 
research rules and procedures in the two fields can be the reason for 
differences in accentuating solidity. In the natural sciences, the lev-
el of researchers’ agreement regarding scientific standards is much 
greater, and consequently they are more often taken as a given in 
the open-ended questions. The situation is the opposite in the social 
sciences: there is much less agreement, so the opinions on scientific 
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quality more frequently emphasise the rather unfeasible principle of 
procedural impeccability.
Scientific relevance is the second-ranked characteristic of the qual-
ity of research and its output in both areas. Several respondents pointed 
out that excellence was incompatible with trivial or irrelevant cogni-
tive contributions. Not only in the paradigmatic sciences is it required 
for new studies to fit into the hierarchy of the relevance of scientific 
problems and results, since this obviously goes for the social sciences 
as well. In each of these sciences there can be several parallel hierar-
chies of scientific importance as a result of different scientific schools 
and orientations but, in spite of this parallelism, such a hierarchy is 
cognitively valuable for social scientists, too. Social relevance was high-
lighted the least often in both fields, which is not that surprising in the 
case of the natural sciences which have a greater share of basic research 
(Golub, 2009). The social sciences, in contrast, have a greater propor-
tion of applied and mixed-type research, and, consequently, relatively 
more professional papers (Prpić and Brajdić Vuković, 2009; Nederhof, 
2006). Thus, a greater role attributed to the social importance of re-
search, as a constituent part of scientific quality, was expected. The lack 
of this greater role, however, is not illogical considering the concrete 
(Croatian) social context. To be more precise, social scientists do not 
have many positive experiences with the willingness of the holders of 
social power to actually apply the results of social research, and empha-
sis on the social relevance of such investigations is thus often declara-
tive, and less grounded on their real applicability.
Originality, which Merton (1974) pronounced the supreme stand-
ard in science back in the 1940s, did not reach the top position in 
our scientists’ open-ended responses, but it ranked third in terms of 
frequency of mention in both fields. In contrast, Swedish scientists 
stressed originality the most in their open-ended answers, but it ranked 
only sixth in closed responses (Hemlin, 1993: 10). Has originality been 
undervalued by practising scientists, or is it also largely considered as 
a given, which can also be said for the most often emphasised solidity 
of research? Deeper investigations into scientific originality and more 
extensive empirical findings on originality perceptions are needed in 
order to be able to answer this question.
First of all, researchers of science have been warning recently that the 
concept of originality in the natural sciences cannot suitably be applied 
to the social sciences and humanities. While the natural sciences usually 
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define originality as the production of new results and theories, the social 
sciences and humanities have a much broader understanding of original-
ity. This finding resulted from 71 interviews with eminent scientists who 
were members of evaluation panels in competitions for research grants 
in those fields. The panel members most often used originality for an 
original approach, more often than for an original theory, topic, data, 
methods, insufficiently explored fields or results. Furthermore, the origi-
nality of the approach had a much wider meaning than the used theories 
and methodologies (Guetzkow et al., 2004: 197).
No matter how broad their understanding and what their defini-
tion of originality is, natural and social scientists do not differ consider-
ably in the frequency of mentioning originality. Only future studies will 
determine whether such answers are underpinned by scientists’ aware-
ness that it is precisely the scientific elites who are the chief producers 
of the most important novelties, and not the majority of researchers, or 
that a certain dose of originality in science is taken for granted, or that 
originality is mentioned more rarely because it is a constituent part of 
scientific excellence which is difficult to describe and even more diffi-
cult to measure. And, finally, we must not completely exclude the option 
that the understanding of scientific quality in one part of the scientific 
population simply does not include originality as the most important 
characteristic of high-quality research! The possibility of a similar per-
ception of scientific quality is indirectly indicated by a statement from 
the opposite end of the continuum of attitudes to scientific excellence 
that says that quality is: “Originality! The rest is just craft!”
Finally, let us look at the most frequent combinations of aspects and 
attributes of scientific quality (Table 2). Although as many as two com-
binations feature in both rankings of the most frequent combinations, 
differences are obvious in both their order and content. In the natural 
sciences, the first positions belong to two combinations that describe 
scientific creativity more, and a solid method which is objective, strict, 
reliable, precise, verifiable and replicable in this scientific context ranks 
only third. Viewed as a whole, this combination partly agrees with the 
findings of an empirical study where among eight possible types of 
originality scientists most often stress the following combination: new 
hypotheses/previously used methods/new results (Dirk, 1999). To be 
more precise, the rankings by the surveyed Croatian natural scientists 
primarily include cognitively important new results, obtained by solid, 
thus reliable and proven, methods.
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Social scientists put solid, thus objective, adequate methods and 
solid or well-founded, and then cognitively relevant results in the first 
two positions. The fact that originality does not appear in one of the 
most frequent combinations may be explained by the help of the men-
tioned research of originality in the social sciences and humanities. 
In other words, the authors point out that originality is only one of 
the many standards of academic excellence found in the statements by 
evaluators-respondents among relevance, well-foundedness, interdisci-
plinarity, clarity and others. Sometimes, the criteria go hand in hand 
with originality, but they also often squeezed originality out, such as 
with original research proposals that were also insignificant or trivial 
at the same time, methodologically incorrect or theoretically chaotic 
(Guetzkow, et al., 2004: 206). Although solidity is not a derivative crite-
rion as a precondition for acknowledging originality only in this field, 
its relatively greater relevance is certainly connected with lower con-
sensus regarding scientific standards.
At the very end of this part of the analysis which has presented 
and commented on all the obtained data, we will also provide several 
open-ended answers by respondents from both fields, because only in 
this way can we understand what no analysis can show – the whole 
statement, expression and tone of the researchers’ concepts of scien-
tific quality. Below, several original responses by natural scientists are 
given:
Scientific quality is adherence to all the rules of scientific work that are 
already familiar: knowing literature about the field and the problem stud-
ied, formulating a hypothesis, conducting experiments, processing results, 
interpreting results and publishing obtained results in a suitable way.
Scientific quality has to be based on research conducted according to all 
the rules of the profession which has yielded results that provide answers 
to open scientific questions. We can distinguish between the quality of the 
research process and the quality of the product – publication, that is, the 
scientific article. High-quality scientific research has to be based on well-
defined goals and the problems it undertook to resolve, a comprehensive 
approach that resolves the problem, and the objectivity and accuracy of the 
procedures and observations.
Scientific quality has several aspects. These include maximum precision 
in expressing results and the originality of research. The two aspects are 
dialectically (in Hegel’s terms) connected. Sometimes, grandiose discover-
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ies are based on precision (the case of the Moessbauer method), and some-
times on the fantastic ingenuity of the author.
Scientific quality is the capacity to change some general cognitions, thanks 
to the results of one’s own scientific investigations, but also the courage to 
even embark on re-evaluating already established knowledge.
This is very difficult to define unambiguously. It could be said that it is 
that type of scientific work that has a significant influence on other scien-
tists and on the wider scientific community. However, sometimes scientists 
engage in a relatively small scientific field with a narrow circle of experts. 
Then, the influence on the wider scientific community is also limited, but 
the quality of scientific work can be greater than in the former case.
I don’t know, but I am certain that it is not “the race for the quantity of 
papers” and fake co-authorships with ten or more authors in a publica-
tion, even if they are published in a CC journal. Today, for example, a 
book that has received a top Croatian award for scientific work (Josip Juraj 
Strossmayer or Ruđer Bošković) or a chapter in a book by the world’s most 
eminent publishers are not valued as “scientific quality” for promotion into 
the scientific ranks, while a paper of 1 to 2 pages with 15 co-authors is con-
sidered “top quality”...
Selected responses by social scientists follow below:
Scientific quality presumes the selection of a scientifically (socially) relevant 
research subject, knowledge of the body of scientific facts about it, an ap-
propriate theoretical framework, the selection of the best possible research 
method, objectivity and thoroughness in the collection and processing of 
data, and creativity in the formulation, interpretation and connecting of 
old and new cognitions.
Scientific quality is made up of a number of parameters and attributes of 
scientific work, such as complexity of the content and scope of scientific 
cognitions, their coherence and logical accordance, their good and full ar-
gumentation, objectivity and verifiability, and the theoretical and practi-
cal relevance and fruitfulness of scientific knowledge.
The capacity to identify relevant and new scientific questions and study 
them in a systematic way, using scientific methods, which results in new 
knowledge and new theoretical concepts.
Scientific quality is “added value” in science, that is, what is new, what may 
not have been known before or has not been clarified enough by previous 
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studies. Scientific quality is characterised by impartiality and relevance. 
Not all scientific research is relevant and important – it depends on its 
influence on the concrete field that the research is engaged in.
The concept of quality is very difficult to define, even in the case of scientif-
ic quality. It is something more to be felt, experienced. Besides, quality is a 
process, not only a result. I would evaluate scientific quality in educational 
sciences primarily in terms of the extent to which the results of research 
contribute to improving educational practice.
I can hardly define it clearly here. Maybe it is that characteristic of some-
body’s scientific approach/research and overall work which the relevant 
scientific group/community of scientists from some field of science – after 
some time – determines as the best thing that was done/produced/achieved 
in a given field!!!
How do these open-ended answers contribute to the interpreta-
tion of the quantitative data? Their contribution is precisely their com-
prehensiveness. In terms of the content of the respondents’ statements, 
three types of answers can be identified in both areas. The first type 
offers a relatively comprehensive understanding of scientific quality 
with the precise listing of its basic aspects and attributes, or mention-
ing those aspects and attributes that the respondent seeks to highlight. 
Such answers are easier to analyse and quantify. Interestingly, these 
answers tend to be more precise the more they focus on solidity of 
research, while the statements that emphasise originality or novelty 
tend to enumerate less. The second (less frequent) type of answer puts 
an emphasis on the difficulties in defining excellence, but also offers a 
key criterion, which ranges from the applicability of the results and the 
advancement of some activities, to the comprehensiveness of the scien-
tific approach (as in these examples). The final answer, which stresses 
the broader approach, and which was not the only such answer given 
by social scientists, is very similar to the dominant characteristic of 
originality as perceived by renowned American evaluators from the 
social sciences and humanities (Guetzkow, et al., 2004). The third type 
of response is actually a criticism of the evaluation system and of sci-
entific practice that adjusts to it, especially to the dominance of quan-
titative criteria where the respondent gives up on determining scien-
tific excellence. From that follows the key message: scientific quality 
is a recognisable property of research, but scientists who cannot, do 
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not know how to, or do not want to define it are scarce. This does not 
indicate in any way that they cannot recognise excellent studies and 
their final products – scientific papers, that is, that they cannot distin-
guish between high-quality and low-quality publications. Quality in 
scientific practice certainly partly escapes precise definition. Whether 
it is measurable, according to scientists’ perceptions, will be analysed 
in the next section.
Before that, we will highlight the theoretically important factors of 
scientific quality (Hemlin, 1993, 2009) recognised by our respondents, 
apart from the research process and product that have already been 
elaborated. Both the natural and social scientists more often stated re-
searchers’ characteristics (22.6% and 27.5%) than highlighted the char-
acteristics of the research environment (9.3% and 1.5% of respondents). 
Obviously, social scientists were slightly more likely to highlight the 
researcher’s personal characteristics on which scientific excellence de-
pends, but they were far less prone than natural scientists to mention 
the characteristics of the research environment – scientific equipment, 
team work and cooperation, and the international scientific commu-
nity. This is also in line with the different socio-cognitive patterns of 
these two areas.
It is interesting that intellectual capacities were mentioned the least 
often as important characteristics of researchers, probably because their 
relatively high level is simply presumed. Familiarity with problems, 
a broad insight into the research field, and then ethics, commitment 
to work or diligence were mentioned most often, while independence/
autonomy, open-mindedness and openness to cooperation and intel-
ligence/genius were mentioned rarely. Thus, the scientist’s scientific ex-
cellence entails superior knowledge of a field, integrity and work habits. 
These are also the personal characteristics that lead to the excellence 
of the research and the research product. The scientist’s competence 
and general working abilities were also stressed by Swedish scientists 
(Hemlin, 1993), while the scientist’s ethics or integrity was mentioned 
by eminent American evaluators in the social sciences and humani-
ties as an important criterion in assessing the scientist’s originality. The 
characteristics of morality mentioned here are those that are important 
for people in the world of science – courage or willingness to take on 
(intellectual) risks, seriousness, commitment to work and the produc-
tion of cognitively and socially relevant knowledge and similar aspects 
of morality (Guetzkow, et al., 2004).
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4. Measuring scientific quality – (im)possible?
Considering the extent of use and influence of quantitative, es-
pecially bibliometric, indicators in the evaluation of scientific quality, 
primarily in the natural, (bio)technical and medical sciences, but also 
increasingly more often in the social sciences and humanities, we were 
interested to know what our respondents thought about measuring 
quality, especially since the two scientific areas stand at opposite poles 
in the use of quantitative criteria of excellence. That is why we assumed 
that (significant) differences might appear between the natural and so-
cial scientists’ perceptions of the (im)possibility of measuring scientific 
quality, either in its basic evaluation or in the strength of the respond-
ent’s conviction, as shown by the content, mode and expression of the 
freely stated opinions.
The respondents’ answers are classified into three categories: 
claims that scientific quality is measurable; claims that it is only partly 
measurable; and claims that deny its measurability. The results of the 
classification of open-ended answers are shown in Table 3.
Table 3. Structure of open-ended responses to the possibility of measuring 
quality (in %)
Measurability of scientific quality Natural scientistsN = 264
Social scientists
N = 141
Measurable 54.9 50.4
Partly measurable 36.7 45.4
Not measurable  8.3  4.2
Chi-square = 4.300; df = 2; p = 0.117
The structure of answers of these two groups of respondents does 
not differ significantly, as was shown by the chi-square test. Although 
statistically insignificant, the differences are not negligible; quite the 
contrary, they are indicative, and even provocative. To be more exact, 
natural scientists more often express their conviction that scientific 
quality can be measured, and, more rarely than social scientists, pro-
nounce it partly measurable, which was expected and in line with the 
relevant characteristics of the cognitive practice and style of the two 
compared areas. The former’s generally stronger conviction in measur-
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ing and in research procedures and methods also extends to the per-
ceptions of measurability and procedures for evaluating scientific qual-
ity. The latter are marked by weaker consensus on the theoretical and 
methodological approaches to research as well as by lesser conviction 
in the possibility of measuring the quality of research. The finding that 
there are almost twice as many natural scientists than social scientists 
who believe that scientific quality cannot be measured is all the more 
interesting. Although this is less than one tenth of the total number of 
natural scientists, it is surprising that they are nevertheless more fre-
quent than social scientists with the same opinion.
A qualitative analysis of answers will be necessary in order to ob-
tain a more specific conclusion, and one should also remember the dif-
ferences in the modes of evaluation that might also have generated dif-
ferences in perceptions. Precisely due to the dominance of quantitative, 
especially bibliometric, indicators of quality, and also due to a greater 
insight into the problems of such measurements, natural scientists may 
be more prone to deny the measurability of scientific quality than so-
cial scientists, who use bibliometric methods to a much lesser extent in 
their field, and thus have many fewer encounters with the weaknesses 
of such evaluation practices. In any case, slightly over one half of natu-
ral scientists are convinced in the measurability of quality, while the 
share of those convinced and (most) sceptical in the social sciences 
are almost equal. Even if the differences are not significant in terms of 
quantity, there could nevertheless be important differentiation among 
the statements in terms of their quality, content and expression.
With natural scientists, measurability often rests on bibliometric 
indicators, but they have a different degree of conviction in the valid-
ity of those indicators. The relative majority of specified answers stress 
bibliometric measures of quality, especially citations and journal im-
pact factors, and some respondents also introduce other indicators of 
quality, such as patents, books, work with young researchers and their 
training, but also symbolic capital and collegiate and institutional ac-
knowledgments in the form of invited lectures and other indicators of a 
scientist’s (international) reputation. We present below several original 
opinions of natural scientists on the measurability of scientific quality:
It is absolutely measurable, but the criteria need to be uniform.
It is easy in the natural sciences with citation counts, number of publica-
tions, number of co-authors and the like for individual fields.
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Definitely. One of the better ways are citation rates (without self-citations) 
of CC papers.
Of course it can. Physicists know exactly how much Newton’s mechanics, 
Einstein’s relativity theory, quantum mechanics... etc. have contributed to 
knowledge. We know (more or less) who participated in the construction 
of that knowledge, so we can speak about the quality of scientific results of 
certain people.
It can be measured by the number of published CC papers, the impact 
of indexed journals, the number of citations, patents, surveys, published 
books, training of younger scientists and so on.
It can be measured by the number of citations of published papers. The 
system itself is relatively slow. The response of the scientific community to 
a certain paper depends on the number of scientists engaged in a scientific 
field and on the time span in which the paper is available to the scientific 
community. There is also the applicable quality of the scientific paper, es-
pecially in societies that do not have adequate resources for basic research, 
which could be evaluated by the number of patents granted.
Even though genius is immeasurable (and it often takes several years to 
recognise how ingenious a discovery was), at least 90% of scientific qual-
ity is made up of diligence, persistence and outgoingness, and the result 
obtained this way can be measured with the professional (NOT amateur) 
application of scientometric indicators.
Yes. Naturally, the great discoveries ultimately reveal “themselves” as such. 
In the everyday life of an “average” scientist, group and institution, net-
worked bibliographic data (CC papers, citation rate, invited lectures, repu-
tation in one’s own community, international reputation in the field, the 
education of young scientists...) correlate greatly to the scientific quality of 
a person, group, and institution.
These statements range from absolute conviction in the measura-
bility of scientific quality using bibliometric indicators, to the relatively 
frequent opinions that add quantitative measurements such as awards, 
doctoral degrees, engagement in scientific associations and so on. The 
differences in the degree of conviction in the objectivity of measuring 
quality within the natural sciences, between physicists and biologists to 
be more precise, have been empirically determined by a Nordic study 
(Kekäle, 2000, 2002). The use of the expression everyday life in contrast 
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to great scientific achievements is interesting, as it directly reminds us 
of Kuhn (1999), as well as the distinction between normal science and 
front-line research with a different social organisation and epistemic 
orientations (Fuchs, 1993).
Despite their general belief in the measurability of quality, some 
respondents also expressed some scepticism about quantity and the ci-
tation rate as the principal indicators of quality, and even regret that 
the quantitative criteria had not been identical for related sciences. 
Other respondents advocate applicability as the principal criterion, and 
a third group stresses the necessity of a complex approach that would 
take into account the scientist’s overall scientific activity. These points 
can be seen in the statements below:
One of the key measures of scientific quality here is the number of published 
papers or number of citations, which is completely wrong since scientific pa-
pers are not necessarily of high-quality, and citations can also have negative 
connotations. Scientific quality can be measured only by the real applicabil-
ity of scientific results and by their benefit to society in general.
Quality can be measured. When measuring, one has to consider all of the 
scientist’s activities, but I would attach greatest importance to a body of 
scientific work and successful collaborators. Training a successful scientist 
requires a lot of knowledge and deliberation and a plethora of good ideas. 
A good scientific paper can be measured by the journal in which it was 
published. The citation count is not the only criterion, because fashion ex-
ists in science as well. However, a good citation rate is certainly a good 
parameter.
Yes, but there is no absolute criterion. It can be a CC paper, but in many 
CC journals in mathematics almost trivial results are published; it can be 
the length of a paper, but many hefty papers are just overblown; it can be 
the number of papers, but many mathematicians with a huge number of 
papers are of minor relevance for mathematics (I know some myself); it can 
be the number of citations, but many groups cite each other uncritically (I 
myself was asked directly to cite a person in my paper even though there 
were no grounds to do that); it can be invitations to conferences and the 
like, but this is similar to the former situation, etc.
Scientific quality is measurable, but one needs to use a complex approach, 
and not only the number of published scientific papers, especially when 
evaluating the work of a scientist, and not just an individual scientific con-
tribution (which is much easier to evaluate).
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In Croatia, scientists’ scientific quality is nowadays measured by the 
number of papers – and if those who evaluate applicants (peer committees 
at the level of scientific fields and areas) were really objective, this would 
not be a problem – the minimal criteria are known and all that is left to 
be done is to evaluate the applicant’s other activities. But forget objectiv-
ity when the number of papers that hardly meet the criteria for a research 
associate in biology (not to mention chemistry or physics) is enough to 
become a full professor at the faculty of agronomy, veterinary medicine, 
biotechnology (to mention only related professions). So where is objectivity 
here? How can such great differences be possible? Or is there something 
wrong in these prescribed criteria?
On the other hand, social scientists who consider scientific quality 
to be measurable can be divided into two subgroups. The smaller sub-
group consists of respondents who, similar to their counterparts from 
the natural sciences, believe bibliometric indicators to be the best indi-
cators. The subgroup of respondents who do not consider the criteria 
sufficient is much larger. We will also report several opinions from the 
first group which are rather succinct and manifest a high degree of con-
viction that quality can be measured on the basis of journal references 
and ranking in international bibliographic and citation databases.
Yes. Scientific quality is measured by publishing findings in top scientific 
publications in certain fields (international journals and books) referenced 
in international databases.
It can, by comparing the impact of individual research on the development 
of the specialty in the narrow or broader sense. It can be assumed that sci-
entific papers with greater response (citations) than average in that line of 
study are of scientifically greater quality than those that are under average.
It can. It is measured by citation of papers. The more cited the paper, the 
deeper the trace it has left in a certain research field.
It can. There are some criteria in every scientific discipline, among the 
most important being citation of an author’s papers in other, especially 
foreign, journals and papers, and the contribution to the development of 
scientific discipline.
The other group includes opinions that the measuring of scien-
tific quality cannot stop at bibliometric indicators. Some statements 
are somewhat longer because they explain the specificities of scientific 
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production in this area, which prevent measuring from being the major 
or only procedure in judging quality, and/or indicate the importance of 
other, standard evaluation procedures (peer review) and the use of the 
wide(st) scientific public. Other statements are shorter and they also 
insist on using more complex quantitative and qualitative procedures 
in judging scientific quality in the social sciences.
Everything is measurable in this world – very objectively. BUT there are 
some fields where the measuring would be too expensive and too long, so 
that it is not really opportune. Scientific quality is measurable too – but 
the measuring cannot be based only on presence in CC and other second-
ary publications. TO MEASURE quality, one has to use a more complex 
method than the existing rating system and ADDITIONALLY use the in-
stitute of the public: this means that any candidate for a scientific rank 
would have to present his scientific achievements to the public.
Not only is it measurable, but it has to be measured. The measure used 
today based on the published paper has been exaggerated to absurdity, so 
that, for example, younger scientists are not in the least interested in pro-
fessional work, teaching, and so on, but only in publishing in journals that 
are often of rather poor quality, but have been pronounced to be of high 
quality and are counted as such. More attention should certainly be paid 
to the grades of our students, graduates, postgraduates and doctorate can-
didates. Educational work is not valued at all, especially not its quality.
Scientific quality can be measured quantitatively, but I think that the 
number of published scientific articles and citation rate are in no way 
measures of quality. Published articles differ in quality and even sciences 
differ in their publication principles, while citation rate is only the capacity 
of attracting “readership” to an attractive theme. I think that competent 
peers’ subjective evaluation of criteria such as innovation, relevance, im-
pact, scientific daring would sometimes be more appropriate than count-
ing articles, even if conducted with some delay.
All elements of work can be measured according to a methodology that 
can be determined in advance. Not all relations have to be quantitative in 
order to be measured. Descriptive elements can be measured by comparing 
them with a selected benchmark and with each other. Measuring can also 
be expressed descriptively, and also by ranking.
It is measurable indirectly, mostly by measuring the number of other scien-
tists that consider a scientific work to be of high quality and relevance: high 
grades in peer review procedures, citation rate by other scientists, etc.
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It can be estimated, and then also measured using psychometric, techno-
metric, econometric and sociometric techniques.
The slight differences in the share of natural and social scientists 
who believe in the measurability of scientific excellence hide inner qual-
itative differences that primarily refer to the unequal importance given 
to measuring quality using bibliometric and scientometric methods in 
the two areas. While in the natural sciences the measurability of scien-
tific quality is relatively more often connected to publishing in relevant 
and renowned journals, which is then measured by their impact factor 
and the citation rate of individual papers, the situation is different in the 
social sciences. Although respondents believe that quality can be meas-
ured, and do not completely reject bibliometric methods, they neverthe-
less do not consider such methods best and most appropriate, let alone 
the key or the only indicators of scientific excellence. In this context, 
the differences between these two areas are greater than they were first 
shown to be by the first one-dimensional quantitative analysis. At the 
same time, theoretical agreement that the measuring of scientific qual-
ity is possible leads to the claim that it is impossible to engage in science 
without a system of evaluating scientific quality, even if such a system is 
fallible, imperfect, as both groups of scientists often see it.
The claims that scientific quality is only partially or hardly meas-
urable make up the second category of open-ended answers. Natural 
scientists explain such claims or doubts regarding measurability by the 
shortcomings of scientometric, primarily bibliometric, procedures and 
indicators when used as the only/key ones. The most important theo-
retical objection to citations and impact factors is their unreliability, for 
various reasons, with manipulation or trading citations among research 
teams being mentioned several times. Disciplinary differences are also 
especially important within the natural sciences, as both scientific pro-
duction and opportunities for publishing in international journals are 
not the same. The criticism is sometimes underlined by resentment 
over the tendency to automatically unify the criteria for different fields 
and specialties of the natural sciences, which is incidentally advocated 
by some natural scientists – including some of our respondents. The 
most important characteristic of scepticism regarding the full measur-
ability of quality is the indication or explicit claim that quality almost 
necessarily contains some elusive, subjective and immeasurable aspect. 
For some, it is precisely its most important aspect – originality.
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Quality can be measured only by a brain trust of people with integrity. 
Scientometric data can provide certain information in order to determine 
the minimal chances that something is of quality. Precision can be meas-
ured, but, for me, the most important aspect of originality is immeasur-
able, and even manipulable!
It is most often recognisable, but difficult to measure, because evaluation is 
approached formally, and different fields, different circumstances, differ-
ent interest communities, politics and other factors help distort the impor-
tance of individual scientific achievements and scientists.
It is difficult, in terms of measuring, which results in figures. It could be 
done using certain methods (“descriptive”!?). Also, we are sick of the so-
called elite, boot-licking and imposing CC papers in the natural sciences 
(chemistry, physics) as the only measure of a good paper-article, a paper 
considered as a criterion for appointment. Croatian journals crave arti-
cles, they are paid by the Ministry, and they accept CC criteria. Absurd, 
isn’t it? Let us not forget, the major part of geology and geography is locally, 
nationally oriented.
It is difficult to fully measure objectively. The much-vaunted impact factor 
makes sense if approached individually, within your field, since it depends 
on the population of scientists engaged in the field. Thus, it makes sense 
to use an impact factor to measure the value of a paper published by a 
molecular biologist in the field of molecular biology, or by an entomologist 
in the field of entomology, but it is insane and completely inappropriate 
to compare and evaluate the impact factor of a journal in which the ento-
mologist publishes a paper to the impact factor of a journal in which the 
molecular biologist publishes.
Hardly! Numerical data, whatever they refer to (number of papers, for 
example) do not contribute more than around 60% to the objective evalu-
ation. I particularly believe that the number of citations is a very subjec-
tive measure (although I have rather good results in this respect!). Papers 
with more than 3 co-authors should be measured in reverse proportion 
to the number of collaborators for all co-authors, except for the first co-
author.
It is very difficult to measure scientific quality. There are indirect measures 
that rely on reviewers and editors of science journals. This is a very simpli-
fied procedure that rates journals on the one hand, and counts citations of 
individual articles on the other. There is much evidence that the measure is 
not crucial for the quality of scientific results, but it is more indicative of the 
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dependence of citations on the journal in which it was published. There are 
also negative citations, when authors are cited for their mistake, silly state-
ment made in a paper, criticism, etc. There are also groups that cite each 
other according to the backscratching principle, pumping up the number of 
citations artificially this way. In conclusion, it should be repeated that it is 
very difficult to measure scientific quality because its evaluation depends 
on many subjective parameters.
Scientific quality can be measured, but not fully. There are a number of 
factors for measuring quality in the natural sciences, such as the number of 
published papers, the quality of journals in which the papers are published, 
the number of citations that the published papers attract, and others. The 
issue is a subject of continuous discussion (and disagreement). I personally 
believe that quality can be assessed with around 70-80% certainty in my 
field. The remaining 20–30% depends either on subjective interpretations, 
or on insufficiently identified factors.
Social scientists express their reservation about the overall meas-
urability of scientific quality mainly as doubt about the applicability 
of its bibliometric criteria to the social sciences. The doubt is often ex-
tended to other quantitative indicators of quality. Their use, as a rule, 
is considered limited, and is supplemented by assessments or peer re-
views. Only few respondents believe that internationally reviewed and 
cited papers can be an acceptable indicator of quality, even in a very 
narrow field, despite the weaknesses of these quantitative evaluation 
procedures. A more frequent opinion among respondents is that such 
indicators, when applied uncritically, only distort the real picture of the 
quality of paper(s). Some respondents express even more general doubt 
about the measurability of all dimensions of quality in science. In their 
opinion, quality is partly elusive and immeasurable. It can be reached 
only by the scientific community of a certain research field where, ac-
cording to some respondents, there is also a certain level of agreement 
in evaluating its members and competent scientific evaluators:
I am afraid that some (tentatively) quantitative aspects of quality can be 
measured, but I believe that the substantial aspects of quality can be per-
ceived only with valid and fair evaluations/reviews by competent scientific 
reviewers.
There is a science called scientometrics, that is, measuring science, but I 
do not consider it completely reliable. To be more precise, the number of 
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published papers does not imply a scientist’s contribution. Sometimes, only 
one paper contributes to a revolutionary breakthrough in science.
It is not easy to measure scientific quality in the social sciences. However, 
the scientific community of an individual field of science, especially in a 
small country like ours, evaluates the value of its members quite reliably. 
Quantitative measures of scientific achievements, according to experience, 
often lead to wrong assessments.
Not completely. It can be estimated by the number of science papers pub-
lished in international or local journals where anonymous international 
peer review is guaranteed, and by the citation of papers by other authors. 
However, these criteria can be used only for comparing authors from the 
same scientific field because the number of scientists and scientific jour-
nals differs significantly in different fields.
Scientific quality can be measured by rigid criteria, such as the number 
of published papers, invited participation at conferences and symposiums, 
but there is also a significant part that is not measurable, and in jurispru-
dence in particular this refers to the effect on the organisation of the legal 
system.
Scientific quality can be measured using some scientometric indicators 
combined with some form of objective peer review; without awareness of 
the context of a paper, the citation rate can provide a distorted picture of 
quality.
Scientific quality cannot be measured exactly. In a scientific article, for 
example, this could be the percentage of new claims or new evidence for al-
ready existing claims that can be verified in a certain way. Unfortunately, 
it is impossible to set up committees to check this, since it would take up too 
much time. Thus, the citations, patents, number of publications and simi-
lar “quantitative” procedures will continue to be the criteria for identifying 
a “quality” scientific paper.
Scientific quality can be judged, but not strictly measured. Usually, there 
is agreement among the scientific public or narrower scientific community 
(from one field) on what is of quality, and what is not.
Scientific quality is extremely difficult to measure due to the high share of 
subjective attitudes, experiences, perceptions of problems, etc., of the possi-
ble “arbiter”. However, the application of universal, objectivised standards 
of measuring to all the social sciences (especially to ALL fields of science) is 
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not very feasible considering the specificities of individual fields. However, 
I support the adoption of attitudes/criteria that would put greater impor-
tance on the international aspect of research – such as the comparative 
method, for example, of studying the wider legal environment – interna-
tional publishing, co-authorships with international colleagues.
Finally, statements which deny the measurability of scientific qual-
ity, at least in their own field of research, make up the third category of 
responses. Although scarce in general, they are relatively more frequent 
in the natural sciences. By denying the measurability of scientific qual-
ity, natural scientists actually refer to the inability to measure it reliably 
and objectively, and sometimes express resignation regarding the situ-
ation in the Croatian scientific environment and in umbrella scientific 
institutions (Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts, HAZU):
No, it cannot be measured, although I am aware that it should be meas-
ured. In what way, I do not know. But as long as there are people who have 
no internationally recognised papers sitting in our Academy, what is the 
point of discussing the issue at all.
No. It cannot be measured objectively; not in a short time span and in a 
small environment. Only scientific idleness and low quality can be meas-
ured objectively and accurately. No work – no quality. It does not go the 
other way around. Maybe it could be measured, but after several years or 
centuries when it becomes evident what discoveries were really important 
for humankind.
There is no reliable quantitative criterion: for example, citation rate can 
be a reflection of somebody’s inane results, that is, interpretation – I per-
sonally often quote such publications, while citations are not necessary for 
generally accepted facts.
Social scientists who deny the measurability of quality express this 
in three types of opinions. First, opinions denying measurability with-
out any explanations and arguments, but pointing out that quality is 
recognisable. We have already encountered claims on the recognisabil-
ity of scientific quality in the social sciences, but propounded by some 
natural scientists, too. The second type of opinion expresses doubt that 
anyone, except the most eminent scientists, can recognise excellence 
at all, and it is also highly critical of the Croatian practice of measur-
ing quality. The third perception is borderline – it completely denies 
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the possibility of measuring originality, and considers publications a 
primitive measure of quality in science, even in terms of craftsmanship 
or profession.
It is not measurable, but it is recognisable.
If this refers to measuring conducted by an institution, I sincerely doubt it. 
Only the most excellent can recognise excellence. All measuring attempts 
used in our country (for example, CC, citation index) have provided quite 
ridiculous results in my field of work.
In the segment of originality – there is no measuring. In the segment of 
professionalism and standard of craftsmanship – the (provisional, rather 
primitive) measure is publication in standardised scientific journals.
It is interesting that the qualitative differences in the perceptions 
of natural and social scientists were least noticeable in the claims of the 
partial measurability of quality, also reappearing in the claims of its 
immeasurability. Namely, scepticism about the total measurability of 
quality in both groups of respondents is founded on their doubt in the 
adequacy of bibliometric evaluation procedures, and both groups are 
also convinced that scientific quality is simply immeasurable in one 
part. These key elements of the sceptical view of the measurability of 
quality are similar in both fields. The theoretical denial of the measur-
ability of scientific quality has different starting points: in the natural 
sciences, it is the explicit or implicit denial of the reliability of measur-
ing, while in the social sciences it appears in several forms of deep dis-
belief in the feasibility and practice of measuring scientific quality.
5. Scientific quality and its recognisability, measurability and 
elusiveness
Another qualitative study was conducted within the framework 
of the web survey of the Croatian research population in order to 
gain insight into natural and social scientists’ perceptions of scientif-
ic excellence. This goal had a cognitive and social or policy purpose. 
Cognitively, the aim was to determine how practising scientists de-
fine scientific quality and whether they find it measurable. This would 
deepen the existing knowledge of scientists’ professional values and 
standards and reveal the concrete benchmarks they use in their eve-
ryday scientific work, which requires them to regularly and constantly 
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evaluate the quality of research and papers in their own field. The social 
importance of the study is underpinned by the expected enhancement 
of the evaluation system (within the Croatian science system) whose 
design and implementation will be made more suitable and efficient if 
we are aware of scientists’ perceptions of excellence.
The basic hypothesis of the study was derived from the theoretical 
framework resting on sociological theories of organisations of science 
(Whitley, 1984; Fuchs, 1992), but it also modified some of their theses 
(Prpić, 1997). Consequently, the concepts of scientific quality were ex-
pected to show resemblance in the natural and social sciences, especial-
ly in the perceptions of the general characteristics of quality, but also in 
the peculiarities connected to the differences in the cognitive practice/
style and knowledge production in these areas. Such differences could 
also be expected to extend to individual scientific disciplines, but this 
level of analysis was not the task of our study.
The categorial system of the study modified the categories used 
in the previous qualitative investigations in Swedish and Norwegian 
scientists’ perceptions of quality (Hemlin, 1993; Gulbrandsen, 2000). 
The respondents’ open-ended answers were categorised according to 
the aspects of scientific excellence, these being the parts of the research 
process – problem, method, results/cognitions and publications/produc-
tion, and according to the attributes or characteristics of research and 
its output – solidity, originality, scientific and social importance.
In sum, the principal findings of the comparison of perceptions 
of quality in the natural and social sciences show both similarities and 
differences in the characteristics of quality, and in the perceptions of its 
measurability. Differences in stressing individual aspects and attributes 
of scientific excellence are statistically significant, but the similarities 
are also incontestable. When it addresses individual parts of the re-
search process, excellence is in both areas most often related to scientif-
ic results/knowledge, and the differences in the third-ranked research 
problems are not significant. The biggest differences were noticed in 
the prominence given to methods, which is greater in the social sci-
ences, and to scientific production, which is more strongly stressed by 
the natural scientists.
Attributes of scientific excellence, however, ranked the same, but 
solidity of research was far more often emphasised in the social sciences. 
The results are very similar to the perceptions of quality expressed by 
Swedish scientists, who also ranked method, problem and results in the 
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top three positions, and originality and two attributes included in the 
term “solidity” – rigour and accuracy (Hemlin, 1993: 10). The finding 
that social scientists give greater prominence to solidity and method in 
their concepts of scientific excellence than natural scientists is some-
what surprising. However, considering the lower level of agreement 
regarding scientific standards, including methodological standards, in 
the softer, social sciences (Fuchs, 1992; Becher and Trowler, 2001), the 
emphasis given to the ideal of solid, reliable research by scientists from 
that area is understandable.
The perceptions of the measurability of scientific quality do not 
differ significantly among the two areas. Both areas have the relatively 
biggest groups of respondents convinced about the measurability of 
quality, but sceptics are also quite numerous, especially in the social 
sciences. However, smaller quantitative differences hide the greater 
qualitative differences in the importance given to measuring excel-
lence using bibliometric and scientometric methods in both areas. In 
contrast to the natural scientists who consider these methods and in-
dicators reliable to a greater degree, the social scientists who believe 
that quality is measurable do not consider them the best indicators of 
scientific excellence.
This final part of this Chapter deals with the social and scientific 
implications of the study, in that order. We believe that the practical 
implications of the empirical insight into the perceptions of scientif-
ic excellence in the Croatian natural and social science community 
are extremely important. To be more exact, the findings suggest two, 
partly different, science policies that would have somewhat converging 
effects.
Firstly, it is clear that there is no complete consensus in the natu-
ral sciences regarding the dominant role of the scientometric and bib-
liometric methods of evaluating scientific research and papers. If al-
most half of the natural scientists believe that scientific quality is only 
partly or barely measurable (including the minority who completely 
deny measurability), and here they primarily refer to the mentioned 
methods, then this is a serious signal to the creators of science policy. 
The signal suggests that the levelling of the evaluation criteria, which 
is evident in the system of the scientific promotion of researchers from 
that area, with the geosciences standing slightly apart, is problemat-
ic, at least to a certain extent. We have seen that numerous scientists 
have strong grounds to criticise the absolute domination of quantita-
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tive criteria in evaluating excellence, even pointing to the differences 
in knowledge production and the communication of scientific results 
within the same field.
These findings drive an impartial observer to the conclusion that 
evaluation criteria certainly have to be reconsidered and adapted to the 
socio-cognitive peculiarities of the individual fields of natural science. 
The dominance of the criteria of the physical sciences in all the natural 
sciences does not have firm empirical grounding, and it was more like-
ly imposed by the scientific elites (Whitley, 1984). Thus, the expected 
changes in the evaluation criteria in the Croatian research system are 
an opportunity for empirically grounded discussion and for transfor-
mation geared to more efficiently increasing scientific quality in this 
scientific area.
Secondly, judging by the statements of the social scientists, half of 
whom believe that scientific quality is measurable in their field, but not 
exclusively or primarily using bibliometric methods, these sciences are 
not as soft as they are usually thought to be. We also have to consider the 
disciplinary distortions of the sample which favours the fields oriented 
to so-called field research where data is collected from respondents and 
which may have influenced the perceptions of the measurability of sci-
entific excellence. Here we also have to consider the enormous discipli-
nary differences which were strongly empirically supported by the first 
bibliometric analysis of their production (Jokić and Šuljok, 2009).
Despite all reservations to and respect for the peculiarities of the 
social sciences, the subjective observer-insider, one interested in ad-
vancing the area, has to draw attention to the need to change the cri-
teria for evaluating scientific excellence. However unpopular it may 
sound, social scientists will have to be exposed to bibliometric methods 
of evaluating the excellence of their research and final outputs – papers. 
It is clear that bibliometric monitoring must not be the chief method of 
evaluating scientific quality in this area, that it has to be adjusted to the 
specificities of the cognitive practice of the social sciences (Nederhof, 
2006), that evaluation must not be based on the same criteria as for all 
the social sciences, but it has to acknowledge the peculiarities of indi-
vidual fields. For this reason, the coming changes in the evaluation sub-
system of science are an opportunity for empirically-grounded discus-
sion and for the introduction of carefully selected, and, to begin with, 
minimal, bibliometric criteria for the scientific (career) advancement of 
scientists, at least in some scientific disciplines/fields. Otherwise, social 
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scientists might be taken aback by the implementation of such meas-
ures imposed by scientific elites in the social sciences, similar to those 
imposed by their colleagues in the natural sciences, with the prevalence 
of bibliometric elements for evaluating scientific quality, or they can 
settle for the formalistic application of those criteria arising from pub-
lishing in the WOS journals, but in the Croatian language.
The scientific implications of our research findings are two-fold: 
some refer to investigations into scientists’ perceptions of excellence, 
and others to a significantly broader theoretical framework created by 
the key theories of science. Thus, the question is to what extent the 
findings of this study fit into the narrow or broader body of sociological 
and other knowledge about science.
Empirically, the analysis has contributed to a better understanding 
of the perceptions of scientific quality. First, it shows that researchers 
from different types of societies, with a different economic, scientific 
and technological level of development and different socio-cultural 
characteristics, form fundamentally similar understandings of quality 
(Hemlin, 2009). This does not apply only to the USA or the Nordic 
countries, which, among other things, also share similar science poli-
cies, but also to a completely different type of society, usually called 
post-socialist. In brief, the claim that there is an established set of tran-
snational professional values and standards has been empirically sup-
ported. Naturally, some specificities that may be marked by the Croatian 
socio-cultural and techno-scientific milieu have also been revealed. For 
example, the predominant stress of social scientists on (methodologi-
cally) solid research can partly be a defence mechanism of a scientific 
area that is (or has been) more exposed to the ideology of the socialist, 
but also postsocialist, period.
Secondly, the study has given a broader insight into scientists’ un-
derstanding of scientific excellence to take in their perceptions of the 
measurability of scientific quality which are an important constituent of 
quality concepts. It suggests that the concepts do not necessarily include 
the conviction that quality can be reliably measured. Furthermore, not 
even a majority of researchers from the natural sciences, who usually 
show a more rigid cognitive style, share such an opinion. We cannot 
say whether a certain degree of scepticism regarding the measurability 
of quality and even the conviction that it is somewhat immeasurable 
can be credited to the transdisciplinary and transnational common 
nucleus, since no similar studies have been made so far. Let us hope 
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that future studies will cover this neglected constituent of scientists’ 
concepts of quality.
Finally, in our opinion, the study’s consistency with and contribu-
tion to the theoretical framework of scientific quality also have a bear-
ing on the further development of the categorial system of the qualita-
tive and also quantitative analysis of quality perceptions. Our empirical 
material certainly shows that the categorial system of quality analysis 
can be logically and theoretically improved, and at the same time its 
empirical adequacy can also be expanded. Besides improving the ana-
lytical system, the findings of the study might contribute to attempts to 
articulate theoretical hypotheses on scientific quality, hypotheses that 
would not try to explain the discrepancies between the universalist cri-
teria and particularist scientific practice at any cost (intellectual acro-
batics), or explain the particularism of practice with particularist scien-
tific criteria, but would include the partial immeasurability of quality 
or, at least, its recognisability, which practising scientists themselves 
cannot analyse, describe or fully explain.
At the broadest theoretical level, which includes the connection to 
the most important and most fruitful sociological theories of science – 
organisational theories of science (Whitley, 1984; Fuchs, 1992), the find-
ings on the perceptions of scientific quality are yet another empirical ar-
gument in their favour and in favour of the need to modify their basic 
claim. The minimal nucleus of shared transdisciplinary perceptions of 
scientific quality, but also the significant differences among scientific ar-
eas (and presumably individual disciplines), support the claims on socio-
cognitive differentiation in science, certainly not the claims on the exces-
sive atomisation of the concepts of science which see science as different 
types or groups of sciences with hardly any resemblances. Both simi-
larities and differences among them have been empirically confirmed. 
However, they should also be theoretically articulated in the future.
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The category of scientific objectivity in the 
social sciences
1. Introduction
The category of scientific objectivity has been a topic of theoretical 
discussions and opposing epistemic opinions since the beginnings of 
science. If nothing else, the controversies have made at least one great 
contribution in that scientific thought has proven how difficult it is to 
attain scientific objectivity based on some degree of consensus. In brief, 
it is impossible to reach objective knowledge in a simple, let alone quick, 
way. In general, we deem the result of scientific study to be objective if 
it is independent of subjective judgments and attitudes. A look into the 
history of cognitive theory reveals that classical philosophy had emerged 
from the differences between objective knowledge and subjective belief, 
even before contemporary scientific thought. Within the framework 
of this pre-scientific thought, what belonged to a person’s opinion was 
called “subjective” and what went beyond subjectivity and was liable to 
intersubjective verification was called “objective”. Contemporary theo-
ries of science usually interpret objectivity in the broader sense of the 
word, but the term nevertheless refers primarily to scientists’ endeav-
ours to make the object of their study as independent of any subjective 
bias as possible.
Within the framework of the modern social sciences, both nomo-
thetic and ideographic approaches have emphasised the importance 
of objective scientific truth. However, these approaches have not 
always shared the same understanding of the category of scientific 
truth. The nomothetically orientated social sciences have tended to 
avoid the danger of subjectivity by maximising the “hardness” of the 
findings, their measurability and comparability. The ideographically 
oriented social sciences have tackled the problem differently. They fa-
voured primary sources, still untouched by mediators, that is, other 
scientists. At the same time, they also supported data that were ex-
pected to make scientists more personally involved in the production 
of databases.
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Naturally, there has always been conflict between the proponents 
of one and the other approach. These disputes remain current even to 
this day, in the same or in another form – let us just remember the dis-
putes on the pre-eminence of the quantitative or qualitative approach 
in sociology.
These disputes are often forced from outside. At the time of the 
establishment of modern scientific thought, a wide range of scien-
tific disciplines sprang up. Mathematics and the experimental dis-
ciplines of natural science stood at one end, and the humanities, 
headed by philosophy, and including the first, new social disciplines 
(economics, sociology, etc.), were positioned at the other end. These 
final two were relatively late to enter the widening gap of the knowl-
edge division (the natural sciences versus the humanities), leading 
to an increasingly greater division regarding the fundamental issues 
of epistemology. Dating back practically to the very beginnings of 
modern science, these disagreements survive in the different names 
of individual groups of sciences. At some point, there was talk of 
the differences between the exact and non-exact sciences, at another 
time it was about the differences between the hard and soft sciences. 
Naturally, other terms were also used. Since the principle of inde-
terminacy has become the fundamental epistemic principle for the 
natural sciences, and after the development of the quantum theory 
and relativity theory, the division into the less and more exact scien-
tific disciplines has today become rather outdated. In this respect, 
one should certainly agree with John P. Van Gigch who says that “... 
these dichotomies (exact/inexact, hard/soft) are much too simplistic 
to describe the spectrum of ontological, epistemological and meth-
odological differences and similarities among scientific disciplines” 
(Gigch, 2002: 552).
Many theoreticians and methodologists of science still doubt that 
the effort to sociologically “understand” reality has ever really been a 
sufficiently consistent alternative to the “explanation” of the natural 
sciences. A relatively long history of positivist discourse in Western in-
tellectual thought (surviving in some parts to this day) could be said to 
doctrinally exalt the following epistemic principles:
1. the idea of unified science that claims that since the world is ho-
mogenous, one-dimensional and causally ordered, man’s (expe-
riential) learning of the world is based on a universal method of 
scientific research and a universal language of science;
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2. the idea of empiricism, stating that overall scientific knowledge 
is based on immediate experience in the form of sense data, 
observational language or common sense;
3. the idea of objectivism which maintains the strict separation 
of the subject and object of knowledge, thus excluding every 
possibility of any interaction between subject and object in the 
process of scientific research;
4. the idea of value-free science based on the assumption of the 
clear separation of values and facts, descriptive and normative 
statements, which should lead to the ideal neutral science – free 
of all moral, ideal and broader social values;
5. the idea of instrumentalism that puts greater focus on technical 
manipulation than on understanding the world, and the closely 
related view that the only function of science is observation, 
and perhaps prediction, and nothing else could be its essence;
6. the idea of technicism where “techniques” or “paths” to re-
search results are exalted to the extreme, while the findings of 
the research and the consequential development of knowledge 
are neglected (Delanty, Strydom, 2003; Roth, 2003).
We will resist such simplified explanations of the relationship be-
tween the social and natural sciences in our exposition. We will also be 
interested in when and how the first steps were made in putting differ-
ent methods on a more equal footing, which can only contribute to the 
cognitive progress of science. This will admittedly take our discussion 
slightly back into the history of scientific thought, but it is precisely 
this approach that will help show that sometimes even the newfangled 
discussions that we are witnessing today uncritically forget that many 
seeds of thought about the value and objectivity of scientific claims 
have already been presented by the greats of sociology. As we will show 
more comprehensively later, Max Weber clearly demanded that every 
scientific interpretation of social phenomena required a procedure of 
verification, even if we did not always have proper data based on im-
mediate observation at hand. Weber believed that if we had nothing 
else at our disposal, it was useful to rely at least on the procedure of 
mental experiment, which, when we theoretically explain the possible 
developments of an event or phenomenon, brings us closer to explain-
ing its causes.
We must not forget another important fact: despite the recent ex-
tensive talk about connecting qualitative and quantitative scientific 
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methods in the social sciences, the epistemic grounds for connecting 
different types of scientific discourse were in fact laid relatively early. 
We are often aware that both from the aspect of its internal cognitive 
development and the aspect of the new social challenges coming from 
the outside, the development of contemporary science requires (espe-
cially in the field of the epistemology of science) increasingly more 
bonds, and not separation, or even mutual exclusion. The connection 
is made both on the horizontal and vertical level, and the trends of 
transdisciplinary scientific knowledge finally eradicate the borders of 
individual scientific disciplines. Demands for the applicability of sci-
ence make the traditional linear innovation models arising from the 
rigid division into basic, applied and developmental research rather 
pointless. We could also list several other examples. We must not forget 
within these cognitive and social changes in contemporary science that 
a hundred or more years ago the very epistemologies of science that re-
sisted the positivist interpretations of scientific knowledge had planted 
a number of crucial seeds of the current processes of the integration of 
scientific knowledge.
We have already said that Max Weber had one of the most impor-
tant roles in the development of the new methodology of research in 
the social sciences which represents a unification of the nomothetic and 
hermeneutic lines of thought. He was one of the first modern think-
ers to show that the objectivity of the social sciences does not correlate 
with their submission to the epistemic principles of the natural scienc-
es. With Weber, the positivist ideal of objectivity in the social sciences 
lost ground. For this reason, the current chapter will devote the great-
est attention to Weber’s methodology of the social sciences. Naturally, 
other important theoreticians of science who have made a significant 
contribution to the understanding of objectivity in the social sciences 
will also be mentioned.
2. Objectivity of research in the natural and social sciences
The starting point of our discussion is the assumption that objec-
tivity in the social sciences cannot always be reduced to a mirror im-
age of objectivity in the natural sciences. If we want to understand or 
explain the phenomena that form social reality, we certainly cannot 
stop at an interpretation of natural factors. Within the framework of an 
analysis of the social world, we have to be interested in values, motives, 
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and the activities of people as well. To explain the natural world within 
the framework of the natural sciences most often means to subsume it 
under some general law of nature, and to do this for every individual 
phenomenon or for the event that we are investigating.
The term law of nature usually refers to the general claims of cause-
and-effect relationships between phenomena or events in nature. In 
this sense, the natural laws are not only a guarantee of order in the 
world, but also a guarantee of its rational cognition. The term scientific 
law has in a way become the central point of explanation of modern 
natural science. At the time of the establishment of modern science in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the model of research used 
in the natural sciences was the general ideal for social science as well. 
This was influenced by different socio-historical and epistemic fac-
tors. The reasons why such importance was assigned to the search for 
general scientific laws in the modern natural sciences also cannot be 
explained exclusively by epistemic factors. The emergence of classical 
natural science is thus a consequence of social factors. For example, 
until the eighteenth century lex naturae, that is, the law of nature, usu-
ally meant something completely different from what it means today. 
The category of natural law referred then to something that we would 
today call the “moral principle”, and which would be ascribed to man 
or god, depending on our worldview. Even Newton held that the claims 
we today call natural laws were principia naturae, the first principles 
from which the special theorems about nature are derived. The con-
temporary meaning of the term law of nature was created primarily by 
analogous deduction of the existence of a divine order from the exist-
ence of regularity in the natural world. Based on the analogy used for 
the first time by natural scientists, events in nature were not only con-
sidered regular, but also universal and necessary. In order for classical 
natural science to emerge, the two basic principles – theory (regular-
ity) and experience – had to unite, and the first problem encountered 
in its later development was the method of proving the necessity of the 
laws. As long as it emerged from, to use metaphorical terms, Leibniz’s 
metaphysical principle of sufficient reason, there was no problem with 
a deterministic explanation of the natural world, where there is a nec-
essary and unavoidable connection between cause and effect. The 
emergence of quantum physics and relativity theory ultimately upset 
the principle of causal determinism on which the knowledge of classi-
cal natural science rests.
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In the light of such development of natural science, one should 
also study the deductive-nomological type of scientific explana-
tion which is a type of epistemic model of natural science research. 
This is known as the Hempel-Oppenheim model of scientific expla-
nation since it was published by Carl Hempel together with the fa-
mous natural scientist Paul Oppenheim in the article Studies in the 
Logic of Explanation. The article was published in 1948 in the jour-
nal Philosophy of Science and was reprinted later in Hempel’s collec-
tion Aspects of Scientific Explanation (Hempel, 1965). According to 
the Hempl-Oppenheim model, known in the epistemology of science 
as the covering-law model, a phenomenon or event is interpreted by 
subsuming it under a universal law, where the law acts as a strictly 
universal or statistical law.1
In modern natural science, which has taken an important step 
forward from the classical mechanistic world view, the fundamental 
laws of the world of science have probabilistic and statistical impor-
tance. That is why it is of extreme importance for the model of the fi-
nal scientific explanation that the explanans includes the probabilistic 
and statistical law in the place of the universal law. In reality, it was 
Hempel, and especially the numerous epistemologists of science study-
ing different models of scientific explanations, who accepted the exist-
ence of probabilistic-statistical explanations, and not only the existence 
of strict causal laws in the explanans of scientific explanation. Within 
the framework of this explanation, we refer to the statistical laws that 
determine the incidence of a certain property in the whole population 
of investigated objects. For example, the descendants of hybrid beans 
are deductively explained by Mendel’s laws of heredity which deter-
mine the probability or relative incidence of a particular property in 
descendants (Nagel, 1974: 15).
 1 The term covering-law model was introduced by W. Dray. Dray extended the term to in-
clude all types of interpretations that subsume the object of interpretation under a general law. 
At the same time, in the spirit of methodological realism, he was aware that the demand for one 
unified scientific law within the framework of a comprehensive model of scientific explanation 
cannot tolerate criticism. We can certainly fully agree with that because some general laws in 
science can be applied to a number of other laws. Both Hempel and Oppenheim, the authors of 
the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation, were well aware of that as well. Carl 
G. Hempel thus says that we can explain the accord between Galileo’s and Kepler’s laws only by 
proving that they are both special instances of Newton’s laws of motion and gravity. They can 
be interpreted anew by being subsumed under the even more general law of the relativity theory 
(Hempel, 1972). Our knowledge is certainly developed and built up by subsuming laws under 
more general covering laws or theories.
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Just like the deductive-nomological model, the deductive-statistical 
models of scientific explanation use a nomological type of explanation, 
since both presume the existence of a universal law. Contrary to this, 
inductive-statistical explanations refer to statistical, and not strictly 
universal, types of laws. For that reason, the arguments on which these 
explanations are based have inductive and not deductive importance. 
That is why we talk of inductive-statistical explanations, because in 
them statistical probability goes hand in hand with induction.
On the whole, we rarely work with complete (deductive-nomo-
logical) models of scientific explanations in contemporary scientific 
research. Even epistemology is becoming increasingly aware of the 
pragmatic aspect of scientific explanations. What we ascribe to an ac-
ceptable explanation primarily depends on the context that the given 
explanation refers to. However, we must not overemphasise the prag-
matic aspect of scientific explanation. It seems that B. Van Fraansen 
was the one to go the farthest in stressing such use of scientific expla-
nation. However, if we followed his epistemic principles, we would find 
ourselves in an absurd situation where we could explain anything with 
everything!
Models of deductive-nomological explanations generally do not 
take us far in social sciences either. In order to understand social reality, 
we need to comprehend what others do or think, and why they behave or 
think that way. Usually, the meticulously met conditions of deductive-
nomological explanation cannot help us much in this process.
It is true that the beginnings of modern sociology developed on 
the premises of deterministic mechanics. Within the framework of 
this premise, sociology was also determined as an effort to discover 
the necessary and universal laws of the world (Hollis, 2003; Montuschi, 
2003). Or, as Alexander Koyre said, “The infinite Universe of the New 
Cosmology, infinite in Duration as well as in Extension, in which eter-
nal matter in accordance with eternal and necessary laws moves end-
lessly and aimlessly in eternal space, inherited all the ontological at-
tributes of Divinity” (Koyre, 1988: 224). The positivist ideal of the social 
sciences was modelled on the natural sciences. Marx and Comte, the 
grandfathers of social science, still wrote their works in the shadow 
of the triumph of the classical natural sciences (Giddens, 1989; Hollis, 
2003). They endeavoured to establish a science about society that would 
create the power of explanation by studying man’s social life equal to 
the one that the natural sciences already had. When Comte revived 
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the term social physics, he clearly showed his cognitive and theoreti-
cal (epistemological) interests. Immanuel Wallerstein claims that the 
triumph of natural science as the model for all other sciences was ver-
bally asserted in that period, and it has kept its power in many respects 
to this day. Anglo-Saxon and Romance languages still use the word 
science to mean primarily or only natural science (Wallerstein, 2000: 
15); everything else is obviously considered closer to the arts than to 
science. If we approach this issue from another angle, unburdened by 
the value hierarchy of the probably more or less scientific sciences, this 
connection between the social sciences and the arts seems even attrac-
tive. Like the arts, the social sciences are also very deeply involved in 
the creative mediation of forms of human life. Both the arts and social 
sciences arise from the source of mutual knowledge in order to develop 
a dialogue, thus increasing self-understanding by understanding oth-
ers. However, we will discuss this later.
The positivist concept of science, which requires overall social sci-
ence to subject itself to the model of natural science, has its proponents 
even today. But, albeit for different reasons, even they are abandoning 
their conviction that the social sciences may be able to reach the power 
of explication enjoyed by the less developed natural sciences. Anthony 
Giddens speaks with a great dose of irony about how in the minds of 
some social scientists there is still a yearning for the coming of a Newton 
of the social sciences, although today there are more of those who doubt 
such a development than those who still hold out some hope. “Those 
who still wait for a ’Newton of the social sciences’ are not only waiting 
for a train that won’t arrive, they’re in the wrong station altogether” 
(Giddens, 1989: 13).
As a rule, the arguments that the method of social science needs to 
completely follow the model of research in the natural sciences refer to 
three levels. Incidentally, these levels are discussed in detail by Martin 
Hollis. The first level is ontological, and proves that the social world is a 
part of the natural order. This is a naturalistic explanation of the theory 
of scientific objectivity. The second level is epistemology. It considers 
knowledge about society as absolutely reliable, and, consequently, we 
should be able to obtain knowledge about society by experience only. 
And finally, the third level is methodology. At the level of methodology, 
it is proved that the empirically inductive method is the model for all 
sciences. This last assumption is positivism par excellence (Hollis, 2003: 
8–30).
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From the point of view of our discussion, it may be interesting to 
learn the great expectations of such a positivistic approach, whether 
they are: (1) universally valid predictions of social events; (2) universal-
ly valid quantifiable accuracy; (3) universally valid laws of social phe-
nomena. The majority of such expectations have naturally never been 
met. Let us stay at the never-fulfilled assumptions of the universally 
valid and absolutely authentic predictions of social events. Namely, so-
cial theories that succumbed to eschatological ideologies turned to the 
belief that social phenomena can be predicted as accurately as those in 
nature. The theories held that, if we can predict natural phenomena 
such as an eclipse of the sun generally accurately, then we can do the 
same and with equal accuracy with all social changes in the future. 
The assumption that social phenomena can be predicted just as well as 
natural phenomena led to the conclusion that prediction in natural and 
in social science is identical. In truth, predictions of social phenom-
ena, just like predictions in astronomy, which are among the most reli-
able, are possible only if two conditions are met – rebus sic stantibus (in 
these circumstances) and ceteris paribus (all other things being equal). 
Modern societies are prone to great changes, and there is also a great 
interconnection of all social factors. Mario Bunge gave an important 
warning concerning this issue: “The rate of success of social forecasting 
is notoriously low. (Examples: Nobody predicted the Great Depression, 
the massive entry of women into the labour force in the 1970s, the oil 
crisis, the breaking up of the Soviet Union, etc.). In light of the forego-
ing discussion, there are several possible reasons for such poor fore-
casting performance. One is that some processes are inherently un-
predictable because they occur in unstable social systems. Another is 
that behaviour is partially determined by learning and expectations. A 
third reason is the dearth of well-corroborated social theories and the 
fragmentation of social studies. A fourth is the wrong approach often 
adopted by social forecasters” (Bunge, 1996: 162).
Even though the logical structure of prediction is the same both in 
the social and natural sciences, it should be pointed out again that the 
methodology of the social sciences needs to consider the convictions, 
interests and motives of people to a much greater extent than is the case 
in the natural sciences. In this regard, I would like to mention the issue 
of the self-fulfilling or self-destroying prophecy. The fact that actors are 
aware that their actions have been predicted can help fulfil the proph-
ecy, or it can prevent the prophecy from coming true. Self-fulfilling 
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prophecies in the social sciences are the prophecies that first miscon-
strue the situation, which sets off new behaviour that finally makes the 
originally mistaken prophecy come true. Robert Merton says in this 
regard: “This specious validity of the self-fulfilling prophecy perpetu-
ates a reign of error. For the prophet will cite the actual course of events 
as proof that he was right from the very beginning” (Merton, 1971: 146). 
He called this the perversity of social logic. With this thought, Merton 
splendidly highlighted the differentia specifica of the social sciences. 
Naturally, there are also examples when public revelation of a proph-
ecy prevented it from coming true. These are self-destroying prophecies. 
The specificities of predictions in the social sciences, compared to the 
natural sciences, raise another set of interesting questions, but they will 
not be our concern in this discussion.
3. “Understanding other minds” in methods of social 
research
Expectations of reaching ideal scientific objectivity in the social 
sciences based on universal scientific laws are certainly out of place to-
day. Even the modern natural sciences have finally freed themselves 
of the narrow conception of objectivity based on the conviction that a 
scientific principle has to deny innovation and variety in the name of 
the eternal, universal law. According to Prigogine and Stengers, natural 
science has finally opened up to unpredictability, which is no longer a 
sign of complete ignorance and sparse control (Prigogine and Stengers, 
1988: 524).
If modern natural science is understood as an area that has 
opened a dialogue with nature, as an area that is constantly search-
ing the open world we belong to, the world in whose creation we also 
participate, then this applies even more to the social sciences. In the 
natural sciences, the rule of thumb is that science analyses its subject 
of study, not that it turns to the topic of the study for an opinion. 
The social sciences are completely the opposite. They are an area of 
research where the “subject” of their study, people, entangles with re-
searchers in the most varied forms of interaction. To put it briefly, in 
their field of study, the social sciences (quite contrary to the natural 
sciences) are more engaged in the relation of subject to subject, than 
subject to object. Furthermore, we need to draw attention to another 
important epistemic difference between the natural and social sci-
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ences, discussed by Fay and Moon (1996). This difference is the for-
mation of concepts and categories used in one or the other type of sci-
ence. In the natural sciences, the forming of concepts is determined 
by two interconnected preconditions: theory and measuring. Such a 
framework is expected to give rise to concepts that would allow the 
establishment of theories, which can usually be tested, where all other 
categories are excluded, especially those derived from common (eve-
ryday) language. The forming of concepts and categories in the social 
sciences and humanities is not so strictly isolated from common (eve-
ryday) language. The terms we use to describe, interpret and under-
stand an actor’s actions are derived precisely from the social world 
which is the topic of our study, and not only from narrowly defined 
and strictly formalised perception theories. This applies at least to the 
initial stages of the research since an actor’s original decision on how 
to act depends precisely on how the actor himself understands the 
significance and the sense of this action. For this reason, the concept 
we use to explain the actor’s actions must appropriately encompass 
that significance and that sense. This greater direct connection be-
tween ordinary (everyday) language and the terminology of the social 
sciences sometimes leads to the wrong impression that some fields of 
the social sciences are actually some kind of semi-science. Of course, 
this is not true because every field of science develops its own termi-
nology which never coincides with ordinary (everyday) language. The 
reasons why laypersons feel invited to deny scientificity to the social 
sciences, but not to the natural sciences, are more axiological than 
epistemological in nature. To put it simply, natural scientists speak 
of nucleoids, isotopes, genes, galaxies, etc. Sociologists, on the other 
hand, speak of different social actors. Since the latter as a rule do 
not see themselves as nucleoids or isotopes, and they do identify with 
one of the ideal types used by sociologists in their studies, their value 
judgments of the status of individual sciences refer more to the social 
sciences than to the natural sciences.
The social sciences face the issue of “double hermeneutics” 
(Giddens, 1989: 174), or, in more philosophically general terms, the is-
sue of “understanding other minds”. As Martin Hollis puts it, “this is 
the philosopher’s problem of Other Minds. It becomes central for the 
social sciences as soon as one thinks of understanding action as involv-
ing an interpretation of interpretation, a ’double hermeneutics’, as it is 
commonly called” (Hollis, 2002: 151).
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Hollis uses the following example to show the slightly different 
epistemological substance of the social sciences: when an astronomer 
in the role of an active research subject notices events in the far skies 
and explains the behaviour of that ordered domain, he starts from the 
assumption that nature is independent of man’s opinion and convic-
tion. When performing the role of observer, the social scientist is in a 
rather different position. Admittedly, he is also trying to reach the final 
explanation of what he sees. Metaphorically, as an onlooker, the social 
scientist can see at least as much of the game as the players themselves. 
In this case, he first reconstructs the viewpoint of the player, and this is 
precisely the significant difference between the social and natural sci-
entist. Martin Hollis says: “There is a fundamental difference between 
understanding and explaining, since what happens in the social world 
depends on its meaning for the agents in a way without parallel in the 
realm of the stars” (Hollis, 2002: 152).
Anthony Giddens has a similar opinion. He is convinced that all 
types of social research require communication with persons or groups 
who are the subject of this research in a certain sense. Giddens says that 
in some examples, such as participant observation, questionnaire sur-
veys, interviews and similar methods, this takes place as real interac-
tion between the observer and the subject (Giddens, 1989: 173). For this 
reason, as Giddens goes on to say, the terms used by members of society 
and the concepts used by observers-sociologists or terms coined as ne-
ologisms need to be reciprocal. This is indispensible to social science, 
even though the positivist category system of the majority of schools of 
“orthodox” sociology has already blurred that fact.
Since the epistemology of the social sciences focuses more on the 
subject-subject relation than the subject-object relation, it is certainly 
reasonable to expect differences in the logical structure of scientific 
generalisations in the natural and social sciences. We have already 
touched upon the specificities faced by predictions in the social scienc-
es. We can thus assume that the general laws in the social sciences also 
imply a series of unchangeable relations, expressed either as a prob-
ability or as a general cause-and-effect relationship. In contrast, within 
the framework of structural (nomothetic) analyses, causal relationships 
that do not express theoretical generalisations in the social sciences do 
not refer only to cause-and-effect relations as established in nature, 
but also to the consequences of human actions. All theoreticians and 
epistemologists of the social sciences who encourage discussions on 
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objectivity criteria in the social sciences, and these are Giddens, Hollis, 
Wallerstein and several others, admit that the causal generalisations in 
the social sciences are in many respects similar to the laws of the natu-
ral sciences. However, they do differ in some important aspects, since 
they depend on the (scientific) replicability of intentional and uninten-
tional human actions and their social consequences.
Fritz Machlup studied the presence of some basic epistemic princi-
ples in the methodologies of research in the natural and social sciences 
(Machlup, 1996). His studies brought him to the conclusion that the so-
cial sciences can in no way be said to be inferior to the natural sciences. 
Let us take a brief look at some of his claims:
1. The principle of replicability of observation has been stressed 
expressly throughout the history of the natural sciences. The 
basic idea behind this principle is that it would be hard to imag-
ine science if phenomena, and their scientific observation (veri-
fication), did not repeat themselves, and if they were a kind of 
structural constant. Physicist Robert Oppenheimer once asked 
whether, if the universe was a unique phenomenon at the level 
of theory, we may assume that everything can be derived from 
one supreme proposition. Oppenheimer naturally knew very 
well that even in the world of physics phenomena are not as 
universally homogenous as we may like to think. Of course, the 
opposite is also true: phenomena in the social world are not so 
heterogeneous that the principle of replicability of observation 
would not apply to them, although in a somewhat less restric-
tive form.
2. In the epistemology of science, we often meet the thesis that the 
verification of hypotheses in the social sciences is extremely dif-
ficult compared to the case in natural science. Machulp agrees 
that differences exist, and, although opposing any exaggera-
tions in that respect, he says that “... with respect to the verifi-
ability of hypothesis, we found that the impossibility of control-
led experiments combined with the larger number of relevant 
variables does make verification in the social sciences more 
difficult than most of the natural sciences” (Machlup, 1996: 
16). At the same time, he adds that even in natural science we 
have to distinguish between the so-called high-level hypothesis 
or even complete theoretical systems, and so-called low-level 
generalisations. The former are most often only postulated and 
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never verified directly. When the natural sciences investigate 
phenomena that are impossible to reproduce and regularities 
for which controlled experiments cannot be devised, they have 
to rely on postulated and not completely verified hypotheses.
3. We have already said in the introduction of this chapter that the 
criterion of exactness is in no way suitable for ranking different 
types of sciences. Machulp also warns that the main difficulty 
regarding the criterion of scientific exactness is its rather ran-
dom use. Those who propose greater exactness of the natural 
sciences never say precisely what this exactness actually refers 
to. Does it refer to measuring? Or to predictions of events? Does 
exactness refer to the level of (mathematical) formalisation? 
Those who claim that the social sciences are less exact than the 
natural sciences are usually not sufficiently familiar with either 
type of knowledge.
4. In terms of the quantitative measuring of phenomena in the 
area of the natural as well as the social sciences, we have situ-
ations where we have a multitude of data at hand, but without 
knowing what to do with them. On the other hand, we can have 
important scientific discoveries even with less measuring and 
data if we have elaborated good theoretical models. The avail-
ability of quantitative data is not in itself a guarantee of the 
better development of a scientific discipline. Malchup believes 
that the methods of natural science would not at all be found 
at the top if scientific fields were rated by the criterion of quali-
tative measuring. Economics is the only scientific field where 
the primary experiential material is already expressed in the 
form of numeric data. Economics looks at prices, sums of mon-
ey and other numeric data. However, in the area of the natural 
sciences, researchers first have to establish all conditions for 
measuring in order to obtain numerical data. A physicist, for 
example, has to reveal and prepare a whole complex of scientific 
instruments which will only help establish numerical values of 
the investigated phenomena. If we follow Lord Kelvin’s famous 
phrase that science is measuring, both in the social and natural 
sciences, science would not deal with the key research problems 
or any convincing criteria on the basis of which one could as-
sess whether immeasurable phenomena are more frequently 
found in the natural or social world.
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Analysing fundamental epistemic principles, Fritz Machulp has 
convincingly proven that there are no less or more superior fields of 
research in the world of science. The first and most important step in 
freeing the methodology of social science from positivism was made 
at the beginning of the previous century by Max Weber. We will even 
find a number of epistemological germs in his views that are still ap-
plicable today. With his method of interpretative explanation (verstehe-
nde Erklaerung), he paved the way for such a balance of forces between 
the methods of the natural and social sciences where the former would 
no longer be seen as an (unreachable) ideal model for the latter, but 
where the natural and social sciences show two different research ap-
proaches that are complementary despite the differences in their topics 
of research. Furthermore, Max Weber also warned that contemporary 
science has to be interested in discovering and resolving the problems 
of this world more than in dividing itself into subject-based fields of 
research, which even critical rationalists accept (Albert, 1999). Before 
an institutional division into numerous fields of research took place, 
Weber had developed a certain vision of transdisciplinary scientific 
knowledge even within social science. He may have shown best in his 
sociological analyses that in studying the social world, it is not possible 
to go “only from within”, to use Hollis’s words (Hollis, 2002: 147), and 
using methods that were significant for the hermeneutical view of sci-
ence at that time. As a social theoretician and epistemologist, Weber 
always tended to unite the nomological and ideographic types of scien-
tific explanation.
4. Explanation and understanding in classical social thought
According to Max Weber, scientific objectivity in the social scienc-
es cannot be reached by a priori valid judgements, but by experience. 
In his methodological papers published posthumously in the collection 
Gesammelte Aufsaetze fuer Wissenschaftslehre (Weber, 1988), Weber 
inferred that causal explanation is reached via objectively valid scien-
tific truth, where only relevant empirical evidence could say whether 
this task is attainable. The assessment of what is subjective and what is 
objective is not only a consequence of unchangeable historical sources, 
but also of the current historical conditions of the object of the research. 
Based on such categories of the subjective and objective, Weber conclud-
ed that social science is always founded on a system of values accepted 
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by a certain scientific community. For this reason, no analysis of the 
social sciences can strive to reach a final or universally valid category 
of scientific objectivity. While astronomy, an example of a borderline 
natural science, is interested in the quantitatively and exactly measur-
able relations between celestial bodies, the social sciences study quali-
tative aspects in investigated phenomena. Thus, the issue of scientific 
objectivity needs to include more factors, and not only causal regulari-
ties. Weber gave the following example: the interest of social scientists 
in research activity focuses on the exchange value of money because it 
is a general phenomenon in modern societies. However, an imperative 
that allows us to obtain new knowledge on the general principles of the 
exchange value of money still does not provide an answer to the ques-
tion why this is so important in modern society (Weber, 1988: 176).
Weber rejected the metaphysical system of values whose task was 
to determine the objective validity of scientific knowledge. Numerous 
researchers of Weber’s methodology admit that Weber’s epistemology 
has in this respect stepped out of the field of absolutely valid judgments 
and scholastic metaphysics of values (Ringer, 1997: 50; Baert, 2005: 45; 
Mommsen, 1990: 114). The system of values that regulates scientific 
research is, according to Weber, socially and culturally conditioned. 
According to some, Weber would, in classical epistemological terms, 
cancel the lines between the so-called context of justification in science 
and the context of discovery in science precisely due to the introduction 
of value and social and cultural assumptions into the process of scien-
tific research. To be more precise, his methodology relied on the social 
anthropology of man as a cultural being (Keyes, 2002; Burger, 1988/89). 
In this respect, Weber branched off from his theoretical predecessors 
(Dilthey, Windelband, Rickert), especially in shifting his scientific in-
terest from the question “what makes a fact worth studying?” to the 
question “what explains the inclusion of a certain fact into a certain 
type of science?” However, attempts at explaining Weber’s epistemol-
ogy of science that say that he avoided determining the content of the 
criteria of scientific validity by formalising the term science, and that 
he was close to the mathematical formalism of logical positivism in this 
respect sound rather unjustified (Wagner and Zipprian, 1994).
Although Weber was aware of the meaning of “nomological expe-
riential knowledge” which is a condition for obtaining objective knowl-
edge on how people behave in given social and historical situations, 
he never understood the phrase in the deterministic sense of natural 
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science. For Weber, social science is the type of knowledge focused on 
analysing the phenomena of life in terms of their cultural significance 
(Weber, 1988: 175). The significance of these phenomena cannot be 
derived from such a final nomological model of scientific explanation 
because in the social sciences we always have to work with values, goals 
and motives of human actions. Scientists’ research interest must be an 
analysis of social phenomena, and not only their universality, but also 
their particularity. Another point of view has to be added to Weber’s 
earlier inference. Weber touched upon the issues of increasing spe-
cialisation and differentiation of scientific knowledge at the turn of the 
twentieth century in one of his most famous works, Wissenschaft als 
Beruf (Weber, 1988: 582–613). He did not lament this trend in the de-
velopment of science, nor did he glorify it. He was a realist with regard 
to the analysis of the methodological issues of science, and was aware 
that the differences among both the natural and social sciences were 
more axiological than ontological in nature. He believed that it was pre-
cisely this that made the bridging of the epistemic and methodological 
gap between the areas easier.
Weber’s stand on the specific cognitive interest of the social sciences 
presented above and derived from the system of cultural values at least 
partly explains why he attributed such great significance to the concept 
of “ideal types” in the social sciences. He found the creation of theoreti-
cal constructs necessary to identify and categorise social phenomena 
according to their cultural and historical significance. Scientists deter-
mine the same ideal type in very different ways, depending on their 
research interest. No ideal-type construct can encompass total reality 
because it is always infinite. However, it is certainly very important that 
every ideal type contributes to reducing the complexity of reality to a 
great extent, which makes the reality more systematic.
The goal of Weber’s interpretative sociological method was to find 
out the meaning of social activity. He thought that being an experience-
based science, sociology was not about discovering absolute metaphysi-
cal sense, but the sense that any real actor has in his thoughts in a his-
torically given example, or actors on average, or the approximation of 
a given quantity of examples, or an actor in a conceptually construed 
clear type. Max Weber has described as social that activity which one 
or more actors perceive as referring to others and which is used as a 
guideline in their behaviour. He understood the category of action 
(Handlung) as human behaviour when and insofar as the actor or ac-
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tors attach a subjective meaning to it. When discussing a course of ac-
tion, Weber primarily referred to determining relations between inner 
(psychological) processes and external (social) manifestations.
Weber was interested neither in the actor’s internal condition, 
nor solely in the actor’s external behaviour, but the action deter-
mined by both internal (psychological) and external (social) factors 
at the same time. In line with this, he tried to unite the category of 
understanding and the category of explanation. His epistemological 
or methodological maxim was best expressed in his connection of 
two epistemic categories: the category of immediate understanding 
(aktuelles Verstehen) and the category of explanatory understanding 
(erklaerendes Verstehen).2
1. Immediate understanding (aktuelles Verstehen) refers to recog-
nising opinions, behaviours and actions significant for the ac-
tor himself, and which are the subject of the study (for example, 
cutting wood, somebody’s anger, or a pointed gun).
2. Within the framework of explanatory understanding (erklaer-
endes Verstehen), an outside observer is analysing the motiva-
tion of an actor’s opinion, behaviour and action in order to de-
termine why he acted or thought in a certain way. Thus, we un-
derstand the chopping of wood or the aiming of a gun in terms 
of the motive if we know that the woodchopper is working for 
a wage or is chopping a supply of firewood for his own use or is 
possibly doing it for recreation (rationally), or he might also be 
working off a fit of rage (an irrational case). Similarly, we un-
derstand that a person aiming a gun is doing so because he was 
commanded to shoot as a member of a firing squad in order 
to defeat an enemy (rational), or that he is doing it for revenge 
(affectually determined, and thus in a certain sense irrational) 
(Weber, 1988: 547).
 2 He presented the interdependence of both methodological approaches in his two meth-
odological papers: Ueber einige Kategorien der verstehenden Soziologie (1913), and Soziologische 
Grundbegriffe (1921). The two papers, which form two independent chapters in the posthumous 
Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Wissenschaftslehre (Weber, 1988), were published several years apart, 
and the latter is actually a reworking of the former. They are both coordinated and extremely 
complex in content. Later interpreters of Weber’s epistemology and methodology mostly re-
ferred to them since they were presented together without Weber’s extensive comments on his 
contemporaneous theoreticians (which were inherent to most of his other methodological pa-
pers). For this reason, these papers are considered to present the gist of his thoughts on episte-
mology and methodology.
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The mentioned role of the outside observer cannot be considered 
only in some mediating variable in the physical, but must also be seen in 
the wider metaphorical sense, as Rudolf Richter said. It is social change 
and change on the level of interpretation (Richter, 1995). In brief, it is 
the issue of understanding other minds, which we have already dis-
cussed in the introductory part of this chapter.
If we ask ourselves here about the reasons for Weber’s division into 
“immediate” (aktuell) understanding and “explanatory” understand-
ing, we must not disregard the fact that he had already established an 
indubitable difference between the so-called inner processes that deter-
mine the meaning of action, and the so-called external actions marked 
by that meaning in his 1904 essay Die Objektivitaet sozialwissenschaftli-
cher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis (Weber, 1988: 146–214). He was 
not interested in every individual aspect of understanding respectively, 
but their mutual relation. He had also already proposed in this work 
that the social sciences should investigate the causal relations between 
internal meaning and external behaviour. Within the framework of ex-
planatory understanding, we respond to the question about the causes 
of action. We do not interpret a situation which involves an actor on 
the basis of intuition but on the basis of wider knowledge of the social 
mechanisms that affect the actor’s actions.
According to Weber, the problem of the interpretative explana-
tion of causal relations between the inner meaning and external be-
haviour of (social) actors naturally refers to the basic (epistemological) 
issue of adequacy of meaning (Sinnadequanz) and causal adequacy 
(Kausaladequanz). The problem of adequacy which became a cen-
trepiece in later discussions of sociological epistemology refers to the 
question of the relationship between the hermeneutical task of mediat-
ing a description of life and “technical” concepts developed in the so-
cial sciences. After Weber, many interpretative sociologists came to the 
conclusion that the social sciences can legitimately use concepts that 
they, to whom the insights refer, do not know.
5. Interpretative explanation in the social sciences
The foundations for understanding social reality in the sense of 
double hermeneutics, which was discussed later by Anthony Giddens, 
were mostly developed by Max Weber. According to him, the category of 
explanatory understanding meets the conditions of adequacy of mean-
266
FRANC MALI
ing if it is undoubtedly evident. Since every interpretation necessarily 
remains at the level of hypothesis, and considering it might also arise 
from something as evident, Weber says that explanatory understanding 
also has to be causally adequate. Naturally, he also allows for the reverse 
as well: every causally adequate claim comes down to mere indecipher-
able statistical probability unless it is also adequate in meaning.
In his methodological texts, Weber was highly critical of the cate-
gory of emphatic understanding (nachfuehlende Verstehen). He claimed 
that “... one need not have been Caesar in order to understand Caesar” 
(Weber, 1988: 543). With this statement, he wanted to stress that the 
capacity to produce the same type of action is not a prerequisite to un-
derstand the action. Considering Weber’s criticism and scepticism of 
the category of “emphatic understanding” and his effort to prove that 
inarticulate insight, or intuition, is not satisfactory in procedures aimed 
at revealing other people’s feelings, but that interpretation always has to 
be a result of stringent critical analytical consideration, the claims that 
Weber was a belated response to Dilthey’s hermeneutic psychologism 
seem amiss. Weber believed that the methods of the social sciences 
need to start from a person’s motives and goals, but they need not stop 
there. Weber went from the level of the individual to the intersubjective 
and farther on to the social level.
Before we credit Weber with unbridgeable polarisation between 
the subjective-individual and the socio-functional, we must first admit 
that all his works are an exciting mix of epistemic elements. Weber’s 
content analyses of individual social phenomena – religion, economics, 
politics – prove that he was avoiding both psychological reductionism 
and sociological functionalism. It is not possible to give an objective ex-
planation of social phenomena and events unless we go from the indi-
vidual psychological level to the general social level, and vice versa: we 
cannot remain at the level of general sociological generalisation which 
would not acknowledge the actor’s subjective meaning of actions. An 
analysis of subjective motives within the framework of sociological 
science has to be put into a wider social context. In order to obtain 
knowledge of a phenomenon, we must know its marginal social condi-
tions as well. However, our intuitive identification with the motivation 
of an individual actor does not suffice here and we also need to rely on 
the more general knowledge of social laws that govern the actions of 
individual actors. At this point, we also have at least to mention that 
Weber believed it was cognitively unproductive to resort to scientific 
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abstractions which have no other purpose than themselves. As he says, 
the more general or abstract the laws, the less valuable they are because 
they may be more devoid of content and more distant from the rich-
ness of reality (Weber, 1988: 178). The conclusion that can be drawn 
from Weber’s deduction is clear: since people never keep to the same 
rules, and they violate them in reality, we are always condemned only 
to claims of probability.
Here, within the framework of activity of social actors, we do not 
have the opposition between chance and necessity, but only adequacy. 
The construction of causal relations thus refers to the relative frequency 
of a type of action. This is why we can ascribe objective probability to 
this type of causal relationship.
Finally, the whole of Weber’s methodological credo is most coher-
ently reflected precisely in his method of ideal types in science. The 
method of ideal types is a good example of bringing together nomoth-
etic and ideographic elements in the procedures of scientific cognition. 
It is a theoretical construct that aims to encompass complex social real-
ity. We will not ponder on every characteristic of the method of ideal 
types in science in this chapter. It is best explained as a category used 
in every procedure of research in order to more forcefully grasp com-
plex social reality. In metaphorical terms, it is like taking up binoculars 
when we want to see a faraway object as clearly as possible, and then 
putting them down again.
It should be pointed out that the method of ideal types in science is 
completely free of any positivist factualism. For Weber, the social and 
historical sciences are not only about determining concrete facts (Weber, 
1988: 193) but also about the search for the cultural meaning of one, 
even simple, individual act (Weber, 1988: 193). He always reaffirmed 
that ideal types were not the goal, but only a tool of the social sciences. 
He denied the possibility of creating a complete reflection of reality 
using these tools. Accordingly, he also refuted the system of theorems 
from which reality could be deducted. He emphasised that he wanted 
to understand reality, and not dissolve it into empty formulas (Weber, 
1988: 37). Ideal types developed from historical material, to which they 
also apply. If social practice is changing, the old ideal types can no 
longer be used and new ones have to be created. However, this does not 
mean that Weber wanted to free interpretative sociology (verstehende 
Soziologie) from the scientific demands for forming categories. Every 
science has to arise from a system of scientific categories, but the ques-
268
FRANC MALI
tion is what those categories have to offer as a means in the cognitive 
process of a certain discipline. It is not about achieving maximum con-
gruence, but the maximum divergence of theory from reality.
In Weber’s time, individual social disciplines that were strongly 
influenced by the natural sciences derived from rigid formal principles 
used to investigate social actors strictly as Homo economicus who con-
sistently follows the logic of goal-driven rationality. With his method of 
ideal types, Weber was far from following that line of thought. For him, 
the activity of the social actor as Homo economicus is only a border-line 
example that interprets how social actors would act if they were led by the 
principles of absolute economic rationality. Such action would be similar 
to a mathematically programmed model. Weber was aware that we do 
not work with such omnipotent and reason-driven economic actors in 
social reality. In social reality, people do not act only with regard to ra-
tional rules, but also with regard to other motives, which are completely 
irrational. For this reason, Weber developed arguments for Homo socio-
logicus who differs from Homo economicus, who existed before him.
6. Category of objectivity and the method of critical 
rationalism
In the context of our discussion, it should be pointed out that none 
of the later and varied interpretations of Weber’s method of ideal types 
in science understood that Weber’s intention was not to put all the ac-
tions of social actors into a Procrustean bed of sterile objectivism or 
rationalism. To be more precise, Weber did not stop at the idea that 
the value of social science methodology can be assessed only in rela-
tion to the actual advancement of scientific knowledge. His approach is 
rather similar to critical rationalism. Like Popper, the most important 
proponent of critical rationalism, Weber also expressed his belief that 
science and its methods can advance only by resolving real problems. 
According to Popper, theoretical speculations, completely unattached 
to real research problems, can be of little help. He said in the text Die 
Logik der Sozialwissenschaften that, just like all other sciences, the so-
cial sciences can be successful or unsuccessful, interesting or hollow, 
fruitful or unfruitful depending on the relevance and attraction of the 
problem they study (Popper, 1970: 105).
Popper repeatedly warned against erroneous perceptions of meth-
odological naturalism and methodological scientism (Popper, 1957, 
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1970, 1974). Naturalism, or scientism, required the social sciences to 
finally learn to follow the method that would lead to objective scien-
tific knowledge. The guiding principle of methodological naturalism 
was: start from observations and measuring, and then use induction to 
make generalisations and develop theories. Such perceptions propose 
that inductive observation is the only path to achieving objective sci-
entific knowledge. Methodological naturalists, of course, always ques-
tion whether such objectivity is attainable in social science. Popper re-
jected methodological naturalism and claimed, in line with his method 
of critical rationalism which will not be expounded here (Mali, 2006), 
that there was no pure inductive science, but only sciences that follow 
experiential verification of theoretical propositions to a greater or lesser 
extent; this applies to the social sciences as well (Popper, 1970: 119).
According to Popper, an analysis of the social situation is the ori-
gin of every explanation in social science. In this regard, he wrote: “The 
fundamental problem of both the theoretical and the historical social 
sciences is to explain and understand events in terms of human actions 
and social situations. The key term here is ’social situation’. In my view, 
the idea of a social situation is the fundamental category of the meth-
odology of the social sciences” (Popper, 1994: 168).
The model of research within the framework of the social situation 
proposed by Popper is reminiscent of Weber’s research model based 
on “immediate” (aktuell) and explanatory understanding. Popper also 
sees the exact and detailed reconstruction of the problem situation, as 
felt by the actor who is the object of study and observation, as the first 
step of the research subject (observer). We could say that this first step 
is the hermeneutical part of the analysis of the social situation. The re-
searcher, naturally, cannot stop here. The actor’s understandings of his 
motives of action and of the circumstances in which he acts are usually 
limited or even distorted and irregular. For this reason, if the scientist 
(external observer) wants to obtain a complete explanation, he needs to 
detach himself from the actor’s understanding, but must not neglect it. 
Put briefly, acknowledgment of the actor’s internal motives and goals is 
the first, but not the last, step in research (observation) procedures.
The rationality principle has a central part in Popper’s method 
described above. Popper reaffirmed the relevance of the objectively 
hermeneutic approach in the social sciences with the claim that an 
analysis of the social situation includes the use of the rationality princi-
ple (Popper, 1974: 199). In his paper Rationalitaetsprinzip, he explained 
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that the principle has nothing in common with the assumption that 
people are always rational because they act rationally in every situation. 
According to Popper, this is a less ambitious principle because it does 
not assume anything more than that our actions respond to the prob-
lem situations the way we see them; even if we do not always consider it 
true, these are the reasons to see it as a good path to come closer to the 
real event. If used in this way, it considerably reduces the randomness 
of our behaviour and actions (Popper, 1995: 359).
The method follows from the hypothesis that any action, or knowl-
edge of individual actors, even if proven wrong later, can be understood 
as a rational reaction to given social and historical circumstances. In 
situation logics, this assumption works as the regulating principle which 
leads us to an objective understanding of social reality. With Karl Popper, 
the leading proponent of critical rationalism, the category of objectivity 
in the social sciences is thus also based on a balanced combination of 
the hermeneutical and critical-analytical approach to the object of re-
search. An additional element that takes Popper’s concept of objectivity 
in the social sciences even farther from positivism is his understanding 
that the method of scientific research allows only a gradual approach to 
scientific truth. We speak of coming closer to the truth (verisimilitude 
of truth), and not of absolutely reaching the truth!
At the end of our discussion, let us point out once more that the 
later epistemic theories that studied the category of objectivity in the so-
cial sciences largely recognised the relatedness of Weber’s and Popper’s 
views, whereas some even ignored any connection between the views. 
More recent constructivist and relativist approaches to the issue of the 
truthfulness and validity of scientific knowledge have undoubtedly 
taken another important step forward from the unchangeable positivist 
explanation of scientific objectivity. Their criticism of the classic posi-
tivist ideal of scientific objectivity was welcomed enthusiastically in the 
frontline scientific fields, since the promotion of several issues or pre-
determined research rules is doomed to fail here. These are the fields of 
scientific research brimming with unpredictability, controversies, etc. 
Work at the scientific frontline contains more interpretative or herme-
neutic contents. This aspect was also highlighted by Kuhn (1998) in the 
book The Structure of Scientific Revolution, albeit in another context. 
How else should we understand the division into the phase of normal 
science and the phase of scientific revolutions within the framework of 
Kuhn’s model of scientific development? As is known, Kuhn’s discus-
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sion of conflicts between paradigms at the times of scientific revolutions 
started from the hypothesis that there was no uniform collection of 
scientific problems or a uniform collection of scientific rules to resolve 
them. This is so since these conditions have never been met completely 
in reality and the conflicts between paradigms can never end with a 
very standardised result (for example, by counting successfully resolved 
problems). However, we will not discuss this issue here in more detail.
Unfortunately, precisely due to neglecting the fact that this issue 
also involves an evolutional line of thought, modern epistemologies of 
science have often brought great confusion to the topic under study. 
Within the framework of an analysis of more recent sociological theo-
ries of (scientific) objectivity, Stephan Fuchs has brought attention to a 
number of weaknesses of these recent constructivist theories of scien-
tific objectivity (Fuchs, 1997). Let us take rhetorical theories of scientif-
ic objectivity as an example. Despite its recent popularity, the viewpoint 
that objectivity in science is a purely rhetorical issue has a number of 
weaknesses. It has not developed a single convincing argument yet why 
one claim in science has the status of an objective scientific claim, while 
another has only the status of an objective opinion. In truth, rhetoric 
can be one of the elements why one scientific proposition can be incor-
porated more easily into an existing body of scientific knowledge than 
another proposition, but it cannot explain in itself why a great number 
of scientific propositions have disappeared from the scene, despite the 
rhetoric that was completely imbued with objectivism. Rhetoric is just 
one, but certainly not a sufficient, condition for determining the crite-
ria of objectivity in the social sciences. Constructivist explanations that 
make a connection between scientific objectivity and social power face 
a number of weaknesses. Although explanations of scientific objectivi-
ty as social power have a very long tradition, and even enjoy the support 
of some philosophers (Husserl, Heidegger, Nietzsche, Marcuse), they 
nevertheless work with very unconvincing arguments. The category of 
scientific objectivity is for them just another form of manipulation of 
the dominant logocentric narration of occidental rationalism dissemi-
nated by modern science and technology.
7. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to warn that the issue of objectiv-
ity in social research dates back to the beginning of the social sciences. 
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Among individual scientific disciplines that are today classified within 
the wider category of social science or are at least related to it, clas-
sical sociological thought has made a very important contribution to 
epistemological issues. Our primary goal was to show that the major-
ity of questions concerning the basic epistemic principles of social sci-
ence can be found in the methodology of Max Weber. Like other great 
theorists of science, Weber also developed a vision of social research 
that strived to integrate, and not separate, different methodological ap-
proaches. This vision, which became the focal point of epistemological 
discussions throughout the twentieth century, has unfortunately not 
been realised to this day.
Even today, we still sometimes encounter positivist views of the 
methods of social research. These views connect the objectivity of sci-
entific research exclusively with nomothetic scientific approaches and 
related scientific quantification, neglecting a whole series of paradig-
matic movements in the natural sciences of the previous century which 
introduced a greater degree of relativism into the overall mode of sci-
entific thought.
This chapter has tried to show that in the field of the social sci-
ences it is heuristically more productive to follow the epistemological 
principles that bring together the elements of a critically-analytical and 
hermeneutical approach. In the words of practical methodological re-
search, we could say that we favour the convergence and not the diver-
gence of quantitative and qualitative methodology. Epistemology is usu-
ally the first step in the direction of understanding the social and cog-
nitive-theoretical laws of the development of modern science. Without 
understanding the epistemological organisation of modern science, we 
cannot understand its social organisation either. And it has lately been 
moving in the direction of the integration of narrow specialised fields.
It is interesting that precisely the borderline fields of scientific re-
search which today work across different categories of human knowl-
edge, such as genetics and nanosciences, often use methodologies that 
were first used in social science. Here, I chiefly refer to different types 
of systemic methodologies. In brief, the heremeneutical way of think-
ing, first promoted by Max Weber in the social sciences, is an indis-
pensible methodological tool in the natural sciences as well. For this 
reason, the categories of scientific objectivity in the natural and social 
sciences cannot be totally different, but in the best of cases they can 
complement each other.
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Scientists’ concepts of scientific objectivity
1. How do practising scientists understand scientific 
objectivity?
The initial question generates a sequence of (sub)questions, like the 
following: does the scope, complexity and development of philosophical 
and sociological concepts of scientific objectivity affect the perceptions 
of practising scientists? Have they been moulded and changed under 
the influence of the previously analysed conceptions of one of the key 
epistemological categories? Are scientists still captives of their classical 
scientific worldview (scientism) and its understanding of objectivity? 
Can they constantly question their own epistemological position, in-
cluding social scientists who are expected to engage in such self-reflect-
ing practices? Or are scientists necessarily inclined to epistemological 
realism, even positivistic orthodoxy, as some authors suggest? Finally, 
what is known generally about scientists’ perceptions of objectivity?
The opinions that sociologists of science ascribe to practising sci-
entists and their basis in the (empirical) sociological, psychological and 
philosophical research of the epistemic concepts of scientists could be 
a good starting point for this study. We will first start with the view-
points of sociologists of science, comparing them later with the avail-
able findings on the cognitive convictions of scientists. Two fundamen-
tal standpoints on scientists’ cognitive orientations can be identified. 
One credits scientists with the traditional view of the nature of science, 
so Cole (1992) assumes that positivism is the prevailing opinion of so-
ciologists, natural scientists and the educated public. The other view-
point differentiates scientists’ epistemological orientations, and Elkana 
(1978) thus claims that (natural) scientists are necessarily realists, and 
historians are relativists, while philosophers of science have the oppor-
tunity to choose between being realists or relativists, but they can also 
combine both views at different levels.
Theoreticians of scientific fields or organisations even establish 
theoretically wider views of the major epistemological orientations of 
scientists. Whitley (1977, 1984) does not pay them full attention, al-
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though they stem from his concept of the intertwined intellectual and 
social organisation of science which is manifested in every type of sci-
entific field in its peculiar way. Fuchs went farther in elaborating the 
connection between the cognitive and the social in scientists’ percep-
tions. He believes that realism is the epistemological view pertaining 
to scientific fields of great social density and interdependence. Their 
cognitive style is characterised by rather absolutist and authoritarian 
standards of objective knowledge. Scientific fields of a loose social and 
organisational structure develop relativism or suffer from a lack of solid 
epistemic foundations (Fuchs, 1992).
The same author described positivism as an organisational myth of 
science which is not only its façade, but also directs the transformation 
from actual research to the public presentation of that research (Fuchs, 
1993a). He develops an even more elaborate typology of epistemologi-
cal orientations of three groups of scientists who engage in different 
types of research. Thus, pragmatism is a philosophy of research fronts 
that constantly produce changes and innovations; positivism, however, 
suits normal science typical of the majority of contemporary (natural) 
scientists engaged in producing facts; finally, hermeneutics is the phi-
losophy of loose textual fields with a high degree of decentralisation 
and the production of discussion, not facts (Fuchs, 1993b).
This view allows for the parallel, different understandings of ob-
jectivity in different scientific areas, and even within one and the same 
area. However, objectivity is not conceived in the sense of the corre-
spondence of knowledge to reality, but in the sense of confidence in rea-
son and evidence in science (Fuchs, 1996). According to Fuchs (1997), 
objectivity is a mode of communication in science, and as long as one is 
engaged in offering communications as scientific communication, this 
code cannot be avoided.
Are epistemological views of scientists really rather uniform, as 
some authors claim, do they show typological diversity, as others be-
lieve, or are they even more complex and ambivalent than theoreticians 
expect? Contrary to many predominantly psychological studies of the 
epistemological beliefs of high school and university students,1 empiri-
 1 The studies in question were adapted to the population of knowledge receivers, and not 
the creators of new knowledge, and thus they focus more on investigating the cognitive convic-
tions of students concerning the structure of knowledge, the stability of knowledge, the speed 
of learning and learning capacity (Paulsen and Wells, 1998; Schommer-Aikins et al., 2003; 
DeBacker and Crowson, 2006). One of the most famous investigations into the subjective side 
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cal insight into scientists’ epistemological orientation is inexplicably 
scarce, narrow and partial.2 Scientists’ understanding of objectivity has 
hardly been investigated empirically. Some conclusions can be made 
about it based on Becher’s famous research, a small number of stud-
ies of some epistemic concepts of scientists, and investigations into the 
research ethos.
Becher’s (empirical) classification of science includes attributes of 
knowledge in the hard-pure natural sciences and in the soft-pure social 
sciences and humanities. The epistemological orientations of practis-
ing scientists can be discerned from them. The natural sciences are thus 
characterised by: cumulative knowledge; atomism; concern with univer-
sals, quantities, simplification; impersonal, value-free knowledge; clear 
criteria for knowledge verification and obsolescence; consensus over the 
significant questions to address now and in the future; results in discov-
ery/explanation. The area of the social sciences and humanities shows 
the opposite features: reiterative knowledge; holism; concern with the 
particulars, qualities, complication; personal, value-laden knowledge; 
disputes over criteria for knowledge verification and obsolescence; lack 
of consensus over the significant questions to address; results in under-
standing/interpretation (Becher, 1994: 10). The different cognitive styles 
of the two scientific areas also include a different understanding of sci-
entific objectivity, or even a discussion on whether or not it is possible.
Qualitative research on a small non-random sample of natural 
scientists (and three engineers) from a mid-size Canadian university 
provided more specific results. All thirteen scientists rejected the tra-
ditional (positivist) and post-modern relativist views of science. They 
described their epistemological position as somewhere between two ex-
tremes, or claimed an evaluativist view of science, according to which 
knowledge is temporary and open to repeated consideration, and sci-
entific method is not reduced to a single group of procedures. The re-
of science is the study conducted by Mitroff (1974), where in-depth interviews were conducted 
with a group of 42 top scientists, participants in the Apollo programme. All interviewed sci-
entists said that the perception of an objective, emotionally disinterested scientist was naive. 
They believed that the perception was prevalent in the widest public and in first-year students. 
Furthermore, in their opinion, scientists have to have an emotional attachment to their ideas.
 2 Moreover, not only the epistemic concepts of scientists, but also their views of the cogni-
tive and social role of science, and their professional values and ethos are rarely studied. There is 
even lesser interest in their extrascientific activities – cultural, religious or political. This could 
be a consequence of the output orientation of science studies, so interest in the creators of scien-
tific knowledge is focused on the social and individual preconditions of their productivity.
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spondents described the nature of science using terms such as: disputes, 
arguments, testing of hypotheses, tentative, best current idea, develop-
ment towards more accurate perceptions (Yore et al., 2004).
An analysis of responses to scientific models made on the basis of 
interviews with nine eminent British natural scientists also indicates 
their epistemological orientations. Their opinions on the relation be-
tween the models and reality cover a range between the strictly real-
istic claims that models refer to reality, views that they at least partly 
concern reality, to the suggestion that models are, depending on one’s 
opinion, either human constructs or the best way to capture nature. It 
is indicative that none of the scientists advocated an extremely con-
structivist claim. The author of the study believes that these scientists’ 
opinions are to a certain extent the result of the scientists’ individual 
worldview and taste. One can also notice a view among the respondents 
that models should not be described as accurate or false, truthful or 
untruthful, although the truth remains the ideal. There are even some 
opinions that models do not have to be true, but that they can neverthe-
less concern reality (Bailer-Jones, 2002).
A study also based on qualitative data, but wider in scope, provid-
ed the most interesting results. In-depth interviews covered 60 natural 
and social scientists from one large university in the USA. It showed 
that positivism and constructivism are equally widespread and accept-
ed among both groups of scientists. Moreover, natural and social scien-
tists did not show any significant differences in the prevalence of vari-
ous philosophical hypotheses on the relation between theory and data. 
The author of the analysis draws the conclusion that most scientists are 
able to articulate and use more than one epistemological perspective in 
their works (Chia, 1998).
An investigation into the cognitive convictions of (mostly social) 
scientists was based on standardised interviews on a sample of 788 re-
spondents from all Danish universities and government research insti-
tutes. It determined statistically significant differences between the so-
cial scientists and natural, computer and medical scientists in percep-
tions of certainty and universal validity of knowledge in their own field. 
Respondents from the latter group showed a great level of agreement 
with the statement that some basic findings will have enduring validity, 
while the former agreed with the same statement less frequently – the 
average result on the seven-point scale was 6.2 and 4.9 respectively. On 
the other hand, the social scientists were more often inclined to agree 
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with the statements about the relativity of knowledge validity in their 
field (Andersen, 2001: 278). Thus, they showed a tendency towards the 
relativistic perception of science, as opposed to the natural, computer 
and medical scientists, who were more inclined to objectivism.
Furthermore, the majority of the social scientists believe that the 
social sciences have their own foundation (54%) or that they are most 
similar to the humanities (22%), while only 9% of the respondents ob-
serve similarity with the natural sciences, and 15% notice similarity with 
both scientific fields (Andersen, 2001: 273). In brief, the social sciences 
have developed both similar and (somewhat) different epistemic con-
cepts compared to the natural sciences, but social scientists have gained 
self-awareness about the intellectual peculiarity of their own field.
Croatian empirical research of the ethics and professional values of 
eminent and young scientists, based on samples of 320 and 840 respond-
ents respectively, also provides information on the epistemic concepts 
of natural and social scientists (Prpić, 1997, 1998, 2004, 2005a, 2005b). 
The research established that natural scientists value the importance of 
theory, objectivity and precise measurements the most. Respondents 
from the social sciences and humanities also value highly the first two 
sets of values, but, in their opinion, the precision of measurement and 
the verifiability and replicability of research are much less important 
characteristics of scientific work and results in their field.
A study of scientists’ perceptions of the cognitive (and social) char-
acteristics of science conducted on a sample of 833 respondents also 
shows epistemic similarities and differences between the fields in ques-
tion. Although the differences in accepting certain statements on the 
cognitive features and on the role of science are not great between these 
two groups of scientists, they are nevertheless indicative. A picture of 
rational and objective, and cognitively unlimited science is supported 
mostly in the natural sciences, although it is also accepted by respond-
ents from the humanities and social sciences, but to a lesser extent. The 
latter show stronger cognitive scepticism, i.e. they accept the claims 
more than the natural scientists do that not all science is reliable and 
that it cannot provide a total and truthful image of the world (Prpić, 
2005c). Despite the differences that indicate the contextual variation 
of the positivist and relativist views of science, both views are found in 
each of the fields. To be more precise, both natural scientists and sci-
entists from the area of the social sciences and humanities accept to a 
relatively large extent both types of claims on the nature of science.
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If we compare the findings of these few studies with the assump-
tions of researchers of science, it seems that the empirical picture of 
the epistemic concepts of scientists and their perceptions of objectivity 
are more complex and contradictory than the theoretical elaborations 
and categorisations of these perceptions. Almost all empirical stud-
ies, those conducted on smaller samples of researchers as well as those 
conducted on large samples, qualitative studies as much as quantita-
tive ones, clearly indicate mixtures of different, even opposing cogni-
tive convictions. This is characteristic not only of wider scientific ar-
eas, but the duality and plurality of views also appear within the areas 
themselves. Theoreticians have either presumed that scientists share a 
common positivist view of science and objectivity, or they have allowed 
for a diversification of the cognitive convictions of scientists from dif-
ferent scientific fields. What most of them have failed to notice is that, 
contrary to the logic of models and ideal types, researchers within the 
same field may have, or may even bring together, various epistemic per-
spectives and orientations.
2. Hypothetical framework and methods of research
A certain gap between the theoretical theses and fragmentary data, 
as an indicator of the cognitive orientation of scientists, does not present 
a problem, but is rather an enrichment of the hypothetical starting point 
of the research. It indicates that duality, even ambiguity, inconsistency, 
ambivalence and contradiction are not necessarily a worrying sign of 
the lack of intellectual logic of the scientist as a researcher, but could 
primarily be a reflection of the life logic of the value-laden foundations 
of the scientific profession, that is, epistemological and even broader 
philosophical assumptions about scientific activity.
The starting, hypothetical framework of the study relies on organi-
sation theories that offer a convincing argument of the differentiation 
of scientists’ epistemic views, contrary to the thesis of one common 
orientation of scientists accompanied by a uniform understanding of 
scientific objectivity. However, the thesis on disciplinary differences 
in scientists’ views can simplify the interpretational framework of re-
search. A more complex theoretical approach presumes one nucleus of 
shared cognitive and social characteristics of science that differentiate 
it from other types of intellectual and cultural production. Therefore, 
it can be expected that there is a minimal common denominator even 
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in the concepts of scientific objectivity which Fuchs (1996) sees in the 
importance assigned to reasons and evidence. This minimum on which 
there is a relatively high level of agreement among scientists is not an 
obstacle to the diversification of their views, either between various sci-
entific fields, or even within each individual field.
In other words, natural and social scientists’ perceptions of scien-
tific objectivity can manifest certain similarities, but also differences 
that correspond to the prevailing cognitive style in those fields. Yet 
each scientific area presumably also contains a mixture of elements 
of other (untypical) objectivity perceptions. This is why natural scien-
tists can show a greater inclination to positivism, just as there can be 
more cognitive scepticism and relativism in the social sciences. Studies 
clearly indicate even the possibility that various understandings of sci-
entific objectivity can be intertwined in the views of individual scien-
tists. Some authors bring the typically clean epistemic orientations of 
scientists into question, and with good reason. For example, minimal 
realism does not necessarily include the whole set of positivist views 
– “absolute” truth, certainty, correspondence, linear causation, reduc-
tionism, universal laws (Paley, 2005).
The aim of this study was determined in line with the findings of 
the previous conceptual and empirical analysis of scientific objectiv-
ity. The conceptual analysis presented and explained the complexity 
of the philosophical and sociological views of objectivity in the natural 
and social sciences (Mali, 2009). The empirical insight into objectivity 
proves to be very modest, indirect and indicative, not clear and com-
prehensive. Since sociological studies of science have not developed a 
category system that could be used for the empirical investigation of 
such a complex, and as yet unexplored, phenomenon, the initial empiri-
cal study of scientists’ perceptions of scientific objectivity was explora-
tive, using the qualitative methods that give the greatest freedom to 
respondents to express their opinions.
The planned research set a suitable goal – to gain the first open-
ended information on how natural and social scientists perceive scien-
tific objectivity. The expression of scientists-respondents was not lim-
ited by any offered definition of scientific objectivity that would direct 
their statements to any of the most common meanings of objectivity.
Janack (2002) found thirteen different meanings of the term ob-
jectivity in literature. Hanna (2004) divided various concepts of objec-
tivity into two basic categories. Internal or methodological objectivity 
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refers to the methods science uses to study the world, while external or 
representative objectivity concerns the truthfulness of the representa-
tion of the world. Fuchs (1997) also drew attention to various meanings 
that could be classified into several groups. Objectivity can be observed 
as the capacity of individual(s) to make impartial and disinterested 
judgments. Sometimes objectivity is perceived as a quality of research 
methods and rules, whose function is to discipline arbitrary and ac-
cidental impacts on knowledge. Finally, when perceived as a feature of 
knowledge, objectivity refers to claims of some independent and exter-
nal reality.
Thus, there was no intention to draw the attention of respondents 
to any of the mentioned aspects of objectivity, since one of the most 
precious pieces of information expected from the research was precisely 
their definition of objectivity. Natural and social scientists’ perceptions 
of scientific objectivity were investigated within the first web survey of 
Croatian scientists. The description of the research, covering the over-
all population of natural and social scientists, the response rate, and the 
characteristics of the samples are presented in the first chapter of this 
book (Golub, 2009).
The questions about scientific objectivity and quality were preced-
ed by a short introduction, motivating respondents and contextualising 
their responses in terms of discipline.3 Then, the following question 
was asked: What is scientific objectivity, and to what extent can it be 
achieved in your field of study? The question was answered by 272 natu-
ral scientists, making up a very high response rate of 87.7%, and 148 or 
87.0% of social scientists, with almost the same response rate. These are 
also the sizes of the two samples (N) and the basis for calculating the 
frequencies of certain categories of answers.
3. Natural scientists’ perceptions of scientific objectivity
3.1. What is objectivity in the natural sciences?
In total, 226 respondents who answered the first part of the ques-
tion of the survey tried to define scientific objectivity. They make up a 
significant majority (83.1%) of those who wrote any opinion on objec-
 3 The introduction said: “Understanding scientists’ opinions on scientific objectivity and 
scientific quality is very important in science studies. Therefore, please state your opinion on 
those characteristics of scientific work in your scientific field in the answers to the questions 
below.”
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tivity, but also the greatest share (72.9%) of the overall sample of natu-
ral scientists. The data are very indicative of the importance that natu-
ral scientists give to scientific objectivity, which they confirmed by the 
great response to the question, in an effort to explain its true nature.
Since the respondents’ opinion on scientific objectivity had not 
been directed to any of its specific characteristics or definitions, the 
category system, which will be the basis of the classification of respond-
ents’ open-ended answers, is of great importance. The preliminary 
analysis of respondents’ opinions that extracted eight groups of percep-
tions also suggested their further narrowing.
Fuchs’s (1997) classification of definitions of objectivity was as-
sessed as the most suitable, both theoretically and empirically. It was 
used in a slightly changed form, so it included: a) definitions that as-
cribe (un)objectivity to scientists’ characteristics; b) definitions that take 
objectivity as a feature of the research process, primarily of its proce-
dures, methods and rules; c) those definitions that refer to the property 
of scientific knowledge, primarily the relation between knowledge and 
reality. This typology is not only analytically appropriate for the col-
lected empirical material (respondents’ opinions), but it also has certain 
theoretical advantages, since it includes all the elements of the cognitive 
triad – the cogniser, the cognitive process and its result. Consequently, it 
allows scientists’ views of objectivity to be analysed according to each of 
those constituents of scientific activity and to establish the importance 
ascribed to each of them by practising natural and social scientists.
Before we present the results, we must make an important note 
concerning the methodology and the content of the respondents’ an-
swers. Few respondents (25 of them) expressed more complex opinions 
that refer to at least two, and some of them even all three, aspects of 
objectivity. Their opinions will be treated as multiple answers, since 
taking into consideration only one of the aspects of scientific objectiv-
ity expressed in the answer, even if it is the dominant aspect, would 
impoverish the empirical insight into the respondents’ views. Just as 
in any other analysis of multiple answers, the number of answers (ex-
pressed aspects of objectivity in this case) does not equal the number 
of respondents.
Natural scientists most rarely perceived objectivity as a feature of 
knowledge, and they most often perceived it as truthfulness in rela-
tion to an independent, external reality. Only 9.7% of all respondents 
who answered the question expressed an opinion that clearly indicates 
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so-called naïve epistemological realism. Usually, it was a very concise 
opinion or even a parenthesis within a statement, most often using the 
following terms: truth, truthfulness, scientific truth. Formulations vary 
from the laconic to more complex sentences, from neutral, impersonal, 
to emotionally charged statements:
Objectivity is a derivation of truth.
Scientific objectivity is a reality that exists independently of scientists’ 
knowledge, opinion and evaluation, and it reflects reality as it is.
Scientific objectivity is the truth. The derivation of truthful conclusions 
based on already proven claims. Lack of objectivity is rare in mathematics. 
Even if a mistake is noticed in one’s line of thought, it does not mean that 
it was completely wrong, but only that it did not cover all the cases to the 
full extent.
In my opinion, scientific objectivity is the deep personal need of a human 
being to realise the truth about the world one lives in regardless of the cul-
ture, convictions and level of knowledge in the milieus one grew up in.
In my field, one knows exactly whether a claim is true or not, or if its truth-
fulness (or untruthfulness) simply cannot be proved yet under the defined 
conditions. Accordingly, there is no doubt about the objectivity of scientific 
facts under the given conditions.
Based on this information, one cannot firmly claim that only a 
minority of natural scientists accept the theory of correspondence, or 
even that epistemological realism is characteristic of only a relatively 
limited group of researchers in the whole scientific area. What is more, 
studies of scientists’ professional ethics lead to quite the opposite con-
clusion. Eminent natural scientists largely assessed the unconditional 
dedication to the pursuit of truth as (very) important in their fields, 
and, accordingly, they ranked it second on a list of thirty-four offered 
items or values (Prpić, 1997: 76). Young scientists from the same fields 
also assigned above-average importance to this value, but they ranked 
it only 21st – 22nd together with environmental awareness and concern 
for (experimental) animals (Prpić, 2004: 155). Furthermore, the great-
est inter-generational differences were found precisely in connection 
with this value, which leads to the tentative conclusion that the epis-
temological orientation of scientists is not static, but liable to change 
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(Prpić, 2005a). Observed from that standpoint, the results of this re-
search might correspond to a greater extent to the observed changes in 
the natural scientists’ perceptions of science.
Although the preliminary character of the study does not allow us 
to make far-reaching generalisations which require deeper investigations 
into their epistemic convictions, it is important to note that the truthful-
ness of knowledge is the priority of the minority of practising scientists 
when they speak about objectivity. Even if such realism is far more ac-
cepted in this scientific population than our findings show, it does not 
necessarily have to be the scientists’ primary concern. It is possible that 
natural scientists simply eclectically combine realism with the more or 
less expressed feature of instrumental orientation for which the truth 
is not of crucial importance, as Bailer-Jones (2002) established. In any 
case, most of the respondents did not clearly declare themselves realists, 
even if they did usually accept such an epistemological orientation.
One third (33.6%) of all respondents who tried to define it see sci-
entific objectivity as the capacity and/or willingness of scientists to 
investigate and to judge their own and others’ scientific contributions 
non-subjectively and impartially. Let us look how and with what words 
natural scientists define scientific objectivity:
Scientific objectivity is the ability to evaluate/describe a phenomenon/
event regardless of one’s own attitudes and the attitudes of society.
Scientific objectivity is the evaluation of the scientific value of a person’s 
work regardless of their own personal characteristics.
Scientific objectivity is the lack of any subjectivity in the design of research 
and in the analysis of results.
Objectivity, as an impartial and impersonal relation to a certain phenom-
enon, is one of the basic principles of science.
It is the impartiality of conducting scientific research, as well as presenting 
and processing the results of scientific work in a certain scientific field...
These respondents often stress that objectivity refers especially to 
the presentation of one’s own findings. Objectivity, according to them, 
includes the presenting of all findings, so they criticise adapting and 
selecting results that are in line with the expectations, hypotheses or 
theories of researchers:
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Objectivity is when you do not manipulate the results of research to make 
them the way you would like them to be and when you interpret your re-
sults for what they are, without favouring what you think they should be.
In my field – experimental physics – objectivity would mostly include as 
little touching up (doctoring) of findings as possible, as well as not neglect-
ing (sweeping under the carpet) the findings that do not support the inter-
pretation whose accuracy we would like to prove.
In a nutshell, scientific objectivity is research that the scientist carries out 
correctly; for example, in conducting experimental measuring, the scien-
tist does not take into consideration, and later on present, only the results 
that agree with his thesis or theory, i.e. those that turn out to be the way 
he wishes them to be; the scientist should state the conditions in which 
the measuring was conducted so they may be replicated by other scientists 
later.
The cited opinions already imply the importance of scien-
tists’ professional ethics, but they do not communicate it explicitly. 
However, the respondents frequently expressly claim that impar-
tiality in assessing the work of other scientists and the provision of 
comprehensive information to the scientific public about their own 
research, their methods and results depend on the ethics or integrity 
of the researcher:
Scientific objectivity is a realistic and fair assessment of merit in the field of 
science. It can refer to a scientific field, the scientific work of one particular 
scientist, the specific study, the specific approach to research.
For me, taking into consideration the term “objectivity”, scientific objectiv-
ity ... is an impartial, fair relation of the scientist to the interpretation of 
results of scientific research, considering the applied methodology.
Scientific objectivity is an approach to scientific work which uncondition-
ally requires impartiality, critical thought and ethics.
A conscientious and fair approach to scientific research and the wholly 
truthful presentation of facts – the results obtained in the course of scien-
tific research.
It is the fair, impartial and public assessment of some and somebody’s sci-
entific activity, which it is possible to conduct, but which depends on hu-
man integrity, morality and ethics.
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Scientific objectivity means presenting the results of your work in an objec-
tive and fair manner regardless of whether they meet your expectations.
Accordingly, the perceptions of scientific objectivity as non-sub-
jectivity and impartiality are brought into connection with scientists’ 
ethics. Ethics is least often mentioned when the respondents see objec-
tivity as non-subjectivity in research, while it is most often indicated 
when they speak of objectivity in terms of the evaluation of other sci-
entists’ work and the presentation of one’s own scientific work. These 
statements seem to imply the scientists’ belief that scientific procedures 
and methods prevent against subjectivism in research, and that the in-
fluence of subjective factors is stronger in the presentation, interpreta-
tion and evaluation of scientific work and its results.
The content of the reported respondents’ opinions corresponds to 
the high ratings of the importance of the non-subjective presentation 
of one’s own results, and the evaluation of scientific ideas and contri-
butions that natural scientists expressed in the study of scientists’ pro-
fessional ethics. The assessments of eminent natural scientists and the 
emerging new researchers in this field were the same (Prpić, 1997, 1998, 
2005b). But the differences are found also in the prevalence of opinions 
on the importance of non-subjectivity among former and current re-
spondents; in favour of the former, of course. The differences are meth-
odological in nature, and they arise due to the two types of questions 
and the related answers – ratings and open-ended answers. All offered 
answers (items) are rated by the respondent, while open-ended answers 
indicate what the respondent is trying to stress, taking some unsaid 
principles for granted. Thus, it is correct to observe them as respond-
ents’ highlights, but not as their overall opinion.
The majority of respondents, 156 or 69.0% of those who answered 
this question, perceive scientific objectivity as a feature and as a result of 
a research process, primarily as the application of scientific procedures: 
scientific rules, criteria, research techniques and methods. As many as 
48.1% of respondents who belong to this majority define objectivity in 
general terms – as adherence to general scientific criteria, rules, pro-
cedures and (other scientists’) findings in research. Respondents who 
hold such an opinion most often stress that objectivity relies on inter-
subjective, peer consensus in their field:
An approach that is an accepted attitude to scientific work which includes 
the best established and accepted criteria in a certain field.
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Resolving scientific problems based on the latest methodologies in line with 
the collected results, and detailed comparisons of these results with those 
obtained from international literature.
An approach to a scientific problem that takes into consideration all the 
rules of the profession and respects the opinion of colleagues who have al-
ready studied the problem or are currently studying it.
Scientific objectivity refers to how correctly we succeed in evaluating the 
quality, relevance and importance of scientific conclusions that we make 
in our scientific work compared to general (international) knowledge in the 
specific scientific field.
Scientific objectivity is the agreement of evaluations of several different 
and preferably mutually independent experts. If we try to express the cor-
relation between different evaluations in mathematical terms, the factor 
should not be under 0.9.
Scientific objectivity is the relation to the results of one’s own and others’ 
scientific work, determined primarily by an analysis of various aspects of 
work (e.g. approach to work, quantity and quality of results...) conducted 
by a substantial number of experts from the same or similar field of work.
A second, somewhat larger, group is made up of respondents (51.9% 
of them) who stressed and specified three main aspects of objectivity 
that sometimes intertwine in the responses. These are: a) objectivity 
perceived as the experimental and mathematical verifiability or prov-
ability of claims or hypotheses; b) objectivity viewed as the replicability 
(reproducibility) of research and research results; c) objectivity based 
on measuring the phenomenon under study.
In this group, the majority of respondents (60%) perceive scientific 
objectivity very similarly to analysts of science, especially some philoso-
phers, as the verifiability and provability of scientific theses, results and 
the overall process of scientific research. Science rests on experiential, 
as a rule experimental, and/or mathematical evidence. This divide, or 
differentia specifica of science, is also its foremost and most important 
characteristic in the opinion of professional practising scientists:
I believe that what can be proved by applying relevant scientific methods is 
scientifically objective. In some fields (those relying on drawing conclusions 
based on results of experimental research), what can be verified by apply-
ing several different methodologies is considered scientifically objective. In 
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my field (mathematics), a scientifically objective result is one that has been 
verified by stringent mathematical proof (in some mathematical theory).
Scientific objectivity is the capacity to make a research hypothesis on the 
basis of established scientific knowledge and to discard or verify the hy-
pothesis on the basis of legitimately conducted scientific experiments, by 
using objective scientific methods.
I do not understand what you refer to with “scientific objectivity”. If you are 
referring to the “objectivity of scientific results” then the answer is the fol-
lowing: S.O. is the systematic verification of knowledge (including theories, 
knowledge in the widest sense) by controlled observation and the change in 
knowledge in line with the observation. That is all in physics.
The perception of scientific objectivity as a precondition and out-
come of the replicability of research and research results is related to 
the previous respondents’ epistemic concept, although the connection 
is not always made explicit. Twenty percent of respondents from the 
group of natural scientists specifying their opinions on objectivity ex-
pressed such a view. Let us consider them:
Objectivity has to be based on conclusions that are made on the basis of close-
ly and carefully measured and replicable results of measuring. In the field of 
physical chemistry, in which I am engaged, measuring and replicability are 
the only criteria that ensure objective and correct conclusions. Without ob-
jectivity there would be no chemistry, and no other natural sciences.
In natural sciences, someone’s subjective opinion becomes objective when 
it can be proven, repeated several times by several mutually independent 
persons. It is certain that today’s limitations in technology do not allow 
many subjective dreams to become objective.
Scientific objectivity is the replicability of results verified by several experi-
mental techniques, whose interpretation is related to the results of earlier 
research and data from literature. In the field of experimental chemistry, it 
is limited only by experimental conditions (equipment) and the capacities 
of the researcher.
The replicability of experiments does not necessarily include the 
practice of repeating the research. This is the conclusion based on in-
terviews with 20 British and American physicists, which indicate that 
replication is not the standard mode of verification in physics, but it 
is used when experimental results contradict the prevailing theory, or 
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when their outcomes are unsatisfactory (Becher, 1990). It is clear that 
natural scientists perceive verifiability and replicability in conjunction 
with measuring. However, measuring has been highlighted as the basis 
of scientific objectivity in the next group of perceptions. The same rela-
tive number of respondents (20%) as in the previous group share this 
opinion. Measuring is the only objective element in science, whereas 
conclusions and interpretations can be subjective:
Natural sciences teach us to be objective. Everything derives from the find-
ings of objective measuring. Assumptions (theories) have to be verified by 
an experiment. If the results of an experiment and the hypothesis are not 
consistent, the hypothesis has to be changed. In my scientific field, every-
thing is based on measuring. The results are as reliable as the instruments 
you have at hand.
Sc. objectivity in my field (physics) was and has remained the model for 
all sciences. Its foundations rest on the capacity to express measuring in 
numbers, and the wider conception and understanding of experiments 
have been expressed in theories that use the language of mathematics as 
its own language. This is seen best in the words of Lord Kelvin: “I often say 
that when you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in 
numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot express it in 
numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind”.
Scientific measuring is objective, while conclusions can be subjective, de-
pending on the organisation of the experiment. We try to be objective and 
declaratively sceptical when we are not confident in the objectivity of the 
conclusion.
The reported respondents’ opinions about scientific objectivity are 
comparable to the findings of the studies of scientists’ ethics, according 
to which natural scientists, both eminent and young, rank highly the im-
portance of precision in measuring, and the verifiability and replicability 
of research and its results (Prpić, 1997, 1998, 2005b). For the methodolog-
ical reasons already mentioned, the position of the same aspects of sci-
entific objectivity is not the same in the ratings of the offered responses 
and in the ranking according to the frequency of open-ended responses. 
However, the importance that the respondents give to the same aspects 
when they rate them on a scale and when they freely describe aspects 
of objectivity leads to the clear conclusion that those characteristics of 
research are important in the area of the natural sciences.
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3.2. Scientific objectivity in the research practice of the natural 
sciences
Overall, 147 or 54.0% of respondents who wrote down any opin-
ion on objectivity answered the second part of the question which 
referred to the possibility of attaining scientific objectivity in their 
field. At the same time, their share in the overall sample of natural 
scientists comes to 47.4%. Thus, somewhat less than one half of all 
respondents from the natural sciences, and slightly more than one 
half of those who answered the question, expressed their views on 
the attainability of scientific objectivity. However, it is clear that the 
respondents put more focus on defining scientific objectivity than 
on assessing its actual presence and applicability in the natural sci-
ences. The attainability of objectivity is probably simply self-evident 
for many of them.
Most of the respondents who expressed their opinion on this as-
pect (112 or 76.2%) believe that scientific objectivity can be achieved 
in their field. However, there are also noticeable differences of opinion. 
Some are apodictic in their claims that scientific objectivity is unques-
tionable in their discipline or in the natural sciences. They most often 
credit scientific objectivity with being: absolutely possible, practically 
absolute, fully possible or possible in full, certainly possible, complete, 
almost guaranteed, necessary, possible and absolutely necessary, not only 
possible but also indispensable. This type of attitude related to scientific 
objectivity is marked by responses such as the following:
Physics is the field where objectivity is present and necessarily attainable 
by definition.
There would be no chemistry, or any other natural science, without objec-
tivity.
It is not only attainable in my field of research, but almost guaranteed.
It is absolutely possible in natural sciences.
It is entirely present in my field of exact natural sciences (physics).
Scientific objectivity is possible to the full extent in fundamental exact re-
search.
Scientific objectivity is utterly possible in the field of mathematics.
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The stated answers are closest to what is usually called the cognitive 
style of the hard sciences, or the positivistic unquestionability of natural 
scientists’ attitude to objectivity. However, this is not the prevailing type 
of understanding of objectivity in the natural sciences: it is advocated by 
slightly fewer than one third (31.2%) of the respondents who believe that 
objectivity is achieved and absolutely attainable in their field.
The other, much larger group is made up of slightly more criti-
cal respondents (68.8% of them), whose opinion is that objectivity is 
attainable in their sciences to a great extent, but not fully. To be more 
precise, they claimed that objectivity is: mostly possible, almost always 
possible, possible to a very great extent, largely possible, possible in 90% 
of the cases, possible in most cases, possible to a great extent. Typical 
representatives of such a softer view are the statements on scientific ob-
jectivity found below:
Yes, scientific objectivity is a constituent part of good scientific and re-
search practice in my field.
It is mostly possible in my field of research.
I believe that a satisfactory level of objectivity can be attained in the field 
of natural science in which I am engaged.
It is possible in the majority of cases in my field.
It is largely possible to attain objectivity in the field in which I work.
I think that it is quite possible in my field, especially compared to other 
fields.
According to the statements reported above, the view that the nat-
ural sciences rely on objectivity and that they attain objectivity to a 
high level is prevalent in these fields, but an important finding is also 
that the majority of respondents do not perceive objectivity as a com-
pletely attainable condition. This finding relativises the theses on the 
rigid, authoritarian cognitive style of natural scientists.
A second, less prevalent type of concept was expressed by 30 or 
20.4% of the respondents to whom objectivity is neither an absolute 
nor totally attainable precondition in science. These convictions clearly 
reveal a critical detachment from complete confidence in scientific ob-
jectivity. The prevailing tone still includes the rather high certainty of 
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the objectivity and exactness of science, but their limits are also dis-
cernible. These respondents elaborate on their views at length, they af-
firm the limitations of extra-laboratory research, the limits of science, 
the personal equation of scientists, and even possible social influences. 
They also highlight the gap between the objectivity of experimental re-
sults and their often subjective interpretation:
Scientific objectivity is valid only within the framework of laboratory re-
search, within reduced methods and narrow models. The fewer param-
eters there are to affect a system, the more possible scientific objectivity is. 
Therefore, scientific objectivity is a rather ungrounded behavioural phe-
nomenon in the real world.
I think that absolute scientific objectivity is not possible (regardless of the 
field), because scientists are only human after all. I believe that scientific ob-
jectivity depends on the objectivity of the scientists writing about science.
Scientific objectivity is the objectivity according to the rules of science. It 
is attainable only to the limits of science. Science has its limitations, espe-
cially in the area of natural science.
Science is exact and rather determined, but scientific objectivity is a com-
plex term because it includes not only facts but their interpretations which 
are affected by various sociological and political, and even religious fac-
tors. Therefore, absolute scientific objectivity does not exist.
Objectivity in measurements is very possible, but being somewhat unob-
jective in interpreting the findings is also possible. Objectivity primarily 
includes confidence in the data obtained in measuring, but, in interpreta-
tion, one finding can sometimes be explained in several ways.
Scientific objectivity is just fiction, an ideal. It is possible to a certain ex-
tent, but it is unattainable in its essence, just like any other ideal.
The statements of the few respondents who say without any doubt 
or hesitation that objectivity is only partly attainable in their field be-
long to the same group. Although one can discern from their formula-
tions that their ideal is the pure experimental or laboratory sciences, 
geoscientists and bioscientists draw attention to the cognitive peculi-
arities of their fields:
Scientific objectivity is the making of an interpretation and conclusions 
based strictly on the data and results of processing. There are “parts” of ge-
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ology where objectivity is possible, especially in terms of quantitative meth-
ods. However, one greater part of geology is chronically dependent on the 
viewpoint of the researcher and the way of understanding certain geological 
phenomena, especially those inaccessible to direct observation, those from 
the depths of the Earth, about which we only get indirect information.
Objectivity implies a one-sided approach to a problem and verification of 
obtained results. It is not always possible because the field I am engaged in 
(geography) is not completely exact (measurable, as chemistry or physics is, 
for example), but it involves a certain level of individual judgements based 
on knowledge and experience.
In the field of biomedicine – research in people, – objectivity is largely lim-
ited, i.e. it refers primarily to observations of the concrete population group 
under study while applying strict criteria of selection and very careful in-
terpretation of results in order to reduce the possible influence of other 
relevant factors (environment pollution, lifestyle, including diet, stress, 
smoking and alcohol, genetic predisposition, etc.).
Only five or 3.4% of the respondents believe that objectivity in 
their field, or in science in general, or in our country, does not exist, 
and that it is not possible. Unfortunately, only one person explained 
such a claim.
Scientific objectivity is to notice how good something done in science actually 
is. That cannot be achieved by merely counting the papers and looking into 
the number of co-authors of a scientific publication. I believe that objectivity 
is rather unattainable in any field of scientific work, including mine.
The overall answer provided by the respondent suggests that the 
denial of scientific objectivity, as well as its perception, refers to the 
evaluation of scientific work. The criticism of assessment based on bib-
liometric methods, which is one of the most important evaluation pro-
cedures in natural science, is also evident.
3.3. Summary and an outline of epistemic concepts of natural 
scientists
Returning to the initial questions concerning the epistemic con-
cepts or even the orientation of practising scientists, the need arises to 
recapitulate the fundamental results of the investigation into the views 
of natural scientists and to tentatively conclude whether their funda-
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mental epistemic concepts comply not only with the theses on the nec-
essary positivistic orientation of natural scientists, but also with the few 
empirical findings that indicate that the views are not unambiguous. 
But in the process, we have to keep in mind the preliminary, explorative 
character of the study, which does not allow a deeper investigation into 
scientists’ perceptions of objectivity.
A summary of the main findings of the qualitative study in a quan-
titative form (Table 1) shows that the majority of natural scientists de-
fine objectivity as the feature and outcome of the research process, pri-
marily as the application of research procedures. Two large subgroups 
of respondents have been identified, one of which highlights the gen-
eral scientific standards and rules as the guarantees of objectivity, while 
the other is made up of a slightly bigger group of other respondents who 
specify at least one of the three aspects of scientific objectivity. They 
largely believe that the role of verification and providing evidence is 
crucial in science (60%), while the replicability of research and meas-
uring are mentioned three times less often. One third of the respond-
ents perceive scientific objectivity as impartiality and non-subjectivity, 
often highlighting the ethics of the researcher in their answers. The 
smallest share of natural scientists are the advocates of naïve realism 
and correspondence theory (Table 1).
Table 1. Summary of natural scientists’ perceptions of objectivity
Objectivity concepts % of respondents
DEFINITIONS*
Objectivity as a constituent of the research process
   – general research standards and rules – 48.1%
   – verifiability, replicability, measuring – 51.9%
Objectivity as researchers’ impartiality and non-subjectivity
   – often includes researchers’ ethics
Objectivity as truthful knowledge of the reality
69.0
33.6
 9.7
FEASIBILITY
Objectivity as attainable and attained in natural fields
   – largely attainable – 68.8%
   – absolutely attainable – 30.2%
Objectivity and its complete realisation doubtful
Objectivity as impossible or nonexistent
76.2
20.4
 3.4
* The definitions of some respondents included more than one aspect of objectivity
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Natural scientists also differ in terms of their perceptions of the 
attainability of objectivity in the research practice of their field. Most 
of them believe that objectivity is possible and has been attained in the 
natural sciences, but the views of most of that majority are not rigid, 
while the claims of the remaining minority are apodictic. Nevertheless, 
the number of natural scientists who deny even the theoretical pos-
sibility of absolute objectivity, as well as its complete realisation in the 
research practice of the natural and all other sciences, is not small, as 
opposed to those who consider scientific objectivity impossible or non-
existent (Table 1).
What is the importance of these briefly stated results and how to 
interpret them? Firstly, we have to point out their general compliance 
with the theoretical hypotheses on the cognitive style of the natural sci-
ences on the one hand, and empirical studies on the other. Compatibility 
with theoretical theses is manifested in the greatest importance that the 
respondents generally assign to the application of research procedures, 
rules and methods in ensuring scientific objectivity, with special em-
phasis on verification and evidence. Impartiality and non-subjectivity 
do not have a prominent role at all in their perceptions of objectivity, 
not because they would not be perceived as a threat to objectivity, but 
because it is probably believed that they are efficiently controlled by 
the research procedures. The understanding of the majority of natural 
scientists that objectivity is not only an eligible cognitive ideal, but that 
it has also been attained in the scientific practice in their field, belongs 
within that mindset.
This is a brief outline of the epistemic concepts of the paradigmatic 
or hard sciences (Biglan, 1973a, 1973b; Becher, 1994; Becher and Towler, 
2001), the concepts of socially dense scientific fields (Fuchs, 1992), or 
concepts typical of normal science (Fuchs, 1993b). Epistemological 
realism, theoretically characteristic of the natural sciences, is indeed 
manifested in the depiction obtained from the respondents’ open-end-
ed answers. Such an epistemological orientation of natural scientists is 
also confirmed by some empirical studies on scientists’ cognitive con-
victions and professional values, especially those carried out on larger 
samples of respondents (Andersen, 2001; Prpić, 1998, 2005a, 2005b, 
2005c).
However, these findings also indicate a certain theoretical, ideal-
type simplification of scientists’ epistemic concepts. Natural scientists 
do not have cognitive concepts as rigid as they are attributed in various 
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typologies. Rigidity, established on the basis of acceptance of the thesis 
on the correspondence between the scientific picture of the world and 
reality, or on the basis of belief in the absolute objectivity of the natural 
sciences, is noticeable in a minority of respondents. Naturally, the rigid 
minority are opposed by the other minority of natural scientists, those 
who expressly doubt or even discard the possibility of absolute objec-
tivity. Although the obtained results do not allow firm generalisations, 
they can be seen as indicators of the three types of wider epistemic ori-
entations of natural scientists. Rigid positivism, or its orthodox version, 
seems to be characteristic of the smaller part of this scientific com-
munity. Judging from the perceptions of objectivity, moderate episte-
mological realism might be the second, major orientation of natural 
scientists. The third type of perception of objectivity, which is marked 
by a clear critical detachment from positivism, is also a minority per-
ception in this scientific field. Whether the natural scientists who ex-
press this view are advocates of interactionist epistemology as opposed 
to the spectator theory of knowledge, or whether they are more inclined 
to realism with tinges of instrumentalism, cannot be determined with-
out further and deeper studies. It can be assumed that the practising 
natural scientists do not have to be familiar with the epistemic con-
cepts advocated by the philosophers of science who, in line with the 
message of the Copenhagen interpretation, do no perceive scientific re-
search as a reflection of reality, but as an intervention embodied in an 
experimental device (Lelas, 1990). If practising natural scientists do not 
subject their scientific work to metascientific analysis that would lead 
to more subtle epistemic concepts, it is nevertheless certain according 
to the findings of the study that the majority of them do not share the 
views of naïve realism or strong positivism.
4. How do social scientists perceive objectivity?
4.1. Definitions of objectivity in the social sciences
A total of 117 respondents (79.0%), who make up 68.8% of the over-
all sample of social scientists, set out their definition of scientific objec-
tivity. Compared to the natural scientists, the portion of respondents 
who tried to define objectivity was 4.1 percentage points lower both in 
the sample and among those who stated any opinion. The differences 
are small and do not alter the claim that social scientists also find the 
topic of scientific objectivity important.
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Naturally, the same category system used for the natural scientists 
was also used in this analysis, and the differences are discernible in 
terms of the frequency of certain categories (answers), their content and 
even the linguistic characteristics of the statements. It is interesting that 
the same number of respondents (25) presented more complex views on 
objectivity here as well, and their opinions will be treated as multiple 
answers, just as in the analysis of the natural sciences.
From the very first glance at the structure of definitions of objectiv-
ity, some differences are seen among natural and social scientists. The 
perception of objectivity as a feature of the research process is much less 
frequent among the latter (its share is 16.0 percentage points lower), while 
the perception of objectivity as a characteristic of the researcher is much 
more frequent, being 21.1 percentage points greater. The concept of ob-
jectivity as a feature of knowledge is represented only to a limited level 
in both fields, so the difference in proportions is small – 3.1 percentage 
points in favour of social sciences. Although this is only a rough quanti-
fication without any insight into the content of the answers, it is clear that 
these are important indicators. According to them, scientists in the social 
sciences are as concerned with the impartiality and non-subjectivity of 
researchers as with the research procedures. The prevalence of proce-
dures in the definitions of natural scientists reflects their confidence in 
procedures, while social scientists obviously do not regard them as that 
powerful in suppressing the subjective influences on science, which are 
consequently seen as a (more) serious threat to scientific objectivity.
The smallest number of researchers in the social sciences perceive 
objectivity as the mirroring, truthful knowledge of reality (15 or 12.8%). 
They express these opinions rather concisely, while they are inclined to 
elaborate more extensively on other aspects of objectivity. The original 
statements of the respondents are evidence of this:
Scientific objectivity is the aspiration to learn the “true order of things”, i.e. 
objective reality.
In the field of kinesiology, it is possible to approach every problem objec-
tively, since all kinesiological problems have real existence, independent of 
the attitude of the researcher.
Scientific objectivity is an unbiased, real, neutral and fair relation to a 
certain phenomenon, subject or object that exists regardless of the subjects, 
their observations and opinions.
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To be fully and uncompromisingly open to the studied reality, to “allow it 
to speak for itself ” and not to subject it and adjust it to any a priori scheme 
and subjective expectations.
These opinions, just like the corresponding opinions of the 
natural scientists, undoubtedly express epistemological realism. 
Respondents connote the correspondence of scientific knowledge to 
reality even when they do not state it explicitly. Only one opinion 
contains an element of doubt in the absolute correspondence, apart 
from the basic realistic epistemological view, since the respondent 
alludes to the Copenhagen interpretation or the message of quantum 
physics, but the thesis remains unelaborated, ending jokingly, if not 
trivially:
Scientific objectivity is to identify things and see them exactly as they 
are. Things objectively are of a certain nature, but also according to well-
known recent findings (from quantum physics, I think) – as they would say 
on “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire”, “I am not an expert in this” – I may 
be wrong.
A methodologically correct comparison of the cognitive convic-
tions of natural scientists and their counterparts from the social sci-
ences may once again benefit from research of the professional values 
of eminent and young scientists. The studies showed that the majority 
of respondents from the social sciences and humanities also rated “un-
conditional commitment to the pursuit of truth” as (very) important 
in their field. Similarly to the natural scientists, significant generation-
al differences arise in the ranking of the mentioned statement. To be 
more precise, eminent scientists put this value high – from 4th to 5th 
place, together with openness to all relevant information, which also 
shows the great importance of objectivity in their professional ethos 
(Prpić, 1997: 76). However, young social scientists, who also find this 
value important, rated it lower than their older mentors and teach-
ers – positioning it in 17th place (Prpić, 2004: 155). The same trend of 
generational differences in objectivity ratings in both fields, but also 
in other sciences, may be indicative of changes in the epistemic con-
cepts of more recent scientific generations. In this case, even a relative-
ly small proportion of natural and social scientists who share similar 
perceptions of objectivity does not have to be a coincidence. So-called 
naïve realism may simply have a falling number of advocates in both 
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fields. This, of course, does not imply that the epistemic concepts are 
very similar in both fields. We will be able to compare how similar 
they are in the rest of the analysis.
Unlike the two-thirds (and more) of natural scientists, only slightly 
more than one half of respondents from the social sciences (62 or 53.0%) 
consider research procedures the most important aspect of objectivity. 
Only one respondent among them (1.6%) believes that the replicabil-
ity of research and research results is a guarantee of objectivity, six re-
spondents (9.7%) assign the role to measurement, while one respond-
ent (1.6%) denies it altogether, and 20 (32.2%) assign key importance 
in science to verifiability and evidence. The remaining 34 or 54.8% of 
respondents hold the opinion that objectivity is based on research pro-
cedures, without giving special prominence to any of them.
Whereas replicability has a completely marginal position in the 
epistemic concepts in this scientific area, the importance of measure-
ment is especially highlighted by only a minority of respondents. They 
consider measurement the key precondition and indicator of scientific 
objectivity. Although this is not an experimental type of research and 
measuring, as in the majority of the natural sciences, respondents put 
special emphasis on the key role of the metric characteristics of the in-
struments and on measuring procedures.
Results of research in the social sciences should also be based on quantita-
tive scientific methods.
Scientific objectivity includes the correct use of the measuring instrument, 
its application, the reading of the obtained results, the correct application 
of methods for analysing the results, and publishing only the data that have 
been verified and that are verifiable. The basic problem in my field is the 
measuring instrument.
Scientific objectivity is impartiality in drawing conclusions. It can be at-
tained if we have an instrument for/mode of measuring the research sub-
ject.
Scientific objectivity primarily concerns the impartiality of the researcher 
and the validity of the measurement procedure. The objectivity of the re-
searcher is a precondition in my field of research, and it is attained rela-
tively easily. The validity of the measurement procedure and the measur-
ing instrument is often problematic and it imposes significant limits on the 
interpretation and generalisation of the research results.
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One opinion, sceptical of the measurability of all phenomena in 
the area of the social sciences, belongs alongside this group that stressed 
the importance of measuring. Starting from the theoretically accept-
able claim that not all social phenomena and processes are measurable, 
and skipping all other options for narrowing down subjectivity in sci-
ence, the respondent believes that the characteristics of the researchers, 
their scientific competence, and personality, are the only guarantee of 
objectivity in science:
Since I am engaged in social research (economics), I think that objectiv-
ity is very, very relative. Figures in particular, statistical or mathematical 
research, cannot be fully objective indicators, since not all phenomena can 
be expressed in numbers. That is why subjective judgment has to pervade 
in my field, and the issue of its objectivity depends on the competence, 
knowledge, but also human characteristics of the researcher.
The only view stressing the replicability of research procedures and 
results in social sciences, and also the perception of scientific objectivity 
as a construct and mode of communication between the hard (nomoth-
etic) and soft (idiographic) sciences, is expressed as a problem:
Scientific objectivity is a fiction that can (and must) be OPERATIONALISED 
THROUGH the replicability and (internal and external) validity of the re-
search. Scientific objectivity is (nevertheless) a construct, a mode of com-
munication between nomothetic and ideographic sciences.
According to the majority (71.4%) of respondents from this group 
which specifies the most important aspects of scientific objectivity, the 
key aspects are precisely verification and evidence. Social scientists 
even express this opinion relatively more often than the (three-fifths 
of) natural scientists:
It is based on the possibility of the comparative verification of the results, 
procedures and all other elements of scientific research by any other re-
searcher.
Scientific objectivity includes establishing evaluation criteria that can be 
verified later in the offered material. This does not have to be strict falsifi-
ability, but there has to be an intention of intersubjective verifiability of 
scientists’ claims.
In my opinion, scientific objectivity denotes founding one’s scientific re-
search on the assumptions and facts that can be verified and scientifically 
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proven, or they have already been verified and scientifically proven, which 
means they are not only a reflection of somebody’s subjective opinion.
Scientific objectivity in my field of research is not reflected primarily in 
results, but in the method, which is unbiased, well-argued, corroborated 
and verifiable; furthermore, an objective study pays attention to the wider 
(comparative) context, and it evaluates the phenomenon from that stand-
point.
Verification and evidence are crucial in the social sciences as well, 
but, unlike the majority of the natural sciences, experimental research 
and verification do not prevail here. Respondents thus hardly stress 
the replicability of research findings, since this makes sense only if it is 
possible to control all the conditions under which research is conduct-
ed, and this can be done primarily in experiments. Experiments are 
a rarely applicable, and ethically often problematic and unacceptable 
research method in the social sciences, so the perceptions of objectiv-
ity and verification do not relate to the replicability of (experimental) 
research.
The studies of scientists’ ethics showed the greatest differences 
between the natural and social sciences precisely in the aspects of ob-
jectivity analysed above. While prominent natural scientists rated the 
importance of precision of measurement fourth, eminent scientists in 
the social sciences and humanities positioned it in the penultimate, 
33rd, position in the importance ratings. Great and also significant dif-
ferences in favour of the natural sciences have also been established in 
the ratings of the verifiability and replicability of research (Prpić, 1997: 
76). The same tendencies were also identified with the young scientists 
from the two fields (Prpić, 2004, 2005b). However, these values were 
important only to a (slightly) larger share of the eminent scientists than 
the beginners, either in the natural or social sciences.
What conclusions can be drawn from this comparison of the per-
ceptions of scientific objectivity and the similar, but not identical, pro-
fessional values of scientists? Verification and evidence are a very im-
portant standard and criterion for most social scientists, but they are 
not taken together with replicability, which they confirmed by rating 
the pair low in the list of professional values. In the open-ended an-
swers, the respondents from these fields simply omitted replicability as 
a criterion, since it was obviously not a constituent part of their cogni-
tive conviction.
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Comparatively the greatest number of respondents who highlight-
ed the role of research procedures did not single out those that are cru-
cial for scientific objectivity. Some, like their colleagues from the natu-
ral sciences, briefly mention the general rules of research and scientific 
standards of their field:
Scientific objectivity is compliance with the standards.
In the affirmative definition of scientific objectivity, I would like to stress 
the great level of compliance with the currently generally accepted scientific 
standards of individual science.
For me, scientific objectivity is adherence to the rules of scientific work, the 
methodology of research
Other social scientists give particular prominence to the multi-
lateral approach to the scientific problem and a diversity of methods 
as important preconditions for attaining objectivity in the social sci-
ences. In scientific fields and disciplines with paradigmatic pluralism 
and a competition of various, often even opposing, theories and related 
streams of empirical research, this can indeed be a fruitful scientific 
approach. Furthermore, the complexity of social phenomena and proc-
esses also requires plural description and various research methods 
(Montuschi, 2004). Some of respondents’ statements on the topic are 
reported below:
Education is the field that requires a multilateral study of the problem, it is 
almost like observing a diamond, in order to achieve scientific objectivity.
Scientific objectivity entails investigation of a problem from several sides, 
with the necessary reduction of the subjective component – the focus has 
to be on the object.
Scientific objectivity is marked by a multilateral approach to the object of 
research and the elimination of the researcher’s judgement.
The ability to enlighten the scientific problem from the standpoint of differ-
ent theories by using various methods of collecting data.
A distinctive group of opinions is made up of descriptions of re-
search rules or the course of procedure where respondents list scientific 
procedures, rules and criteria that a research process should have to ad-
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here to in order to achieve scientific objectivity – from choosing a prob-
lem and the hypothetical framework, to the interpretation of results:
The effort to accept the possibility that one might obtain expected and 
unexpected results of research and find their interpretations. The optimal 
situation would include starting from the zero hypothesis, the applica-
tion of the phenomenological method as the basis for constructing the 
questionnaire and the rating scales, the inclusion of the judgements of a 
greater number of evaluators, consultations with experts in the field, rely-
ing on statistical and psychometric analyses, the inclusion of high-quality 
control of the greatest possible number of systematic variable factors – in 
research designs, the use of quality (random and stratified) samples of 
respondents.
It differs according to scientific areas; in general = 1. In the scope of the 
research problem (already in the approach itself), it is important to include 
all the relevant facts/data, without avoiding/leaving out the series of data 
that might threaten the attitude that the person/researcher a priori (usu-
ally) has. One also has to verify the findings of the research using several 
methods, and to avoid and not to leave out unwanted findings (which can 
often be unexpected/unwanted for the author/scientist) in the interpreta-
tion of the results.
Finally, social scientists relatively (most) often defined objectivity 
as impartiality, non-subjectivity, that is, as the feature of the cogniser or 
the researcher – propounded by a total of 67, or 54.7%. Their views are 
similar to the views of the natural scientists, but they also show some 
of the peculiarities of the social sciences. The least difference is found 
in the understanding of objectivity as impartiality, as the exclusion of 
personal wants, preferences, prejudice, a worldview:
Scientific objectivity is an impartial approach to a scientific problem (phe-
nomenon), independent of a researcher’s needs and attitudes.
Scientific objectivity is the full and unbiased study of a problem, without 
any previously determined standpoint about the problem.
On the individual level, openness to various theoretical approaches, criti-
cism, effort to reduce the researcher’s “personal equation” to the mini-
mum.
In scientific work, there is no room for prejudice, personal preconceptions, 
emotions, researcher’s bias.
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It is precisely that – objectivity and impartiality – the main characteristics 
of scientific activity in the field of social sciences – in political sciences. If 
there is no objectivity in the scientific activity, then we have ideological 
knowledge, and not scientific knowledge! Of course, there is no room for 
theory where ideology rules!
Similarity is also discerned between these epistemic concepts of the 
natural and social scientists in the respondents’ propensity to connect 
non-subjectivity to the ethics of the researcher, especially when present-
ing one’s own results and evaluating the work of other scientists:
Scientific objectivity is conducting research in a fair way, and the honest 
and truthful presentation of the results of the research. It is also the capac-
ity of an individual to evaluate one’s own and other persons’ work in an 
objective manner. There is a tendency to make a bad evaluation of a study 
only because of its author, and not because of the quality of the research. In 
our small country, it is always widely known who does what, so there are 
no anonymous reviews.
Scientific objectivity in my field is actually scientific integrity or, put sim-
ply, basic integrity.
Scientific objectivity is the ability to evaluate scientific work only on the 
basis of the quality of the results which are presented without the interfer-
ence of other factors, such as the name of the author, institution where s/
he works and similar.
A combination of a professional, ethical, well-argued and unbiased ap-
proach in defining and stating the research problem and goals.
The main difference in the perceptions of scientific objectivity 
between the scientists from the two observed scientific areas is in the 
evaluation of the presence and danger of external, social and political 
influences on scientists. They were explicitly mentioned by only one of 
the respondents from the natural sciences, while they are more often 
mentioned here as threats that scientists have to resist, even at the cost 
of their own inconvenience or even to their own detriment:
Scientific objectivity is the unbiased consideration of certain scientific is-
sues, without the influence of the environment or certain persons. Since 
I am engaged in the social sciences, which are by definition often a part 
of everyday politics (economics), I think that it is much more difficult to 
maintain scientific objectivity in these fields than in the natural sciences.
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Scientific objectivity means that one has to act objectively when investigat-
ing and describing a social problem, to be above the current political or 
other situation and give one’s own judgment regardless of the unpleasant 
consequences.
Why would scientific objectivity be anything different from objectivity in 
general, and that is not letting various external or personal influences, 
prejudice, intentions, feelings affect the process of analysis, appraisal and 
so on, and the inferring of (scientific) judgement.
Scientific objectivity means presenting the results of research without any 
personal engagement of any kind. In the field of history, which I am en-
gaged in, the greatest threat to scientific objectivity is political attitudes 
and orientations.
Independent choice of research topics, without any type of external influ-
ence.
Scientific objectivity excludes a personal worldview, political, religious and 
ideological beliefs in presenting scientific results, and any (foreseeable and 
recognisable) external non-scientific influence.
Not to let oneself be convinced of something by incompetent persons, not 
to be under political and lay pressure. To have arguments; to be construc-
tive and ready for dialogue, for a conflict of opinions. The field does not 
depend on itself, but on the person (the person’s character, sternness, in-
tegrity, reputation and such like) to present their opinions in science in an 
objective manner, to present them and stand firmly by them, regardless of 
possible pressures or hypocritical servility which many highlight as a way 
of building one’s career.
As shown by the opinions reported above, scientific objectivity in 
the social sciences presupposes the extreme professional integrity of the 
researcher who will not succumb to external pressures in their work – 
to the (everyday) political manipulations and attractions of professional 
and other benefits. The complexity of the relation of the scientist to 
subjective and external influences may increase the demand for value 
or ethical neutrality, which can be read in and between the lines written 
by some respondents:
Scientific objectivity is manifested in the absence of value judgements in 
the research process.
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Scientific objectivity should be separated from personal beliefs in terms of 
the value system, and it should draw attention to the possible effects of a 
certain legal system, for a comparison to be made with the value system 
which is to be protected or established.
Only one respondent explicitly expressed the demand put on re-
searchers by the new mode of knowledge production, in which the 
social responsibility of the researcher is expected, desirable, and even 
a necessary value within the concept of applicable science. The social 
responsibility of scientists is irreconcilable with the traditional, posi-
tivistic concept of value neutrality. Value or ethical neutrality is thus 
replaced with reflexivity, in the sense of acknowledging the needs of the 
public and its segments (Gibbons et al., 1997). Thus, scientists are in-
creasingly expected to have an extremely developed awareness of their 
own value position. However, only one of the respondents highlights 
this:
Since it is impossible to avoid normative judgments in the social sci-
ences (they are often implicit in the hypotheses themselves), objectivity 
is expressed through the high level of self-awareness of those judgements. 
Furthermore, objectivity is expressed by the willingness to be critical of 
one’s own work and the work of those you cooperate with, or those you 
depend on in a way. Objectivity is finally expressed in a non-selective ap-
proach to the facts, arguments and theories, which might make your own 
opinion, claim or theory doubtable.
The findings on the study of the professional ethos of both social 
and natural scientists show ambiguity in the perceptions of value neu-
trality. Although eminent scientists from both fields rated the impor-
tance of the social responsibility of scientists and the humanistic goals 
of the development of knowledge and science rather highly, all the while 
positioning ethical neutrality at the bottom of the rated professional 
values, it nevertheless gained greater importance than was appropri-
ate for the ethos of social responsibility (Prpić, 1997). Furthermore, the 
rising importance of ethical neutrality was recorded in the young sci-
entists in both areas, especially those in the social sciences, along with 
the high ratings of the values of scientists’ social responsibility (Prpić, 
2004).
To sum up, despite the different models of science offered by so-
ciological theories from which different views of value neutrality can 
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be inferred or have even been explicitly stated, the ethics of practising 
scientists in fact shows far greater inconsistency and ambivalence than 
the models predict. Social scientists can conceive ethical neutrality as 
a regulatory standard that is never actually attained, such as truth, for 
example (Schmidt, 2001). Despite the generally convincing assumption 
that there is no value-neutral knowledge and cognition, practising sci-
entists, by insisting on non-subjectivity, the rejection of external influ-
ences and pressures, and less often on ethical/value neutrality, accentu-
ate a set of socio-cognitive values which act as their landmarks in their 
professional efforts to rely on reason and evidence in their scientific 
work, i.e. to be objective.
4.2. To what extent is objectivity possible in the social sciences?
While some of the respondents from the natural sciences were sur-
prised to see the second part of the question about the possibility of 
achieving objectivity in their field, and while the majority of them an-
swered the question rather tersely, since it was an inherent property of 
research in the natural sciences, the social scientists reacted differently. 
First, they offered longer answers, which is indicative of their inclination 
to express more complex opinions. This implies that the opinions that 
bring the attainability of objectivity into question are probably more 
frequent. The structure of answers, categorised the same way as those 
provided by the natural scientists, support this thesis.
But first let us present the basic data, according to which the sub-
question was answered by 99 or 66.9% of respondents who expressed 
an opinion on objectivity; they make up 58.2% of the total sample of 
social scientists. Their response rate is thus 12.9 and 10.8 percentage 
points higher than that of the natural scientists. The structure of an-
swers is also significantly different, since the share of scientists who 
believe that objectivity is attainable is 23.7 percentage points lower than 
in the natural sciences, while the share of partly or wholly sceptical re-
spondents is 9.9 and 13.8 percentage points greater than in the natural 
sciences. In comparison, conviction in objectivity irrefutably belongs 
to the cognitive style of the natural, but not necessarily social, sciences, 
where cognitive scepticism is much more expressed.
Conviction in the possibility, attainability and attainment of sci-
entific objectivity was expressed by 52.5% of respondents (52 persons). 
Slightly more than one half of them (55.8%) answered briefly that ob-
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jectivity was possible, usually possible or mostly possible in their field. 
Another 13.4% of respondents who also believe that objectivity is pos-
sible under certain conditions, usually connected to the professional 
ethics and behaviour of the researcher, can be assigned to this group 
as well. Comparing the hard sciences with the social sciences, some 
respondents underline attainability, but also differences in the proper-
ties of objectivity:
It is also possible in the field of the social sciences, and even in the field of 
jurisprudence, but with the consistent application of the principles and 
rules of the profession.
In my field, it is possible to ensure scientific objectivity with necessary ef-
fort and principled behaviour.
... it is possible, depending on whether you keep the above-stated in mind 
– and with an open spirit, integrity and tolerance of unexpected develop-
ments.
It is possible if the researcher understands the problem, and if there are no 
obstacles (usually fear) in the way.
In my opinion, scientific objectivity is possible in every field, but the scien-
tist’s attitude to scientific objectivity is crucial.
I personally believe that scientific objectivity in my research field is possi-
ble, although not in the same ways as in the area of the natural and techni-
cal sciences.
Scientific objectivity is the capacity to express sufficiently precise knowl-
edge, i.e. models of a certain problem field. My basic education is in the 
field of electrical engineering, but I am engaged in the social sciences now 
(modelling of tourist behaviour, for example), and my biggest problem is to 
attain objectivity in this new field. Scientific objectivity is possible in this 
social area as well, although its nature is very different from that in electri-
cal engineering. The difference is in the nature of expressing the knowledge 
and in the level of accuracy of models created in this way.
It is interesting that the share of the group of scientists firmly con-
vinced of objectivity (30.8%) in the social sciences is almost the same as 
in the natural sciences (31.2%). Their opinions, however, are much less 
apodictic, since they are less prone to use the terms absolute and guar-
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anteed objectivity. Nevertheless, they also use qualifiers such as wholly 
possible, possible to a high degree or possible to a great extent, possible 
and necessary.
It is fully possible.
It is almost always possible in my field.
Since I am working in a quantitative field, scientific objectivity is possible 
to a great extent.
Science in itself includes objectivity, so scientific objectivity is not only pos-
sible, but also inevitable.
An objective approach to a scientific problem is certainly possible. I believe 
that it is certainly possible also in the field of research in which I am en-
gaged.
The criteria of scientific objectivity can be met to a rather high degree in 
the scientific field of civil law. To be more precise, although jurisprudence 
always includes value judgements that depend on personal understanding 
and, to a certain extent, also the moral attitudes of the researcher, civil law 
is a very old legal discipline that has an elaborate set of scientific instru-
ments and it is thus possible to achieve a satisfactorily objective approach 
to problems.
As we can see from the cited open-ended answers, the level of 
respondents’ conviction in the attainability of scientific objectivity is 
greater than in the previous group of social scientists. Despite being less 
resolute than the corresponding statements of the natural scientists, 
these beliefs in the high certainty of scientific objectivity in the social 
sciences are indicative of the presence of positivistic epistemological 
orientations among social scientists too.
The partial attainability of scientific objectivity or even its ques-
tionability in the traditional positivistic sense is emphasised by 30 or 
30.3% of respondents. Some of them, just like the natural scientists, 
point to the differences in objectivity between individual subdisci-
plines in their scientific fields, or to subjectivity in the interpretation 
of results. Others, however, express scepticism about the possibility to 
control their own subjectivity and/or the external influence on science, 
especially on the social sciences.
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That varies greatly in my field, depending on the discipline of psychology 
one is engaged in – i.e. I believe objectivity can be attained more easily 
in so-called neuropsychological research than in the field, for example, of 
social or political psychology.
It is possible in terms of conducting research and in the analysis of data, 
but not completely in the field of data interpretation in the selection of the 
very problem of research.
It is possible in my field, but it is often under the influence of ideologies (of 
various orientations).
I believe that this is a relational concept, depending on various factors, 
such as the availability of relevant information, the scope of knowledge, 
value judgements and the worldview of the scientists themselves, their pos-
sible prejudices, as well as the ideologies and political conditions in which 
the scientist works. It is probably easier to establish in the sciences that can 
(if at all they can) be tested experimentally.
In my field of research, scientific objectivity is possible to the extent to which 
I can personally recognise my own exposure to a non-scientific influence 
(which generally determines each of us), while the objective non-scientific 
influences are in my case concretely connected to access to data marked 
confidential to some degree.
Since the object of study in my field is usually the human being, many in-
tentional as well as unintentional mistakes are possible. Measuring instru-
ments mostly estimate (and to a lesser degree measure) certain capacities 
and characteristics of the human being. The number, type and quality of 
measuring instruments, as well as the inability to control external influ-
ences, can often be the causes of the mistake.
There are different interpretations of one and the same findings/data in 
economics (macroeconomic policy); some parts are determined beforehand 
– with the selection of the starting points & methods – but a significant 
part of the results can be adapted and interpreted according to the subjec-
tive criteria of the author (most often to flatter the authorities, or to con-
firm the author’s own political convictions).
This group of perceptions is marked by the researchers’ implicit 
conviction that objectivity is possible in principle, but it is more dif-
ficult to attain, or it can be attained only partly, in the research practice 
of the social sciences. Judging by these data, there is no epistemological 
312
KATARINA PRPIĆ
relativism behind these views, but some form of realism. To be more 
precise, objectivity in scientific practice is here also assessed by the 
same subjective and external conditions listed by the respondents who 
explicitly claim that it is attainable. Differences have been found either 
in the assessment of the research practice which the more sceptical so-
cial scientists believe to be more problematic and susceptible to subjec-
tive, ideological and political influences, or to evident limitations of the 
methods, measuring instruments, and availability of data.
The third and smallest group includes 17 or 17.2% of respondents 
who quite clearly express complete distrust in objectivity, deep doubt in 
its general attainability, or (more rarely) disbelief in its attainability in 
the Croatian scientific community and society:
I am a psychologist and I do not believe in scientific objectivity.
An ideal, almost unfeasible, but imperative. However, without deeply 
building one’s personality (subjectivity) in scientific work, objectivity is 
truly unattainable.
Objectivity is the construct of a scientist and it means distance from the ob-
ject of study. The principle of objectivity was a norm in its time, but today, 
however, it is brought into question.
Objectivity is loose in the social sciences in my experience because their ob-
ject is like that, this type of science is like that, and the researcher as well.
On account of numerous influential factors, since these are social studies 
and specific institutions – very hard to attain.
The object of study is people who cannot be “objects”, so the “objectivity” of 
the discipline is very dubious or impossible.
Scientific objectivity is the ability to differentiate between a person with a 
significant scientific contribution and a mere quack. It is relatively easy to 
establish scientific objectivity at the global level, although it is not always 
achieved. In our small scientific community, where everybody knows each 
other, it is almost impossible. Considering the fact that there is no will to 
apply objective criteria at the level of the whole of society, there is no real 
reason for things to be different in the scientific community, regardless of 
what the members of the community think about themselves.
And what is truth? What is scientific truth? Can I be objective if I inves-
tigate human behaviour that varies due to strong bio-psycho-social influ-
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ences? Individual differences among people, i.e. differences in human be-
haviour in the field of special education – or to be more precise, the field I 
study: the phenomenon of deafness and hearing loss – also require a strictly 
individualised approach in research. Some rules of human behaviour and 
study can be “put into a system” but they also often change. A scientifically 
objective scientist is one who leaves open the possibility of finding new sys-
tems, new solutions, better programmes.
Questioning, scepticism and the denial of objectivity are typical 
of postmodernism and the accompanying epistemological relativism 
that is pronounced characteristic of the social sciences and humani-
ties. However, only one third of respondents manifested such opinions, 
which is far from the predominance of relativism that the bipolar clas-
sifications of science attribute to this field. The majority of researchers 
in the social sciences nevertheless remain faithful to objectivity, which 
many sociologists determine anyway as a mode of communication 
(Fuchs, 1997) or as a social value (Williams, 2006).
4.3. Epistemic views of social scientists between realism and 
relativism
A recapitulation of the qualitative analysis of objectivity in the so-
cial sciences shows that there were no greater differences in the ob-
served scientific areas in terms of the response rate to the open-ended 
question on scientific objectivity, which indicates the relatively equal 
interest of both groups of researchers in this distinctive characteristic 
of science in general.
The definitions of objectivity provided by social scientists also be-
long to three groups (Table 2). Just as in the natural sciences, the least 
frequent are the perceptions of objectivity as a reflection of reality in 
scientific knowledge, which support the concept of what is known as 
mirroring realism.
Unlike the natural sciences, where objectivity is perceived as a fea-
ture of the research process by more than two-thirds of researchers, in 
the social sciences their share is considerably lower – somewhat more 
than one half of the respondents. A bigger proportion among them be-
lieve that research procedures, rules and methods guarantee objectivity 
in their field, without ever highlighting any of them. From all the speci-
fied aspects of objectivity, most respondents underline verifiability and 
evidence. Opinions that stress the crucial role of measuring are far less 
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frequent, while replicability is of wholly marginal importance (Table 2), 
and the perceptions of these very aspects of objectivity are considerably 
different in the observed scientific areas.
Table 2. Summary of social scientists’ perceptions of objectivity
Objectivity concepts % of respondents
DEFINITIONS*
Objectivity as a constituent of the research process
   – general research standards and rules – 54.8%
   – specified procedures, mostly verifiability and evidence – 45.2%
Objectivity as researchers’ impartiality and non-subjectivity
   – often includes social and political influence on scientists
Objectivity as truthful knowledge of the reality
54.8
54.7
12.8
FEASIBILITY
Objectivity as attainable and attained in social fields
   – attainable – 69.2%
   – absolutely attainable – 30.8%
Objectivity and its complete realisation doubtful 
Objectivity as impossible or nonexistent 
52.5
30.3
17.2
* The definitions of some respondents included more than one aspect of objectivity
The definition of objectivity as impartiality and non-subjectivity 
was more frequently expressed by social scientists who pointed out that 
objectivity is also often threatened by external, social and political pres-
sures on researchers (Table 2). At the same time, natural scientists obvi-
ously find research procedures to be their greatest protection against 
bias, since they give them greater importance than the characteristics 
of the researchers themselves.
Finally, important differences can be discerned also in the views 
of natural and social scientists about the attainability of objectivity 
in the research practice of their own scientific fields. The differences 
are not only quantitative, which is obvious from the considerably big-
ger proportion of those convinced of the attainability of objectivity 
in the natural sciences. One can also notice qualitative differences 
between the two compared groups which are manifested in the lesser 
belief of the social scientists in the attaining of maximum objectiv-
ity. Accordingly, the latter are also more inclined to express opinions 
on partial objectivity and the denial of its attainability than natural 
scientists (Table 2).
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The cognitive style of social sciences identified on the basis of this 
analysis confirms the basic theoretical claims that it is characterised by 
the less firm (rigid) cognitive convictions of researchers and their lesser 
consensus on the importance of all parts of the research process than 
the style of natural sciences. Although social scientists also perceive 
objectivity as an essential characteristic of the scientific effort, which 
is confirmed by their response rate and the emphasis put explicitly on 
its crucial importance in (social) science, they define it in a different 
way, and assess the attainability of objectivity differently. Equally of-
ten, their views include scientific rules, criteria and methods on the 
one hand and the characteristics of the scientists on the other. The im-
portance of this finding lies in the fact that objectivity depends both 
on the scientific standards and the researcher, personality, and profes-
sional scientific integrity which includes not only control of one’s own 
subjectivity, but also external, social influences. Perceptions of the at-
tainability/attainment of objectivity are also more relative in such a sci-
entific environment. The empirical insight gained in this study roughly 
complies with the presumed epistemic concepts of scientists from the 
preparadigmatic or soft sciences (Biglan, 1973a, 1973b; Becher, 1994; 
Becher and Towler, 2001), the cognitive orientations of researchers in 
scientific fields of low social density (Fuchs, 1992), or the persistently 
questioning epistemic orientations of textual scientific fields (Fuchs, 
1993). The obtained picture of the peculiarity of social scientists’ epis-
temic concepts is also shown by the more extensive empirical studies of 
scientists’ cognitive convictions or professional values (Andersen, 2001; 
Prpić, 1998, 2005a, 2005b, 2005c).
Much as in the natural sciences, the analysis shows that the theo-
retical positions on the epistemic concepts of the social scientists also 
suffer from oversimplification. Social scientists do not prevalently de-
velop relativism, which is ascribed to them by the authors of various 
social theories and typologies. An expressed relativism is the episte-
mological orientation of a minority of respondents. The three types of 
broader epistemological orientations that can be discerned in natural 
scientists can be recognised here as well. Positivism, less orthodox than 
in the natural sciences, is developed by the smallest segment of social 
scientists, contrary to the opinion of S. Cole (1992). The other two views 
are more moderate epistemic realism and relativism, which can appear 
and intertwine in theoretically illogical and unexpected combinations. 
Based on the respondents’ answers, we could even assume that real-
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ism is the point of view of the relative majority of social scientists, pro-
vided that we do not take into consideration only those who perceive 
objectivity as possible, or those who see scientific procedures as a bar-
rier against subjectivity, but also those who demand a high degree of 
professional integrity or self-control of one’s own subjectivity. There 
are certainly many more relativist conceptions here than in the natural 
sciences, but the data do not allow or support the thesis that it is the 
primary orientation of social scientists.
Finally, perhaps Pleasants gave good advice to social scientists on 
how to avoid the traps of uncritically looking up to the natural sciences 
and of the metaphysical discussions that frequently unroll in the social 
sciences. He recommended that they keep contemplating their scien-
tific practices, but forget the assumed ontological foundations of their 
discipline and focus on the production of “work that is interesting, rel-
evant, thought-provoking and enlightening” (Pleasants, 2003: 83).
5. A look from the other side: scientists’ positivism and 
relativism
The final generalising summary of the findings includes a review 
of their scientific and practical implications. Organisational theories 
of science explain the results of this and other rare studies of scien-
tists’ perceptions of science, their cognitive and social values, as well 
as research practices, better than other theoretical models, especially 
the popular distinction between the hard and soft sciences. According 
to these theories, scientific fields differ in their socio-cognitive charac-
teristics, so their scientific practices, cognitive styles and the epistemic 
concepts of the scientists can also be different (Whitley 1984; Fuchs 
1992). Becher’s typology (Becher and Towler, 2001) also acknowledges 
these characteristics in principle. However, even organisational theo-
ries result in limiting typologies that draw a rather firm line between 
individual natural and social sciences.
Just as general claims on the positivism of practising scientists, 
regardless of their scientific area or field, unify sciences despite their 
mutual differences, typologies also result in excessive fragmentation of 
sciences and constrain certain types of social and intellectual organi-
sation within individual (sub)disciplines. Instead of a uniform science 
or fragmented scientific disciplines, one complex structure of science 
seems more convincing. This structure shows both a common socio-
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cognitive nucleus of all sciences and recognisable patterns of individual 
scientific areas, fields and (sub)disciplines (Prpić, 1997).
Thus, professional values, perceptions of science or epistemic con-
cepts of scientists from different scientific fields or organisations can-
not be expected to be either uniform or completely disparate. After 
all, as we have already shown, this is corroborated by the similarities 
and differences in scientists’ concepts of research quality (Hemlin 
and Montgomery, 1990; Hemlin, 1993; Gulbrandsen, 2000; Prpić and 
Šuljok, 2009), studies of scientists’ professional ethos (Swazey, 1993; 
Anderson, 2000; Prpić, 1998, 2005b) and surveys of scientists’ views of 
science (Andersen, 2001; Prpić, 2005c).
This analysis and the cited comparative studies of the epistemic 
views of scientists reveal that the structure of the concepts of science 
and scientific objectivity is also complex. It does not strictly adhere to 
the boundaries between disciplines; it produces different combinations 
of values, attitudes and opinions, revealing also a nucleus of common 
epistemic concepts, but also peculiarities of the cognitive styles of the 
natural and social sciences.
Which perceptions of natural and social scientists present a com-
mon view of objectivity, and which indicate the peculiarities of each of 
the two areas? Objectivity is the crucial value for both natural and social 
scientists. Both mostly believe that it is attainable; both are least prone 
to define it as the correspondence of knowledge and reality; both stress 
the importance of research procedures, primarily verification and evi-
dence in science, and non-subjectivity and impartiality. At least two or 
even three epistemic concepts are discernable in both. However, a type 
of epistemological realism in the sense of the importance of evidence 
and reason seems to prevail in both scientific areas.
Peculiarities of the cognitive style of the natural and social sciences 
follow the sociological typologies of scientific fields. Natural scientists 
show greater conviction in the attainment and attainability of objec-
tivity, generally greater confidence in the power and efficiency of sci-
entific methods and procedures, and they also accentuate replicability 
and measurement. Their greater inclination towards positivism is ob-
vious. Relativism is, naturally, more frequent in social scientists. They 
put greater emphasis on the inevitability of subjectiveness and external 
influences in their field. They express greater doubt in the omnipotence 
of research methods and procedures, and more often either question 
the possibility of achieving objectivity or reject it in principle.
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These findings also have some practical implications since they al-
low natural scientists and social scientists to gain insight into the pe-
culiarities of the other scientific area, so as not to observe and evaluate 
it from the standpoint of the cognitive practice and style of their own 
field. The so-called science wars do not even have to be mentioned as 
an extreme form of the unwanted gap between the two scientific fields. 
It will be sufficient to bring to mind the examples closest to Croatian 
(and probably wider) everyday life in science – the criteria of the aca-
demic promotion of scientists that has caused resentment among the 
natural scientists on account of the “privileged” appointments of social 
scientists that “are not based on WoS publications”, and the irritation 
of the latter due to the attempts to automatically expand the research 
productivity criteria of the natural sciences to the social sciences.
The theoretical implications of the analysed results are twofold. 
Firstly, they warn that even the social theories that explain the social 
and intellectual organisation of science better than others still offer 
an oversimplified picture. And the simplicity and/or elegance of the 
theoretical models that the natural scientists admire are not neces-
sarily also successful in the social sciences. Here, the simplest, bipo-
lar models of science(s) receive the lowest empirical support. We are 
still waiting for a complex and explanatorily (more) powerful social 
theory of science.
The second remark concerns the scientific importance of under-
standing scientists’ epistemic views. If we follow the logic of social 
constructivism, such knowledge would be of no importance due to the 
discrepancy between everyday scientific practice and the scientists’ val-
ues which are their ideology or the ideological front of science. The 
discrepancy, and often the rift, between the values and life of science is 
not manifested only in the studies of scientific practice and in knowl-
edge production. It is also revealed by our respondents who warn of 
unprofessional and unethical actions in their own scientific organisa-
tions and communities as a hurdle to greater objectivity. Despite the 
various opinions, objectivity, as a socio-cognitive value or norm, is an 
important landmark or ideal for scientists. If only for that, objectivity 
has an important role in the production and evaluation of knowledge, 
regardless of its realisation in scientific practice. Put briefly, sociologi-
cal theories should consider more seriously the role of objectivity in 
order to reach a deeper understanding of scientific practice and its (un)
attainable value landmarks.
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Bridging the gap between the two scientific 
areas
Before returning to the initial question of this book and draw-
ing conclusions about the gap between the natural and social sciences 
based on the conducted theoretical and empirical analyses, it might be 
important to recapitulate the findings obtained in our research. Here, it 
is necessary to take into account the selectiveness of the samples whose 
influence we have tried to control by comparing our results with the 
findings of other studies and then also with the results of the bibliomet-
ric studies of scientific productivity of all doctors of natural and social 
sciences when analysing the research productivity of our respondents.
The social and professional profile of natural and social scien-
tists (Golub, 2009) showed no significant differences in the two groups 
regarding their socio-demographic and socialisational background. 
Thus, we can conclude that they were mostly recruited from the same 
social groups. That is why there are relatively more men than women, 
middle-aged and older rather than younger researchers, offspring of a 
narrow group of highly educated parents than scientists of a lower edu-
cational background, more scientists who graduated as very successful 
students than those who were outstanding. An elite social background, 
not necessarily accompanied by early elite educational achievements, 
characterises both groups of scientists.
On the other hand, significant differences are seen in the profes-
sional aspects of these groups which also indicate a differentiation of the 
social and cognitive organisation of the two areas. While an academic 
institutional structure prevails in the social sciences, the natural scienc-
es are marked by a high proportion of public institutes, mostly thanks to 
the biggest scientific institute in Croatia – the Ruđer Bošković Institute. 
Basic research prevails in the latter scientific area, while the social sci-
ences include a greater proportion of applied research, development and 
mixed-type research, as artificial as this distinction and as heterogene-
ous as the concept of basic research may be (Calvert, 2006). Bibliometric 
indicators (Nederhof, 2006), as well as self-reported research produc-
tivity (Prpić and Brajdić Vuković, 2009), also provide evidence of the 
relatively high proportion of applied social studies. Croatian (post)so-
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cialist economic and techno-scientific development must certainly have 
influenced this institutional and cognitive structure, so there are some 
national specificities of the science model alongside its resemblances to 
international trends.
The career patterns in the compared areas also manifest great 
differences. Thus, an average natural scientist obtains a doctorate at a 
younger age than the social scientist. His career is more focused on reg-
ular research cooperation with international colleagues, and his high 
integration in the international scientific community is confirmed by 
the high rate of his reviewing of papers by international colleagues. He 
dominates the local scientific scene with extensive team work and en-
gagement in scientific and professional associations. In contrast to the 
Croatian natural scientist, the Croatian social scientist works on more 
local projects and reviews more papers by local authors. He is also more 
often a member of the editorial boards of local journals. In brief, the 
natural scientists’ international orientation and the local national focus 
of social scientists are empirically corroborated here.
The research productivity of natural and social scientists was in-
vestigated in a questionnaire survey (Prpić and Brajdić Vuković, 2009) 
and by using biblometric parameters (Jokić and Šuljok, 2009). In terms 
of self-reported productivity, it has been empirically proven that the 
natural and social sciences have developed different publication pat-
terns. The social area is characterised by twice the number of profes-
sional publications and by the preponderance of mono-authored pub-
lications among scientific works, whereas natural scientists produce 
twice as many papers indexed in WoS databases, and predominantly 
co-authored papers. A significant differentiation of research produc-
tivity is noticed in both areas because individual sciences show recog-
nisable patterns of career and five-year productivity. The disciplinary 
specificities of research production patterns can be ascribed to differ-
ences in the intellectual and social organisation, mode of knowledge 
production and cognitive styles of scientific areas and fields.
The composition of significant predictors and their contribution to 
explaining the analysed types of research productivity also differ. The 
best predictors of production in the natural sciences are the researcher’s 
international cooperation and networking, whereas the social sciences 
show the greater impact of the scientist’s national or local orientation, 
i.e. focus on the local scientific community. However, a predictor that at 
the same time accounts for a significant portion of publication produc-
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tivity in both areas and indicates the scientist’s social capital has been 
identified. It is the variable of invited stays abroad that would be impos-
sible without the scientist’s international collegial networking.
Longitudinal data from Croatian and foreign studies (Kyvik, 1988, 
2003) identify deep structural changes in the main forms of research 
productivity in both areas, especially in the social sciences, and chiefly 
in the number of authors and international availability of scientific re-
sults. Our findings, however, lead to the tentative conclusion that the 
levelling out or reduction of differences between the social and natural 
sciences takes place in productivity patterns, but to all appearances also 
in productivity predictors.
Due to selectiveness, and particularly due to the orientation to-
wards scientific periodicals and the English language, scientific out-
put indexed in WoS and Scopus databases favours hard science pub-
lications, and consequently manifests even greater differences among 
the observed domains. To be more precise, the natural sciences greatly 
surpass the social sciences in terms of productivity, citation rate and 
the h-index. According to WoS, the average number of papers per natu-
ral scientist was ten times the number of papers per social scientist. 
Practically three quarters of the social scientists did not publish a single 
paper referenced in these databases over a period of ten years, com-
pared to slightly over one tenth of the natural scientists. The average ci-
tation rate of a natural science paper was almost three times the citation 
rate per paper from the social sciences. In contrast to the social sciences 
that still lag behind the world average for its area, the natural sciences 
in general are less far behind, while some of the disciplines are on a par 
with their international counterparts. The defects in the international 
bibliometric and citation databases and the mentioned differences in 
patterns of scientific communication strongly suggest that the biblio-
metric monitoring of publications in the social sciences and humanities 
should not rest on the same methodological assumptions that apply to 
the hard sciences (Nederhof, 2006).
In addition, significant disciplinary oscillations were determined 
in the natural and social sciences. Scientific fields show specific publi-
cation practices, making the levelling of criteria in any of the two ob-
served scientific areas utterly questionable. Since this is the first com-
prehensive bibliometric study, it is unfortunately impossible to make 
any comparisons with earlier periods. It is nevertheless certain that the 
differences between the publication productivity of the social and natu-
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ral sciences had to be even greater in the past due to the earlier even 
greater provinciality of the former.
Perceptions of scientific excellence and objectivity were inves-
tigated using a qualitative research method – open-ended questions 
(Prpić and Šuljok, 2009; Prpić, 2009). Regarding scientific quality, our 
respondents proved to understand it in a way similar to the understand-
ing of Swedish scientists (Hemlin, 1993). This confirms the claim of the 
author of the theoretical review that scientists from different countries 
basically develop similar concepts of scientific quality (Hemlin, 2009). 
The smaller scientific community of post-socialist types of societies 
complements the social and scientific context of Nordic countries and 
the USA, on which the hypothesis/conclusion was founded.
Differentiation between natural and social scientists in giving 
prominence to individual aspects or parts of the research process and 
the quality attributes ascribed to them is statistically relevant, but the 
similarities of their concepts of scientific quality are also indubitable. 
In both scientific areas, quality is most often mentioned in regard to 
scientific results and/or cognitions (knowledge), and the research prob-
lem is ranked third. However, methods are the second most frequently 
mentioned aspect in the social sciences, while scientific production has 
the same position in the natural sciences. Despite the same rating of at-
tributes of scientific excellence, social scientists tend to highlight solid-
ity of research more often than natural scientists.
The perceptions of the measurability of scientific quality are struc-
tured similarly in both fields and no significant differences have been 
determined among them. Those convinced in the measurability of 
quality are relatively the most numerous, but while natural scientists 
more often tend to see bibliometric and scientometric methods as rela-
tively reliable, social scientists do not consider them as the most suit-
able for measuring excellence. It is important to point out that natural 
scientists also do not agree about the dominant role of these methods 
of evaluating scientific research and published papers, since almost one 
half of respondents express scepticism about the (reliable) measurabil-
ity of quality. If the natural sciences are not as hard as presumed, it 
seems that the social sciences are also not as soft as they are usually 
believed to be – one half of social scientists believe that scientific qual-
ity is measurable in their field as well.
The structure of respondents’ opinions of science and scientific 
objectivity proved more complex than theoreticians and philosophers 
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believe, since it is formed by different mixtures of values and opinions, 
manifesting some shared epistemic convictions, as well as peculiarities 
of the cognitive styles of the scientists’ scientific fields.
To be more precise, objectivity is the key value for both natural 
scientists and social scientists. The majority believe that it is attainable, 
both groups perceive it in the context of the correspondence thesis least 
often, and they both emphasise the importance of research procedures 
and non-subjectivity and impartiality. At least two cognitive orienta-
tions can be identified in both, with epistemological realism prevailing 
in the broader sense of the weight of arguments and evidence. These 
similarities in understanding objectivity underpin the basic thesis ex-
pressed in the theoretical paper – epistemic differences between the so-
cial and natural sciences are not insurmountable (Mali, 2009).
The specificities of the cognitive style of the natural and social sci-
ences depicted by our findings also corroborate the propositions of the 
sociological distinctions (theories) of the scientific fields. Natural sci-
entists manifest firmer belief in the objectivity of their disciplines and 
area, and they express confidence in the efficiency of scientific meth-
ods and procedures, especially stressing replicability and measuring. 
They show greater commitment to positivism than social scientists do. 
In contrast, relativism is more common to social scientists who tend 
to stress that subjectivity is unavoidable (to a certain extent) in their 
domain.,Social scientists are also more sceptical of the omnipotence 
of research rules and methods, and more often tend to doubt or even 
deny the attainability of objectivity. Despite the differences, objectivity 
is an important scientific benchmark, ideal or mode of communication 
(Fuchs, 1997, 2002).
In conclusion, we should ask how the outlined principal findings 
of our studies answer the question from the beginning of the book and 
what their theoretical and practical implications are. Let us start from 
the hypothesis/claim about the insurmountable differences between 
the natural and social sciences as perceived by Snow, and advocated by 
numerous researchers of science, especially social constructivists.
Judging from the recruitment of research personnel, scientists’ 
organisational and cognitive context and career patterns, their output 
and cognitive convictions, the natural and social sciences show both 
similarities and significant differences. However, we cannot talk of any 
insurmountable hiatus in the light of our results. Differentiation in the 
social organisation of science seems even greater than the differences 
328
KATARINA PRPIĆ
in the cognitive dimension, at least that made up of scientists’ cognitive 
convictions. In other words, even greater differences were identified in 
the organisation and mode of knowledge production reflected in career 
patterns, in professional differentiation and stratification in scientific 
organisations and communities, and in research productivity than in 
scientists’ perceptions of scientific quality and objectivity. At first sight, 
at least.
Although the differences between the two areas seem great, as in 
the dichotomy of the orientation towards international and national 
research, or team and individual work, and even appear enormous 
at times, as in the scientific production indexed in WoS and similar 
bibliographic databases, there are also similarities, even tendencies for 
cognitive practices to converge. Thus, the growing orientation towards 
team work, cooperation, and the international scientific scene can also 
be identified in social scientists, just as the lessening of those differ-
ences can be noticed over a relatively short period of time. Differences 
in publication practices in journals indexed in the most eminent bib-
liographic and citation databases are also expected to decline. The 
process must have already started, but it has not been monitored ana-
lytically.
Significant differences found in the cognitive convictions of re-
searchers in the two scientific areas do not seem that great consider-
ing the theoretical expectations or the described cognitive styles of the 
natural and social sciences (Biglan, 1973a, 1973b; Becher 1994; Becher 
and Towler, 2001). Naturally, typologies can always be defended by 
the necessary divergence of different varieties and transitional forms. 
However, there are too many of them in both areas when one area is 
pronounced hard, and the other one soft, as happens in many uses of 
this bipolar classification in literature.
If the obtained cognitive differences are slighter than theoretically 
assumed, this suggests that they do not have to completely reflect scien-
tific practice, which again indicates a certain autonomy of the cognitive 
sphere of science which is often questioned by sociologists of science, 
even when they call scientists’ professional standards a professional 
ideology or façade which never corresponds to the professional prac-
tice of science. The discrepancy between scientists’ everyday research 
activity and what they profess as their values, convictions or norms is 
indubitable. The only question is whether a sociologist can neglect sci-
entists’ opinions if he or she wants to explain and understand science 
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as a social and cognitive activity in the best manner of the Weberian 
epistemological and methodological credo.
For this reason, the claim of the unbridgeable gap between the 
natural and social sciences seems more of a myth when viewed through 
our empirical results than as a well-founded presupposition. What, 
then, are the theoretical implications of the data and analyses presented 
here?
The theories of scientific fields or organisations (Whitley, 1984; 
Fuchs, 1992) are superior to the unitary concept of science in their ex-
planation of the differences in the social and intellectual organisation 
of scientific fields. Yet, it is impossible to explain the common features 
of scientific fields within an area, or the similarities among wider scien-
tific areas, without conceptually demarcating science and other knowl-
edge and belief producers, and consequently the changes in the theses 
of these theories. When such a modification is made (Prpić, 1997), these 
theories (as shown by our findings) can successfully interpret both the 
similarities and specificities in the social and cognitive sphere of the 
natural and social sciences: the common and the specific in the social 
organisation, professional and career patterns, research production and 
in the scientists’ cognitive convictions.
The practical implications of our research relate to the possibility 
for the two great scientific communities to establish bridges for bet-
ter communication which can then be the basis for the development 
of the transdisciplinarity predicted by some sociological models of the 
development of science (Gibbons et al., 1997). Being better informed 
and having a deeper understanding of the mutual similarities and dif-
ferences may be the first step in this direction. We therefore hope that 
our book will be interesting not only to the narrow circles of analysts 
of science from different disciplines, creators of science policy, but also 
to practising scientists interested in this topic. We hope it will reach the 
broadest scientific public, especially the majority of natural and social 
scientists, and encourage them to (re)consider their own understanding 
of the other scientific area. However, we do not believe that this scien-
tific insight can itself bridge the gaps in their beliefs or bring down the 
myths of the natural and social sciences.
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